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This investigation is an examination of party competition over the centre-
periphery cleavage. The focus is placed on which factors are expected to have a 
deep effect on the way parties compete when framing the relations between 
centres and peripheries. The literature has explored different key elements that 
are able to strongly influence party behaviour along this cleavage, such as for 
example, party type, ideology, identity, or language. This thesis is centred on 
other factors that have been overlooked by the same different studies. These are: 
distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. The main purpose is to observe the 
ways in which parties adapt to them in the different regions in which they 
compete. This research problem is approached via the research question: what 
factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage?  
To answer this research question, the research method used is the sub-
national comparative method. This method is applied by using a sequential mix 
method approach, with a quantitative followed by a qualitative analysis. The 
purpose of this is obtain at the same time a complete and in-depth understanding 
of the phenomenon. Employing a case study research strategy, Spain is 
examined based on the politically salient territorial tensions between its centre 
and peripheries. In order to observe how the centre-periphery cleavage unfolds, 
the main sources of information chosen are the political manifestos articulated by 
parties to compete in regional elections. Addressing the regional level allows to 
comprehend with more detail how this territorially based cleavage is formulated.  
From the above three factors, the main findings point in the direction of 
characterising distance as the element that influence the most the way in which 
parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage. The further away a region 
is from the centre, the more parties territorialise their appeals to the voters. This 
is followed by fragmentation, which has unexpected and promising results. 
Polycentricity has to be further analysed in future research agendas, but the 
results preliminary flag the importance of its different degrees of impact. Finally, 
these factors are best understood in a qualitative manner in contrast to the 
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Multi-level politics have provided the grounds to create new arenas of party 
competition, granting the opportunity to further address social cleavages with a 
more contextualised focus (Jeffery 2010: 145-147). Regional-scale politics are 
now viewed to be of crucial importance (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300), 
contributing with a much wider and deeper understanding of social processes 
and phenomena. With this in mind, this investigation aims to address how 
parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage at a regional scale to 
observe how they adapt to the context in which they act. The purpose of this 
chapter is to frame the broad lines of this investigation, outline the theoretical 
umbrella under which this thesis develops, identify and justify a research 
problem and agenda, provide a well-structured research question and a 
rationale for it, and orientate the reader in the chosen methodological direction. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section refers to the 
general research area in which this investigation can be inserted. The second 
section identifies and highlights a research agenda that fits the purpose of this 
thesis, introducing and justifying the main research question. The third section 
refers to the research design and roadmap. 
2. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AREA 
The aim of this section is to establish a general topic within which to locate 
the research developed here. Social cleavages have been long studied in Political 
Science as one of the key social and political identification processes that Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) developed in their seminal work. In order for a social cleavage 
to become politically salient, three main conditions have to apply (Pisciotta 2016: 
195): first, people have to be distinguished according to one of the characteristics 
of the cleavage; second, people have to be able to identify to which group they 
belong in relation to those characteristics of the cleavage; and third, parties need 
to organise their support and compete around this cleavage. With this in mind, 
this investigation is located in the dynamics that the third condition unfolds. 
Amongst the different social cleavages, the centre-periphery cleavage is crucial 
in understating multi-level relations in decentralised states. Party competition can 
be understood, therefore, as organised and structured as a mechanism of 
expressing these different social cleavages (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 112). In 
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order to do so, parties articulate the relations between centres and peripheries 
as an axis of competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 852).  
The original Cleavage Theory was designed before the regions became 
one of the main centres of decision-making processes in politics. Regions and 
territorial politics, through processes such as decentralisation, have been 
evolving in the past decades to become, currently, one of the most salient 
political arenas (Goldsmith and Newton 1988: 359-361; Jeffery and Hough 2003: 
206). For example, regionalism, as an example of territorial politics, can be either 
top-down and through decentralisation (Loughlin and Guy Peters 2004), or 
bottom-up and through social and political mobilisation (Keating 1998). The 
literature that explores social cleavages has observed, throughout the last few 
years, a process of stable alignment, de-alignment, and re-alignment (Dalton et. 
al. 1984). This means that, in regards to the centre-periphery cleavage, there 
has been both a trend of de- and re-territorialisation (Knutsen 2011: 144). In this 
sense, this cleavage has been stable, abandoned, and deepened, depending on 
the regions that one studies, providing a high degree of regional variation that 
needs to be further understood (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300). The increasing 
importance of regions and territorial politics draws attention to the way in which 
previous assumed state-wide phenomena, such as social cleavages, are also 
addressed at a regional scale (Jeffery 2010: 137-139).  
The terms centres and peripheries are widely, and perhaps therefore 
variably, used. Using the crucial work done by Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 13), a 
peripheral region can be characterised as geographically distant (Gottman 1980: 
11), and culturally different and economically dependent (Rokkan and Urwin 
1982: 2-3). Although Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 5) proposed a broad definition of 
centres, this can be narrowed down to define them in political terms: “the centre 
is normally the place where the seat of authority is located. It is usually called the 
capital” (Gottman 1980: 15). Both definitions imply subordination and dominance, 
where centres have, and maintain, a predominant relation of advantage over the 
peripheries. The result is the ability of the centres to control, rule, and obtain 
substantial benefits from exercising their authority on the peripheries. These 
dominant relations generate territorial grievances between centres and 
peripheries. This is when the centre-periphery cleavage starts to be articulated 
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and become important, politicising these territorial grievances and identifying 
peripheral populations as deprived groups. To help maintain this status quo, 
centres, through state-wide parties (from now on SWPs), articulate political 
projects that have in their core ideology the protection of these dominant 
relations. In order to challenge this situation, peripheries, through regionalist 
parties, identify the political projects that come from the centres as detrimental to 
their interests, linking their future to a more regionalised power-based relations. 
At this point the centre-periphery cleavage is finally consolidated, when parties 
compete and frame the relations between centres and peripheries as part of their 
axes of competition, and where this investigation is inserted. 
The last step in this section is to outline the two main characteristics that 
in this investigation defines the centre-periphery cleavage. These characteristics 
are, on one hand, the centre-periphery cleavage understood as a process, and 
on the other, this process characterised as dynamic. The first characteristic 
refers to the centre-periphery cleavage as a process. Centres, as highly 
developed and locus of decision-making processes, and peripheries, as 
geographically distant, and poorly developed regions, can be analysed using a 
process-centred perspective (Kühn 2015: 368). This process can be labelled as 
corelisation-peripheralisation. In this process, centres and peripheries are 
articulated using economic, cultural, and political dimensions. Centres and 
peripheries are not static but contingent. They can be articulated and dismantled 
over time. A region is not a centre of decision-making processes, depositary of 
human and material resources, or the opposite, per se. The regions are labelled 
as centre or as peripheries depending on the result of a specific process, making 
centres as politically dominant and strong, and peripheries as politically 
dependent and weak. Regions can be considered as centres or peripheries at a 
certain point in time, but this can change over time. The key idea is that this 
process is not deterministic. One region influences the other and vice versa in a 
bi-directional way.  
The second characteristic considers the centre-periphery cleavage as a 
dynamic process. This dynamism is provided by the actors that are responsible 
for articulating regions as centres or peripheries. These actors make the above 
process unfold in a certain way. In this investigation, the actors that are 
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responsible for the unfolding of this process are political parties. Delimiting 
centres and peripheries are a result of how parties act and interact on the centre-
periphery cleavage. The behaviour of parties determines which regions are 
centres and peripheries. These rational actors comply with a certain political 
project to fulfil the interest of the elites that they represent. The elites at the centre 
try to, through SWPs, implement a certain political project to control the 
peripheries and extract the necessary surplus to maintain their dominant position. 
In response to this, the elites at the peripheries attempt to, through strong 
regionalist parties, challenge this political project via a regionally based political 
project to defend their interests. Because not all regions have the same 
characteristics, parties need to adapt to the regions in which they act. This 
reinforces the idea that the centre-periphery cleavage is a process of defining 
centres and peripheries, and at the same time, dynamic because it varies across 
regions. 
This broad theoretical discussion and research area is the umbrella under 
which this investigation can be found and feeds from, understanding the centre-
periphery cleavage as a profound salient focus of political struggle and tensions 
between regions through party competition. The comparative studies that started 
with authors such as Rokkan (1975), Strassoldo (1980), or Rokkan and Urwin 
(1982;1983) can be considered as the best examples of how the study of the 
centre-periphery cleavage provides a variation of observations that need to be 
understood in a highly contextualised scenario. In other words, understand social 
cleavages through a regional scope and away from the state lenses, which 
sometimes, hide their real impact (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 302). The centre-
periphery cleavage can be understood as a universal response to territorial 
tensions, but this needs to be specified to the case in which it unfolds. Regional 
variation strengthens the idea of the new dynamics that multi-level politics 
introduce, considering regional-scale politics as a completely new, and standing 
on its own, field of study (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300).  
3. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AGENDA AND MAIN RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
The intention of this section is to identify a specific research agenda within 
which the main research question can be inserted. With the above 
6 
 
characteristics of the centre-periphery cleavage in mind, the purpose of this 
investigation is to address the following research problem: understand party 
competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, defined as a dynamic process 
that balances out the power relations between regions. This falls into the limits 
of the research agenda identified by authors such as Gómez et al. (2009), 
Alonso (2012), Gómez et al. (2014), and Alonso et al. (2015; 2017) through the 
Regional Manifesto Project (RMP). This research agenda addresses precisely 
how parties behave, at the regional level, in a multi-dimensional political space, 
amongst which the centre-periphery cleavage is one of the main axes of 
competition (Alonso et al. 2013: 194-199). The RMP, building on the previous 
methodology provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), provides 
the necessary data and sources of information to approach the aim of this 
investigation with the necessary depth.  
The rationale for identifying this research agenda and following the path 
opened by the RMP is fourfold. Firstly, the literature needs to increase the focus 
on the actors that articulate the dynamic processes that social cleavages 
represent (Herrschel 2011: 98). The multi-level and multi-dimensional party 
competition in decentralised states is crucial to understand how social 
processes are addressed in other levels which are not the national level. 
Comprehending how these social processes unfold can be done by putting the 
focus on those actors that heavily influence them. In this case, and as explained 
above, these are political parties. These actors belong to a heterogenous family. 
On one hand, SWPs, having their centre of loyalties at the centre, adapt to multi-
level party competition by addressing the regional demands with a state-wide 
perspective and adjusting their internal structure (Deschouwer 2003; Fabre 
2008; Swenden and Maddens 2009). This goes in line with the idea of 
considering regional elections as first-order elections (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 
210). On the other hand, regionalist parties, which vary in their demands 
(Hepburn 2009: 480-485), represent the main mechanism through which the 
defence of the peripheral interests are articulated (De Winter and Türsan 1998; 
De Winter et al. 2006; Dandoy 2010). The two types of party, therefore, tend to 
behave diffidently. Not only these parties tend to behave differently, but their 
patterns of interaction are also varied (Jeffery 2009: 645). One of the possible 
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reasons behind this is that they need to adapt to the region in which they act, 
providing regional variation that needs to be addressed in depth, as the RMP 
aspires to.  
Secondly, the gap identified by the literature in relation to the actors that 
articulate the centre-periphery cleavage (Kühn 2015: 376) is being filled by 
projects such as the RMP. The data provided by these projects at a regional 
scale opens the door to address research questions with a regional lens, such 
as the ones that are articulated around this cleavage. This provides the literature 
with detailed answers to social phenomena which could be faded or concealed 
at the national or supra-national levels (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 302). 
Peripheral mobilisation is better understood at the regional level, where its bases 
are situated, locating the regions at the centre of the agenda (Fabre and 
Swenden 2013: 344). If the work done by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan 
(1980), Rokkan and Urwin (1983), or Caramani (2004) was aimed to address 
the problem of power and territory, this was informed, to some extent, by a 
national bias. This investigation tries to approach the phenomenon of territorial 
tensions at a regional scale, better understanding that regions might not be as 
assimilated units as part of the literature suggests (Keating 2008: 63). The 
centre-periphery cleavage is territorial in nature (Alonso et al. 2013: 190), and 
therefore, this needs to be considered in its proper territorial unit, the region. The 
regional level is the one addressed by the RMP and its research agenda, being 
the most suitable data-base to approach the centre-periphery cleavage at the 
territorial level where it unfolds. 
Thirdly, the RMP grants the literature with a set of categories that can be 
used to articulate a precise centre-periphery scale to address the complexity of 
this social cleavage. Although some authors have proposed a centre-periphery 
scale that gravitates around two main dimensions, the competential and 
identitarian dimensions (Alonso et al. 2013: 192-193), the RMP has flexible 
categories that could be used to articulate alternative scales. This flexibility is 
crucial to approach social phenomena which, due to their complexity, need to 
be understood via different approaches. The deep effects of multi-level politics 
in decentralised states might challenge the existing assumptions of part of the 
literature, and the flexibility of the categories offered by the RMP and its research 
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agenda grants the opportunity to provide the field with new results that could be 
used to picture with more detail profound social processes. These alternatives 
do not undermine each other, they are intended to enrich the literature and 
procure different approaches to compare results and accumulate knowledge. 
Fourthly, more empirical studies of how this cleavage unfolds through party 
competition as its fundamental driving force are needed (Alonso et al. 2013: 
190). Most of the existing studies are based on either quantitative (Alonso and 
Gómez 2011; Alonso 2012; Alonso et al. 2013; 2015; 2017) or qualitative data 
(De Winter and Türsan 1998; Tronconi 2006; Massetti 2009; van Houten 2009). 
To further provide the literature with solid, robust, and in-depth empirical 
findings, this investigation aims to contribute with both quantitative and 
qualitative results, in the same way as Basile (2015) or Massetti and Schakel 
(2015) do. Providing findings of both natures can enrich the literature that 
addresses party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage. The data 
collected at the national level, informed by the national bias outlined above, has 
provided rich data to produce important research at the mentioned level, but this 
does not address the regional variation (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 301) that can 
be found in important decentralised states, where the regions are crucial units 
of decision-making processes. The RMP and its research agenda allows to 
approach the main research question developed below with both types of data. 
On one hand, quantitative data via its fully developed data-set, and on the other 
hand, qualitative data via the original manifestos.  
As mentioned above, the RMP, and the research agenda that builds on it, 
provides the grounds to understand how parties behave at the regional level in 
multi-level decentralised states and in a multi-dimensional political space. In this 
multi-dimensional arena of competition, the centre-periphery cleavage is one of 
the main axes of competition, contributing to observe how social cleavages with 
a clear territorial base, such as this one, are articulated and unfold. With this in 





What factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery? 
The justification for this research question is twofold. Firstly, the centre-
periphery cleavage, as a dynamic process, needs to be further specified to make 
sense of it. The regional variation that one can find in decentralised states, 
where regions represent key centres of decision-making processes, requires a 
deeper explanation that needs to go beyond the dichotomous labels of centres 
and peripheries. Centres can be considered as stable and consolidated, but 
peripheral regions are more dynamic. This means that inside the broad label of 
“peripheral regions”, one can find a high degree of variation that differentiates 
one peripheral region from another. The literature does not take into 
consideration this variation with enough depth, and regards all peripheral 
regions to belong to the same category. This fades away the possible reasons 
behind how regions interact. To address this gap, the centre-periphery cleavage 
is understood in this investigation not as a dichotomous scale of centre versus 
peripheries but as a continuum. Both labels (“centres” and “peripheries”) need 
to be addressed with more precision to fit the context. The centre-periphery 
continuum, as developed in the conceptual framework, has more grey scales 
than simple centres and peripheries, allowing for a better understanding of the 
variation between regions.  
Secondly, and as further developed in the next chapter, the research 
agenda based on the RMP focuses on party behaviour around three main 
issues. These are, the saliency, position, and strategies that parties adopt to 
compete, at the regional level, on multiple axes of competition. This is, there is 
deep understanding on the behaviour of parties when they selected which 
issues to emphasise, what position they assume according to the issues they 
address, and the strategies they adopt to position themselves on different axes 
of competition. Although this investigation can be inserted in this research 
agenda, the focus here lies on comprehending what shapes party behaviour 
(Bielasiak 2005: 334). The literature has identified some of the factors that shape 
and can explain, to some extent, party behaviour. Examples of these are 
economic development, identity, or party type, but there is little or no work done 
on other factors that might also deeply shape party competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage. To address this gap, this investigation turns the focus to 
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three main factors that are also expected to strongly shape party behaviour 
along the centre-periphery cleavage: distance, fragmentation, and 
polycentricity. Overlooking these factors might provide misleading results, and 
this investigation aims to observe and comprehend how and with what intensity 
they shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage to provide a 
wider and more detailed picture of the phenomenon.  
Linking both justifications for the main research question, it can be 
theorised that the regional variation that the specification of the centre-periphery 
cleavage can help to outline can be understood, to some extent, according to 
the effects that the above factors may have on party behaviour in relation to the 
regions in which parties act. In other words, the context in which parties act is 
presumed to shape their behaviour. The expected effects that distance, 
fragmentation, and polycentricity may have on party behaviour are dependent 
on the region that is being analysed, and this derives from exploring the 
proposed centre-periphery continuum. Disentangling the centre-periphery 
cleavage into precise categories, as this investigation aims to achieve, is 
theorised to procure the necessary observations to contextualise with more 
accuracy the impact that these factors are hypothesised to have on how parties 
frame the relations between centres and peripheral regions.  
Once the different explanatory variables have been addressed, the final 
task is to disentangle how the centre-periphery cleavage is captured. Parties 
have based their claims for the decentralisation of power and strengthening of 
subnational autonomy on various justifications, such as for example, ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, or religious arguments (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 
56), and this is still the case, subsuming these issues in a broader territorial axis 
(Alonso et al. 2017: 253-256) as an intrinsic measure of how centres and 
peripheries relate to each other (Alonso et al. 2013: 190-192). In order to follow 
the same path opened by the RMP and its research agendas, this investigation 
builds on this territorial axis that includes two different dimensions: the 
competential and identitarian dimensions. The competential dimension refers to 
the different claims for authority to be devolved to the regions in order to 
reinforce their political importance inside and outside the state. The identitarian 
dimension relates to the issues that gravitate around the idea of strengthening 
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the national/regional identities in the regions as a means of implementing the 
culture from the centre or as a challenge to this. To address both dimensions, 
this investigation taps into the centre-periphery cleavage using five different 
dependent variables: saliency of the regional level, competence distribution, 
attitudes towards multiculturalism, constitutional status of the region, and 
identity. The purpose of these dependent variables it be able to capture to the 
full extent both dimensions in which the centre-periphery cleavage, territorial 
axis, is disaggregated. All together can provide an in-depth understanding of 
how parties calibrate the relations between the centre and its peripheries. As it 
is explained in the fourth chapter, they are applied differently to fit the purpose 
of the methodological approach chosen, and its main aims, developed in this 
investigation. 
- Spain as a politically salient case study 
Following the argument given by Fishman (2020: 15), the importance of 
Spain as a politically salient case study for comparative politics is very difficult to 
deny. In terms of its political development throughout Modernity, Spain 
experienced the same stages of evolution that other modern European states 
have, but this does not rule out its importance or dilute it amongst a general 
population of cases so easily. Analysing Spain using a comparative analysis 
framework highlights the difficulties to classify this case study using a simple and 
clear criteria in relation to an specific topic, as it can be observed for other 
countries, such as for example France and colossal research agenda on the 
building of a national identity (e.g., Bell 1996; Byrnes 2005; Greenwalt 2009; 
Hampton 2001; Jenkins and Sofos 1996; Kaiser 1999; Safran 1991). This lack of 
agreement amongst academics already gives the reader a clue of the importance 
of scrutinising this case in depth to comprehend what makes it divert from the 
generality of the population without considering it unique in any way (Fishman 
(2020: 16-17). The mix record of conjunctions and divergences with general 
theories in Politics that one can find in Spanish political history provides the 
grounds for further explorations that should attract the attention of any researcher 
who is interested in employing a comparative approach to obtain generalisable 
findings which can be applied to a broader set of cases both in a theoretical and 
empirical perspective. This is even more apparent after the transition to 
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democracy and the process of democratisation, making Spain one of the most 
successful and studied cases in Europe (Linz and Stepan 1996: 87). 
One of the most salient issues in the Spanish political context is the 
articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage (Fishman 2020: 26-27), both in its 
decentralisation (e.g., Colino 2008; Colomer 1998; Convery and Lundberg 2017; 
Martínez‐Herrera 2002; Moreno 2002) and identitarian dimensions (e.g., 
Flynn 2001; Lecours 2001; Martínez‐Herrera and Miley 2010; Medrano and 
Gutiérrez 2001; Moreno et al. 1998; Núñez Seixas 2001; Núñez Seixas and 
Umbach 2008) and its constant cycle of appearance, disappearance and re-
appearance throughout the last two centuries (Ruane 2003: 29-32). As it is further 
developed in the next chapter, the centre-periphery cleavage developed parallel 
to the processes of state- and nation-building, which provided, and still provides, 
very contextualised political responses both by the centre and the peripheries, 
making Spain a source of new theoretical and empirical findings which 
reconfigured, and still reconfigures, the understanding of these processes. Since 
the 19th century, this social cleavage has been in the very core of Spanish politics, 
and is still nowadays a source of important political decisions when it comes to 
the design of the Spanish state and nation (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 1-3). The 
undeniable importance and deep-rooted saliency of the relations between the 
centre and its peripheries in Spain procures a very challenging research arena in 
which one can address key political quizzes that can be used to reinforce the 
explanation of the emergence of state and nations in Western Europe with a more 
detailed lens. 
4. RESEARCH PLAN 
The first step in this research plan is to address the main research method, 
which can be inserted in the broad category of the comparative method. The 
comparative method is defined here as Lijphart (1971: 682) does: one of the 
basic methods that can be used to generate valid empirical inferences linking 
them to a comparison between the principal variables. The two aims of this 
method are, on one hand, outline the possible relations that may exist between 
the most important variables whilst controlling for other possible explanatory 
variables (Collier 1993: 105-108), and on the other hand, address the validity of 
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the design in its internal and external spheres (Pennings et al. 2006: 6). These 
two features were originally designed to be applied on a national scale. In other 
words, the comparative design had some degree of national bias. The main 
problem with this procedure was that the use of national averages was 
inappropriate to understand how sub-national units, such as regions, unfold 
(Snyder 2001: 97). The new waves of decentralisation helped the articulation of 
sub-national units of decision-making networks and centres. In this scenario, 
comparative designs driven by the above national bias needed to be updated to 
have better and more precise answers to important research questions. With 
this in mind, the main research method used in this investigation is a variant of 
this well-known comparative method: the sub-national comparative method. 
The sub-national comparative method is the methodological answer to this 
decentralisation challenge. In this method, sub-national units of analysis are put 
in the centre of the research process. Comparing sub-national units of 
measurement decreases the risk of falling into national biases and provide the 
grounds for researchers to gain in-depth knowledge of complex social processes 
that under the state-scale scopes are not approached with enough accuracy 
(Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300). The sub-national comparative method provides 
three main advantages to the pre-existing general comparative designs (Synder 
2001: 94). The first main advantage addresses and improves the limitations that 
a small or single-N study has in terms of the externalisation of the findings in 
controlled comparisons. The second main advantage refers to the selection and 
coding of the cases that could be selected. The third main advantage concerns 
the ability of researchers to better understand complex processes that are 
uneven in their spatial development.  
The rationale for the use in this sub-national comparative method in this 
investigation is as follows. Synder (2001: 95-97) outlines two key: the increase 
in the number of observations, and the increase of the trustfulness of the 
controlled comparisons. The first key strength links to the problem of a small 
number of observations in studies with a low, or single, number of cases (King 
et al. 1994, 208), such as the small-/single-N designs. The purpose of this is to 
have more relevant sources of knowledge that can result in an increase in both 
the internal and the external validity of the design. For example, although a 
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single-N design is applied, sub-national units of measurement result in an 
increase in the number of observations, allowing to extract more important 
results and findings, helping to further develop detailed and developed answers 
to the research questions articulated around this single case (Landman 2008: 
91-92). With these extra observations and findings, the aim is to avoid the well-
known criticism of too few cases and too many variables (Goggin 1986). In this 
investigation, the sub-national units of observations are the regions. 
The second key strength relates to the ability to make strong controlled 
comparisons. The rationale is to be able to compare cases, and at the same 
time, have control over other possible explanatory variables (Lijphart 1971: 689-
690). Managing a comparison between sub-national units that share the same 
characteristics avoids the application of the Galton´s problem, but in this case, 
applied at a regional level. This is, comparing two variables which belong to two 
different contexts can lead to misleading findings and spurious relations 
between the variables. Providing general conclusions from political systems that 
have heterogeneous sub-national units (King et al. 1994: 222) can lead to poor 
and unspecific inferences and answers. Within-nation comparison is the specific 
technique that this investigation uses as part of the application of this sub-
national comparative method. In the case of this investigation, all the regions 
need to share more or less the same cultural, historical, and socioeconomic 
characteristics so that the inferences and variation can be highlighted with more 
precision, controlling for other possible explanatory variables.  
 The second step in this research plan is to outline the proposed structure 
and roadmap. To answer the main research question, this thesis has eight main 
chapters that deal with the necessary steps to comply with the principles of 
internal and external validity, and reliability.  
Chapter 2-The Literature Review. This chapter outlines the main literature on 
the research problem. Two main research areas are addressed: on one hand, 
the centre-periphery cleavage, and on the other hand, party competition. The 
aim of this chapter is to further develop the research area and agenda in which 
this investigation can be inserted. 
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Chapter 3-The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework. This chapter contains, 
first, the definitions of the main concepts used in this thesis, and second, a 
theoretical framework that explores the main variables and hypotheses to be 
tested. This chapter provides the theoretical bases from where this investigation 
feeds before addressing the main research question with the analysis of the 
different sources of information and data. 
Chapter 4-Methodology. The sub-national comparative method of analysis is 
further developed in detail to comply with the required methodological thickness 
and truthfulness that any investigation needs. This chapter aims to set the 
research design that is followed to obtain the inferences that are used to address 
the main research question. 
Chapter 5-Quantitative Analysis. After detailing with the methodology used, the 
first step is to proceed with the quantitative description and analysis of the main 
data-set selected. The aim of this chapter is to obtain a general and big picture 
of the phenomenon. 
Chapter 6-Qualitative Analysis. After providing a general and big picture of the 
phenomenon, a second step is introduced to analyse the different sources of 
information with a qualitative approach. The aim of this chapter is to allow for an 
in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon. 
Chapter 7-Discussion. The inferences and partial conclusions obtained in the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis are integrated to addresses the main 
research question. The aim is to finalise with a final answer according to the 
knowledge gained from both analyses in a unified approach. 
Chapter 8-Conclusions. This final chapter summarises all the different steps that 
have been taken in this investigation. The aim of this chapter is to conclud with 
the overall most important ideas and findings that can be extracted from the 
research process as a whole. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This first chapter has been used to introduce the primary research area, 
the research agenda where this investigation finds its purpose, the main 
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research problem and question, and finally, a reasonable research method and 
roadmap to approach it. The centre-periphery cleavage is the primary research 
area where this thesis finds its foundations. In relation to this social cleavage, 
the research agenda that addresses multi-level party competition at the regional 
level has yet to deal in depth with distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity as 
key factors that may contribute to shape party behaviour in establishing, 
maintaining, and/or challenging the relations between the centres and 
peripheries. With this in mind, the main research question is: what factors shape 
party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage? The sub-national 
comparative method is viewed here as the most reliable design than can be 
used to answer research questions that refer to units of analysis that are not 


















































 The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on the main research 
problem, understand how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. This 
provides the necessary foundations to accumulate knowledge, contributing to 
expand and map the various explanations to this phenomenon through the 
different approaches taken by the main authors in the field. This chapter aims to 
meet two main criteria (Creswell 1994: 37): on one hand, present the existing 
literature that addresses the same research problem, and on the other hand, 
review the research agenda in which this investigation can be inserted. The 
literature provides multiple answers on how parties behave at the regional level, 
adapting to the existence of multiple dimensions and levels of competition where 
the centre-periphery cleavage plays a major role. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, this investigation can be inserted in the research agenda that build 
around the RMP, this is, multi-dimensional party competition at the regional level. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first outlines the literature 
regarding the centre-periphery cleavage as the main research area from which 
this investigation feeds. The second deals with party competition in general 
terms. The third focuses more specifically on party competition along the centre 
periphery cleavage in Spain as the main research agenda that fits the purpose of 
this thesis. 
2. CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE 
2.1) Introduction 
 The notion of centre-periphery cleavage in its original form can be traced 
back to a variety of different disciplines, such as Human Geography (Hartshorne 
1941; Gottmann 1952; Cox and Reynolds 1974; Landes 1998; Porter and 
Sheppard 1998), Economics (Perroux 1950; Hirschman 1958; Vidal 2002; 
Martínez Peinado 2011), or Architecture and Urban Development (Brunn and 
Williams 1993; Brockerhorff 2000). Mainly employing a comparative method, the 
centre-periphery cleavage is framed in political science in different scenarios, 
from nation-states to world-wide phenomena, to understand the ways in which 
different types of regions interact with each other. In this chapter, the main focus 
is located on nation-states through a comparative perspective (Deutsch 1961; 
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Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Kuznetsov 2015). Despite this, it has to be 
acknowledged that there is an extensive application of the centre-periphery 
analysis with a world-wide perspective (Wallerstein 1974; 1978; 1983). Finally, 
this section is based on the seminal work done by Wellhofer (1988; 1989). 
 Wellhofer (1989: 340) summarises the findings with which political science 
contributes to expand the knowledge and understanding of the relations between 
centres and peripheries. Firstly, centre-periphery location is important for 
understanding politics and social organisation. Secondly, the dynamics between 
core and periphery are crucial to understand social change. Thirdly, the 
interpretation of the type and kind of relations between the core and the periphery 
can explain the political and social status between them. With this in mind, the 
literature can be grouped into three main questions or debates (Wellhofer 1989: 
340): how do centres and peripheries arise? (the emergence of states and cores); 
which mechanisms are used to establish the dominant position of the core vis-a-
vis the periphery? (centre-periphery relations); and counter-core movements and 
their analysis (counter-core movements).  
2.2) The emergence of states and cores 
 The first of the three main questions, outlined by the literature, gravitates 
around one of the most discussed issues in political science: the emergence of 
states, although some authors think that this concept is out of data (Levi 2002: 
34). This is addressed in two steps. The first step refers to the key features that 
characterise the emergence of states, and the second step describes this as a 
process. Amongst the different characteristics that the literature identifies in order 
to understand the emergence of states, here, the focus is located on four key 
elements: a centralised bureaucracy; taxation; the use of war as a catalyst; and 
economic expansionism.  
 Some authors consider centralised bureaucracy as the most important 
feature of the emergence of states (Vu 2010: 151). Large-scale bureaucracy and 
standardised processes were implemented to address the different needs of the 
population and the state itself (Pierson 1996: 16-17). This centralised 
bureaucracy saw an evolution from the early processes, first described as a 
cooperative relation between the vassals and the lords, and then as less 
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patrimonialised and more rationalised (Vu 2010: 153). Part of the literature 
identifies the implementation of standardised processes as a result of the survival 
of the elites, or in other words, the collective rule of the ruling class (Adams 2005: 
14-21). As states emerged, the elites adapted to this evolution on the basis of 
their own survival, forcing a change from above through this centralised 
bureaucracy (Spruyt 1994). This centralised bureaucracy enlarged at the same 
rate as the state itself in order to cope with its needs (Riggs 1997: 347), adapting 
to new contexts. Although considerable bureaucratic complexes were not new in 
history, the professionalisation of the personnel and the hierarchical relations 
between levels were characteristics that defined the emergence of states after 
the 15th century (Rothstein 1998: 291). 
The next element is taxation and the spread of centralised processes of 
collecting revenues through a strong effective fiscal system (Dincecco 2015: 
903). This factor can be seen, to some extent, as a direct consequence of the 
implementation of a centralised bureaucracy to cover the costs of the expansion 
of the state´s coercive means (Tilly 1975: 73). No state could have emerged 
without the ability of extracting resources for its existence (Tilly 1990: 96). The 
collection of revenues was spread state-wide and all citizens became subjects to 
taxation, spreading the internal cohesion and legitimacy of modern states in 
comparison to the systems in place in earlier periods (Pierson 1996: 25-26). As 
with a centralised bureaucracy, this taxation system also saw an evolution as 
states emerged. The introduction of a centralised taxation system developed from 
a decentralised market-base method of collecting revenues in the early modern 
period, to a centralised and bureaucratic fiscal system of the last period of the 
modern era (Johnson and Koyama 2014: 2). This process could be defined as 
the evolution from tax farming to standardised state-wide taxation (Tilly 1989: 
565). 
 The third characteristic was the use of war as a catalyst, identified as one 
of the most prominent features of the emergence of states (Spruyt 2002: 135). 
The building of armed forces to expand the influence of the state outside and 
inside its borders (Tilly 1990: 20-21) contributed to the survival of the ruling 
classes (Vu 2010: 152). As with the above two characteristics, this feature also 
experienced an evolution. The needs of the emerging states increased as they 
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faced threats from the outside and the inside, pushing for more modern and 
professional armed forces, resulting in the so-called “military revolution” of the 
16th and 17th centuries (Ertman 2005: 378). Consequently, the development of 
more sophisticated war technology and the expansion of state war machines 
strengthened the centralised bureaucracy and taxation means to support them 
(Spruyt 2002: 136). The result of military expansion placed much tension on pre-
modern institutions, which in some cases, collapsed and gave way to modern 
military-bureaucratic states (Downing 1992: 239). 
 The final characteristic of the emergent states was the economic 
expansionism of the centralised military-bureaucratic administration. Acquiring 
more resources to fuel the state machinery is identified by the literature to be a 
key aspect of the emergence of states (Tilly 1990: 16-17). Some authors link the 
rise of capitalism with the need to strengthen the power of emerging modern 
states (Strayer 1970; Mendels 1972; Brenner 1976) to secure the markets from 
where the ruling classes extracted the surplus to finance their own survival via 
their increasing coercive forces (Spruyt 2002: 137). At the same time, securing 
new sources of resources favoured the efficiency of the centralised bureaucracy 
and taxation systems (Vu 2010: 156-157). This economic expansion of the 
modern states also had another side effect. The fragmentated scenario of Europe 
during the last part of the feudal period limited, to some extent, the expansion of 
the states (Spruyt 2002: 138). The reason for this was the resistance of the urban 
elites to support excessive taxation and economic subordination to the needs of 
the ruling classes (Tilly 1989: 656-566), especially after the crisis of the 14th 
century and the strengthening of cities (Ertman 2005: 373). This resulted in the 
incorporation of the interests of these urban classes (Spruyt 1994: 177), 
reinforcing the link between public and private interests, and the economic 
success of the state itself (Spruyt 2002: 138). 
 The second step pictures the emergence of states as a process. The 
above discussed characteristics are better understood if they are inserted in a 
context in which they unfolded. The key point in this process is outlined by Tilly, 
who identified this as a reaction of the ruling classes to continuum 
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 historic events (Gustafsson 1992: 192). There was no beforehand plan to react 
to the events that came along. Modern states emerged improvising and adapting 
(Tilly 1990: 26). Spruyt also outlined the reaction to specific historical contextual 
events to make sense of the emergence of states (1994:21-25). This can also 
explain, to some extent, the variety of state forms in Europe during the late 
medieval period. Part of the literature identifies the period of the 11th century as 
the starting point when the European modern states began to emerge (Spruyt 
2002: 132), evolving until the most refined political formation, the nation-state 
(Tilly 1990: 15; Ertman 2005: 375). The period before was characterised by the 
segmented local power of lords and kings. Some features that favoured this 
evolution were identified by Pierson, including demographic changes, 
transformation of the modes of production, and the implementation of capitalism 
(1996: 28). With this in mind, the emergence of modern states in Europe saw an 
evolution from fragmentated entities to homogeneous nation-states after the 
French Revolution (Spruyt 2002: 133). This is, an evolution from empires in the 
5th century to the modern nation-state of the 19th century (Pierson 1996: 30-44), 
fulfilling stages such as feudalism and the absolute state (Held 1992: 74-90). 
Finally, it is important to consider how pre-modern institutions adapted and gave 
way to sustain modern states, being part of this evolutionary process (Tilly 1975: 
48). 
 Considering that the modern state rose to respond to specific historic 
conditions (Hall 1985: 158-161), and that the feudal period was characterised by 
a strong fragmentation (Jonsson et. al. 2000: 62-63), this part of the section 
addresses the emergence of cores and peripheries. This is divided into two main 
dimensions: the spatial and the process dimensions. Regarding the spatial 
dimension, the argument is that the feudal system located the new centres of 
power in the peripheral areas of the old empires (Rokkan 1973: 77; Rokkan 1975: 
576). This provided these peripheries with a strong control over the economic, 
cultural and political agendas, becoming the new cores during the period after the 
fall of the Western Roman Empire (Held 1992: 79-82). Despite this spatial 
dimension, the discussion can be further expanded to address the process 
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dimension through which these peripheries became the new cores1. The 
literature is divided into two main arguments. On one hand, those who argue that 
the modern states and cores emerged from the feudal and rural aristocratic elites 
(Rokkan 1973; 1975; Anderson 1974a; 1974b; Hechter and Brustein 1980), and 
on the other hand, those who argue that they emerged from the urban bourgeois 
elites (Moore 1966; Tilly 1990; Epstein 2000; Boone 2002).  
The two schools of thought can be merged into what can be labelled as 
the process of corelisation-peripheralisation. As the old empires collapsed, the 
new centres of power where located in the rural peripheries, controlled, at the 
beginning, by aristocratic rural elites. Cores emerged, to some extent, from 
natural advantages, with a strong rural elite that attracted resources to further 
develop, backed up by expanding cities and urban centres with consolidated 
communication and financial channels (Kindleberger 1978: 66-134; Parker 1984: 
145). As these rural elites expanded their influence and control through the 
implementation of a centralised bureaucracy, taxation system, professional 
armies, and economic expansionism, they found increasing resistance from the 
urban elites that emerged from the concentration of new modes of production, 
which replaced the old rural modes of production (Hilton 1979). The struggle 
between the rural and urban elites to control the new modes of production and 
resources can be described using the process of corelisation-peripheralisation, 
resulting in the emergence of new cores and European states. Corelisation-
peripheralisation can be conceptualised as the process of transition from the 
aristocratic rural to the urban bourgeois elites (Merrington 1975: 71-73). 
The corelisation-peripheralisation process can be developed through 
Anderson´s analysis (1974a; 1974b). The fragmentation of power structures, 
Anderson argues (1974b: 148-52), favoured the rivalry between the aristocratic 
rural and the emerging urban bourgeois classes. The absence of a strong 
centralised power granted the best scenario for power competition because there 
was little or no control of one ruling class over the other (1974a: 21). The process 
through which the new cores and modern European states emerged can be 
described as a reaction of the rural aristocracy against the urban bourgeois 
 
1 Rokkan´s analysis does not describe how and through which processes did these modern 
European states and cores rose (Wellhofer 1989: 345). 
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classes and vice versa. Identifying, for example, the absolutist state as a reaction 










 Figure 2.1. The process of emerging cores and peripheries. 
 This struggle has one key element that favoured its appearance: a strong 
class consciousness. The aristocratic rural classes had a more developed class 
consciousness in comparison to the urban bourgeoisie (Wellhofer 1989: 345), 
which at the beginning, were no more than a group of local artisans and 
merchants. As Hechter and Brustein (1980: 1990) described, this resulted in a 
delegation of personal power by the aristocrats to the new centralised modern 
European states to secure their privileged position (Hechter 1977: 1068-1073). 
This scenario was not always the same, and the urban bourgeois classes, as they 
become stronger, challenged the existing power relations (Rotz 1985: 64; De 
Long and Shleifer 1993: 685-695; Dumolyn and Haemers 2005: 374-380). This 
highlights the fact that this process was dynamic in nature and changing over 
time. The means through which these urban bourgeois classes challenged this 
status quo were, amongst others (Rokkan 1973: 91), the development of a literate 
bureaucracy and legal institutions, growing trade, and the establishment of 
cultural standards, which latter on facilitated the processes of nation-building. 
This gave way to a change in power relations with the introduction of new 
capitalist modes of production, and therefore, the development of new forms of 
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political organisation like the liberal state (Held 1992: 89). Therefore, those cities 
or city-belts located in the old peripheries became the new cores, replacing the 
old aristocratic rural elites and centres of power through a predominant and 
emerging urban bourgeoisie via controlling the new modes of production and the 
supply of goods (Jacob 1984: 42-44; 63-64). This class struggle and the 
predominance of the urban bourgeoisie were responsible for the emergence of 
the modern European states (Epstein 2000: 29-30). It is not a simple change of 
role, the old peripheries becoming the new cores, it was a whole political, social, 
and economic process. The cores of the modern European states were those 
regions where the incipient urban bourgeoisie located its centres of power (Moore 
1966)2, replacing the original rural aristocratic classes as Rokkan theorised 
(1975: 596-597)3. 
2.3) Centre-periphery relations 
 The second question that the literature on the centre-periphery cleavage 
addresses is the ways in which the relations between cores and peripheries are 
conducted and governed. The literature, in this case, is clearly divided into two 
main schools of thoughts: the neoliberal and the neomarxist schools of thought. 
The first approach is adopted by authors such as Lipset-Rokkan (1967), Urwin 
(1982) and Meny and Wright (1985), and the second approach is defended by 
authors such as Hechter (1975a), Nairn (1977) and Frank (1979).  
-   Neoliberal school of thought 
 It draws its theoretical arguments from the classical liberal economic 
discourse and pluralist theories of politics (Wellhofer 1989: 341). The main 
assumptions considered here are, amongst others (Wellhofer 1988: 285-286): 
first, society is represented as a reservoir of scarce resources continuously 
reallocated by the market through the price mechanism; second, in the long term, 
markets are self-regulating mechanisms returning to equilibrium; third, 
inequalities are noncumulative; fourth, trade is based on comparative advantages 
 
2 For a more detailed analysis of Rokkan´s conceptual map, see Allardt (1981) and Flora (2007: 
95-209). 
3 It is curious that Rokkan, in his conceptual map of Europe (1973: 80-84) develops more in 
detail the theory of Moore, but goes in the opposite direction when he lays the foundations of 
the modern European state on the rural aristocratic classes. 
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of market participants; fifth, who enter the market from free choice; sixth, wealth 
is created by the division of labour in conjunction with free markets; seventh, a 
distinction is drawn between private and public, with corresponding lines between 
politics and economics; and eighth, conflict is competitive, integrating competitors 
into a new equilibrium functioning as a regenerative mechanism for the existing 
social order. In simple terms, the neoliberal approach states that when markets 
are articulated in a free, voluntary, mutually beneficial way, both the cores and 
the peripheries benefit from them. These free markets of the cores will bring 
prosperity and benefits to the periphery so that the relations would be considered 
complementary and harmonious (Jacobs 1984: 47). This idea of harmonious 
relations is contained in other analyses, such as O´Brien (1982) or Smout (1980: 
623-624) with reference to Scotland, considering this way that due to this mutual 
benefit gained through the free markets, the periphery does not exist on the 
dependency vortex that the neomarxist approach argues but on the assumption 
of complementary and interdependence (Meny and Wright 1985: 7). 
 Rokkan argues that competing markets and institutions help to self-limit 
the long-term accumulation (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 166-192), resulting in a 
more or less equal distribution of wealth amongst the regions through, for 
example, the mechanism of gaining representation at the cores by the peripheries 
(Rokkan 1970: 121). A difference between Rokkan´s analysis and other 
neoliberal approaches is that he introduced not only the economic (Jacobs 1984: 
140-144; Parker 1984: 145) but also the political and cultural spheres. The 
equilibrium, according to Rokkan, is found in the interconnection between the 
three. Not only is the equilibrium favourable, but competition between the core 
and the periphery is seen as a good thing which brings regeneration of the nation-
states (Meny and Wright 1985: 6). The neoliberal theoretical approach relies 
strongly on the liberal economic theory, stating that free markets would bring 
mutual benefits to the cores and the peripheries. This competition becomes a 
dynamic force that would favour the regeneration of the state when dealing with 
an unequal development of the different regions (Wellhofer 1988: 289). The self-
regulation feature of the market would prevent any social group or class from 
being too dominant over the others, finding, through an economic equilibrium, 
political and social stability.  
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-   Neomarxist school of thought 
 If the neoliberal approach assumes that the market is a free entity capable 
of self-regulating and produce mutual benefits for both the cores and peripheries, 
establishing not a dependency relation but one of respect and beneficial 
competition, the neomarxist approach questions this premise. It does so by using 
terms such as internal colonialism (Hetcher 1975a) in order to articulate a 
theoretical framework that advocates the idea that the relations between cores 
and peripheries are dominated by a position of subordination of the latter to the 
former. This can be observed by the transfer of surplus to the cores, with the state 
as the political structure that is there to ensure the subordination of the 
peripheries. Using the example of the core-periphery economic analysis that 
came from Latin America and the ECLAC (Furtado 1964; Dos Santos 1970), the 
Dependency Theory4 was applied within the nation-states. The peripheries are 
seen therefore as mere surplus extracting regions for the core to maintain its 
economic dominance. Following the economic subordination came the cultural 
and political subjugation of the peripheries, which, in order to regain control over 
their own modes of production, rise as a collective. 
 The main assumptions of this school of thought are, amongst others 
(Wellhofer 1988: 290): first, the spheres of economy, cultural and politics are not 
separate, but connected  with a predominant domination of the first one; second, 
instead of distinguishing the cores and the peripheries using living standards, 
they are distinguished using the modes of production that reflect the living 
standards; third, markets are not free, balanced, and self-correcting mechanisms 
but they are unbalanced mechanisms of coercive relations; fourth, the wealth 
attracted by the core is not due to the division of labour or the markets, it is based 
on the extraction of surplus from the peripheries; and fifth, conflicts are not 
beneficial but cumulative and disintegrated. The main argument of the neomarxist 
approach is that the cores use the peripheries, under a relation of dominance, to 
 
4 The Dependency Theory uses a core-periphery perspective worldwide to describe the 
economic dominance of the core over the peripheral regions, integrating both kind of regions 
in the so-called world system. Its two main theoretical assumptions are: first, the poor regions 
(nations in this case as the perspective is worldwide) provide the rich regions with wealth, 
cheap labor, surplus and markets; and second, these rich regions maintain the dominance 
power relations through the economic, cultural and political interconnected spheres (Cardoso 
and Faletto 1969; Cardoso 1973; Wallerstein 1978). 
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extract surplus to maintain the economic, cultural and political superiority to 
sustain the division of labour in the two regions. This approach does not consider 
possible to separate social interaction into three different spheres which operate 
separately.  As Wallerstein states (1978: 7), the economic is the root for the 
cultural and political, and therefore, the latter two are the main consequences of 
the former. This thesis of non-separation of the three spheres is not only 
defended by authors of this school of thought in politics (Massey 1984: 12-17; 
Burawoy 1985: 30-32), but also by some authors in other fields of study, such as 
Marvin Harris (1975; 1979), Dollimore and Alan (1985) or Price (1982) in 
Anthropology and the Cultural Materialist approach. 
 The spatial analysis of the neomarxist approach regarding cores and 
peripheries deals with the diffusion of capitalism and the different development of 
the regions. Taking into account the irregular characteristics of the expansion of 
capitalism (Walker 1978: 28; Amin 1983: 363-365), the spatial differentiation of 
labour and modes of production produce an uneven relation between those 
developed cores and those less advanced peripheries. The main result is the 
unequal exchange mechanisms to maintain the relations of dominance between 
them (Johnston 1982: 51). One of the main results of this uneven diffusion of 
capitalism is segmented labour markets, which at the same time fuel a spatial 
division of social classes and, if some regions that have ethnic original population, 
a cultural division of labour (Hechter 1985; Levi and Hechter 1985; Rogowski 
1985). None the less, cores and peripheries are distinguished by these means 
using labour control mechanisms which fit perfectly to the different stages of 
evolution and penetration of capitalism (Burawoy 1985: 263-268; Wellhofer 1988: 
291). 
2.4) Counter-core movements 
 This section deals with the dilemma that is most important for this 
investigation, the counter-core movements. These movements have been 
gaining strength throughout the second half of the 20th and first part of the 21st 
century, challenging both the state and the nation. The idea of a harmonious 
integration of peripheries through processes such as state or nation-building is 
somehow disproved by the case studies used by the recent literature. The early 
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literature viewed the peripheral regions as traditional and less developed (Seers 
1979: 3; 8-9; 12-14) and the cores as modernising forces, bringing development 
in the economic, cultural and political arena (Randall and Theobald 1998: 15-21). 
The expansion of the cores to the surrounding peripheries (Hoogvelt 1997: 15) 
meant the integration of the latter into the economic system of the former. This 
results into an integration of the peripheries into the cultural and political networks 
of the cores (Shils 1961: 128) under a relation of domination. This economic, 
cultural and political assimilation would end up in the loyalty of the peripheries 
towards the core in the state and nation-building processes (Almond and Powell 
1966: 36). Despite this initial premise, a nation-state, although still the central unit 
of political organisation of a given population, does not have the internal 
homogeneity that it was thought to have (Fitjar 2010a: 1). The recent tensions on 
the nation-states that are focused on the pooling of sovereignty to supra-national 
entities and globalisation (Holton 1998: 97), and the growing spatial differences 
between cores and peripheries (Massey 1984: 82; 112) have not been solved by 
the processes of state and nation-building, triggering territorial tensions between 
the cores and the peripheries.  
- The centre-periphery conflict 
 Territorial tensions between cores and peripheries are, according to Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967: 13), the direct result of the state and national-building 
processes. More precisely, the reaction of the minorities in the peripheries to the 
homogenisation and assimilation by the core (Deutsch 1961: 498) through 
economic, cultural, and political standardisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 59; 
Urwin 1985: 160-164). Cores and peripheries, when confronted with each other, 
become antagonistic units, representing huge obstacles to the processes of state 
and nation-building, resulting, sometimes in armed conflict and secession 
(Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 29). As Lopez-Aranguren (1983: 30) points out, the 
processes of state and nation-building have two main handicaps. First, the 
problem with the state-building process is that it involves the establishment of a 
centralised authority in regions where other cultural and political groups have their 
own social networks (Weiner 1966). Second, the problem with the process of 
nation-building is that it involves that those same differentiated cultural and 
political groups need to pay allegiance to the new centralised power or they risk 
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being assimilated under the cultural and political relations coming from the core 
(Almond and Powell 1966: 36). Europe is currently going through a time of sub-
national mobilisation (Hooghe 1995; Loughlin 2004; Teló 2007; Dardanelli 2017), 
through movements such as regionalism (Fitjar 2010a: 5), balancing the tensions 
between simple administrative decentralisation and total independence. The 
psychological bases of regional mobilisation are being triggered by the centre-
periphery conflict5. 
- Analysis of the counter-core movements 
 According to Wellhofer (1989: 346-348), there are three main analyses 
that can be applied to the conflict between cores and peripheries: the 
developmental or functionalist theory (Alford 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 
McKenzie 1977); the reactive ethnicity theory (Hechter 1975a; Ragin 1977); and 
the ethnic competition theory (Hannan 1979). The first theory follows the 
neoliberal approach and the last two follow the neomarxist approach. To narrow 
down the scope, the most important theories for this instigation are the last two, 
as the relations between the centres and the peripheries are framed using the 
neomarxist approach. 
 The ethnic reaction theory argues that the diffusion of capitalism to pre-
capitalist regions create uneven class furtherance, which combined with the pre-
existing territorial, ethnic or cultural identification, splitting the cultural division of 
labour (Bonacich 1972: 558; Meadwell 1989: 139-142), triggering the ethnic 
cleavage (Wellhofer 1989: 346). This model was developed by authors such as 
Hechter (1975) and Hechter et al. (1982) to explain, using terms such as internal 
colonialism, the social context of ethnic groups in regions inside nation-states that 
are under the dominance of the cores, reinforcing the struggle between ethnic 
groups (Ragin 1979: 621). Due to the dominance relation of cores over 
peripheries, the continuing economic, cultural and political differences will carry 
on, which will not be shadowed by an increase in the contacts between cores and 
 
5 The psychological bases of social integration (named as national but that can be applied to 
any social group) are numbered by Katz et. al. (1970), and are four types: first, symbolic 
commitment to signs and symbols representing the group; second, functional commitment to 
the benefits and rewards that the commitment to the group offers; third, normative commitment 
to the norms and rules of the group; and fourth, ideological commitment to the idea that 
articulates the group. 
31 
 
peripheries (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 24). The result would be the opposite, 
inequalities would be institutionalised rather than disappear (Leifer 1981). This 
means that certain roles are assigned to certain individuals because of their 
ethnic characteristics (Bonacich 1979), resulting in a cultural division of labour 
(Hechter 1978: 295-296). Not only assigned roles are institutionalised but also 
there is a relation between the higher roles, assigned to the members of the 
cores, and the lower roles, assigned to the members of the peripheries. This 
ethnic division will relentlessly end up in the foundation and reinforcement of a 
differentiated periphery in contrast to the core (Nielsen 1985), favouring its 
mobilisation and reinforcing ethnic antagonism (Bonacich 1976: 549). 
 Two variants of this theory can be found (Wellhofer 1989: 346). The first 
variant is that reactive ethnicity becomes stronger when de-territorialisation of life 
(Williams 1979: 279-280), proletarianisation and extraction of surplus 
(Poulantzas 1980: 103-105; Johnston 1982: 123-147) from the peripheries is 
strongly perceived by the working class of the region that share ethnic features. 
This is even more evident where inter-group differences are sharper (Rogowski 
1985: 94). The second variant is that ethnic nationalism is a reaction to 
modernisation by the middle class or intelligentsia of the peripheries in order to 
maintain its privileges, seeking the mobilisation of the population to weaken the 
assimilation by the cores (Ragin 1977: 449; Smith 1981: 60), although this might 
not necessarily result in the disappearance of the ethnic group (Olzak 1983: 362). 
 As Cunningham states (2012: 507), the ethnic competition theory states 
that, building on Barth´s theory of boundary social making (1969), when two or 
more ethnic groups compete for the same resources in the same space, group 
boundaries are reinforced (Hannan 1979: 253-256). Uneven economic 
development and inequalities will strengthen the cohesiveness of group identity 
(Wellhofer 1989: 346), focusing on the grievances that these differences create 
(Rothschild 1981:43). Ethnic boundaries are generally perceived in a low intensity 
scale when ethnic groups inhabit separate economic, cultural and political 
systems. On the other hand, when competing ethnic groups occupy the same 
economic, cultural and political space, ethnic solidarities intensify and contribute 
to increased territorial based conflict (Soule and van Dyke 1999: 728-731). The 
ethnic competition model of Barth (1969) is more likely to appear when the 
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expansion of capitalism and its economic, cultural and political networks start to 
interfere with the local economic, cultural and political networks. Modernisation 
processes cause that the economic opportunities are not linked any more to 
specific ethnic assignments and they are based on a merit and success scale, 
articulating a competition habitat for multiple ethnic groups to compete for the 
same resources. Ethnic solidarity is essential when competing for the resources 
available. 
 As for the above ethnic reaction theory, here, the middle class and 
intelligentsia of the regions are responsible for this ethnic solidarity amongst the 
groups who are competing for the resources (Banton 1983; Brass 1991).  This 
theory was inspired by an instrumentalist critique of primordialism. They disagree 
with the assumption held by primordialists that "ethnicity is strongly determined 
by common ancestry and traditions. Instrumentalism has directed attention 
toward ethnicity as a calculation of social, economic, and political profits carried 
out by political elites" (Vermeersch 2011: 7). Authors such as Nagel (1996: 23) 
argue that ethnic mobilisation is the result of individuals engaging "in continuous 
assessment of situation and audience, emphasising or deemphasising particular 
dimensions of ethnicity according to some measure of utility or feasibility".  
2.5) Sources of regional conflict 
 In this investigation, the main source of regional conflict is found in the 
concept of horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are understood as 
systematic economic and political inequality between regional groups (Ostby 
2013: 207), although it should be acknowledged that the literature also applies 
this concept to other types of groups, such as ethnic or religious collectivities 
(Cederman and Girardin 2007). The focus is put on inequalities amongst groups 
and not amongst individuals, as vertical inequalities suggest (Stewart 2008: 12-
13). The latter tries to explain how greed instead of grievance between groups is 
able to explain inequalities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 587-589). Horizontal 
inequalities are taken as a multidimensional frame, with an economic, social, 
cultural, and political dimension (Stewart 2002: 9), all considered intrinsically 
connected, one affected by the other (Stewart 2008: 13).  
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 A variety of reasons can be found to explain these differences between 
regional groups, from economic relations to the distribution of resources (Brown 
and Langer 2010: 29-31). The key issue is that these inequalities are maintained 
through time, helping to create privileged groups in the cores and disadvantaged 
groups in the peripheries (Ostby 2013: 215). These inequalities, maintained over 
time, are perceived as a dominating mechanism implemented by the cores (Ostby 
2013: 215). This perception by the population of the peripheral regions leads to 
its mobilisation when it is articulated as a grievance between them and the cores. 
Grievances are understood here as the feeling that a group has when it perceives 
itself being dominated by another from a superior position (Cederman et al. 2013: 
37-44). 
-    Socio-economic grievances 
 The socio-economic source of regional conflict is the uneven capitalist 
development between centres and the peripheries. Not only is an uneven 
development required, but it has to be institutionalised by the core in order to 
keep the inequalities as a source of income for its own elites. The uneven 
economic development affects therefore the regional population, and is perceived 
as an extraction of surplus by the core and its elites, strengthening these 
inequalities (Myrdal 1957). The socio-economic relation is perceived as a relation 
between the dominated (periphery) and the dominant (core). The strengthening 
of the inequalities results in a social unrest in the peripheries as they see their 
status being undermined in comparison to the core. These socio-economic 
grievances can also be cross-regional. Poor and rich regions can claim that their 
development is limited by the transfers they provide to other regions (Keating 
2017: 12). This might affect the inter-regional solidarity and raise normative 
issues regarding the territorial justice of the welfare state (Strorper 2011: 6-7). 
- Cultural grievances 
 The process of nation-building, unlike the state-building process, is more 
based on the assimilation of the peripheries into the cultural network of the core 
(Keating 2001: 29). This implies the suppression or dissolution of the cultural 
base of the peripheries if they contradict the culture coming from the core 
(Coakley 1992: 344-345). Cultural grievances can be seen as more drastic if 
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there are strong pre-existing distinct cultural elements that differentiate the 
periphery from the core (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 32). Using a Marxist and a 
cultural materialist framework of analysis, the cultural network is a direct result of 
the economic relations existing in a society. Those who own the modes of 
production are able to articulate a whole superstructure of many mechanisms, 
including culture, to express the economic relations on the base of society. 
Therefore, the existing and dominant culture in a society is the reflection of the 
economic relations (Harris 1975; 1979). The nation-state that the core is trying to 
assert in the peripheries is not a simple political entity (Hall 1993: 355), it is the 
articulation of economic relations, expressed through culture, that clashes with 
the economic relations in the periphery, and inevitably with its culture. 
- Political grievances 
 The uneven distribution of power among the elites is a source of territorial 
tensions (Lopez-Arangure, 1983: 33), with the ones coming from the core seeking 
to gain more and more power in the peripheries and the local ones seeking to 
maintain the one they have. The regional population seems to feel a 
disconnection between the defence of their interests and the power relations and 
decision-making processes, from which they are excluded. The exclusion of the 
regional population from any power relations and decision-making processes 
deepens the feeling of being subordinated to the interest of others. The power 
struggle between the different elites is the main example of the political 
grievances that the implementation of certain power relations creates.  In terms 
of the relations between the centres and the peripheries, this can be 
contextualised in the homogenous wave that tries to strengthen the interests of 
the elites at the core (Rokkan and Urwin 1982), subordinating the peripheries to 
their will. 
2.6) From horizontal inequalities to regional conflict 
 The process that explains regional conflict through horizontal inequalities 
can be divided into two main steps. The first step refers to the identification of 
horizontal inequalities as grievances, and the second step refers to the 
grievances as a source of mobilisation amongst the regional population. 
Referring to the first step, the main argument is that grievances on their own are 
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not enough to promote regional conflict (Ostby 2013: 216). The reason for this is 
that, in opposition to horizontal inequalities, grievances are seen as subjective 
phenomena (Cederman et al. 2011: 481). These grievances need to be 
acknowledged by the regional population in order for it to construct its own group 
identity that identifies it as a disadvantaged social group (Stewart 2008: 7-12). 
This own identity articulated by the regional population is the first step to fuel 
regional conflict between the periphery and the centre. Social comparison is key 
here to understand how a group identifies itself as disadvantaged in comparison 
to others, increasing the chances for conflict (Ashmore et al. 2001: 3-4). The 
result of these self-perceived grievances amongst the regional population is the 
feeling of resentment, as Petersen states (2002: 40), understood as the feeling 
of being politically dominated. 
 The second step focuses on the process of mobilisation. For a group to be 
able to mobilise around these grievances, two main elements are needed (Ostby 
2013: 216): organisation and opportunity. Organisation is understood as the 
ability to organise a social group in order to achieve a goal in the name of that 
group and in detriment of another (Stewart 2008: 11-12). Opportunity is 
addressed using Gurr´s argument (1993: 130), understanding it to be internal or 
external, depending on whether this relates to intra-group issues (internal), or if it 
relates to the context in which the group acts (external). Both elements have to 
be present in order to use the already identified grievances as a source of 
regional mobilisation. The fulfilment of the process that explains regional conflict 
through horizontal inequalities is expressed in regionalism as one of the main 
counter-core movements that can be found in sub-national political scenarios. 
2.7) Regionalism as a counter-core movement 
-    Socio-economic regionalism 
 Socio-economic regionalism is based on the socio-economic 
subordination and dependence that the peripheries suffer (Johnston 1982: 51; 
123-133). The main reason for the appearance of this kind of regionalism is the 
permanent state of undevelopment that the local population of the periphery 
sense their region has (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 39). This can be expressed in 
many ways, such as for example, low wages or poor communication links. The 
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main claim of socio-economic regionalism is the differences between the regions 
and their socio-economic development, having the idea that the relation between 
the core and the periphery is unevenly balanced towards the former (Frank 1969). 
Socio-economic regionalism demands also focus on more equal social 
opportunities for all regions and not the institutionalised inequalities that make 
some regions richer and more developed than others, highlighting the importance 
of upgrading the less favoured regions with more investment in order to catch up 
with the rest. 
 This kind of regionalism is the best example of the clash between the elites 
in order to rearrange the socio-economic relations and ownership of the modes 
of production (Massey 1984: 105; 112). Demanding a full decentralisation of 
socio-economic matters is one of its most mentioned purpose, being the best way 
to manage from within the region the interests of the local population and its 
socio-economic aspirations and needs. Worth mentioning here is the contrasts 
between socio-economic regionalism and what the new regionalism approach6 
means by regionalisation. Regionalisation can be understood as political 
measures approved by the government to: first, approach the territorial 
organisational needs of a region; second, draw an economic plan to fulfil the 
needs of the region; and third, solving the excessive bureaucratised weight of a 
too centralised state. Socio-economic issues are increasingly presented through 
the regional scope, fuelled by socio-economic grievances (Keating 2017: 13). 
- Cultural regionalism 
 This type of regionalism emerges when certain cultural elements, such as 
language, religion or traditions, are challenged by the culture coming from the 
core (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 35). The key point is that these cultural elements 
that are challenged by the core become politicised. When certain cultural 
elements are challenged by another social group, the threatened social group 
tends to make those cultural elements the political bases of a distinct identity and 
intra-group solidarity (Easton 1965).The main aims of cultural regionalism are: 
first, fight the uniformity that globalisation and the modern nation-states bring 
 
6  To learn more about the New Regionalism Approach, see: Ethier (1998), Hettne and 
Söderbaum (1998), or Söderbaum (2003). 
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(Robertson 1992: 98-105); second, recognition of the cultural differences that 
exist from one social group to the other (Türsan 1998: 3-7); third and final, 
redistribution and decentralisation of power (Weiner 1992: 318-320). In other 
words, regional elites, using regional cultural elements, politicise a distinct 
regional identity from the one coming from the core to maintain their own interests 
as the main privileged group in the periphery. Although in some occasions 
decentralisation processes can fuel strong secessionist positions, normally, this 
distinct regional identity can be part of a broader national project (Núñez Seixas 
2001: 485-486), claiming the self-rule of the region based on this distinctiveness 
(Keating 2001: 28-30). 
- Political regionalism 
 This can be considered as the activity that uses the multi-level political 
channels to reinforce the importance of the regions. This can unfold through the 
institutional design of the state (such as the Senado in Spain or the Bundesrat in 
Germany (Hooghe 1993; Börzel 2000)), or through the adaptation of parties to 
multi-level competition. Decentralisation is one of the most obvious issues raised 
by the regions to protect and promote their interests (Bukowski 1997). 
Decentralisation engages with the process of devolving competences to the 
regions in order to correct, or sometimes to deepen, the differences between the 
regions inside a state through, for example, efficiency in implementing policies 
(López-Santana and Moyer 2012: 770-771). This increases the regional and local 
representativeness and importance in party competition. Examples of political 
regionalism can be seen in the process of political centrifugation SWPs. For 
example, the importance of regional leaders (León 2014: 393), the degree of 
autonomy of the regional branches (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 228), or the 
adaptation of strategies when competing with regionalist parties (Libbrecht et al. 
2011: 625). 
2.8) Spatial dimension 
 Paradoxically, and despite the fact that the location of cores and 
peripheries has an important role in the whole analysis, the reality is that 
geographical location is not the indispensable element that it appears to be from 
the brief summary given above. More than a spatial dimension, the centre-
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periphery analysis gives a territorial dimension, not necessarily attached to a 
specific physical and geographical element. For example, Shils (1975: 3), when 
describing what a core is, gives it a central position when being a productive 
element of cultural values, but does not mention a geographical or physical 
location of this core. Other social sciences incorporate in the centre-periphery 
analysis a more relevant spatial dimension, with authors such as Lewthwaite 
(1966) or Harvey (1969) when they deal with human geography for example. This 
could be seen more as a metaphor rather than an analytic construct using 
location as a determinant element (Wellhofer 1989: 342). Although it must be 
highlighted that at the beginning of the centre-periphery analysis (Myrdal 1957), 
geographical location and the dynamics that the relations between cores and 
peripheries had were used as united and parallelly important, the later 
development of different schools of thought lost the physical locus of the regions 
and focused on the relations as dynamics with different labels, such as urban and 
rural differences (Rokkan 1970: 181-225) or state service delivery (Tarrow et. al. 
1978), without a geographical or physical location. 
- Distance as a geographical variable 
 Two main general considerations can be developed here. The first 
consideration refers to distance as a political metaphor. Distance, real or 
imagined, is used as a political instrument to forge identities, being an active part 
of political discourses (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). If identities are articulated, and 
therefore changing (Hall 1990), space could be part of the characteristics used in 
this shifting (Hall and Jacques 1990). These distances are mainly negotiated and 
not only geographical, meaning that they act in both ways (Giampapa 2004: 193), 
from the core to the periphery and vice versa. On one hand, distance can tend to 
unify by introducing a common identity capable of incorporating the peripheries, 
or on the other hand, distance tends to be used to differentiate, used by the elites 
at the peripheries to articulate a different identity from the one coming from the 
core. 
 The first consideration of distance is understanding it as a political act. One 
of the possible effects of being far away from the centre and having a unified 
political aim of new power relations that benefits the periphery and not simple 
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delegations of the core through identity, is the potential for the agency factor 
(Giampapa 2004: 193). This means that the political community at the periphery 
can, either move from the periphery to the core and become included in its 
economic relations, or create a new core and maintain the preexisting economic 
relations in the periphery (reconfiguration of the periphery), challenging the power 
relations of the core. In the first move, distance is considered as a characteristic 
of the relations between the two types of region, not used to undermine the status 
quo. In the second example, distance is mediated to create and increase a sense 
of common identity in the periphery and consolidate its political saliency as an 
element of distinctiveness.  Connor (1994: 159) described how ethnonational 
bonds are stronger than any other ties, making the intragroup solidarity the best 
example of group identity, being this at the core or at the periphery.  
 The second consideration analyses distance as a geographical and 
psychological factor. The argument here is that the farther a community is from 
the core, the more chances for that community to articulate its own identity based 
on distance. Spatial distance makes individuals see events as more abstracts 
(Henderson et. al. 2006), and therefore, more difficult to make them key to their 
identity articulation. The relation between geographical spatial distance and the 
psychological factor of abstraction is the following. The core, when articulating an 
identity, needs to adapt and assimilate the characteristics of the peripheries in 
order to avoid the abstraction effect, and this adaptation needs to increase as 
distance, and therefore the abstraction effect, also increases. This can be 
translated into a broader political project. The political project that is articulated in 
the core is stronger because the abstraction effect has little impact, and less 
strong at the peripheries because the abstraction effect has a big impact due to 
spatial and social distance. To keep the abstraction effect as weak as possible, 
the political project that comes from the core needs to adapt and mutate to 






3. PARTY COMPETITION  
3.1) Party competition 
 According to the main literature, party competition is essential in the 
functioning of modern democracies (Bielasiak 2005: 331) and democratic 
processes (Powell 1982: 3), but there should be a clear difference between the 
former and the latter. Having party competition as the only way of popular 
involvement in democratic processes makes any democracy very limited (Ware 
1989: 21). Party competition is part of the democratic process, but not the process 
as a whole. In this investigation, party competition is understood using two key 
elements. On one hand, parties´ political issues and positioning and the 
strategies to adopt them (Rovny 2012: 269), and on the other hand, the struggle 
over the interconnectivity of the different dimensions that make up the political 
space (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 59). Parties decide to compete and position 
themselves on the different axes of competition in order to shape the political 
agenda. The four main conditions for party competition are (Bartolini 2002: 89-
90): electoral contestability, electoral availability, electoral decidability, and 
electoral vulnerability. Contestability is aimed to capture and understand the 
degree of openness of the political arena when new competitors want to enter it. 
Electoral availability refers to the articulation of different segments of the 
electorate to be able to produce a change in their preferences. Decidability is 
understood as the process were parties dedicate themselves to produce a 
change in the political scenario through competition. Vulnerability is intended to 
capture the extent to which governments are threatened by the opposition 
through a change in office. 
3.2) Party competition as multi-dimensional 
Articulating the political space in a single-dimension is not enough to 
understand the dense and complex nature of political competition (Albright 2010: 
699-700). The multiplicity of issues makes party competition a 
multidimensionality struggle to connect the different axes of competition in which 
the political space can be divided into (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 56-58). Parties, 
in this complex nature of competition, position themselves according to a 
designed plan and not randomly (Albright 2010:702-704), calculating how they 
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can differentiate between themselves (Tavits 2008: 51). SWP and regionalist 
parties compete to position themselves on these dimensions using different 
strategies in order to maximise the support obtained from the voters (Rovny 2012: 
269-270). Parties, in order to be more efficient when framing their own positions, 
articulate the political space in different dimensions to address the issues that are 
salient for the electorate (Sartori 1976: 350). The multi-dimensional nature of 
party competition is in constant evolution. Parties introduce new issues and axes 
of competition mainly due to two reasons (Albright 2010: 702). First, parties fail 
to obtain the most out of the current structure of voting preferences, making them 
restructure the political space by introducing new issues and dimensions to 
become more efficient. Second, the changing nature of the political space makes 
voters turn to new issues and axes, making parties also turn to them in order to 
obtain political advantage when competing.  
To understand party competition as a multi-dimensional struggle, the two 
main theories that are reviewed here are the spatial (or positional competition) 
and the salience theories of party competition. Despite the fact that they are 
different forms of competition, and following Elias et. al. (2015: 839-840), both 
theories are better understood as complementary and not competing views 
(Alonso 2012: 19; Wegner 2012: 857; Rovny 2013: 5). The spatial and salience 
theories are useful to understand how political parties interact and shape political 
spaces (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 53). Parties behave as suggested by the two 
theories, shaping their own agendas and the agendas of the other parties when 
competing (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609-610). 
 Starting with the spatial theory, Downs (1957: 132-133)7 argues that the 
political space is made up by an unlimited number of issues that the voters 
perceive that could be addressed by their representatives. In his model, these 
issues can be reduced to a single axis, the left-right dimension (Down 1957: 132). 
If a party seeks success in any given election, the wider the range of issues, the 
weaker the position of the party. This results in parties converging these different 
issues along the left-right axis (Alonso 2012: 15). This theory, applied to other 
political dimensions, expects parties to position themselves on multi-axes political 
 
7 This theory is known as the Proximity Theory (Down 1957). 
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spaces to compete with each other (Elias et. al. 2015: 840). Following with the 
salience theory, and according to Budge and Farlie (1983: 23)8, it can be seen 
that parties challenge each other using issues that are considered important and 
in which they are going to be judged positively. The way they choose the issues 
is more based on their own credibility and prestige (Petrocik 1996: 825-826). In 
this sense, they “own” the issues that they use to maximise votes. This theory 
expects parties to selectively emphasise issues favourable to them (Alonso 2012: 
16). Parties accommodate these issues for their own purpose, which means that 
they emphasise more an issue if they think that they will gain more support or 
centralise their discourses when an issue needs to be settled down with a low 
profile (Klingemann et. al. 1994). Following Elias et al. (2015: 841), and focusing 
on the Steenbergen and Scott (2004: 190-191), there is a key difference between 
the two theories. On one hand, the positional theory expects parties to challenge 
each other by moving within the political space available. On the other hand, the 
salience theory expects parties to challenge each other by selectively 
emphasising issues that are favourable to them, defining the political space. The 
difference is that in the first case, the position of parties is endogenous to 
competition, and in the second case, it is the salience which is endogenous to 
competition.  
Finally, three main sets of assumptions can be emphasised after setting 
out the main lines of the two theories described above. The first set of 
assumptions deals with the single-axis debate concerning Downs´s argument. 
Despite the argument given by Downs (1957: 132), parties can be classified using 
a multi-axis dimension (Alonso 2012: 31) and not only the left-right dimension. 
This links with the consideration, by part of the literature, of regionalist parties as 
niche parties, which deal only with a specific issue, normally unaligned on the 
left-right axis (Elias et. al. 2015: 841). Support for these parties is based on quasi-
exclusive issues was used to support the niche theory (Meguid 2008: 14-15). The 
recent debates in the literature have proved with empirical data that regionalist 
parties could be considered in the same way as SWPs, this is, as rational actors 
in the political space, acting strategically (Elias 2009: 549-552; Hepburn 2009: 
 
8 This theory is known as the Salience and Issue Ownership Theory (Robertson 1976; Budge 
and Farlie 1983). 
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478-479; Alonso 2012: 29). These studies reflect the fact that regionalist parties 
position themselves on other axes and not only on their core strategy (Elias et. 
al. 2015: 843). Dealing with the second set of assumptions, and despite the fact 
that Downs´s analysis of the classification of parties on a single-axis is not 
sufficient for this investigation, here it could be said that his assumptions that the 
spatial theory of voters is informed by the self-interest of the actors (1957: 31) 
can also be applied to parties. Political parties move in a multi-axis political arena 
seeking self-interest (Rovny 2013: 1), positioning themselves and selecting any 
issue that would benefit them (Tavits 2008: 51). The third and last set of 
assumptions goes in the same lines as Budge’s and Farlie’s theory (1983). 
Although voters´ preferences can change over time according to their own 
choices (1957: 46), parties also attempt to move them to maximise their changes, 
moving voters´ preferences to their own location.  
- Two axes of competition considered in this investigation 
 Following Alonso (2012: 31), political spaces are better understood as a 
multi-axis framework and not only a single-issue focus, such as Downs´s (1957: 
132) development of the left-right axis. As seen above, party competition is 
understood as a multi-dimensional competition (Elias et. al. 2015: 842), nearly 
without an end to the number of possible dimensions due to the complexity of the 
political space and party competition (Albright 2010: 699-700). An axis of 
competition is understood as the main issue packages or related dimensions in 
which a party competes and positions itself. To narrow down the number of axes 
ex ante and in advance (Benoit and Laver 2012: 196), two have been selected: 
the left-right, and the centre-periphery (or territorial) axes. These two axes make 
up the, in multi-level and in multi-national democracies, the two most salient 
dimensions in party competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 852; Field and Hamann 
2015: 902) 
 The first axis of competition is the well-known left-right axis. This axis has 
been considered by the literature in the past years as the single or most important 
axis of the political space (Huber and Powell 1994: 294; Powell 2000: 162-163; 
Adam et. al. 2006: 31; Albright 2010: 701). In order to prevent concept stretching 
and to narrow down the scope of this investigation, two main dimensions are 
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considered to be part of this axis: the economic and the social dimensions. In 
other words, the degree of control over the economy and the degree of 
inclusiveness towards minorities or other social groups (Benoit and Laver 2012: 
195). Economic issues are mainly the first considerations when dealing with this 
axis, but the literature also has identified other issues that may relate to the left-
right axis (Elias et al. 2015: 842). Issues such as social concerns, religious values 
or alternative ways of doing politics have also been considered to be contained 
in the left-right axis (Hooghe et al. 2002: 967; Marks et al. 2006: 156-157; Wagner 
2012: 849-852; Massetti and Schakel 2015: 877). Left positioned parties tend to 
be more inclusive in opposition to right positioned parties, which tend to be more 
conservative. The reason to have the left-right axis included in this investigation 
is that ideology can be seen as the narrative that is used by parties to interconnect 
the different dimensions in which the political space is divided into (Rovny and 
Edwards 2012: 59), but without collapsing all dimensions into it because it would 
not capture other issues with sufficient depth (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976: 
269-272). This is especially applicable to SWPs in multilevel party competition. 
 The second axis of competition is the centre-periphery (territorial) axis. 
This axis is based on the centre-periphery cleavage described above. Party 
competition on this axis can be seen as an example of how the left-right axis of 
competition is not adequate enough to channel regional conflict with the needed 
robustness, even if the state is more ethnically homogeneous than multi-ethnic 
(Albright 2010: 702). This centre-periphery cleavage is articulated around the 
dispute for the political control of the peripheries (Alonso et al. 2015: 852). The 
homogenisation wave that the core tried to impose state-wide gets challenged by 
the peripheries that, on one hand, have a distinct historical, economic, cultural, 
and/or linguistic background, and on the other hand, do not have strong 
distinctive characteristics but politicise other grievances such as economic or 
political inequalities. The motivations for this centre-periphery cleavage differ 
from region to region, and there is not a common denominator regarding 
mobilisation in the peripheries (Elias et al. 2015: 843). Despite this variation, one 
main shared characteristic can be outlined here. All the actors that compete along 
this axis share in common that they seek territorial control over their region 
(Alonso 2012: 25; Hepburn 2009: 482). It emerges when the elites in the 
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periphery within distant, distinct, and dependent peripheries challenge and 
oppose the homogenisation wave coming from the core and which represents the 
interests of the central elites (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). 
The centre-periphery axis can be defined for this investigation as the axis where 
the state´s right to rule uniformly state-wide is challenged (Elias et al. 2015: 843). 
 This centre-periphery axis, which is the direct translation of the centre-
periphery cleavage, needs to be considered as deeply rooted in political 
competition and not as a niche issue or dimension (Rovny 2015: 915). The point 
of view that takes the left-right axis as the prime dimension in which all other 
issues can be collapsed is not valid any more as the multidimensionality of party 
competition makes dimensions interact, with no clear dominant axis. This 
argument is applicable especially to multi-national and multi-level democracies or 
political scenarios where the centre is heavily challenged by its peripheries (Elias 
et al. 2015: 843). In states where the peripheries are empowered enough to 
become a threat to the centre, the centre-periphery axis becomes as important 
as the traditional left-right divide (Field and Hamann 2015: 900). SWPs, when 
positioning themselves on this centre-periphery axis, tend to nationalise the 
issues discussed, subordinating the sub-national to the national level (Cabeza et 
al. 2017: 80). On the other hand, regionalist parties tend to focus more on issues 
that belong to the centre-periphery cleavage, or at least, articulate issues 
according to this axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 852). In other words, and comparing 
the left-right and centre-periphery axes, it can be said that SWPs tend to collapse 
all issues into the left-right axis (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 636-637), and regionalist 
parties tend to collapse all issues into the centre-periphery axis (Massetti and 
Schakel 2015: 866-868). In relation to this, it must be stated that regionalist 
parties have clearer pro-periphery positions than SWPs in general (Alonso et al. 
2017: 252-253), which may vary for the latter depending on their position on the 
left-right axis and their degree of inclusiveness. 
 The above argument can be summarised by putting the focus on the 
purpose of the elites that use parties to achieve a certain goal. Political parties 
are understood as the main instrument to impose power relations and decision-
making processes in the core and in the periphery (Fitjar 2010a: 7-9). In this 
sense, on one hand, some SWPs try to impose centralisation, which legitimises 
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certain socio-economic relations through a strong national-dominated project, 
and on the other hand, some regional and SWPs try to challenge that core-
dominated political project with a more regional, regionalist or secessionist 
project. As the literature dealing with the new waves of regionalism argues 
(Agnew 2002; Paasi, 2004; Keating 2008) in comparison to the “old” regionalism 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose and Urwin 1975), territorial tensions are central 
to the explanation of the success of some regional and SWPs and the subsequent 
territorial policies. An example of this can be observed in the articulation of 
regional identities. At this point is where the analysis of Paasi regarding identity 
and region (2002: 139-141) could be introduced, but applied to political parties 
as the main actors. Taking into account Keating´s three elements of any regional 
identity (1998: 86), the important one that could be applied here is the third one. 
This refers to the regional identity as instrumental, where the region is used as 
the basis for mobilisation and collective action amongst the local population 
through the described grievances. Regional identity, as a hierarchical and nested 
social phenomenon (Herb and Kaplan 1999) is articulated using features which 
correspond to the region itself that are stereotyped (Paasi 2002: 140) by political 
parties in order to mobilise the local population in the regions.  
3.3) Strategies adopted by political parties in a multi-dimensional competition 
There are four basic strategies that parties can follow to position 
themselves in the different dimensions that articulate party competition (Elias et 
al. 2015): the uni-dimensional, the blurring, the subsuming, and the two-
dimension strategy. Before going into the analysis of each of these strategies, 
one important point could be clarified. These strategies are not circumscribed to 
electoral campaigns or periods (Elias et al. 2015: 841). For this investigation, the 
strategies that parties select are considered more in a long run rather than 
designed exclusively for electoral campaigns. Political competition is articulated 
rather as a process that is sustained in time, although this process can be divided 
into the institutional scenario and the campaigns, but both part of the same 




- Four main strategies 
The first strategy is the uni-dimensional strategy. Here, parties select one 
dimension, either the left-right or the centre-periphery axis, and focus on that one 
ignoring the other one. The way parties articulate this strategy can be as follows: 
they chose a certain axis, either left-right or the centre-periphery axis, depending 
on how much they are interested in exploiting that same axis. They will tend to 
emphasise the issues along the core axis and ignore any other issue that is not 
aligned to it (Elias et al. 2015: 844). Some SWPs are expected to position 
themselves on the left-right axis and ignore any issue that constitutes the centre-
periphery axis, and some regional and SWPs are expected to do the opposite, 
emphasise the centre-periphery axis and ignore the left-right axis. 
The second strategy consists in adopting a vague, contradictory, or 
ambiguous strategy towards issues that are placed in the second dimension or 
axis. The difference between this strategy and the first uni-dimensional one is 
that here parties do not ignore issues on the second axis, they just have a 
calculated vague position, so they do not lose support from voters on the first axis 
and at the same time do not leave the second axis entirely for the other parties 
to benefit from all the voters there. This is set by the party-system agenda, forcing 
parties to take positions on issues from the second axis that sometimes they are 
not willing to take. In order to position themselves along the second axis and 
keeping it at the same time vague, they express their opinions blurry (Elias et al. 
2015: 844). Some SWPs are expected to focus on the left-right axis and position 
themselves vaguely on the centre-periphery axis, and some regional and SWPs 
are expected to act the opposite way. 
The third strategy can be labelled as the subsuming strategy. Here, parties 
deliberately try to erase the second dimension by framing the issues associated 
with it into the core axis (Elias et al., 2015: 845). Parties will try to frame and 
accommodate a secondary dimension issues into their core axis, which Rovny 
and Edwards (2012: 70) found that for SWPs this means subsuming territorial 
issues into the left-right axis. This is, according to Elias et al. (2015: 845), a 
rhetorical strategy of the parties to try to attract to their core axis as many voters 
as possible that normally prioritise the second axis. Some SWPs are expected to 
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subsume territorial issues into the left-right axis, and vice versa with some 
regional and SWPs.  
The last and fourth strategy is known as the two-dimension strategy (Elias 
et al. 2015: 845). In this strategy, parties position themselves on both axes 
without distinguishing which one is the main and which one is the secondary axis 
or dimension. SWPs and regionalist parties will position themselves on the left-
right and centre-periphery axes. The positions in this strategy differentiate from 
the first, second, and third in the sense that parties will position on the left-right 
and centre-periphery axes with clear and structured opinions about issues 
concerning both axes (Alonso et al., 2015: 853). The secondary axis is 
considered by the literature as complementary to the first axis (Alonso et al., 
2015: 853), but it rather seems as if both axes act as principal axes, and not 
simply one complementing the other, which would distinguish this strategy more 
clearly from the second and more sharply from the third one.  
4. PARTY COMPETITION OVER THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE IN 
SPAIN 
4.1) The centre-periphery cleavage in Spain and its evolution 
Before introducing the review of the literature regarding the behaviour of 
parties along the centre-periphery in Spain, it is necessary to set out the evolution 
of this social cleavage in the last two centuries. Instead of going far back in 
history, the starting point of this narrative is the 1812 Constitution, not because it 
was the first one based on national sovereign (Torres del Moral 2011: 88-92), 
which it was (Eastman and Sobrevilla Perea 2015: 2-3), but because it was the 
first time that a true articulation and development of the Spanish state was 
attempted, which included the regulation of the relations between the  different 
regions (Muro and Quiroga 2004: 20-22). This key event represents the start of 
the transition of Spain from an imperial to a national state and kick started the 
processes of state- and national-building in full (Ruane 2003: 30), providing at the 
same time the grounds for the emergence of the modern social cleavages 
identified by Rokkan (1987; 1999), amongst which the centre-periphery split 
represented one of the most salient ones.  
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Conflicts between regions have been strongly present in Spanish modern 
history before the 1812 Constitution (Moreno 2002: 399), but it was the 
dissolution of most of the Empire by the first quarter of the 19th century and the 
introduction of modern economic relations what triggered important regional 
grievances (Centeno and Ferraro 2013: 14-18), which fuelled by some resilient 
cultural differences in important peripheral regions (Beramendi 1999: 81), gave 
way to territorial tension that where mostly dealt with via two dichotomous 
solutions: federalism (e.g., Peyrou 2007) and centralism (e.g., Aróstegui 1998). 
The enforcement of these two political solutions did not solve the centrifugal 
problems of the state-building process that Spain underwent, reinforcing the 
negative reaction of the central and peripheral elites. The struggle between these 
elites did not only undermined the establishment of a solid Spanish state, but it 
also weakened any attempt of articulating a Spanish national identity, which 
fluctuated between its civic and ethnical variants (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15). 
By the end of the 19th century, Spain could be described as a, to some extent, 
“failure” both in its state- and nation-building processes (Linz et al. 2004: 15), with 
an evident lack of ability to implement, on one hand, a unitary political structure 
in the form of a modern state (Linz 1973: 102), and on the other hand, the 
articulation of a national base with which the generality of the Spanish people 
could identify (Linz 1993: 255). In addition, the regional grievances in certain 
peripheral areas, specially the Basque Country and Catalonia, were used by local 
elites to stablish a solid intellectual base with which to articulate strong peripheral 
nationalisms in the incoming century (Muro and Quiroga 2004: 23). 
The succession of military and civil coupes, weak governments, territorial 
tensions, and uneven socio-economic development of powerful industrialised and 
backward agricultural regions during the second half of the 19th century weighed 
down the coming of the new century (Ruane 2003: 30). The loss of the last 
overseas territorial possessions deepened the general sense of the Spanish 
failure in terms of building a modern European state and nation (Muro and 
Quiroga 2005: 15-16). In this context, the struggle between central and peripheral 
elites became political with the emergence of strong regional movements in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the new bourgeoise local elites had 
the means to stablish well-grounded social bases (Enrlich 1998: 400; Mees 1990: 
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115). Taking advantage of the weakness of the Spanish regime, these 
movements were channelled through newly created political parties, or at least 
the first examples of regionalist parties in Spain, which attracted the desires for 
more autonomy in both regions. The Lliga Regionalista (e.g., Smith 2010) and 
the PNV (e.g., Castells et al. 2007) were the result of these tensions and the 
response of the peripheral elites in their demands against the centralist forces of 
Madrid. The central governments reacted to this challenge in two main ways. On 
one hand, the resurge of a strong ethnical Spanish-Castilian nationalism in light 
of the intellectual discussion to find the psyche of the nation (Muro and Quiroga 
2004: 26), and on the other hand, using repressive and strongly ideologised 
means which crystallised during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s 
(Quiroga 2004: 243-245). After a short alliance of the left and the peripheral 
movements using a more liberal understanding of the Spanish nation during the 
Second Republic (1931-1939) (Pastor 2012: 96-102), the fascist dictatorship of 
Francisco Franco (1939-1975) reinforced these centralist ethnical tendencies 
with even more brutal mechanisms (Núñez Seixas 2007: 61-63). As a result, the 
first three quarters of the 20th century saw powerful centripetal forces that 
deepened the grievances between the centre and its peripheries (Muro and 
Quiroga 2005: 20).   
With the end of the fascist dictatorship and the coming of the current 
democratic regime, both the central and peripheral elites articulated a political 
compromise to incorporated regional demands in an overall inclusive Spanish 
state (Moreno 2002: 399-400). In light of this new context, which left behind the 
incarnate struggle between the different ideas of Spain, the Autonomous 
Communities were, and still are, a reflection of these demands, which not only 
included the historical Catalan and Basque appeals, but also incorporate the new 
regionalisms (Ysàs 1994: 106-107). This political climate of negotiation and 
compromise also favoured the articulation of a Spanish national identity based 
on liberal and democratic premises and leaving behind its hyper-Castilian 
conception (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010: 7-11), and at the same time, open 
to the possibility of recognising sub-national realities (Muñoz Mendoza 2012: 50-
70). This resulted in a dual identity feeling (no contradiction between feeling 
Spanish and belonging to a specific region) that most of the Spanish population 
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currently has (Moreno 1997a: 126-127). Spain now can be described a 
multinational state with a strong decentralised system in which territorial 
disparities could be dealt with via well-established channels (Colomer 1998: 40-
41). Despite this political compromise between the centre and the peripheries, 
the regional grievances did not disappear as this new quasi-federal system 
resulted in a de facto uneven territorial outcome, with many differences between 
Autonomous Communities (Moreno 2002: 400). The main contribution In 
comparison to previous historical periods is that the Constitution of 1978 
implemented a political system in which territorial tensions and grievances can 
be solved peacefully (Moreno 1997b: 65-66), and this was a key step in Spanish 
history.  
This new peaceful multi-level scenario deepened the complexity of the 
centre-periphery cleavage and added new dynamics which trespassed the simple 
dichotomy between the centre and its peripheries. As Flynn (2004: 139-141) puts 
it, it is now a tripartite competition between the state-legitimating centralists, the 
non-Spanish nationalist, and the Spanish-identified regionalist. This competition 
takes place in the three main levels of power (central, regional, and local) that 
resulted from the process of decentralisation and which are now the fundamental 
arenas of competition in which parties move to fulfil their main agendas, being 
these state-wide or purely regionalist (Keating and Wilson 2009: 536-538). Party 
competition in these arenas can be labelled as multiple ethnoterritorial 
concurrence (Moreno 1995). It can be described as a competition between 
different political actors and agendas which represent different ways of 
understanding Spain with the purpose of solving territorial conflicts in a peaceful 
way by incorporating and acknowledging the existence of different ethnical 
realities without undermining the possibility of articulating an overall plural society 
(Moreno 1994: 163). This rests on three principals that the new regime stablished 
as the pillars on which the state was going to lay down (Moreno 1997: 73): 
democratic decentralisation; comparative grievance; and interterritorial solidarity. 
4.2) General overview of party competiton along the centre-periphery cleavage  
The aim of this subsection is to review how parties behave and compete 
in Spain along the centre-periphery cleavage that the Constitution of 1978 
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channeled through peaceful means. Party competition in Spain is well-stablished 
as multi-dimensional (Amat 2012: 451), where the decentralisation process 
initiated by the Constitution of 1978 gave way to strong regional governments. 
This federalisation of the Spanish state (Agranoff 1996; Moreno 1997a; Requejo 
2004) pushed parties to adapt to a multi-level and multi-dimensional political 
arena using multiple strategies to maximise their performance during regional 
elections (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 200-201; Rovny 2012: 270-273) and an 
appropriate internal structure suitable to face this challenge (Fabre 2008: 318-
324). 
The literature that focuses on party competition in Spain has dealt with 
different topics to understand party behaviour at the regional level (Wilson 2012: 
124). Some studies focus primarily on the external behaviour of parties, dealing 
with issues such as the formation of regional governments (Falcó-Gimeno and 
Verge 2013), how new parties affect national and regional party systems (Rodon 
and Hierro 2016), or the negotiation of bills in the national parliament (Field and 
Hamann 2015). In terms of the internal behaviour of parties, the main topics are 
essentially the strategies that parties can adopt to positions themselves in a multi-
dimensional political space (Alonso et al. 2015), how they adapt their internal 
structure to a multi-level democracy (Hopkin 2009), or the interaction of SWPs 
and regionalist parties (Keating and Wilson 2009). To narrow down the scope of 
this subsection, party behaviour is understood to be articulated around three main 
issues: saliency, position, and strategies.  
Overall, the saliency, position, and strategies of SWPs and regionalist 
parties, using mostly the RMP but also other data sources, can be summarised 
in the following conclusions. In terms of saliency, SWPs normally tend to 
emphasise the left-right axis in comparison to regionalist parties, which 
emphasise more the centre-periphery axis, their respective core dimensions. 
When it comes to their positions, SWPs can be located in overall pro-periphery 
positions, graduated by their nature as state-wide actors. In comparison, 
regionalist parties have stronger pro-periphery positions, in line with the expected 
behavior of these kind of parties. The strategies that both types of parties adopt 
are more focused on positioning themselves on both dimensions, in line with the 
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literature that considers SWPs and regionalist parties multi-dimensional 
competing actors. 
4.3) Saliency and position 
 When it comes to the saliency and position of parties that compete at the 
regional level in Spain along the centre-periphery cleavage, the literature has 
tried to give an overview of how they behave using mostly quantitative methods 
of analysis (Libbrecht et al. 2009; Alonso 2012; Alonso et al. 2013; Alonso et al. 
2015; Alonso et al. 2017). These different analyses are based mostly on the CMP 
and, most recently, the RMP, which applies the same methodology (Klingemann 
et al. 2006) but with a multi-level perspective. Depending on which data-set is 
used, the results are different, but some general behaviours can be outlined. The 
main purpose of these seminal works is to highlight the emphasis that parties 
give to the centre-periphery axis, what issues they emphasise along it, and how 
they position along it. 
 In terms of the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage, the results are 
the following. SWPs vary in their emphasis on the centre-periphery axis (Alonso 
et al. 2015: 856), mainly to avoid attempting to battle with regionalist parties on 
their own terrain (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 74). SWPs, in line with the issue-
ownership theory, emphasise more the left-right axis (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 74), 
where they are seen by voters as reliable actors (Alonso 2012: 73-75) and it is 
considered their core dimension (Alonso et al. 2015: 855). Turning to the 
positional scores, overall, they adopt more pro-periphery positions rather than 
clear pro-centre in defense of the interests where their loyalties are based (Alonso 
2012: 75). Their behaviour, both in terms of saliency and position, is strongly 
determined by the context in which they act, and this needs to be studied 
according to the region in which they act (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 75-76). 
Competition with strong regionalist parties make SWPs´ behaviour clearly shift. 
This is translated into further emphasising the centre-periphery axis (Alonso et al. 
2015: 856) and the position they adopt is less consistent, increasing variation, 
having stronger pro-periphery position but also introducing clearer pro-centre 
positions. Other authors confirm this shift, but with less significance (Libbrecht et 
al. 2009: 76). When applying the RMP, Alonso et al. (2013: 203-207) are able to 
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confirm this shift with more precision in the behavior of both the PSOE and the 
PP during the period 2008-2011. An example of this can be found in the PP, 
where its manifestos for the Basque Country and its regional framework were 
clearly pro-centre (Alonso et al. 2013: 206).  
The final observation in relation to SWPs is that their behaviour is affected 
by their ideological orientation (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 625). Probably the most 
significant behaviour than can be pointed out from the above-mentioned studies 
is not the overall saliency and position of SWPs on the centre-periphery axis in 
Spain, but the different behaviour observed between the PSOE and the PP. The 
reason is that the PSOE, being a more inclusive and decentralised party, allows 
for a stronger saliency of the centre-periphery axis and pro-periphery positions in 
comparison to the PP, a more conservative and integrated party (Libbrecht et al. 
2009:76; Libbrecht et al. 2011: 631; Alonso et al. 2013: 205-206).  This is also 
outlined by the findings of Alonso and Gómez, who pointed out the higher 
dispersion of emphasis and position that the regional branches of the PSOE have 
in comparison to the PP (2011: 196-201). Hopkins (2009) also confirms these 
differences between the regional branches according to which party they belong 
to, especially focused on the PSOE. The decentralisation process of the Spanish 
state coincided with the decentralisation process of the party, which matches the 
expectations of the regions in a multi-level party competition scenario (Hopkins 
2009: 192-195).  
When comparing SWPs with regionalist parties, Alonso (2012) and Alonso 
et al. (2015) are able to describe the emphasis given by the latter to the centre-
periphery axis. According to these authors, overall, regionalist parties give more 
emphasis to the centre-periphery axis than SWPs (Alonso 2012: 72-73), as 
expected. Despite this, the results of the above two studies showed a clear 
difference depending on the data-set used. Using the CMP (Alonso 2012), 
regionalist parties gave more emphasis to the left-right axis in comparison to the 
centre-periphery axis. This might not be a surprise when it comes to the SWPs, 
but it is somehow an interesting result for regionalist parties, taking into 
consideration that the centre-periphery cleavage is supposed to be their core 
dimension (Alonso et al. 2017: 242). When the RMP introduced data for the 
regional elections (Alonso et al. 2015), results seemed to change, and regionalist 
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parties dedicated more amount of space, and therefore, emphasised more the 
centre-periphery axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 855-856), but without dismissing the 
left-right axis, outlining the importance of both axes for these parties (Alonso et 
al. 2017: 249).  
The studies that used the RMP (Alonso et al. 2013; 2015; 2017), in 
comparison to those that used the CMP (Libbrecht 2009; Alonso 2012; Libbrecht 
et al. 2011), are more precise in their findings. The variation in the results 
obtained applying the RMP can be explained by observing how regionalist parties 
adapt to the context and circumstances in which they act (Alonso et al. 2017: 
258). In relation to the position along the centre-periphery axis, these studies 
confirm the regionalist parties´ programmatic clarity. This is, they strongly 
emphasise pro-periphery positions along the centre-periphery axis (Alonso 2012: 
79-84; Alonso et al. 2017: 251-253). Results show that the variation on the left-
right axis is higher than on the centre-periphery axis, where pro-centre positions 
are non-existent (Alonso et al. 2015: 856). The positions on the left-right axis are 
less consistent in comparison to SWPs, and this is more determined by a catch-
all strategies of vote maximisation (Alonso et al. 2017: 258). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the different dimension and issue packages 
that make up the centre-periphery axis for both the SWPs and regionalist parties. 
The centre-periphery axis is made of two primary dimensions (Alonso et al. 2013: 
190-192): the competential and identitarian dimensions. The competential 
dimension refers to the distribution of political authority between the regions and 
the central government. This dimension affects all the issues that regionalist 
parties emphasise. These range from health to economic issues, or in other 
words, all the issues that make up their manifestos except for those that make up 
the next dimension. The identitarian dimension relates to the claims over 
nationhood, nation-building, and identity in the region. The issues that make up 
this dimension are those related to the regional-building process, especially 
culture, language, and regional-building policies.  
With these two dimensions in mind, and applying them to regionalist 
parties, the latter have a mixed record of emphasising either (Alonso et al. 2017: 
253-257). For example, Eh Bildu focuses its manifestos on a clear identitarian 
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themes. In contrast, CC behaves in the opposite direction, emphasising more the 
competential dimension of the territorial axis.  Regionalist parties can be grouped 
in three different behaviours when combining the competential and identitarian 
dimensions (Alonso et al. 2017: 256-257). The first group focuses on the 
identitarian dimension, leaving little space for the competential dimension. The 
second group centers its attention on the competential dimension. Finally, the 
third group combines the two dimensions more or less with the same intensity. 
Alonso et al. (2013) show that the emphasis given by SWPs to both dimensions 
is more or less the same, in line with the above third group of the regionalist 
parties. Libbrecht et al. (2009) try to disentangle the issues that make up the 
electoral profile of SWPs, classifying them under the different competences that 
can be found in Spain, amongst which one can find, for example, agriculture, 
health care, defence, or education. 
4.4) Strategies 
The strategies that parties follow when competing in regional elections 
along this multi-dimensional political space can be observed in Libbrecht et al. 
(2011), Alonso (2012), and Alonso et al. (2015). Other authors also focus on the 
different strategies that parties adopt at the regional level but in relation to other 
issues, such as, for example, strategies for government coalitions (Tronconi 
2015), territorial reform (Verge 2013), or how regional branches nationalise 
regional politics (Cabeza et al. 2017). When it comes to the strategies of SWPs 
and regionalist parties along the centre-periphery axis, it must be pointed out that 
both parties, when competing at the regional level, blur less on the centre-
periphery than on the left-right axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 857). This is not strange 
for regionalist parties, as this is their core dimension, but for SWPs, this was not 
expected. It is important, despite these results, to highlight that, because party 
competition is multi-dimensional, along the centre-periphery and left-right axes, 
both the SWPs and regionalist parties contextualise their strategies in both 
dimensions (Alonso et al. 2015: 859-860). 
The behaviour of SWPs in Spain has been explained by Libbrecht et al. in 
the following way (2011: 626). When competing with regionalist parties, they can 
adopt three kinds of strategies. The first is the accommodative strategy, applied 
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when SWPs adopt centre-periphery issues to compete with regionalist parties, 
especially if the latter are strong. The second is the adversarial strategy, when 
SWPs compete with opposite demands to those of regionalist parties. The third 
is the dismissive strategy, applied when SWPs do not face regionalist parties. 
According to the results, findings point to the fact that SWPs normally adopt the 
first strategy, although more recently, the literature has identified a more defined 
two-dimension strategy as the most common one (Alonso 2012: 36; Alonso et al. 
2015: 858). Facing strong regionalist parties in most of the regions (Libbrecht et 
al. 2011: 634-637) results in a position over the two axes of competition (Elias et 
al. 2015: 846). These different strategies reveal that SWPs need to adapt to the 
regional context to select the necessary strategy (Alonso et al. 2015: 859-860).  
In order to counterbalance these pro-periphery positions by SWPs, 
regionalist parties also adopt a two-dimension strategy (Alonso et al. 2015: 859; 
Elias et al. 2015: 846). This is translated in two different outcomes (Alonso 2012: 
234-235): either they emphasise more radical pro-periphery positions, or they 
diversify their positions on the second dimension, the left-right axis. Decentralised 
states tend to give way to grievances between regions, and regionalist parties 
can use this circumstance to adapt to multiple scenarios in order to maximise 
their performance (Alonso 2012: 235). The two-dimension strategies locate 
regionalist parties on stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs, in line with 
their primary purpose. 
5. IDENTIFYING THE GAP IN THE LITERATURA 
5.1) The general literature 
As it has been outlined in the sub-sections above, the main literature that 
addresses party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain at the 
regional level gravitates around three main issues that are used to define their 
behaviour: saliency, position, and strategies. A decentralised state like Spain is 
a salient case to understand how parties adapt to a multi-level democracy where 
the regional arena is crucial and compete in a multi-dimensional political space 
where the centre-periphery cleavage is one of the key axes of competition 
(Alonso et al. 2015: 852). Turning the focus to the regional level to understand 
how territorial tensions are addressed, it is important to observe how parties 
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adapt to new dynamics of competition (Jeffery 2009: 640). This applies to both 
SWPs and regionalist parties, which, as rationale actors, look to contextualise 
and maximise their electoral performance (Hepburn 2009: 487-489; Libbrecht et 
al. 2009: 75-76; Massetti 2009: 502; Libbrecht et al. 2011: 634-636; Alonso et al. 
2015: 859-861; Rovny 2015: 916).  
The different studies that build on the research agenda stablished by the 
RMP address, in order to understand party behaviour, topics such as for example, 
issue packages in party manifestos (Alonso et al. 2017), the importance of 
internal consistency and cohesion (Klingelhöfer 2014), SWPs facing regional 
elections (Gómez et al. 2014), or how parties try to nationalise regional elections 
(Cabeza et al. 2017). Some of these studies focus on the possible factors that 
are expected to shape party behaviour in relation to these issues. Amongst these 
different factors, the most common are type of party, SWPs facing or not 
regionalist parties, or ideological position. The same can be observed in the 
literature that does not utilise the RMP but also centres the attention on party 
behaviour via other research agendas. The main issues that are addressed are, 
for example, party issue profile in relation to the distribution of competences 
between levels (Libbrecht et al. 2009), how do parties adjust to a two-dimensional 
party competition (Massetti 2009; Massetti and Schakel 2015), possible 
strategies that parties might follow in regional elections (Libbrecht et al. 2011), 
the importance of internal cohesion (León 2017), or how decentralisation has 
affected the ideological positioning of parties (León 2014; Massetti and Schakel 
2016) and behaviour (Elias and Tronconi 2011). Again, some factors that are 
expected to shape party behaviour in relation to these issues are introduced to 
better understand the main findings, such as por example, party systems, 
economic development of the regions, or identity. 
Despite this considerable body of literature on party competition, the 
factors that are expected to shape their behaviour tend to be the same: economic 
development of regions, identity, language, party type, ideological position, and 
SWPs facing or not regionalist parties. These can be divided into regional- and 
party-level factors. The first category refers to the characteristics that can be used 
to describe a region, such as for example, economic development, identity, and 
language. The second category addresses the characteristics that can be used 
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to define parties, such as for example, party type, ideological position, and SWPs 
facing or not regionalist parties. The main findings in relation to these factors 
provide strong insights and have expanded knowledge on party behaviour in a 
multi-dimensional political space. However, there is little or no attention to other 
possible factors, as preliminary flagged in the previous chapter, that could also 
deeply affect how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage and are 
currently overlooked. This is the gap in the literature that this investigation tries 
to engage with in relation to the above identified research problem. 
Amongst these overlooked factors, the emphasis is placed on: distance, 
fragmentation, and polycentricity. The task here is to understand what makes 
parties behave as they do when they select to emphasise a certain issue or 
position themselves in a certain direction when they compete along the centre-
periphery axis through stressing the importance of other factors that the literature 
has overlooked when approaching the main research problem. These factors can 
contribute to further comprehend in detail party behaviour with more a contextual 
lens which would provide additional reasoning for the regional variation that the 
literature encounters. Although these factors can be considered as static 
(distance and fragmentation) and very stable over time (polycentricity), their effect 
on how parties compete is circumscribed to the region in which they unfold, and 
context is key here. This will allow to further explain the way in which parties 
adapt to regional variation, depending on the context in which they act. The 
remaining regional- and party-level factors already identified by the existing 
literature are also taken into consideration to control for them in order to observe 
if the results obtained here go in the same line as the results presented by 
previous studies. All these factors are theorised in the next chapter. 
5.2) Spain 
The same can be concluded for the body of literature that addresses Spain 
as a case study. There seems to be a match between the above identified gap in 
general literature and the factors that the specific literature on Spain misses to 
scrutinise in detail. Most of the research that considers party competition along 
the centre-periphery in Spain focus on the same factors, such as for example, 
party type (e.g., Leonisio 2012; Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio 2016), ideology 
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(e.g., Pardos-Prado 2012; Alonso and Rovira 2015), economic grievances (e.g., 
Vampa 2016; Barrio et al. 2018), and distinctive cultural markers (e.g., Beswick 
2002). Regional-level factors such as the ones that are the centre of this research 
receive, or have received, little or no attention. If the aim of this research, in 
relation to on the general literature, is to provide further knowledge on how to 
understand the centre-periphery with a more developed and fine-grained point of 
view linked to unattended, but also important, structural characteristics, the 
purpose of this study is also to build on and depart from the specific literature on 
Spain in two main ways. 
First, and in line with the general literature, understanding how these three 
regional-level factors affect party competition along the centre-periphery 
cleavage will provide a more detailed picture of how parties frame the relations 
between centres and peripheries with focus on Spain, a politically salient case 
when it comes to these kind of territorial tensions. Being a significantly important 
case adds the necessity of comprehending the dynamics that make it prominent 
to be able to extract conclusions that could be generalised to a broader population 
which is informed by the same features. Combining the results obtained here with 
the already existing studies portraits a more developed image of the behaviours 
that parties have when managing the tensions between regions. Second, the 
case studies that have been developed by this body of literature normally involve 
specific regions, for example, the Basque Country or Catalonia, or consider Spain 
as a whole. With this in mind, the methodological approach elaborated here has 
the aim of providing the overview of Spain as a case study in combination with 
the use of subunits of analysis to be able to extract conclusions which are at the 
same time general to Spain and specific to regions that encompass the entire 
centre-periphery cleavage. Overall, this research builds on the conclusions 
provided by previous research on how parties articulate the relations between 
regions and departs from it presenting it as a novel approach that not only 





This chapter has approached the centre-periphery cleavage in relation to 
how parties compete and frame the relation between centres and peripheries. 
The purpose was to explore how the main literature understands this social 
phenomenon. The traditional dominant left-right axis is now confronted with other 
social cleavages which are as rooted as the former in the struggle for political 
domination, which in this investigation is the centre-periphery axis. The 
interconnectivity of these dimensions of political competition is articulated through 
parties that position themselves along them to connect with the voters and gain 
support in order to shape and implement their own political agendas. In order to 
move in this multi-dimensional political space and combine the positions on 
multiple axes of competition, parties can use four main strategies to obtain 
support from the voters by setting their primary and secondary dimensions of 
competition. This general idea is further explored using Spain as a case study 
and how parties behave along the centre-periphery cleavage. The results show 
that parties move along both the left-right and centre-periphery axes, 
emphasising and positioning themselves on each one by adapting to the context 











































This chapter aims to outline the conceptual and theoretical framework 
used in this investigation. A framework such as the one presented here is an 
essential part of any research, helping to support and account for the arguments 
that are used to explain the phenomenon studied by proposing reasoned 
observable implications to be tested (King et al. 1994: 19). In order to develop a 
conceptual and theoretical framework with a strong explanatory power, this 
chapter builds on previous knowledge and proposes a narrative which connects 
the principal variables with the main expectations and hypotheses (Toshkov 
2016: 28-30).  
 The three main factors that are expected to shape party competition on the 
centre-periphery cleavage are: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. These 
three main factors, as developed in this chapter, represent key characteristics of 
outer-peripheries, key subcategory in which the general category “peripheral 
region” is divided into by the proposed centre-periphery continuum. Adapting to 
the context requires parties to accommodate to the characteristics of the regions 
in which they act, and these three factors, as fundamental features of important 
peripheral regions, are expected to strongly shape their behaviour. To control for 
the different factors that the literature has identified to shape, to some extent, 
party behaviour when competing along the same cleavage, the following 
variables are also included: economic development, identity, language, party 
type, ideology, and party structure. These factors are considered here as control 
variables. The first three control variables are labelled as regional-level variables, 
and the last three are labelled as party-level variables. 
  In order to achieve the aim described above, this chapter is divided into 
two main sections. The first section clarifies the main concepts to provide 
coherent and rigorous definitions along all the investigation. The second section 
outlines the main explanatory and control variables with the purpose of 
delimitating and setting the scene. Each variable is theorised in three main steps. 
The first step analyses the variable at an abstract level. The second step applies 
it to all the regions of Spain. The third step applies it to a comparison between 
Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands.  
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1) Centres and peripheries 
As it was observed in the previous chapter, the literature that addresses 
the centre-periphery cleavage uses the labels “centres” and “peripheries” as 
consolidated and stable units. This does not comply with the regional variation 
that one can find in decentralised states such as Spain or Germany. In order to 
engage with this gap in the literature and to be able to understand with more 
precision the variation between one region and another, this investigation 
introduces a centre-periphery continuum. The purpose is to be able to measure 
with more accuracy this variation and address the complexity of the centre-
periphery cleavage. The three explanatory variables that are the centre of this 
thesis are expected to have a different degree of impact depending on the region 
that is being studied, and therefore, this continuum is aimed to help disentangle 
these different effects with more accuracy.  
A possible centre-periphery continuum can be articulated using the 
definitions of centres and peripheries provided by Wellhofer (1988: 283; 1989: 
342) and Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 2-3; 1983: 14-18). This continuum gravitates 
around two main dimensions: the geographical and the political dimensions. The 
geographical dimension takes into consideration the distance between the cores 
and the peripheries, helping to identify the different types of regions that can be 
found when analysing the broad category of periphery. The political dimension 
outlines the political characteristics of centres and peripheries, and tries to 
capture the subordination situation in which peripheries are in relation to the 
centres. In combination, both dimensions help to reinforce and maintain the 
contrast between centres and peripheries as opposing regions in general terms, 
and at the same time, approach and acknowledge the variation that one can find 
between the different peripheral regions.  
  Dealing with the geographical dimension, the centre-periphery continuum 
can be divided into different types of regions depending on the distance that 
separates them. Distance is a factor that helps to reinforce the differences 
between centres and the peripheries. In this sense, the latter are negatively 
affected by the distance that separates them from the networks of political power 
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relations and decision-making processes that are located at the centre. The 
further away a periphery is from the centre, the deeper the differences. Added to 
this, the division of states into regions results in scenarios where the distances 
between centres and the peripheries are not homogenous in all cases. Some 
peripheral regions are further away from the centre than others. With the above 
in mind, in this investigation, the centre-periphery continuum is therefore divided 
into three main categories: centre, inner-, and outer-peripheral regions.  
  
 
Figure 3.1. Centre-periphery continuum. 
Focusing on the political dimension, this is articulated around the 
assumption that centres are the regions where the political power is seated. This 
means that centres exercise a set of political power relations in order to maintain 
a privileged position in comparison to peripheries, making the latter subordinate 
to the former. An example of these political power relations that make peripheries 
subordinated to the centres can be observed in the capacity that both regions 
have to be the centre of decision-making processes. Centres are able to impose 
on the peripheries decisions that are designed to politically subordinate them to 
their interests by implementing and reinforcing decision-making processes where 
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the outcomes are skewed in their favour. In contrast, peripheries are unable to 
counterbalance these political power relations to the extent of freeing themselves 
from this subordination situation. This results in centres being more politically 
developed and advanced than peripheries (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 2-3; 1983: 
14-18).  
Using both dimensions, the centres, inner-, and outer-peripheries are 
defined in this investigation as follows. Centres are regions characterised by 
imposing coercive political power relations that keep peripheries subordinate to 
their interests through decision-making processes that reinforce this situation. In 
comparison, peripheries are regions that are far away from centres and politically 
less developed and subordinated to them. This means that they are not able to 
balance these power relations in order to be able to challenge the political 
hegemony of centres. In these general category of peripheral regions, one can 
find inner- and outer-peripheries, the former being closer to centres than the 
latter. This makes outer-peripheries even less developed in comparison to inner-
peripheries due to their remoteness from the networks of political power relations 
and decision-making processes located at the centres. 
2.2) Regions 
 Following Fitjar´s (2010a: 2) statement that a region can be defined using 
multiple terms and concepts, in this investigation, the best approach is to give a 
definition that tries to avoid this variety of meanings and reinforce the need for a 
single constant concept (Loughlin 1997: 154). A region for this investigation is 
defined using an institutional approach. According to this approach, a region is 
defined as a bounded territory organised by its own administrative rule. This 
means not only a geographically distinct territory but also a political-administrative 
body to deal with highly contextualised socio-political situations (Power and 
Goertz 2011: 2388-2389). Regions are ruled by some kind of self-government 
institutions, such as the Autonomous Communities in Spain or Länder in 
Germany. This suggests the existence of a strong and extensive network of social 
and political institutions that serve the purpose of the self-rule of regions (Safran 
2000: 12-13).  
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This institutional approach has one main implication for this investigation. 
As distinct territorial and institutional entities, regions can be considered, just as 
nations are for the modernist approach in the field of nationalism (Anderson 1991; 
Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990), imagined communities (Smouts 1998: 33-35; 
Süssner 2002: 200). As for the nationalist doctrine, the regions in regionalism 
should have a congruence between the political and the regional unit. Here, a 
region is defined as a political and institutionally bounded and distinct territory 
which is used as the geographical base of a community that identifies itself as a 
separate group of people in relation with other communities and exercises its own 
self-rule through a regional-based institutional network. In this thesis, the region 
is the main unit of observation. They represent the administrative and political 
level that is between the central government and the municipalities. 
Following from this, regionalism is understood as the phenomenon of 
territorial tension between a dominant core and a subordinate periphery (Lopez-
Aranguren 1983: 33). It is used to describe the movement that arises in the 
regions when territorial tensions are adopted to base regional demands. It is the 
politicisation of regional issues with a regional bias (Fitjar 2010a: 5). It offers 
objectives and aims to solve the problems that affect the region, trying to 
rearrange the relations between the core and the periphery, and the peripheries 
between each other. It could plead for self-determination or not, depending on 
the benefits that the relation with the core offers to the region. In the case that the 
region fulfils its aims through means like the devolution process, it will remain 
strong but inside a state-wide project. In the case the different processes of 
accommodation do not fulfil the region´s aims, it could turn to a secessionist 
attitude. 
2.3) National identity, nacionalidad, and regional identity 
 In this investigation, the conceptual framework requires a differentiation 
between national identity, nacionalidad, and regional identity that is applied 
specifically to Spain as a case study. Starting with national identity, one can find 
various and well-argued definitions. This is based on the vast amount of 
discussions amongst the different authors that contribute to the debate (Geertz 
1963; Connor 1978; Smith 1991). Although the definition of national identity 
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requires an extensive discussion, and in order to focus the debate, here, national 
identity is defined as the feeling of belonging to a certain social group named as 
nation (Wodak, 1999: 3-4), based on the perception of a distinct economic, 
cultural and political national reality.  
 Nacionalidad is a term introduced by the Spanish constitution of 1978 to 
fulfil the demands of the so-called “historic” regions (Ñúnez Seixas 2010: 132-
133). This was applied, at the beginning, to the Basque Country, Galicia, and 
Catalonia to protect, and at the same time, recognise the cultural and regional 
diversity that can be found in Spain (Pallarés et al. 1997: 137-139). The key 
aspect here is that the label nacionalidad is not equivalent to national identity 
despite the fact that it is used in most of the literature as synonymous with it. The 
Spanish constitution, with this label, formally differentiated the nacionalidades 
(regions) from the nation (Spain). Nacionalidades refers only to the cultural 
identities that the historic regions articulate, but never to another entity with the 
same status as the Spanish nation (Serra 2006: 40). Although originally applied 
to the historic regions, currently, “new” regions are developing their Estatutos de 
Autonomía9 in the direction of recognising themselves as nacionalidades. Finally, 
regional identity can be defined as the feeling of belonging to a specific social 
group called region (Fitjar 2010a: 3), but subordinated to the national identity, like 
a complement to it rather than a challenge. It is based on the perception of a 
distinct economic, cultural and political regional reality in comparison to other 
identity realities such as the nation or other regional identities (Lopez-Aranguren 
1983: 58). 
 The above differentiation has a final aspect that also requires to be 
explained. This is the relation between the three. These different labels are 
related in subordination. In Spain, the labels are related in the following way. 
According to the interpretation of the Spanish constitution, the national identity is 
the primary term. This means that there is only one nation, the Spanish nation. 
Subordinated to this, one can find nacionalidades, which refer to the different 
cultural identities found in Spain (Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country, Valencia, 
 
9 Estatutos de autonomía refers to the basic norm in Spain that regulates the regions. They 
have constitutional recognition and they develop the right to self-rule of the regions (Aja 2003). 
From now on, the label used is Statute of Autonomy. 
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Andalusia, Aragon, the Canary, and Balearic Islands). Finally, regional identities 
are used to define the regions that identify themselves as regions but not to the 
extent of positioning themselves as distinct cultural units. In Spain, the labels that 
the different Statutes of Autotomy use to refer to regional identities are: 
comunidades históricas (Asturias, Cantabria, and Castilla y Leon), regiones 
históricas (Extremadura), and identidades históricas (La Rioja). 
2.4) Parties 
 Using Sartori´s (1980: 91) definition of parties, this is, any political group 
identified with an official label in the elections that is able to present candidates 
in elections (free or not) and achieve seats for public office, this investigation 
makes a difference between SWPs and regionalist parties. To simplify the 
different views that academics have in the literature regarding the characteristics 
that define a political party, three dimensions are used: 1) its organisation, 2) its 
social base and support, and 3) its core level or the place where its loyalties lay.  
- State-wide parties (SWPs) 
SWPs play a major role in federal and quasi-federal states, as they are the 
link between the regional and national level of party competition, helping to 
understand the dynamics of multi-level competition (Swenden and Maddens 
2009: 253). In terms of their organisational dimension, SWPs are understood as 
parties that act throughout the state with a state-wide organisation, regardless of 
the structure, which could be for example, federal or quasi-federal (PSOE) or 
highly centralised (PP) (Deschouwer 2006: 293). In multi-level states, such as 
Spain, SWPs have to adapt to this specific context, meaning that they structure 
a multi-level organisation (Biezen and Hopkins 2006: 15), having a national, 
regional and local dimension inside the same organisation (Lancaster 1999: 64). 
The main effect of this state-wide organisation is the territorial pervasiveness of 
the parties (Deschouwer 2006: 292). This refers to the number of regions where 
these parties run for elections and fill in candidates. SWPs tend to run and fill in 
candidates for all the elections in most or all of the regions, having a high territorial 
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pervasiveness (levels 8 and 9 (Deschouwer 2006: 292)10. Regarding the social 
base and support dimension, the main consequence of having a state-wide 
organisation and high level of territorial pervasiveness is that they receive support 
from citizens throughout the entire state. This is, they receive support nationally 
and regionally (Molas 1977: 188). This means that their political projects need to 
acknowledge a high variety of interest, making them to be perceived and 
considered as state-wide, defending the interests of the whole state. Focusing on 
the last dimension, the core level of SWPs, these place their loyalties at the centre 
(Deschouwer 2003: 216–17). 
- Regionalist parties 
Regionalist parties in this investigation are considered multi-dimensional 
parties (De Winter 1998: 208-211) in the same way as SWPs, in contrast to some 
of the existing literature that considers them niche parties and focused on a single 
dimension of party competition (Müller-Rommel and Pridham 1991; Mudde 1999; 
Meguid 2005; 2008; Adams et. al. 2012; Wagner 2012). Here, regionalist parties 
also move in a two-dimensional political space (Tranconi 2006; Gómez-Reino 
2008; Massetti 2009), the left-right and territorial axes (Alonso 2012: 42). The 
position of regionalist parties in this two-dimensional political space is determined 
by political choice and strategy in order to maximise their options in pre- and post-
electoral scenarios (Elias et. al. 2015: 841). The defence of the region in which 
they act is their main mission (Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 258).  
Turning to the organisational dimension, regionalist parties are understood 
to act in only one or a few regions, and considered to have a regional-based 
organisation (Brancati 2005: 143-145). It has to be acknowledged that they might 
 
10 The aim of Deschouwer with these different levels is to divide the parties into a typology that 
considers their performance in a multi-level political system. The typology has two axes: on 
one hand, the territorial pervasiveness (referring to the constituencies in which parties’ act; one 
region, some regions, and all regions), and on the other hand, the participation in elections 
(regional, national, or both). Cross-validating these two axes result into a total number of 9 
levels. The higher the level, the more the party operates in a higher number of regions and at 
the same time, the more they compete in different type of elections. For example, a party 
scoring a level of 1 means that the party only operates in one single region and only competes 
in the regional elections only. A party that scores a level of 5 means that in comparison, the 
party operates in more than one region and competes in the national elections only. A party 
scoring a level of 9 refers to a party that operates in all the regions and competes in regional 
and nation elections (Deschouwer 2006: 291-293).  
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also have a multi-level organisation to adapt to multi-level states, just as SWPs 
do (Fabre 2011: 345). Translating this into their territorial pervasiveness, they 
only run and fill in candidates for the elections in their own region (or few regions), 
having a low pervasiveness (level 7) (Deschouwer 2006: 292). Considering the 
social base and support dimension, regionalist parties receive their support from 
a regional social base (Brancati 2005: 143-145). One possible reason for this is 
that they are perceived as one of the most effective ways to represent and defend 
the interests of the regions (Heller 2002: 658). In terms of their political projects, 
these can be graded between a simple regional and a secessionist project, as it 
is developed below. This variation can explain the different labels used by the 
literature, such as ethnoregionalist parties (Müller-Rommel 1998: 18-19) or 
peripheral parties (Alonso 2012: 2). The core level dimension, referring to the 
location of their loyalties, is also regionally based (Deschouwer 2003: 216–17). 
- Types of regionalist parties in relation to their political demands 
 Developing more in depth the different political demands that regionalist 
parties have, the idea is the following. A possible continuum of political demands 
can be articulated using a scale ranging from simply regional to openly 
secessionist demands. The key difference is their ideological position in the 
defence of the interest of the regions, promotion of territorially defined identities 
and cultures, and centred on developing the self-government of the territory (De 
Winter 1998: 204-205), reorganising the national state for the benefit of a certain 
region (Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 11-15).  
This reflects a disparate number of demands coming from, not only 
regionalist parties (Urwin 1983: 227), but regionalist parties in general (Alonso 
2012: 27). This is based on the definition given by Massetti (2009: 503) to 
regionalist parties, but applied broadly. According to this author, one of the 
characteristics of regionalist parties is that their activity is focused on the explicit 
defence of only the identities and interests of their own region. The more the party 
positions itself in a dichotomous scenario between its region and the state in 
which it is currently inserted, the more it changes from a regional or regionalist 
project to a more nationalist or secessionist one. In other words, the ideological 
position of these parties gravitates around their understanding of the region as a 
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separate entity (Massetti and Schakel 2016: 60), but the degree of their demands 
depends on the challenge that this represents to the state in which they are 
inserted (Dandoy 2009: 4-6). 
With this in mind, in this investigation, the regional political demands 
continuum is based on four main points, going in the same direction as part of 
the literature that classifies these types of party according to the same categories 
(Keating 1988; Sorens 2008; Massetti 2009; Dandoy 2010; Massetti and Schakel 
2013; 2016): regional, regionalist, nationalist, and secessionist political demands. 
Regional demands are pushed forward to defend the interests of the regions 
within the political current scenario, with no links for more autonomy or devolved 
competences, such as the recognition of regional cultures (Toubeau 2011: 429-
432). Regionalist demands are held when parties request more autonomy for the 
regions and devolving more competences by the central government (Massetti 
and Schakel 2017: 432-434). Nationalist demands go a step further, deepening 
and strengthening the degree of self-government, with a special link to the 
recognition of regions as nations inside the state in which they are inserted but 
with the necessary changes in the constitutional design of the state to adapt their 
demands (Hepburn 2011: 4-9). These two last degrees are to be understood 
inside the constitutional framework in which the regions are inserted (Fitjar 2010a: 
5), considered in general terms as autonomist parties. They aim to deepen the 
self-government of the region (De Winter 1998: 204-205). This gravitates around 
the idea of the region being a distinct community based on characteristics such 
as culture, identity, or language. Finally, secessionist demands request full 




 Figure 3.2. Regional political demands continuum. 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1) Pro-centre/periphery positions of parties 
 Before theorising the different explanatory and control variables, it is 
important to highlight what is understood as the effects that these may have on 
parties when competing over the centre-periphery cleavage. This is, what effects 
do these factors have on party behaviour. Party behaviour is defined here 
according to two main effects that these factors may have. These effects are, on 
one hand, pro-centre, or on the other hand, pro-periphery positions along the 
centre-periphery cleavage, both linked to the five dependent variables used to 
tap into the latter. Despite the fact that these dependent variables are described 
in detail in the methodological chapter, it is also necessary to do so here at a 
theoretical level in order to have a deep understanding of the effects that these 
 













Increasing the demands for the defence of the interests of 
the region, promotion of territorially defined identities and 
cultures, and centred on developing the self-government 




explanatory and control variables may have on party competition along the 
centre-periphery cleavage. 
 When parties are described to have pro-centre positions, this means that 
they emphasise more the centre. This is translated into a negative emphasis on 
the saliency of the region, re-territorialising competences towards the centre or 
retaining the ones it currently has, negative attitudes towards social groups in the 
periphery, supporting the constitutional subordination of the peripheral regions 
towards the centre, and reinforcing the identity coming from the core. In contrast, 
when parties are described to have pro-periphery positions, these should be 
interpreted as emphasising more the periphery. This is, they put more emphasis 
on the saliency of the region, claiming for more devolved competences to the 
region, having a positive attitude towards social groups in the periphery, 
increasing the importance of the region with a more favourable constitutional 
status, and protecting and promoting regional identities. These positions on the 
centre-periphery cleavage are not understood here as static and absolute 
categories, they can be graduated. This means that parties can emphasise more 
or less these positions to adapt to the specific characteristics of the regions. 
These two effects can be inserted in a continuum with each category at the far 
ends, granting parties the possibility to move from one to the other. For example, 
a party can have milder pro-periphery positions in one region and stronger in 
others. At the same time, moving towards one of the ends of this continuum does 
not put parties in a dichotomous position towards the other end. This means that 
their positions tend to be more absolute towards one of the categories. It is the 




Figure 3.3. Pro-centre/periphery continuum. 
The way this section is structured further develops how these different 
positions are understood. Each explanatory and control variable are theorised in 
three main steps. The first step theorises the variable in an abstract way with a 
general discussion. This is, the possible effects of the variable on party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage are described as pro-centre or pro-
periphery as a whole. How these positions are understood are further developed 
in the next two steps. The second step applies the variable to all the regions of 
Spain. The purpose is to have a general overview of how it affects party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage with a state-wide perspective, 
where the 17 regions present a variety of different characteristics. Eight variables 
are taken into consideration, the three main explanatory and five control 
variables: distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, economic development, 
regional identity, regional language, party type, and party ideology. These 
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saliency of the regional level, position on competence distribution, and attitudes 
towards multiculturalism.  
The third step applies the variable to the regions of Castilla-La Mancha, 
Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. The purpose is to present a focused 
comparison between the centre (Castilla-La Mancha), inner-periphery 
(Andalusia), and the outer-periphery (the Canary Islands). The aim of this is to 
have an in-depth analysis of how parties compete on the centre-periphery 
cleavage across these three regions, covering all three categories of the above 
centre-periphery continuum. The expected behaviour is that they will adapt their 
discourses to the specific characteristics of the regions. The variables selected 
are six, the three main explanatory and three control variables: distance, 
fragmentation, polycentricity, party type, party ideology, and party structure. 
These variables are applied to the following dependent variables: saliency of the 
regional level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence 
distribution, and identity.  
With these three steps in mind, a party has an overall strong pro-periphery 
position when, focusing on all the regions of Spain for example, it strongly 
emphasises the saliency of the regional level, calls for more competences for the 
region, and displays a positive attitude towards multiculturalism. A final 
observation has to be outlined here. The same list of control variables is not 
applied in steps two and three. This is, a different set of control variables is 
applied, on one hand, to all the regions of Spain, and on the other hand, to 
Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. This is because some 
are controlled via case selection in the specific comparison between the latter 
three regions. The different measurement schemes, justification for the 
explanatory and dependent variables selected, and the analyses performed, are 






3.2) Main explanatory variables 
3.2.A) Distance 
General discussion 
 The first point to make is that in political science, the literature has not dealt 
sufficiently with distance theoretically. Theories concerning space, place, and 
territory (Herb and Kaplan 1999; Paasi 2004; Elden 2005), can account to a 
certain degree for distance and its effects on the articulation of the centre-
periphery cleavage, but for a deeper understanding, other fields of knowledge are 
also valuable. For this purpose, social psychology is useful here, and more 
precisely, the Construal Level Theory (Nisbett et. al. 1973; Fiedler et. al. 1995; 
Linville et. al. 1996; Idson & Mischel 2001)11. Distance represents one of the main 
characteristic of outer-peripheries, as outlined in the above centre-periphery 
continuum. The main argument here is that the farther away a community is from 
the centre, the more abstract that centre becomes. Spatial distance makes 
individuals see events as more abstract (Henderson et. al. 2006) and therefore, 
affects the ways in which they relate to the centre.  
Combining political science with social psychology, a theoretical 
development of the effect of distance is to consider the variable as a mixture of 
three different dimensions: space, place and territory. All three dimensions are 
seen here as interlinked in the way communities articulate a sense of attachment 
to what they call “home”. The point of departure for this section is the analysis 
that Penrose (2002: 278-285) makes of the latent powers of space, place, and 
territoriality for human beings. Although implicit in the analysis of distance as a 
psychological dimension, space, place, and territoriality are different aspects 
which are seen as part of the same process of boundary making. The basic 
argument of these three aspects of boundary making process dealing with the 
physical characteristics of nature is that they act as a successive culmination of 
stages. In this sense, first comes space, then place, and finally territoriality 
through a process of psychological and political articulation. 
 
11 To read more about this theory see, amongst others, Fujita et. al. (2006), Trope and Liberman 
(2010), and Fiedler (2012). In this investigation the important factors of this theory are the 




 Starting with space, it has been proven very difficult to define. Penrose 
(2002: 278) gives a definition of space which is valid for this investigation. Space 
is everything that can be seen as structures of the real world. In other words, the 
structures that naturally can be found in the real world and that are a product of 
the evolution of the planet. Two important factors are mentioned at this stage 
which are extracted from the above definition. The first factor is that space is the 
raw material with which the discourses of places and territoriality are articulated 
(Penrose 2002: 278). Due to the aspect of raw material of space, other authors, 
such as Shaefer (1953: 232), suggest that it could be better named using other 
terms, like for example structures of the real world. The second factor is that 
space is independent from the discourses that build up places and territorialities 
(Penrose 2002: 278). 
 The analysis of space holds two main sources of latent power for human 
beings (Penrose 2002: 278-279). The first source of latent power relates to the 
raw aspect of space, which contains the main resources used to sustain human 
life. This source of latent power is referred to as the latent material power, or in 
other words, the power to sustain life, and therefore, communities. Distance is 
seen as one of the factors that determines the ability of the communities to sustain 
life. If the resources to sustain life are far away from a community, that same 
community has two options, either move closer to those sources, or look for 
alternatives in the surrounding spaces. The survival of the community using the 
resources that are available triggers an emotional feeling of belonging and 
attachment response by the community towards that same space. Not only does 
it survive physically, but also emotionally. This emotional response to space gives 
way to the second source of latent power that space represents. 
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 The second source of latent power refers to space as a source of latent 
emotional power. The community, through the process of survival gained through 
the experience of working space, fills the psychological need of attachment. At 
this stage, the psychological attachment to this raw piece of terrain is not greater 
than an emotional response to the space that a community uses to survive. This 
psychological response is not expected to be considered yet as a basis for the 
articulation of an identity. The community channels the emotional response 
through what Penrose (2002: 279) calls the relational dimension of space. This 
second source of latent power of space is characterised by the filter of the 
experience of the community using the relational dimension of space to articulate 
a psychological response of attachment to the space used for survival. The 
relation between the latent material and the emotional power is skewed towards 
the former one, being this the most important source of latent power. 
  
 Figure 3.4. Sources of latent power in space. 
- Place 
 The latent emotional power is here seen as the point of departure that 
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community is a symbolic one. A concrete space supports the community, and this 
same community is emotionally required to take care of it, making a space 
become a place (Penrose 2002: 281). Therefore, place can be defined as the 
symbolic articulation of space. Place is the social construction of space. Places 
can be delimited using an economic, cultural, political, or natural dimension 
(Paasi 1995: 42). A space becomes a place when it acquires certain stability for 
a community in a multi-dimension spectrum. A place is not necessarily a delimited 
space in comparison to other spaces until it acquires perceptual unity for the 
community (May 1973: 212). This multi-dimension stability and perceptual unity 
is achieved through the psychological process of place attachment. The main 
argument that social psychology uses to explain the psychological process of 
place attachment is that the latter can be divided into three main dimensions 
(Scannell and Gifford 2010: 2-6): the person dimension12, the process 
dimension13, and the place dimension. 
Place dimension, is considered as the most important dimension for this 
investigation. Scannell and Gifford (2010: 4) divide place dimension into two main 
levels: the social and physical levels of place attachment. It is expected for the 
last level to have a deeper theoretical impact for this research. The social level 
refers to the bounds created around social ties inside the group, such as family 
for example (Riger and Lavrakas 1981: 56-58), and the physical level links to the 
 
12 This dimension is subdivided into two further components: the individual and the group level. 
The individual level deals with place attachment that involves individuals on their own. In the 
group level, the analysis concerns the way social groups share the psychological multi-dimension 
issue of place attachment (Low 1992). For this thesis, the focus is put on the group level of 
analysis. This is, the symbolic meaning of a place that the members of a community share. In this 
sense, communities develop place attachment to pieces of terrain or land where they actually 
develop their practices and cultures (Michelson 1976).  
13 The process dimension is divided into three main levels, and concerns the way in which the 
individuals and groups relate to a place: place attachment as affect, as cognition, and as 
behaviour. Place attachment as affect can be summarized as the relations between a person and 
a group with a place, and this represents a variety of different kind of emotions, from love and 
happiness to hatred and ambivalence (Manzo 2005). Place attachment as cognition can be 
described as the memories, beliefs, meaning, and knowledge that individuals and groups 
associate with being personally important (Proshansky et. al. 1983). Place attachment as 
behavior is defined through the actions of the individual or group (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996). 
The main argument is that there is a positive affective link between the individual or group and a 
specific place, based on the closeness of the individual or group o that place (Hidalgo and 
Hernández 2011: 274). 
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bounds created around physical features of the place. Focusing on the physical 
features of the place, it is based on the ability of these physical features to provide 
the community with the necessary conditions to achieve its aims (Stokols and 
Shumaker 1981: 442-448), ranging from a mountain to the sea in the case of 
archipelagos (Manzo 2005: 81-84). If a correlation between the arguments used 
to describe space and place attachment is drawn using the two sources of latent 
power, place attachment relies more on the latent emotional power. 
The relations between nature, space, and place have been commonly 
defined as place attachment (Kyle et. al. 2004)14. Social theorists have stated that 
places, i.e. physical spaces, are sources of identification and affiliation (Hosany 
et. al. 2015: 484). In this sense, places represent for people and social groups a 
source of attitudes, values, and beliefs (Sack 1992: 16-19), in which identity is 
placed and articulated around physical features of spaces (Budruk et. al. 2009: 
824-827). This articulates place-identity, which refers to the connection between 
people and places (Proshansky 1978: 148-150). The greater the dependency of 
a group on the physical characteristics of a space, the more likely the group will 
be loyal to it (Scannell and Gifford 2010: 4-6). In contrast, the further away one 
moves from these physical characteristics, more abstract it becomes for the 
population.  
 Despite the fact that distance itself has been overlooked by most of the 
literature that deals with the centre-periphery cleavage, relations, and regionalism 
(Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 124), some studies have tried to prove that, 
especially in insular outer peripheral regions, geographical remoteness is an 
important factor of distinctiveness (Corner 1988: 231-235). The argument is that, 
as distance increases, abstraction increases, and therefore, the less loyal the 
population affected by the effect of abstraction is to the core because the physical 
characteristics of that region, as they are not physically present in the periphery, 
do not satisfy people's needs generated by place attachment (Stokols and 
Shumaker 1981: 445-448).  
 
14 Place attachment can be defined as: it involves an interplay of affects and emotions, 












Figure 3.5. Effect of distance and its spatial dimension. 
- Territory 
 Distance, real or imagined, is used as a political instrument to forge 
identities, being an active part of political discourse (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). This 
is where the process of territoriality, and final stage of the process of boundary 
making, is an important factor (Penrose 2002: 280-282). When a community 
transforms spaces into places, and the latter into territories, they are hardening 
the boundaries that previously were not a source of political identification. This 
can be called the process of territoriality. Cores and peripheries are now 
articulated to distinguish communities. A place becomes a source of political 
identification (a territory) through the process of delimitation. Spaces, places and 
territories can exist all at a same point in time, and the process is sequential and 
not alternative (Sack 1986: 16). In this way, first comes space, then place, and 
finally territory. 
 The process of territorialisation, according to Penrose (2002: 280-282), 
has four main dimensions. The first dimension is that territories are seen and 
conceptualised as natural. Distance acts therefore as a factor that delimits 
naturally a space, which at the same time, marks a certain place. This 
naturalisation of territories is aimed to frame the territories with an aura of 
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immutability (Jackson and Penrose 1993: 2-3). Islands and archipelagos are used 
here as an example. Both types of insular regions are considered as bounded 
territories because of their natural characteristics. The sea acts as a natural 
frontier that the discourses of territoriality use to reinforce the idea of a territorial 
unit. The second dimension refers also to the naturalness of territories, but in this 
case, with the natural relation between communities and territories. The third 
dimension considers the psychological attachment to the territory that most of the 
people living in it have. The fourth dimension represents the way in which the 
relation between territories and communities are reinforced. 
 For the analysis of distance and how it affects the interaction between the 
centre, the inner-, and the outer-peripheries, the most important dimension of 
territoriality is the first one, the naturalization of spaces in territories using their 
natural features as frontiers. These natural frontiers have to be present for the 
community to articulate a feeling of belonging and identification. Distance can act 
as a catalyst for this articulation. If a community interacts every day with certain 
natural features that define a territory, the more it will use these natural features 
to articulate an identity around them. For example, when a community of an 
archipelago outer-periphery stands in front of the sea as a natural barrier, two 
types of identification can be articulated. The first type of identification is a self-
identification process. The community identifies itself as islanders, using the sea 
as a characteristic of its identity. The second type of identification refers to the 
sea as an indicator to identify and differentiate a community from another. This is 
expected to deepen the sense of distance between the archipelago and the 
mainland. By this mechanism, the sea as a frontier is used as a basis of a distinct 
identity from the one in the mainland. If identities are articulated, and therefore 
changing (Hall 1990: 222-225), space, place and territory are part of the 
characteristics used in this shifting (Hall and Jacques 1990: 12-19). This 
articulation is mainly negotiated, meaning that it acts in both ways (Giampapa 
2004: 193), from the core to the periphery and vice versa.  
 This may respond to what Penrose (2002: 284) describes as the two main 
forms of territoriality in modernity. The first form defines identity as cultural. The 
significance of territoriality builds on the fact that culture is geographically 
distributed. The second form refers to identity being defined territorially. The 
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geographical distribution of a political unit that is used to delimit a specific territory 
(Sack 1983: 56-58). The natural characteristics and its symbolic meaning for the 
community are used to influence in its formation and are mechanisms to articulate 
means of preserving it through an identity which re-evaluates the natural features 
of the territory. If, as Guibernau suggests (1996: 3), it is the combination of the 
two forms of territoriality that is privileged in modernity over any other, then it is 
understandable that nationalism and regionalism procure most of its resonance 
and resilience from the natural features of a given territory. 
 This abstraction level can shape party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage in the following way. The starting point is that as distance from the 
centre increases, the same happens with the abstraction level. Therefore, as 
distance increases, more difficult it becomes for the regional population to identify 
itself with the centre because this becomes more and more abstract. With this in 
mind, SWPs are expected to accommodate and adapt their discourses and 
position on the centre-periphery cleavage to the increasing distance and 
abstraction level to counterbalance their negative effect and maintain the 
identification of the regional population with the centre. Their discourses are 
expected to adapt to the regional-level characteristics to be able to prevent the 
regional population from articulating a strong challenge to the centre based on 
confronting the characteristics of the centre to the ones of the periphery. The 
more the regional population identifies exclusively with its own characteristics, 
the stronger the challenge to the centre. This is favoured by the increasing 
distance from the latter. Therefore, the further away the periphery is from the 
centre, the more SWPs need to adapt to the characteristics of the regions to 
counterbalance the effect of distance and the abstraction level.  Their discourses 
can be adapted, amongst other ways, by positioning themselves in a more pro-
periphery attitude, increasing as distance also increases. This is, regionalising 
their discourses in the face of the difficulties to make the centre visible. By doing 
so, these parties try to balance at the same time the interests of the centre and 
the peripheries, and therefore counterbalance distance as a factor that helps the 
articulation of the peripheral regions as dichotomous to the centre.  
Regionalist parties, seen as one of the best mechanisms to defend the 
interests of the regions and having a regionally based social support, are 
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expected to adapt to distance and the abstraction level by increasing their pro-
periphery positions. Again, as distance increases, the more regionalist parties will 
use this factor in order to challenge the centre. For these parties to articulate a 
strong challenge to the centre, they can argue that the distance that separates 
them from the core is a strong characteristic of the region and a source of 
identification for the peripheral population. As they adapt their discourses to the 
increasing distance, this also affects their political demands. Distance counter-
balances the centre-periphery cleavage towards more pro-periphery positions. 
The higher the distance, the more chances for regionalist parties to support 
stronger pro-periphery positions.  
With this theorisation in mind, a general hypothesis can be formulated to 
understand how distance affects party completion on the centre-periphery 
cleavage. This general hypothesis is: 
H1-the further away from the centre, the stronger the pro-periphery 
positions of parties 
Distance applied to all the regions of Spain 
 In Spain, distance is expected to play a major effect as one moves away 
from the centre (Madrid, Castilla-La Mancha, and Castilla y Leon). It is expected 
to have a major effect in, for example, the Balearic Islands, an inner-peripheral 
region, but this effect is expected to be even greater as one moves even further 
away, to the outer-periphery of the Canary Islands. Parties adapt to this effect by 
giving more importance to the region as distance increases. This is hypothesised 
as follows: 
H1.A-the greater the distance from the centre, the more parties emphasise the 
regional level 
H1.B-the greater the distance from the centre, the more calls from parties for 
more competences for the regions 
H1.C-the greater the distance from the centre, the more emphasis of parties on 




Distance applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 
 Considering these three regions, the effect of distance is aimed to be 
further analysed. By doing so, the aim is to test if the abstraction effect actually 
increases as one moves away from the centre. This effect is expected to increase 
when moving from Castilla-La Mancha (centre) to Andalusia (inner-periphery), 
and finally to the Canary Islands (outer-periphery). The hypotheses are: 
H1.D-as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the 
regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally 
to the Canary Islands 
H1.E-as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise a more 
differentiated constitutional status of the region as one moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 
H1.F-as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the demands 
for more competences as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, 
and finally to the Canary Islands. 
H1.G-as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the emphasis 
on a differentiated identity as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, 
and finally to the Canary Islands 
3.2.B) Fragmentation  
General discussion 
 The previous discussion of distance and the abstraction effect has a 
counterbalance in certain regions with specific characteristics of space, places 
and territory. This alternative effect applies specifically to archipelagos because 
of the natural features that distinguish these kinds of regions. Although islands 
can be understood as the best example of periphery, they have been studied only 
to some extent in the field of comparative politics (Royle 2001: 42), with the issue 
of non-sovereignty and island jurisdiction as the most develop themes 
(Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Baldacchino 2010; Hepburn and Baldacchino 
2013). This variable is theorised in this investigation because most of the outer-
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peripheries to be found are archipelagos. Archipelagos such as Hawaii or the 
Canary Islands are examples of how fragmentation affects the articulation of the 
region. Following Hepburn and Elias´s (2011: 862) argument, fragmentation is 
understood, in relation to the periphery, as follows. Fragmentation, or insularity, 
stands in the very far end of the centre-periphery continuum, meaning that, 
because of the very nature of islands, “the experience of peripherality and 
isolation is enhanced to the greatest extent in the island context”. This specific 
nature of islands affects all the aspects of the political articulation of archipelagos 
and the dynamics that this encompasses (Baldacchino 2004: 272-275). 
Fragmentation, via identifying the islands as the territories where the loyalties of 
the local populations rest, may undermine the effect of distance and the 
articulation of a strong regional discourse. This factor is outlined according to 
three key elements: the psychological effect of fragmentation, the spatial, and the 
political dimensions. Working against fragmentation could trigger the reaction of 
the local population, preventing the articulation of a strong regional project. In 
order to avoid this reaction, parties are expected to necessarily adapt to 
fragmentation by, although having pro-periphery positions, also favouring the 
local level. This would inevitably undermine their pro-periphery positions 
- The psychological effect of fragmentation 
Regions seems to be the most used units of observation in the literature, 
as if this was the granted scale on which the centre-periphery analysis should be 
focused. This is, that, as Paasi (2002: 138) puts it, regions are taken for granted 
and there is no further fragmentation of the region into smaller units of 
identification. The literature has placed little emphasis on smaller units that may 
have major effects and that are not taken into account. This should not be taken 
as monolithic. Regions, especially archipelagos, are also subdivided into smaller 
units (islands) that the local population see as their bounded territories. The 
fragmentation of archipelagos into islands may counterbalance the effect of 
distance, abstraction, and place attachment, weakening identification with the 
region. Hay (2003: 203) argues in this respect that the “water boundary is 
conducive to psychological distinctiveness, because it promotes clearer, 
‘bounded’ identities.”.  
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In archipelagos, the islands become the units of identification for the 
space, place, and territory. Islands are compacted natural units, which deepens 
the notions of location and identity (Baldacchino 2004: 272). In these regions, the 
local population, affected by this psychological effect of fragmentation, may 
identify with their own islands more than with the region. Hache (1998: 47) further 
develops how insularity is used to articulate a distinctive island-based identity. 
Not only does the local population identify with its own island, but it also considers 
this island-based identity to be threaten by any other identity that tries to 
assimilate it. A regional identity might be seen as a threat if it negates the 
existence and importance of these island-based identities. This psychological 
effect is better understood via the two dimensions outlined below. 
- Fragmentation as a spatial dimension 
The fragmentation of the unit "archipelago outer-periphery" also has to be 
considered when observing the articulation of a regional project. This means that 
islands are perfectly delimited units of land which are perceived by the 
communities not only as space, but also as place and territory at the same time. 
In other words, the three dimensions coincide inside the same borders that water 
encircles. The local populations in archipelagos tend to identify more with their 
islands than with the region, determined by the insular characteristics of the 
territory to which they are attached to (Baldacchino 2004: 272). Communities in 
islands are inherently related to their delimited natural spaces and separated from 
the exterior by this specific natural characteristic. The island is identified as the 
condition of its own character, and therefore, it is the unit upon which the local 
loyalties relay. It is, as Goldman states (2008: 28), "...literally the space of the 
people and their place in the world is shaped by the relationship between the land 
and the surrounding waters.". It can be said that islands have the power to 
subdivide the archipelago into smaller units. These island-based loyalties tend to 














Figure 3.6. Comparison between contiguous and fragmented regions. 
  Although in contiguous territorial states, such as Germany or Poland, 
regions may be the best possible unit of observation to explain the centre-
periphery cleavage, in other states, such as those that have archipelago outer-
peripheries, this may not be necessarily the case. The argument behind this can 
be summarised using Penrose’s words (2002: 280) “…islands are frequently 
viewed as discrete geographical entities because the boundaries of the land are 
clearly marked by water.”. Islands individually and not the archipelago are the 
natural feature that the local population uses to fulfil the place attachment 
requirements. The distance that separates each island of the archipelago acts in 
the same way as the distance that separates the archipelago from the mainland 
regions, reinforcing the island-based identification. Even if there is a relatively 
short distance between islands, the sea still retains its psychological effect of 
natural barrier, perfectly bounding the island-based territories. 
- Fragmentation as a political-administrative dimension 
If distance and the abstraction level is a factor that increase the importance 
of the region as the preferred unit of identification for the peripheral populations, 
fragmentation, via this political-administrative dimension, is a factor that 
counterbalances this effect, blurring the region as a whole. It can be said that the 
above Construal Level Theory can be further applied to sub-regional units. 
 
MAINLAND VS. ARCHIPELAGOS OUTER-PERIPHERIES 
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Region                                    Region (Archipelago) 
 
Province/Municipality                          Local (Islands) 
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Having these sub-regional units of identification is a factor that works against the 
region as the main source of latent emotional power for the local population to 
identify with. The identification with these sub-regional ruling bodies increases as 
the abstraction level also increases. The more abstract the centre becomes, the 
more important local ruling bodies become for the local population to fulfil its 
attachment feelings. As one moves away from the centre, the political-
administrative dimension of fragmentation increases its negative effect as the 
local population increments its identification with the local ruling bodies. All parties 
are expected to be affected with the same intensity. This position can be labelled 
as pro-subregional. This dimension can affect both archipelago and continuous 
regions. 
It has to be pointed out that fragmentation is expected to have deeper 
effects if both dimensions coincide, like in archipelagos. In this sense, the 
recognition and acknowledgement by parties of the importance of these island-
based loyalties (spatial dimension) and island-based ruling bodies (political-
administrative dimension) for the local population may prevent the articulation of 
a strong regional discourse. Not only does the local population strongly identify 
with the island, but also with the local body that rules it. In other words, this 
focuses on the political agency factor that spatial fragmentation favours 
(Giampapa 2004: 193). This means that the island-based political community 
unifies under the local body that rules the island. This undermines the capacity of 
a regional project to be articulated with a strong regional base. Local bodies such 
as Provincial Councils15 in continuous regions can be assimilated to the local 
island-based ruling bodies, but the degree of importance for the local population 
is higher in the case of the latter due to the perfect match between the islands 
and the jurisdiction that these island-based local bodies can exercise. The 
boundaries coincide, reinforcing the link between the territory and the political-
administrative body that governs it. If only one dimension (spatial or political-
administrative) is present, the negative effect is also expected, as theorised, but 
with a lower degree of impact than when the two are combined.  
 
15 Provincial Councils in Spain represents the administrative and governmental level between 
the regions and the local bodies such as municipalities. Some regions have a territorial division 
called province, but no actual council, such as the Canary and Balearic Islands. 
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Focusing on the above theorisation, the general hypothesis that can be 
formulated to understand how fragmentation affects party completion on the 
centre-periphery cleavage is the following: 
H2-fragmentation undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties 
Fragmentation applied to the different regions of Spain 
 The above theoretical discussion can be applied to the different regions of 
Spain in the following way. Because all regions are affected by political-
administrative fragmentation, the focus is put on the first dimension. In the 
archipelago regions of the Balearic and the Canary Island, spatial fragmentation 
is expected to undermine the articulation of a strong regional discourse by parties. 
This first stage tries to observe if the spatial dimension of fragmentation in 
isolation has the theorised effect. The acknowledgement of island-based loyalties 
and identities is predicted to negatively affect the pro-periphery positions of 
parties. Increasing the importance of the region with more pro-periphery positions 
is perceived as going to the detriment of these island-based loyalties and 
identities. This is hypothesised to have the following adverse effects: 
H2.A-fragmentation undermines the emphasis of parties on the regional level 
H2.B-fragmentation reduces the calls from parties for more competences for the 
regions  
H2.C-fragmentation favours a less positive attitude of parties towards 
multiculturalism  
Fragmentation applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 
 In the case of these three regions, the analysis is expected to be useful to 
observe, on one hand, the increasing negative impact of political-administrative 
fragmentation as distance from the centre increases, and on the other hand, if 
the combination of both dimensions of fragmentation has the profound effect 
above theorised in comparison to the presence of only one due to the perfect 
match between the boundaries of the islands and the jurisdiction of the local 
island-based bodies.  
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First, the effect of political-administrative fragmentation is expected to 
increase as one moves away from the centre. The higher the distance from the 
centre, the more abstract its ruling bodies become for the local population in the 
peripheries, and therefore, the more important the local bodies of the peripheries 
become to fulfil its attachment feelings. For example, the Provincial Councils in 
Andalusia have had a major role in the region, both in history (Girón Reguera 
2004; Romero and López 2005) and in the current democratic period (Yerga 
Cobos 2010). In comparison, the importance of the same local bodies in Castilla-
La Mancha is less, although also present in history (Pillet Capdepón 2015). This 
is where the Construal Level Theory explained above can be further applied to 
this factor in order to explain this variation. The distance from the centre is higher 
in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha, and therefore, the more important these 
local ruling bodies are for the local population in the former region as the 
abstraction level increases when one moves away from the centre. This effect is 
expected to be even deeper in the Canary Islands. This is based on the fact that 
because the distance that separates this region from the centre is even greater, 
the abstraction level is expected to be also higher. Overall, political-administrative 
fragmentation is expected to deepen its effect as one moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands due to the increase in 
importance of the local bodies for the local populations. 
Added to this increase in the impact of political-administrative 
fragmentation as distance from the centre increments, the region of the Canary 
Islands is expected to be even more affected by fragmentation due to the 
combination of both dimensions of this factor via the Cabildos16 (García Rojas 
and Alvardíaz García-Portillo 2005). The Cabildos represent the perfect match 
between the spatial and political-administrative dimensions of fragmentation. The 
islands found in the Canary Islands are well distinct bounded territories, which 
undermine the possible image of the region as a whole, being this more abstract 
for the local population. This does not happen in continuous regions due to the 
lack of spatial fragmentation. This combination reinforces the importance of the 
Cabildos in the Canary Islands, where they are a key element of the political life 
 
16 Cabildos are the insular-based governments of the islands in the regions of the Canary and 
the Balearic Islands. They took over the competences of the Provincial Councils. 
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of the islands (Ramírez Muñóz 1996: 278-280). The loyalties are stronger in these 
well-bounded insular territories, leading to what is known as insularismo 
(Hernández Bravo 1989) or insular dimension (Hernández Bravo 2004), which 
refers to the political loyalties between the local population and the islands 
(Hernández Bravo 1989). Figure 3.7 summarises the strength of the loyalties is 
the Canary Islands. 














 Figure 3.7. The three levels of identification and loyalties in the Canary Islands. 
With the above expectation, the hypotheses are the following:  
H2.D-fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by 



















Local/Island Level             Region/Archipelago Level         Nationwide/Country Level 
   
 




increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and 
finally to the Canary Islands 
H2.E-fragmentation weakens the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated 
constitutional status of the region due to the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-
La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 
H2.F-fragmentation reduces the ability of parties to call for more competences 
for the region due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, 
increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and 
finally to the Canary Islands 
H2.G-fragmentation erodes the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional 
identity due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, 
increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and 
finally to the Canary Islands 
3.2.C) Polycentricity 
General discussion 
 Polycentricity is normally understood as the existence of several urban 
centres of more or less the same size (Roberts et al. 1999) and capability of 
agglomerating resources (Agarwal et al. 2012: 434) more efficiently than smaller 
ones (Puga 2010: 209-210), without being subordinated to a full extent to another 
larger city. Two important aspects are added in order to define polycentricity for 
the purpose of this investigation: on one hand, the decision-making processes, 
and on the other hand, the competition between them. Taking into account the 
first aspect, polycentricity can be defined as the existence of multiple centres of 
decision making-processes with some degree of independence from one another 
to act and develop their own socio-economic programmes (Ostrom et al. 1961: 
831). Considering the second aspect, these centres of power are in constant 
competition to attract more resources and expand their capability to incorporate 
more decision-making process and accumulate resources. For this investigation, 
polycentricity is informed by their constant competition to become the centre 
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decision-making process and attract more resources to expand their influence in 
the region.  
The articulation of an alternative to the centre is expected to generate a 
debate in the peripheral regions. This is, which urban area will replace the centre 
as the new location of the decision-making processes and power relations in the 
periphery? This debate would gravitate around the power fight of the different 
candidates to become this new centre of power. The different centres of power 
would compete to become the new dominant centre of power in order to improve 
their own position in the region. This would prevent them becoming subordinated, 
as a new form of peripherality inside the periphery itself (Herrschel 2009: 242). 
When it comes to the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage, the presence 
of multiple centres of power in the peripheral regions can be expected to have a 
negative effect. This is because the articulation of an alternative discourse is due 
to have a strong single centre of power in the periphery to be presented as a 
challenge to the one in the centre. The absence of a strong unique centre of 
power in the periphery provides a high degree of uncertainty. The regional 
population would not have a strong centre of power to turn to in order to seek a 
political project that is supposed to replace the one coming from the centre. 
Apart from the overall negative effect of polycentricity, an effect that has 
not yet been theorised is the concentration of competition in a few. With this in 
mind, this can be used to articulate a scale of polycentricity to observe if its 
negative effect deepens as the concentration of power in small number of urban 
centres increases. The starting point is the presence of multiple centres of power 
having an overall negative effect, as theorised above. Further developing this, on 
one end of the scale, one could find multiple centres of power and a high degree 
of polycentricity in combination with a low impact of its negative effect, and on the 
other end, one could find the opposite scenario, few centres of power and a low 
degree of polycentricity in combination with a high impact of its negative effect. 
The reason for this is that having multiple centres of power (high degree of 
polycentricity) can produce a positive status quo where all benefit from it and 
there is no real action taken by any to increases its predominance in case it loses 
its influence by the counteraction of the others. The current situation in which they 
already are is considered as positive and they have more to lose than to win. The 
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pro-periphery positions of parties are expected to be affected as the general 
discussion for this factor has outlined above, but with a low impact of its negative 
effect. This is expected to change as one moves to the other end of the scale and 
the number of centres of power decrease and the competition is concentrated 
around two or three centres of power (low degree of polycentricity). As the degree 
of polycentricity decreases and the competition is concentrated in few centres of 
power, the more the pro-periphery positions are expected to be further 
undermined (high impact of its negative effect). The reason for this is because as 
competition is concentrated around two or three centres of power, the higher the 
expectations to improve as there are fewer challengers. This encourages the few 
centres of power to increase their competitivity and react negatively to any move 
from any other actor that might undermine their own positions. The previous 
positive status quo is not beneficial anymore. This is when the pro-positions of 
parties are deeply undermined.  In this investigation, both the overall negative 
effect and the decreasing degree of polycentricity is expected to be observed. 
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- Polycentricity in archipelagos 
Although the presence of multiple centres of power is expected to affect 
both continuous and archipelagos regions, polycentricity in interaction with 
fragmentation is expected to deepen the negative effect of both factors. Like the 
effect of fragmentation, which explores a new unit of identification, the island, 
having two or more rival centres of power traces another negative effect. If the 
islands represent clearly defined units of identity, as discussed above, the political 
agency factor that spatial and political-administrative fragmentation in 
combination favours (Giampapa 2004: 193) is also expected to works at this level, 
promoting the creation of island-based centres of power. With this in mind, the 
presence of island-based rival centres of power can be seen as one of the main 
possible consequences of fragmentation interacting with polycentricity. The 
relation between the island as a territory, the local island-based body, and a 
strong island-based centre of power is reinforced. All three dimensions work in 
the same direction, the strengthening of the island as a whole inside the 
archipelago. The intergroup solidarity (Dovidio 2015: 164) amongst the different 
island-based social groups of the archipelago that encouraged the articulation of 
a challenge to the centre is threatened by polycentricity and the need to articulate 
a strong single centre of power. This intergroup solidarity would be undermined 
as the articulation of a single strong centre of power endangers the already 
existing island-based centres of power, where the loyalties of these social groups 
seat. This is expected to further undermine the pro-periphery position of parties 
in comparison to continuous regions. 
 This factor is expected to affect party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage in a negative way. Parties, to articulate a strong challenge to the centre, 
need to present an alternative centre of power to the one at the core. The 
existence of multiple centres of power in the region erodes this. The power 
struggle between them to become this alternative centre of power weakens the 
challenge. Although there is a possibility to become more influential in the region, 
the different centres of power also see a threat to their current position via a 
possible subordination to the alternative new single centre of power. This concern 
becomes stronger if the different centres of power have more or less the same 
degree of influence in the region. Having more or less the same degree of 
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influence strengthens competition amongst them, which is not present if there is 
a considerable difference, resulting in subordinated relations between them. The 
pro-periphery positions of parties would be reinforced if they are able to articulate 
a region with a strong single centre of power that challenges the one at the core, 
but they would be undermined if they are not able to do so. Parties are expected 
to comply with the social groups where their loyalties are based, and these are 
normally found in strong centres of power. If these feel threatened by a stronger 
alternative centre of power, they would pressure parties to weaken the latter, 
inevitably eroding their overall strong pro-periphery positions. 
Considering the above description of how polycentricity might affect party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, the general hypothesis is the 
following: 
H3-polycentricity undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties 
Polycentricity applied to all the regions of Spain 
 Polycentricity is theorised to affect the way parties compete on the centre-
periphery cleavage, as developed above, in an overall negative way. By 
considering all regions, the aim is to observe if polycentricity, in general terms, 
has this expected negative effect. As it is outlined in the quantitative analysis 
chapter, the high number of regions with multiple centres of power provides the 
necessary observations to test if polycentricity has the basic theorised negative 
effect. The different hypotheses are:  
H3.A-polycentricity undermines the emphasis of parties of the regional level  
H3.B-polycentricity weakens the calls from parties for more competences for 
the regions  
H3.C-polycentricity diminishes the positive attitudes of parties towards 
multiculturalism  
Polycentricity applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. 
 If applying polycentricity to all the regions of Spain is intended to observe 
its negative effect in general terms, applying it to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, 
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and the Canary Islands is aimed at examining if the different degrees of 
polycentricity make a difference. As further outlined in the data utilised in the 
quantitative chapter, multiple centres of power are present in all three regions, so 
the same basic general negative impact is to be expected. This is, polycentricity 
is expected to negatively affect party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage. Building from this, Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, according to the 
possible scale of polycentricity proposed above and as outlined in the qualitative 
chapter, have higher degree of polycentricity in comparison to the Canary Islands. 
Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria are the two very distinct 
centres of power that compete in the Canary Islands. This is the so-called pleito 
insular17, which has a deep impact on how parties in the region act (Hernández 
Bravo 1998). 
The competing dynamics between these two centres of power are 
expected to have a deeper negative impact than the dynamics found when 
several centres compete due to the competitiveness to become the new centre 
of power of the region, affecting how parties frame the region as a whole. This is 
also favoured by the fact that the fragmentation of the archipelago into major and 
minor islands has established a high degree of subordination of the latter to the 
former. This is sometimes called segundo pleito insular (Ferrer Peñate 2012). In 
the Canary Islands, the minor islands can be considered as the periphery of the 
archipelago (La Palma, El Hierro, La Gomera in the province of Tenerife; 
Fuerteventura and Lanzarote in the province of Gran Canaria), source of surplus 
for the two main islands and centres of power (Santa Cruz in Tenerife and Las 
Palmas in Gran Canaria). This has been in place since the 19th century (Acirón 
Royo, 1998; Millares Cantero 2007), and has deep roots in the political reality of 
the archipelago (Ramírez Muñoz 1996; García Rojas 2003: Sánchez Herrera 
2004). The more the competition can be condensed into small number of centres, 
the higher the negative impact of polycentricity. Further to this, the interaction of 
polycentricity and fragmentation is expected to deepen the negative effect of both 
factors in the Canary Islands. As the data employed to determine the presence 
of multiple centres of power contained in in this investigation suggests, it is also 
 
17 Pleito insular refers to the tensions that exist between Tenerife and Gran Canaria, which are 
the two main centres of power in the region. 
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expected to find a difference between the two mainland regions. Andalusia has 
fewer competing centres of power (Sevilla, Malaga, and Cadiz) in comparison to 
Castilla-La Mancha (Albacete, Guadalajara, Toledo, Talavera de la Reina, and 
Ciudad Real), considering the former to have a lower degree of polycentricity than 
the latter, and therefore, being more affected overall by this factor. Therefore, 
polycentricity is expected to increase its negative effect as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands. This can be 
hypothesised as follows: 
H3.D-polycentricity weakens the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional 
level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, 
and finally to the Canary Islands 
H3.E-polycentricity undermines the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated 
constitutional status of the region, increasing its effects as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 
H3.F-polycentricity erodes the ability of parties to call for more competences for 
the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 
H3.G-polycentricity reduces the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional 
identity, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 
3.3) Regional-level control variables 
3.3.A) Economic development 
General discussion 
 One of the factors that has been identified by the literature capable of 
shaping party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage is the economic 
development of the regions (Hadjimichalis 1987; Keating 1998; Beer et al. 2003; 
Mistry 2003; Scot and Storper 2003). Although part of the literature in the past 
anticipated the decrease in importance of territory in economics and politics 
(Elkins 1995; Burnham 1999; Sassen 2000), this has not been reached with the 
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degree that was expected (Fitjar 2010a: 18).  Instead of a gradual disappearance 
of small bounded economic arenas, the economy has become reterritorialised 
towards the regions (Porter 2003; Haughton and Naylor 2008; Prager and Thisee 
2012). The reterritorialization of the economy has provided the regions with more 
opportunities to seek new economic opportunities (Pike et al. 2007: 1259-1261). 
Economic disparities between regions, horizontal inequalities, is a strong 
incentive to fuel sub-national mobilisation and nationalism (Gourevitch 1979: 302-
322). 
This control variable can be divided into two main dimensions: the 
international and the national dimension. The international dimension can be 
explained theoretically by the reterritorialisation of the regions in a globalised 
world of economic relations (Keating 1997: 383-385) and the access to new 
markets, such as the EU single market (Kreinin and Plummer 2002; Petrakos et 
al. 2005; Balassa 2013). Attracting more capital and specialised labour (Turok 
2004: 1070-1071) gives the elites at the regions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008: 
268-273) a reason to demand more presence in an increasing globalised arena. 
The national dimension deals with the tension between the regions in order to 
obtain more influence according to their economic development and the uneven 
distribution of resources (Fitjar 2010a: 29-30). The uneven development of 
regions pushes the local elites to put forward demands to increase their weight in 
providing and receiving economic resources from the central government and 
rearrange the current relations between them. In this investigation, the national 
dimension is the focus. 
 The key point in the national dimension is the economic relation between 
the centre and the peripheries, and between the peripheries themselves. 
According to the internal colonialism perspective (Hechter 1975a; Williams 1977; 
Simon 2011), the centre extract surplus and raw materials from the peripheries 
in order to maintain their economic superiority (Wellhoffer 1988: 284). This 
subordinating relation is maintained by the centre to keep the peripheries as 
sources of surplus (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 2-3). These economic inequalities 
deepen the identity of the peripheries as exploited regions (Fitjar 2010a: 27-28), 
supporting the notion of economic grievances. The common identity of being 
exploited by the centre leads the peripheral elites to demand a change to this 
102 
 
situation, pushing forward for a fairer exchange relation between them. By doing 
so, they would be in position to fulfil their economic perspectives, rearranging the 
regional economies to meet the needs of the local population (Porter 2003: 559-
562).  
This applies not only to poor regions, to improve their economic situation, 
as expected (Hechter 1975a: 30-34), but also to richer regions (Keating 1988: 
12), as they seek to match their economic importance to their political importance 
in the national context, strongly challenging the centre (Urwin 1982: 430). 
Economic inequalities and grievances provide the regions with a strong incentive 
to mobilise (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 292-293). These economic inequalities are 
understood here as the difference between the transfer the regions receive and 
the transfers they provide. As Bookman (1992: 115) puts it, the regions can claim 
that they receive too little to achieve their economic needs, or they give too much, 
preventing them to reach their economic perspectives. The poorer regions might 
demand more resources from the central government so that they can put an end 
to the dependency situation in which they are via a fairer distribution. This can be 
seen as a “revolt of the poor” to demand more presence to avoid the negative 
impact of economic marginalisation (Keating 2017: 12). The richer regions might 
argue that their contribution to the development of the poorer regions undermines 
their ability to further develop (Fitjar 2006:336-339). This “revolt of the rich” is 
intended to reduce their contribution to the solidarity that regional economic plans 
from the centre implement to redistribute the wealth (Keating 2017: 12). Both 
types of regions may seek more decentralization, either demanding a fairer 
distribution of economic resources or to retain them for their own benefit 
(Newhouse 1997). 
 The economic development of regions shapes party competition on the 
centre-periphery cleavage by tensioning the balance between fulfilling the 
demands of the peripheries and maintaining the core as the seat of economic 
dominance. SWPs would not necessarily pressure for more pro-centre positions 
per se, as the peripheries are the main source of surplus, but they are expected 
to adapt to the regions in which they act. In poorer regions, they would push for 
more pro-periphery positions so that they receive the requested transfers from 
the centre to reach the average economic development rates of the country. In 
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rich peripheries, SWPs would also adapt to the grievances that are perceived due 
to the high transfers from these to poorer regions. The perception of retracting 
resources can shift parties to locate themselves in more pro-periphery positions. 
Approaching these grievances based on high transfers may be, indirectly, related 
to prevent secessionist conflict, especially if these grievances are also linked to 
ethno-characteristics of the regions (Hechter 2000; Roeder 2007). 
On the other hand, regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-
periphery positions in comparison to SWPs because regional elites want to be 
able to have access to more economic resources, seeking to fulfil their own 
needs. Access to new markets and resources is a strong incentive for regional 
elites, providing the means to improve the economic perspectives of the region 
and decrease the economic dependency of the centre. This attitude can be found 
both in poor and rich regions. In poor regions, these positions might go in the 
direction of having a fairer distribution of economic transfers. This can be labelled 
as internal colonialism (Hechter 1975a). In rich regions, they might go in the 
direction of criticising the balance between what they transfer to poorer regions 
and what they receive from the central government, arguing that they give more 
than they receive, undermining their capacity to further develop. This can be 
labelled as bourgeois regionalism (Harvie 1994). 
Taking into consideration the explanation of the effect of economic 
development on party behaviour, the general hypothesis is as follows: 
H4-the higher the difference between the regional and national degree of 
economic development, the stronger the pro-periphery positions of parties 
Economic development applied to all the regions of Spain 
 The variety of economic development of the regions of Spain con provide 
the necessary observations to test if the perception theorised above has the 
described result. It is expected that the wider the gap between the region´s 
economic development and the country’s average, the more chances for the 
parties to have stronger pro-periphery positions to address the economic 
grievances produced by this deviation. The hypotheses are as follows: 
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H4.A-the higher the difference between the economic development of the 
region and the country´s mean, the more emphasis of parties of the regional 
level 
H4.B-the higher the difference between the economic development of the 
region and the country´s mean, the more calls from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
H4.C-the higher the difference between the economic development of the 
region and the country´s mean, the more emphasis of parties on positive 
attitudes towards multiculturalism 
3.3.B) Identity 
General discussion 
Using Friedman´s (2000: 31) statement that identity is for humans as 
important as "food in the belly", in this investigation the concept of identity is key. 
In the field of psychology, identity is found to be essential to construct the self-
awareness of humans. This derives from their knowledge of belonging to certain 
social groups, based on the emotional value of attachment to those groups (Tajfel 
1982: 2). The articulation of any identity is based on two dimensions: the objective 
and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension is the one that refers to the 
usage of objective elements to differentiate one group from another, such as 
language or culture. The subjective dimension is the psychological awareness of 
those objective elements. Hobsbawm argues (1990: 5-6) that to articulate an 
identity, national or regional, both dimensions are required. For this investigation, 
the subjective dimension is the most important one, following authors such as 
Anderson (1991: 6), Guibernau (1996: 47), or Moore (1997: 906). 
In this investigation, identity is understood not only as a mechanism to 
articulate the self-awareness of individuals or groups, but also as a social 
construct which is subjected to dynamics of change and articulation (Holt and 
Gubbins 2002: 1). Identity is socially constructed and reproduced through 
discourse (Benwell and Stokoe 2007: 4). If discourses and discursive practices 
produce, reproduce and reinforce identity, this is done by incorporating 
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characteristics of uniqueness and difference (De Cillia et al. 1999: 153-154). In 
this sense, identity is used as a collective marker to articulate the distinctiveness 
of a social group vis-à-vis other groups. Consequently, collective identity is used 
by social groups to mobilise the population to achieve a specific goal, which in 
the case of parties, is political in order to reinforce the borders between groups 
(May 2001: 27). Parties try to articulate identity, via identity consciousness18, to 
fit the purpose of their discourses, which reflects the defence of certain interests 
(Paasi 2013: 1207-1208). 
 National/regional identity is the key issue on which parties struggle to 
politicise identity in order to achieve political mobilisation. On one hand, SWPs 
use national identity to homogenise the state in order to defend the interests of 
the elites that are located in the centre. National identity is defined here as the 
feeling of belonging to a certain social group named as nation (Wodak 1999: 3-
4), based on the perception of a distinct economic, cultural and political national 
reality. On the other hand, regional identity is used by regionalist parties to defend 
the interest of the elites located in the peripheries. Regional identity is understood 
in the same way as national identity, as a hierarchical social phenomenon (Herb 
and Kaplan 1999: 13-17) which is nested (Paasi 2002: 140), but bounded to a 
region. It is based on characteristics of the region that have been classified by 
regional social groups as constituents of the identity of the region (Chromý and 
Janu 2003: 108). These characteristics can be based on natural markers of the 
region (Sörlin 1999: 103-104), or on socio-economic differences (Johnson and 
Coleman 2012: 864-867). 
To understand this argument better, Paasi (2002: 140), divides regional 
identity into two dimensions: an ideal and a factual regional identity. The former 
refers to the collective and normative aspect of the regional identity, or in other 
words, the final ideal target of what a region is supposed to mean politically. The 
latter relates to identities as framed through social interaction, like for example, 
 
18 Following Lopez-Aranguren (1983: 55-58), this investigation relies on three levels to identify 
the degree of development of any social identity consciousness: the first and lower level is the 
perception or awareness of the elements that define a social group in comparison with others. 
This is, the subjective dimension of identity. The second and medium level is the identification 
of the elements that define a social group in comparison with others. This is the objective 
dimension of identity. The third and superior level is the aspirations of making the distinct social 
identity a reality, based on economic, cultural and political grounds. 
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through parties. If nationalism can be understood as a political doctrine that aims 
to converge the ideal to the factual nationalist identity, then regionalism should 
be understood in the same way, the aim of converging the ideal to the factual 
regional identity. If identity is used as a mark of distinction, this means that the 
political community of the periphery can either resign or resist (Chromý and Janu 
2003: 106). This is, move from the periphery to the centre and become 
assimilated, moving only in the factual sphere of the regional identity, or challenge 
it and legitimise its own reality in the periphery through converging the ideal and 
factual regional identity spheres into a single one based on its distinctiveness.  
Combining these two dimensions with Keating´s third element of regional 
identity (1998: 86), the theorisation is the following. This third element refers to 
the regional identity as instrumental, where the region is used as the basis for 
mobilisation and collective action amongst the local population, articulated 
through political discourse to achieve a concrete political convergence of interests 
and distinctiveness (Miodownik and Cartrite 2010: 733). Parties, understood as 
political instruments of certain social groups in the regions (Fitjar 2010a: 7-9), are 
used to imposed a specific political project, either from the centre or to challenge 
centralisation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14). In this sense, SWPs try to impose 
centralisation through a strong national identity, and regionalist parties try to 
challenge it with a strong regional identity.  
As the literature dealing with regionalism argues (Agnew 2002; Paasi 
2004; Keating 2008), territorial identities are central to the success of regionalist 
parties and the subsequent territorial policies. It does not matter how historical 
the peripheral identity is or if it is only restricted to a small group in the periphery, 
it is still a political binder which gives regionalist parties a sense of common aim 
which they use to build a challenging political movement towards the centre 
(Alonso 2012: 24). SWPs are expected to adopt pro-periphery positions on the 
centre-periphery cleavage when these regional identities are strong. They do so 
in order to be able to contextualise their national project and incorporate these 
identities into a broader national identity. Positioning themselves against these 
strong regional identities can trigger resistance form the regional population, 
deepening the feeling of becoming assimilate against their will. In comparison, 
regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions in 
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defending regional identities as they are used to articulate distinct communities 
at the peripheries, making this a specific marker to challenge the centre.  
The effect of strong regional identities on party completion on the centre-
periphery cleavage is hypothesised in this investigation in the following way: 
H5-strong regional identities reinforce the pro-periphery positions of 
parties 
Identity applied to all the regions of Spain 
 The existence of strong regional identities in Spain is a key element of the 
tensions between the centre and the peripheries (Keating 1993; Lecours 2001; 
Llera 2009) at the regional level (Chernyha and Burg 2012). This has been 
present since the 19th century (Beramendi 1999), and its implication in politics is 
very deep (Aja 2001; Flynn 2004). Theorising that the stronger the regional 
identity, the stronger the pro-positions of parties to address this mark of 
distinction, either to incorporate it to a broader national project by SWPs, or to 
challenge the centre by regionalist parties. The hypotheses are: 
H5.A-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties of 
the regional level 
H5.B-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more calls from parties for 
more competences for the regions 
H5.C-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties 
on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism 
3.3.C) Language 
General discussion 
 Culture-base factors are well studied arguments on how regional 
distinctiveness affects party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage (Rose 
and Urwin 1969; Rose 1974; De Winter and Türsan 1998; Knutsen 2004). The 
formation of a strong centre requires for the peripheries to be homogenised in 
order to nationalise the state-building process (Caramani 2004: 32). The main 
challenge to this centre-formation process comes from regions that have their 
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own regional cultures and present resistance to this homogenisation wave 
coming from the core (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 10). This resistance, when it 
becomes a strong counter-core movement over time in order to protect regional 
distinctiveness, is labelled here, as outlined in the conceptual framework, 
regionalism (Hueglin 1986: 439). From all the possible dimensions that make up 
this regional distinctiveness and the centre-periphery cleavage (Rokkan and 
Urwin 1983: 16), this investigation focuses on the cultural dimension, and more 
precisely, on language. 
 Language, inside this cultural dimension of the centre-periphery cleavage, 
is agreed to be a strong source of regional distinctiveness when it is shared by 
the peripheral population in contrast to the one used in the centre (Cartrite and 
Miodownik 2016: 122). The processes of state- and nation-building are designed 
to, through the homogenisation wave when forming the centres, create a scenario 
with one state, one nation and one language (Mar-Molinero 2000: 11). Therefore, 
language plays one of the most important factors to, on one hand, shape a 
common identity (Barbour and Carmichael 2000: 4), and on the other hand, 
maintaining this common identity (Wright 1994: 3). When these processes 
expand to peripheral regions with local languages, this element becomes a 
source of distinctiveness and political competition (Beswick 2007: 30). There is a 
clash between the language that comes from the centre and the languages 
spoken in the peripheries. The key issue considered here to classify them as 
different is done based on a political choice (Carter and Sealey 2007: 21). This 
is, languages are politically articulated to reinforce a certain identity, linked to a 
specific culture, and the latter to a specific territorial unit. The result of this link is 
that the relation between a certain language, a certain culture, a certain territory, 
and therefore, a certain population, is constantly reinforced through political 
engagement. This engagement happens from the centre towards the periphery, 
with the homogenisation wave, and from the periphery towards the centre, with 
regional distinctiveness and regionalism as a counter-movement to the former.  
As a distinctive marker, language is used to frame group identity in the 
centre and in the periphery (Carter and Sealey 2007: 23). If regionalism is 
understood as a collective struggle deeply rooted in territorial grievances (Murphy 
et al. 2002: 77), language is one of the issues over which regionalism frames 
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most forms of fight (William 1997: 112-115) where this distinctive marker is 
present.  In terms of party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, this is a 
major issue, especially in regions where there is coexistence between the 
language from the centre and the language from the periphery. Despite this, the 
mere existence of a regional language is not the reason per se for a strong 
regional distinctiveness (Beswick 2007: 40). This has to come through a well-
developed political engagement to turn it into a source of political distinctiveness. 
Parties are the mechanism through which these regional languages are used to 
articulate this political distinctiveness.  
SWPs position themselves in the support of the language from the centre, 
where their core level and loyalties lay. Despite this, the protection and promotion 
of regional languages can be part of their discourse, being able to articulate one 
where both languages can coexist, but the limit is always drawn by the language 
that is spoken at the centre. If a regional language poses a threat to the language 
of the centre, they can position themselves in more pro-periphery positions in 
order to incorporate it to a broader national political project and protect, via this 
way, the national language (Heller 1995: 374). The stronger the regional 
language, the more SWPs would try to incorporate it to a national-wide political 
project to prevent a negative reaction from the regional population that identifies 
with it. This is graduated by their ideological position in terms of their ability to 
promote the inclusion of minority cultures and languages. Regionalist parties are 
expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions. As language is an important 
marker in the articulation of cultures and identities, the existence of regional 
languages is argued by these parties as a key issue in party competition to 
highlight their defence of the region. Regional languages provide regionalist 
parties the reason to put forward strong pro-periphery demands on the centre-
periphery cleavage. Language becomes a marker in the conflict with the centre 
and an instrument to articulate a strong counter-core movement (Llobera 1994: 
131). Around language, regionalism reinforces the common identity of the 
periphery and is able to mobilise the population (Roller 2001: 42).  
The general hypothesis that can be articulate to understand how regional 




H6-regional languages reinforce the pro-periphery positions of parties 
Language applied to all the regions of Spain 
 As with regional identities, regional languages in Spain have deep roots in 
politics (Lasagabaster 2011) and the political relations between the centre and 
the peripheries (Shabad and Gunthe 1982). Some of these regional languages 
have major impact in regions such as Catalonia (Hoffmann 2000; Strubell and 
Boix-Fuster 2011), Galicia (Beswick 2002; van Morgan 2006), or the Basque 
Country (Conversi 1990; Urla 2012), being a trigger for regional mobilisation. This 
mark of distinction plays an important role in these regions, where a coexistence, 
not always peaceful, between the national and the regional language can tension 
how parties frame this conflict. In order to adapt their discourses to the existence 
of strong regional languages, parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery 
positions where these are present. The hypotheses to test this are: 
H6.A-a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis of the regional 
level 
H6.B-a regional language makes parties increase the calls for more 
competences for the regions 
H6.C-a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis on positive 
attitudes towards multiculturalism 
3.4) Party-level control variables 
3.4.A) General Framework 
 The party-level control variables focus on describing the characteristics of 
political parties and how these can affect party competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage. Because practices and discourses shape socio-spatial 
consciousness, legitimising structures of dominance (Paasi 1996), parties are 
one of the most effective means to shape the relations between the centre and 
the periphery. In this investigation, the focus is put on how parties and their 
characteristics can shape the multi-dimensional party competition along the 
centre-periphery cleavage to maximise their performance (Heller 2002: 660). For 
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a better understanding of this framework, the party-level control variables 















Figure 3.9. The different party-level control variables that might shape party competition on the 
centre-periphery cleavage. 
3.4.B) Party type 
General discussion 
Using the definition of SWPs and regionalist parties contained in the 
conceptual framework above, this control variable is expected to shape party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in the following way. Having the 
























in the region for regionalist parties (Brancati 2005: 143-145), is assumed to make 
a difference in the position that parties have on the centre-periphery cleavage. 
SWPs tend to articulate a discourse that reinforces the centre by undermining a 
possible strong periphery that is articulated as a threat to the former, but without 
having pro-centre positions per se. This has to be put in context of decentralised 
states. The more decentralised the state is, the more important and complex the 
regional level becomes (Hopkins 2003: 227-230), and SWPs accommodate to 
this new political arena accordingly (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 243). These 
parties have the responsibility of maintaining a state-wide cohesion across all 
regions (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 343), so going against the interest of the 
regions in regional elections might make this task difficult and counterproductive 
for their electoral perspectives. To avoid a negative reaction from the regional 
population and maintain their project as state-wide and inclusive, they are 
expected to emphasise, to some extent, pro-periphery positions. In contrast, 
regionalist parties, because they are seen as the main instrument to defend the 
region (De Winter 1998: 204-205), articulate a discourse that strengthens the 
periphery vis-à-vis the centre. Therefore, regionalist parties are expected to have 
stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs. 
 An important consequence that party type has on the centre-periphery 
cleavage taken into consideration here is when SWPs face regionalist parties in 
regional elections. In regions where SWPs face regionalist parties, the former 
need to adapt to an even more complex competition to attract votes in 
comparison to a scenario where SWP, although in regional elections, compete 
between each other with no third actor (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 187-188). In 
this sense, SWPs, when competing with strong regionalist parties, try to adapt 
more pro-periphery positions to avoid ownership of territorial issues from the latter 
(Swenden and Toubeau 2013: 253). For example, Meguid (2005) refers to this 
interaction as pro-decentralisation strategies. Despite this, adopting this agenda 
by SWPs might not always grant them the credibility from the voters that they 
initially intended (Alonso 2012: 182-191). Leaving aside the possible strategies 
that SWPs can undertake (Elias et al. 2015), the key point is that not all SWPs 
adapt in the same way. Not all SWPs have the same behaviour when competing 
with regionalist parties, adapting with different intensity on the centre-periphery 
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cleavage. Some limitations can be, for example, ideology and structure (Meguid 
2008; Swenden and Maddens 2009; van Houten 2009). 
With this in mind, on one hand, facing regionalist parties might pose 
pressure on the SWPs to regionalise even more their positions on the centre-
periphery cleavage in order to still benefit from electoral competition (Alonso et 
al. 2015: 855) through grating more autonomy to their regional branches (Hopkin 
2003: 233). On the other hand, not facing regionalist parties might benefit the 
SWPs by taking ownership of the territorial dimension of party competition to 
prevent a strong regionalist party to consolidate (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 189). 
For example, a SWP that faces a regionalist party in a region where a regional 
language is an important distinctiveness marker is expected to adapt differently 
than when the same party competes in a region with a lesser degree of regional 
identification (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 628). This behaviour can be also observed in 
regionalist parties. Their behaviour is expected to change when facing SWPs in 
order to adapt to the behaviour of the latter (Elias 2015: 94-95). 
In light of the above theorisation of how party type might affect party 
competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, the general hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H7-SWPs have milder pro-periphery positions than regionalist parties 
Party type applied to all the regions of Spain 
 In order to avoid the missing data from the RMP in relation to the 
regionalist parties, the hypotheses designed for this control variable are focused 
on the PSOE and the PP, both SWPs, with very consistent electoral performance 
in all regions across the vast majority of electoral periods. With this in mind, the 
hypotheses are: 
H7.A-SWPs emphasise less the regional level than regionalist parties 
H7.B-SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties 
H7.C-SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties 
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 Following with the focus on SWPs, and as theorised above, one of the 
consequences of this factor is that the presence of a regional competitor might 
make SWPs change their behaviour. The expected behaviour is that SWPs, in 
order to present themselves as parties that are able to defend the interests of the 
region to the same extent as regionalist parties, adopt stronger pro-periphery 
positions. In order to be able to test this, the hypotheses are: 
H7.D-SWPs emphasise more the regional level when facing regionalist parties 
H7.E-SWPs call for more competences when facing regionalist parties 
H7.F-SWPs emphasise more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism when 
facing regionalist parties 
Party type applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 
 In comparison to all the regions of Spain, the regionalist parties in 
Andalusia and the Canary Islands allows to extent the hypotheses to the PA/CA 
and CC, further testing the theorised expectations. To test this, the hypotheses 
are: 
H7.G-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the regional level than the PSOE and 
the PP 
H7.H-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more a differentiated constitutional status 
of the region than the PSOE and the PP 
H7.I-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the devolution of competences to the 
region in comparison to the PSOE and the PP 
H7.J-the PA/CA and CC emphasise a stronger regional identity in comparison 
to the PSOE and the PP 
3.4.C) Party ideology 
General discussion 
 This sub-section deals with the ideological position of parties, categorised 
using the dichotomy left vs. right orientation. Following Elias et al.´ (2015: 842) 
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argument that the economic dimension is not the only one that defines the 
ideological orientation of “left” and “right” parties, there are other issues that could 
be more useful for this investigation. In this section, the focus is placed on the 
social dimension, understood as the social change values (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990: 215) or value orientation (Knutsen 2011: 155)19. 
 Knutsen (2011: 155-158) defines social values as the belief that some 
social and personal behaviours are preferred to others. This means that for some 
social groups, some behaviours with respect to themselves, and/or other social 
groups, are better than others. It could be interesting to add to this definition the 
one given by Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 215), who understood social values 
as those which refer to some kind of social change and its acceptance. 
Combining these two definitions, it is possible to come up with a useful meaning 
of social values that can help understand the purpose of this section. With this in 
mind, here, social values are understood as the behaviour or social position, and 
the way in which it may change, that a group adapts with respect to the social 
and political participation of other groups and the possible exercise of minority 
rights (Knutsen 2011: 155-156). Social values can be summarised in the 
dichotomy of libertarian vs. authoritarian political orientation of parties (Rovny and 
Edwards 2012)20. In other words, the way in which parties allow for the social and 
political participation of other social groups. 
 The basic argument is that left/centre-left parties tend to be more 
progressive (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 213) and less resistant to change 
(Thorisdottir et al. 2007: 175). In the sense, they are more open to social change 
in order to promote the social and political participation of other social groups. 
Right/centre-right parties therefore tend to be more conservative (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990: 214), more resistant to change (Thorisdottir et. al. 2007: 175), 
and defend a national culture and community from the challenges of, for example, 
 
19 The inclusion of social values to the left vs. right categorisation of parties is sometimes 
labelled in the literature as the new politics orientations (Inglehart 1991: 279–285; Freire 2006: 
360; Knutsen 2011: 156). 
20 This does not mean that in this investigation the dichotomy libertarian vs. authoritarian is 
considered as a separate dimension or category of the parties (Middendorp 1989; Evans et. 
al. 1996), but as a characteristic of those same parties that are categorised as left or right. 
Using Ray´s (1982: 33) wording, libertarian vs. authoritarian is not really a new dimension but 
more a characteristic or variable of the left vs. right parties. 
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sub-national or regional identities in the case of right/centre-right SWPs (Hooghe 
at. al. 2002: 981). This is what can be labelled as the value orientation of parties, 
the degree to which they are able to include, depending on their categorisation 
as left or right, other groups and their interests to the political project they 
emphasise. It is important to highlight that this applies both to SWPs and 
regionalist parties indistinctively, and value orientation can be very useful to 
understand party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage (Knutsen 2011: 
157). 
 Ideology affects party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in the 
following way. Right/centre-right parties tend to have more conservative values 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 214), defending the traditional dominance of a 
social group over the rest, offering some resistance to change this set of power 
relations (Hooghe et al. 2002: 981). These parties tend to defend a political 
project that has a dominant position with respect to other groups and interests, 
reinforced by traditionalism as one of their main characteristics. These 
conservative values make right/centre-right parties articulate their positions on 
the centre-periphery cleavage in a more exclusive way, being this at the centre 
or the peripheries. These parties are less able to incorporate other cultures and 
social groups to their political projects. Left/centre-left parties tend to be on the 
opposite side (Kundnani 2012). They tend to be more inclusive regarding other 
cultures and social groups (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 213), presenting less 
resistance to change (Thorisdottir et al. 2007: 175) when it comes to the 
redistribution of power relations. These parties are characterised as inclusive 
towards other social groups regarding their rights and interest, aiming for a 
peaceful coexist inside broad political projects. Their positions on the centre-
periphery cleavage would be more open to be inclusive towards other cultures 
and social groups, being this at the centre or the peripheries. 
The key point here is that ideology, in this investigation, is considered first 
in isolation. Most of the literature develops the ideological orientation of parties in 
relation to their type (Sorens 2008; Massetti 2009; Elias and Tronconi 2011; 
Massetti and Schakel 2013; 2016). The aim is to observe if this factor actually 
determines the inclusiveness of the political projects and positions of parties. If 
these are more or less inclusive or exclusive pro-centre or pro-periphery depends 
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on which party articulates them. The lesser degree of compatibility between 
groups, the more the positions would skew to one of the ends of the centre-
periphery continuum. Determining which this end is, is the result of ideology in 
interaction with party type. Ideology on its own is expected to determine the ability 
of parties to incorporate other social groups to these pro-centre/periphery 
positions.  
The effect of ideology on the positions that parties have when competition 
along the centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in general terms as follows: 
H8-the ideological orientation of parties affects the inclusiveness of the 
pro-centre/periphery positions  
Ideology applied to all the regions of Spain 
 The high number of different types of parties that are both left and right 
orientated in Spain, including SWPs and regionalist parties, allows to test if 
ideology on its own is expected to shape party competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage as theorised above. The hypotheses are: 
H8.A-the ideological position of parties makes no difference on the emphasis of 
the regional level 
H8.B-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more 
competences for the regions. 
 The reason for hypothesising that the ideological position of parties is not 
expected to shape party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage via 
these two dependent variables is that, for example and in the case of the saliency 
of the regional level, the PSOE, a left/centre-left SWP, can emphasise the region 
more than the PP, a right/centre-right SWP, but at the same time, less than the 
PNV, a right/centre-right regionalist party, or the BNG, a left/centre-left regionalist 
party. This is, this dependent variable is not directly affected by the social 
dimension of the ideological position of parties. Social values have little influence 
over it. The same can be observed for the position on competence distribution.  
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 Where ideology is expected to have a deep impact on its own is in the 
attitudes of parties towards multiculturalism, where the social values are key to 
understand how parties behave along the centre-periphery cleavage, 
independently from their type. Left/centre-left parties, as framed above, are able 
to include other social groups to broader political projects in opposition to 
right/centre-right parties, more resistance to social change and shifts in the power 
relations that they support. This can be hypothesised in the following way: 
H8.C-left/centre-left parties are able to have more positive attitudes towards 
multiculturalism than right/centre-right parties. 
Ideology applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 
 Due to the mixture of SWPs and regionalist parties, the same can be 
developed when comparing Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary 
Islands. It is difficult to separate the influence of party type from their ideological 
position. Again, it would be interesting to see if this also applies to these three 
specific regions in the same degree as for all the regions of Spain, reinforcing or 
rejecting the possible results from the above expectations. This applies for the 
saliency of the regional level and the position on competence distribution. The 
hypotheses, with this in mind, are the following: 
H8.D-the ideological position of parties makes no difference in the emphasis of 
the regional level 
H8.F-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more 
competences for the regions  
 Taking this last variable as an example, ideology on its own is supposed 
to have little influence on the way the PSOE, the PP, the PA/CA (left/centre-left 
party), or the CC (right/centre-right party) articulate the distribution of 
competences for the same reason as in the above application to all the regions 
of Spain. Finally, the ideological position of parties is believed to have a deep 
impact in the way parties frame the region in relation to its inclusiveness with 
other social groups. Without considering if the identity that parties support is 
national or regional, the social values that they support make them more or less 
119 
 
open to interact and coexist with other social groups. The hypotheses are the 
following: 
H8.E-the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive 
constitutional status of the region 
H8.G- the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive 
national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties 
3.4.D) Interaction between party type and ideology 
General discussion 
The above consideration takes party ideology on its own, but this has 
another major effect, which is the interaction of this variable with party type. 
Taken together, these two party-level control variables can deeply affect how 
parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. Considering SWPs first, the 
context in which these parties adapt their positions is determined, to some extent, 
by the degree of decentralisation and the multi-level party competition that results 
from it (León 2014: 392-394). The never-ending regional demands from 
empowered regional elites are dealt by SWPs taking into consideration the 
political reality in which they act, and in decentralised states, this can become a 
challenge. Their positions on the territorial axes can be, to some extent, divided 
into those who support more decentralisation and inclusion, and those that do not 
(Massetti 2009: 513). In this sense, one can say that SWPs subsume the centre-
periphery into the left-right dimension, core of their ideology (Alonso 2012: 72-
73).  
Left/centre-left SWPs are able to articulate a discourse which is capable 
of including regional cultures and social groups into a broader state-wide national 
political project. This means that their positions tend to be more pro-periphery so 
that this national inclusive discourse is regionalised. The coexistence of a national 
and regional culture is put forward as a value of this discourse in order for the 
regional population to identify itself with the state-wide national project. These 
regional cultures and social groups are not only incorporated, but this is done so 
by applying a multiculturalist approach of recognition and protection. In contrast, 
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right/centre-right SWPs would behave with less openness towards these regional 
cultures and social groups. Their less inclusive values result in resistance to 
incorporate them in the same way as left/centre-left SWPs. This does not mean 
that they would position themselves in pro-centre positions exclusively, always 
thinking that multi-level party competition requires them to adapt and regionalise 
their positions to some extent. On the contrary, they would still have pro-periphery 
positions but with less emphasis. This mild pro-periphery positions would be 
articulated in the way of subordinating regional cultures and social groups to the 
culture and social groups at the centre. 
In terms of regionalist parties, their ideological position also affects their 
position on the centre-periphery cleavage, being a more complex dynamic in 
comparison to SWPs (Coakley 1992: 16), where, for example, regional 
characteristics can play a major role (Massetti 2009: 505-512). Right/centre-right 
regionalist parties tend to have more exclusive values in terms of a peaceful 
coexistence with the culture and social groups coming from the core. The pro-
periphery positions of these parties are articulated in contrast to broader state-
wide political projects like the ones some SWPs put forward (Pallarés and Keating 
2003: 242-243). Left/centre-left regionalist parties, due to their high degree of 
inclusiveness, are more open to defend demands where regional and national 
cultures can coexist. Their pro-periphery positions are not framed in a necessarily 
dichotomous way, and are open to be included in a broader state-wide national 
political project.  
These positions would have to be highly contextualised in order to be able 
to put them into a scale (Newman 1997; Erk 2005), where the lower inclusiveness 
could be considered as stronger pro-periphery positions than those which are 
more open to interaction with other social groups. This can be explained because 
their ideological stand and their territorial political preference for the region 
normally come together (Aguilar and Sánchez-Cuenca 2008: 115; Massetti and 
Schakel 2013: 803), resulting in a variety of positions (De Winter 1998: 205-207), 
ranging from autonomist to secessionist demands and with self-government rule 
as the starting point of all (Alonso 2012: 1), as outlined in the conceptual 
framework. This variation in the position of regionalist parties can give support to 
the thesis outlining that this type of parties subsumes left-right issues into the 
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centre-periphery dimension, core of their ideology (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 
867).  
In regional elections, the ideological orientation of parties has its 
importance, both for SWPs, when they have to considerate their secondary 
dimension (centre-periphery dimension), and for regionalist parties, when they 
convey with their also secondary dimension (left-right dimension) (Massetti and 
Schakel 2015: 866). This is developed in the next section.  
The general hypothesis that can be articulated when considering this 
interaction between party type and ideology and its effect on party competition 
along the centre-periphery cleavage is the following: 
H9-left/centre-left SWPs are more able to have stronger pro-periphery 
positions 
Interaction between party type and ideology applied to all the regions of Spain 
 To observe the interaction of party type and ideology when applying it to 
all the regions of Spain, the focus is put on the two most important SWPs, the 
PSOE and the PP. The reason for this is that these two parties act in all the 
regions of Spain except for the PP in Navarre until 2008. This provides a high 
number of observations to analyse the impact of this interaction over time. 
Regionalist parties could not be the best choice for this due to two main reasons. 
First, their electoral performance is less consistent, and second, their own 
existence. In this sense, not all regionalist parties have been present in the 
regions for the same period as the PSOE and the PP. Some have disappeared 
and some have been newly formed, preventing a proper analysis of trends over 
time. The general pattern is that the PSOE is expected have more pro-periphery 
positions in comparison to the PP (Massetti 2009: 513). Taking this into 
consideration, the hypotheses are: 
H9.A-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, emphasises more the regional level 




H9.C-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, has more positive attitudes towards 
multiculturalism 
Interaction between party type and ideology applied to Castilla-La Mancha, 
Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. 
 In the case of Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia and the Canary Islands, the 
consistency of the regionalist parties acting in the last two regions allows to apply 
the interaction of party type and ideology not only to the PSOE and the PP, but 
also to the PA/CA and CC. This would provide a wider view of the ways in which 
this interaction affects the way parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. 
The PSOE is expected to be able to include to its broader national project the 
social groups in the peripheries, having stronger pro-periphery positions than the 
PP. Considering the ideological position of the PA/CA and CC, the latter would 
have stronger pro-periphery positions than the PA/CA, due to its less capacity of 
incorporating other social groups to its political project. The hypotheses are the 
following: 
H9.D-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, is more capable of incorporating the 
regions with a more important role in relation to the centre 
H9.E-the PA/CA, in comparison to the CC, emphasises a more symmetrical 
constitutional status of the region 
H9.F-the PSOE calls for more and more important competences to be devolved 
to the regions in comparison to the PP in order to fulfil the needs of the social 
groups in the peripheries 
H9.G-the PP and CC articulate a less inclusive national/regional identity in 
comparison to the PSOE and the PA/CA 
3.4.E) Party structure 
General discussion 
The structure of parties is key to understand how they accommodate to a 
multi-level competition scenario (Thorlakson 2013: 714) in partially federal and 
federal states (Dardanelli 2019: 8-12), where the regional level plays an important 
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role. Parties in multi-level systems face strong challenges that are directly related 
to the organisation of the state (Deschouwer 2006: 291-291). In this case, parties 
need to adapt in order to merge their electoral performance (Deschouwer 2003: 
217) and the possibility to hold a position in office at the different levels 
(Thorlakson 2013: 714). The main purpose of these multi-level integration is to 
maintain their image amongst the voters as a way to defend their interests. 
Therefore, these internal dynamics condition party performance (Hopkin 2003: 
228). In this thesis, this applies especially to SWPs. The ways in which the state-
wide party and its regional branches articulate their relations determines the ways 
in which they position themselves in the different dimension of the political space.  
 The support that SWPs receive comes from two main sources (Thorlakson 
2013: 714). The first source is the state-wide support that the party receives, 
normally in general elections. The second source comes from the support that 
they receive from sub-national arenas, such as regions and municipalities. The 
balance between these two sources is where the internal structure plays a major 
role. The way in which the checks and balances are articulated between the state-
wide party and regional branches form the way in which both can benefit from 
each other without undermining the position of each other in their specific 
competition level (Filippov et al. 2004: 195). A multi-level system puts upon SWPs 
major challenges in their electoral performance (Hopkins 2003: 231-233), internal 
integration (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 565-566), and ideological cohesiveness 
(León 2017: 2). When competition shifts from the national to the regional level, 
this is reflected in the internal cohesion of parties, and therefore, power balance 
also shifts (Hopkins 2003: 230) 
Vertical integration is understood as the organisational links, cooperation, 
and the relations and interactions between the state-wide party and regional 
branches (Thorlakson 2009: 161-162). This is, the intra-organisational aspect of 
the same party (Deschouwer 2003: 216). An important feature of this vertical 
integration is that, although they compete under the same name and despite the 
fact that they can have programmatic variations in the different elections in which 
they fill in candidates (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2-3), they share a common goal and 
loyalties (Filippov et al. 2004: 192). The common goal and loyalties refer to the 
relation with the core level of the party as a whole (Deschouwer 2003: 216-217). 
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In other words, taking into considerations the existence of differences between 
the state-wide party and the regional branches, both are merged in a single 
integrated party (Thorlakson 2013: 716).  
Horizontal integration is understood as the differences between the actions 
taken by the regional branches of a party in their specific regional contexts 
(Thorlakson 2006: 39). The key issue to understand the horizontal integration of 
parties is the highly regionalised context in which regional branches act. Policy 
heterogeneity might be key for electoral and office success (Mueller and 
Bernauer 2018: 567), and therefore, certain programmatic autonomy of regional 
branches is necessary. Every region possesses its own characteristics, being this 
cultural, historic or economic. If the behaviour of parties is understood as a 
reflection of the social context in which they act (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 
569), then the variation across regions is inevitable. The behaviour of regional 
branches in regions with a specific language is not the same as the behaviour in 
regions where this marker is non-existent. The more the party is able to 
regionalise its strategies and structures, the more it can benefit from electoral 
success (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4-5). 
Some authors, such as Thorlakson (2009; 2011), differentiate vertical and 
horizontal integration from autonomy. The latter refers to the degree of autonomy 
that the state-wide party has to act with no constrains from the regional branches 
(Thorlakson 2009: 162-163). In multi-level party competition, this can be further 
applied. Parties need to take into account that the regional level is highly 
contextualised, shaped by the interests of the regions. Therefore, this need to be 
addressed directly. Due to the fact that every region is distinct vis-à-vis the others, 
the autonomy of the regional branches is at the same time affecting the vertical 
and the horizontal integration of parties. The main result of this is that the 
conceptualisation of autonomy can also be applied to the regional branches 
(Fabre and Swenden 2013: 345). Therefore, autonomy can be also understood 
as the degree of action that regional branches have to act with no constrains from 
the state-wide party (Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009: 103). By doing so, the state-
wide party benefits from the direct link between the regional branches and the 
regional demands (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2). This takes into consideration the link 
between the location of the loyalties and core level of the party as a whole 
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(Deschouwer 2003: 219-220), and the necessity to adapt to the regional demands 
and interests in a multi-level system (León 2017: 1-3).  
In order to maintain their influence and performance in regional elections, 
SWPs provide their regional branches with some degree of autonomy. This 
involves not only some sort of autonomous organisation (Jeffery 2010: 139-141), 
but also some sort of autonomous positioning on the different axes of competition 
in comparison to the state-wide party (Grofman 2004: 39). This applies especially 
to regions where specific characteristics or markers that tension the centre-
periphery cleavage, such as those that have cultural or identity distinctiveness 
(van Houten 2009: 141). The main result is the appearance of tensions with their 
core levels and loyalties (León 2014: 399). This autonomous organisation and 
positioning are also applied horizontally, and each regional branch is granted 
some sort of autonomous action to adapt to the specific region in which they are 
acting. The behaviour of the regional branches is therefore highly regionalised, 
like for example, in the articulation of their electoral programmes (Müller 2013: 
178). This puts tension on the horizontal integration of SWPs. This is better 
explained by the delegation model between SWPs and their regional branches 
(van Houten, 2009a; 2009b). 
This can be summarised in the degree of integration of the SWPs. The 
more integrated the structure of the SWP is, the less autonomy the regional 
branches have. The less integrated, the more autonomy the regional branches 
have. SWPs that have a more integrated structure are expected to have milder 
pro-periphery positions or even pro-centre positions. The autonomy given to the 
regional branches is enough to regionalise their discourses but not to have a high 
degree of variation amongst the different regions and regional branches. This is 
designed to have a strong internal cohesion in defence of the interests of the 
elites at the centre. In contrast, SWPs that have less integrated structures can be 
expected to display a more regionalised performance depending on the region in 
which they act. The pro-periphery positions are therefore stronger because their 
discourses are highly contextualised as the regional branches have more 
freedom to adapt to the specific characteristics that they face. One can find more 
horizontal variation in SWPs with less integrated structures. This stronger pro-
periphery positions put more tension on the internal cohesion, as regionalising 
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discourses might put pressure on the interest of the elites at the centre, and even 
more in regions with distinctive characteristics (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4-
5), such as having a strong identity or language. 
The effect of the structure that SWP have when competition along the 
centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in general terms as follows: 
H10-SWPs that are less integrated are able to have stronger pro-
periphery positions 
Party structure applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 
 This variable is only applied to these three regions. The reason for this is 
that there is no consistent measuring scheme that can be applied to regionalist 
parties and provide the same results as for SWPs. Regionalist parties can also 
have local branches, like CC, which is a regionalist party with, on one hand, a 
strong island-based identity, and on the other hand, island-based branches. In 
comparison, the PA/CA has a different structure, which is expected due to the 
different characteristics and historic development of Andalusia. This makes 
measuring the structure of these regionalist parties difficult for the purpose of this 
investigation. To avoid this difficulty, this variable is only applied to the PSOE and 
the PP to test the expected behaviour theorised above. The hypotheses to test 
this are: 
H10.A-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE makes them 
emphasise more the importance of the regional level in comparison to the PP, 
resulting in more horizontal variation  
H10.B-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases 
the possibility to articulate a more differentiated constitutional status of the 
regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation 
H10.C-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases 
the possibility to call for more and more important competences for the regions 
in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation 
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H10.D-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases 
the possibility to reinforce the coexistence of multiple identities in comparison to 
the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation 
3.4.F) Interaction between the three party-level control variables focused on 
SWPs 
This sub-section is used to describe the interaction between the three 
party-level control variables with special focus on SWPs. This is focused on two 
main issues, the social values on one hand or ideological position, and internal 
cohesiveness on the other. Although right/centre-right parties tend to be less 
inclusive to any changes that come from minority cultures and populations, the 
multi-level party organisation of SWPs will deal with these issues in a more 
contextualised dimension. This means that right/centre-right SWPs tend to 
assimilate regional cultures and population into a state-wide political project in 
each region via their regional branches. This can be translated into a less 
inclusive vision or attitudes towards multiculturalism in peripheries where the 
regional cultures and populations have more consciousness of their 
distinctiveness and may present a challenge to the culture and population of the 
centre, leaving less autonomy to their regional branches when dealing with these 
issues. Having a state-wide project does not mean per se that right/centre-right 
SWPs will have an exclusive vision of the regional cultures and populations. 
These SWPs can have an inclusive vision of the regional cultures and 
populations, despite the fact that some states can be highly ethnically divided, 
favoured by these multi-level organisations and adapting to the different 
circumstances that may appear (Biezen and Hopkins 2006: 15-19), like for 
example, giving their regional branches some autonomy to deal with the regional 
contexts in which they operate (Filippov et al. 2004: 192–194).  
Left/centre-left SWPs, being more inclusive towards regional cultures and 
minorities, favour the articulation of a broad state-wide national project. In order 
to be able to incorporate regional cultures and minorities, their regional branches 
will tend be have more autonomy to contextualise this incorporation to a project 
in which the former should identify themselves. This means that they will tend to 
have stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to right/centre-right SWPs. 
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The higher degree of autonomy granted to the regional branches when it comes 
to left/centre-left SWPs can be seen as the result of incorporating regional 
cultures and minorities, not assimilating them, to a broad national political project 
that could be described as multicultural. The variation that can be found in the 
attitudes of the regional branches that both types of SWPs have can be explained 
by the horizontal variation across the different regions of the state (Deschouwer 
2006: 294) and how the parties adapt to each context (Fabre 2008: 311). Not only 
have SWPs to adapt to the regional contexts but also, they have to adapt to the 
demands of their voters and try to preserve their internal structure (Hopkin and 
Bradbury 2006: 136), their cohesiveness (León 2017: 1-3), and maintain a 
coherent ideological position (Swenden and Maddens 2009: 260-263). This 
means that despite their degree of flexibility depending on the social values they 
defend when including regional cultures and interest, both right/centre-right and 
left/centre-left SWPs need to preserve their internal cohesiveness around their 
state-wide political project.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to conceptualise and theorise the ways in 
which the different factors outlined here can shape party competition on the 
centre-periphery cleavage. The main concepts, theory, assumptions, main 
expectations, and hypotheses outlined here are seen as intended to introduce 
the theoretical pillars on which the main research problem rests. It is not only an 
extension of the literature review but a more developed relation between the main 
concepts and the explanatory and control variables. In total, nine main variables 
have been theorised: distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, economic 
development, regional identity, regional language, party type, party ideology, and 
party structure. On one hand, the first three are considered as the main 
explanatory variables, and on the other hand, the last six are treated as the main 
control variables. All are theorised and expected to shape the way in which 
parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage, first in abstract terms, and 
then applied to Spain as a case study. Taking into consideration Spain, there is 
a difference between the expectations for all the region and the focused 
comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. 
Finally, the main hypotheses (Table 3.1) outlined here are differentiated 
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depending on the aim to be fulfilled, either a general view of Spain and all its 












 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
DISTANCE 
H1-the further away 
from the centre, the 
stronger the pro-
periphery positions of 
parties 
 
H1.A-the greater the distance from the 
centre, the more parties emphasise the 
regional level; H1.B-the greater the 
distance from the centre, the more calls 
from parties for more competences for 
the regions; H1.C-the greater the 
distance from the centre, the more 
emphasis of parties on positive attitudes 
towards multiculturalism 
H1.D-as distance from the centre increases, 
parties will emphasise more the regional 
level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha 
to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary 
Islands; H1.E-as distance from the centre 
increases, parties will emphasise a more 
differentiated constitutional status of the 
region as one moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the 
Canary Islands; H1.F-as distance from the 
centre increases, parties will increase the 
demands for more competences as one 
moves from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; 
H1.G-as distance from the centre increases, 
parties will increase the emphasis on a 
differentiated identity as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally 






periphery positions of 
parties 
 
H2.A-fragmentation undermines the 
emphasis of parties on the regional level; 
H2.B-fragmentation reduces the calls 
from parties for more competences for 
the regions; H2.C-fragmentation favours 
a less positive attitude of parties towards 
multiculturalism 
H2.D-fragmentation undermines the 
articulation of a strong regional level by 
parties due to the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local level, increasing its 
effects as one moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the 
Canary Islands; H2.E-fragmentation 
weakens the ability of parties to articulate a 
differentiated constitutional status of the 
region due to the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local level, increasing its 
effects as one moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the 
Canary Islands; H2.F-fragmentation reduces 
the ability of parties to call for more 
competences for the region due to the 
acknowledgement of the importance of the 
local level, increasing its effects as one 
moves from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; 
H2.G-fragmentation erodes the ability of 
parties to articulate a strong regional identity 
due to the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local level, increasing its 
effects as one moves from Castilla-La 







periphery positions of 
parties 
 
H3.A-polycentricity undermines the 
emphasis of parties of the regional level; 
H3.B-polycentricity weakens the calls 
from parties for more competences for 
the regions; H3.C-polycentricity 
diminishes the positive attitudes of 
parties towards multiculturalism  
H3.D-polycentricity weakens the ability of 
parties to articulate a strong regional level, 
increasing its effects as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally 
to the Canary Islands; H3.E-polycentricity 
undermines the ability of parties to articulate 
a differentiated constitutional status of the 
region, increasing its effects as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and 
finally to the Canary Islands; H3.F-
polycentricity erodes the ability of parties to 
call for more competences for the region, 
increasing its effects as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally 
to the Canary Islands; H3.G-polycentricity 
reduces the ability of parties to articulate a 
strong regional identity, increasing its effects 
as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands 




H4-the higher the 
difference between 
the regional and 
national degree of 
economic 
development, the 
H4.A-the higher the difference between 
the economic development of the region 
and the country´s mean, the more 
emphasis of parties of the regional level; 
H4.B-the higher the difference between 
the economic development of the region 
and the country´s mean, the more calls 





periphery positions of 
parties 
the regions; H4.C-the higher the 
difference between the economic 
development of the region and the 
country´s mean, the more emphasis of 





identities reinforce the 
pro-periphery 
positions of parties 
H5.A-the stronger the regional identity 
feelings, the more emphasis of parties of 
the regional level; H5.B-the stronger the 
regional identity feelings, the more calls 
from parties for more competences for 
the regions; H5.C-the stronger the 
regional identity feelings, the more 








positions of parties 
H6.A-a regional language makes parties 
increase the emphasis of the regional 
level; H6.B-a regional language makes 
parties increase the calls for more 
competences for the regions; H6.C-a 
regional language makes parties 
increase the emphasis on positive 
attitudes towards multiculturalism 
NOT APPLICABLE 
 CONTROL VARIABLES 
PARTY-LEVEL VARIABLES 
PARTY TYPE 
H7-SWPs have milder 
pro-periphery 
H7.A-SWPs emphasise less the regional 
level than regionalist parties;  H7.B-
SWPs call for less competences than 
regionalist parties; H7.C-SWPs call for 
H7.G-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more 
the regional level than the PSOE and the PP; 
H7.H-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more a 






less competences than regionalist 
parties; H7.D-SWPs emphasise more 
the regional level when facing regionalist 
parties; H7.E-SWPs call for more 
competences when facing regionalist 
parties; H7.F-SWPs emphasise more 
positive attitudes towards 
multiculturalism when facing regionalist 
parties 
region than the PSOE and the PP; H7.I-the 
PA/CA and CC emphasise more the 
devolution of competences to the region in 
comparison to the PSOE and the PP; H7.J-
the PA/CA and CC emphasise a stronger 
regional identity in comparison to the PSOE 




orientation of parties 
affects the 




H8.A-the ideological position of parties 
makes no difference on the emphasis of 
the regional level; H8.B-the ideological 
position of parties does not influence the 
calls for more competences for the 
regions; H8.C-left/centre-left parties are 
able to have more positive attitudes 
towards multiculturalism than 
right/centre-right parties 
 
H8.D-the ideological position of parties 
makes no difference in the emphasis of the 
regional level; H8.E-the PSOE and the 
PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive 
constitutional status of the region; H8.F-the 
ideological position of parties does not 
influence the calls for more competences for 
the regions; H8.G- the PSOE and the PA/CA 
are able to articulate a more inclusive 







SWPs are more able 
to have stronger pro-
periphery positions 
 
H9.A-the PSOE, in comparison to the 
PP, emphasises more the regional level; 
H9.B-the PSOE, in comparison to the 
PP, calls for more competences for the 
regions; H9.C-the PSOE, in comparison 
to the PP, has more positive attitudes 
towards multiculturalism 
 
H9.D-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, is 
more capable of incorporating the regions 
with a more important role in relation to the 
centre; H9.E-the PA/CA, in comparison to 
the CC, emphasises a more symmetrical 
constitutional status of the region; H9.F-the 
PSOE calls for more and more important 
competences to be devolved to the regions 
in comparison to the PP in order to fulfil the 
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needs of the social groups in the peripheries; 
H9.G-the PP and CC articulate a less 
inclusive national/regional identity in 
comparison to the PSOE and the PA/CA 
PARTY 
STRUCTURE 
H10-SWPs that are 
less integrated are 





H10.A-the greater autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE makes them 
emphasise more the importance of the 
regional level in comparison to the PP, 
resulting in more horizontal variation; H10.B-
the greater autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE increases the 
possibility to articulate a more differentiated 
constitutional status of the regions in 
comparison to the PP, resulting in more 
horizontal variation; H10.C-the greater 
autonomy of the regional branches of the 
PSOE increases the possibility to call for 
more and more important competences for 
the regions in comparison to the PP, 
resulting in more horizontal variation; H10.D-
the greater autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE increases the 
possibility to reinforce the coexistence of 
multiple identities in comparison to the PP, 


































The aim of this chapter is to give a fully developed record and account of 
the process used in the analysis of the different sources of evidence. Here, the 
sub-national comparative method outlined in the introduction chapter is expanded 
to specify how it is applied in this investigation. A mixed method approach has 
been selected to obtain a complete and in-depth picture of the identified 
phenomenon, with Spain as the chosen case study. In order to do so, the five 
dependent variables outlined in the introduction chapter have been articulated to 
be able to fulfil both requirements, applied differently to fit their needs. This 
detailed account can be labelled as an audit trail of the process used (Altheide 
1996: 25-33). The purpose of this audit trail is understood to be applicable to both 
a quantitative and qualitative analysis, suitable for the methodological approach 
selected. To fulfil this aim, this chapter is structured in six main sections. The first 
section deals with an outline of case study as the main research strategy and 
case selection. The second section introduces an account of the mixed methods 
approach as the one adopted. The third section underlines the sampling frame 
and design. The fourth section outlines the main sources of evidence. The fifth 
section expands on the quantitative analysis performed. Finally, the sixth section 
elaborates on the qualitative analysis carried out. 
2. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION  
2.1) Research strategy: case study 
In this investigation, a case study design is considered as the main 
research strategy (Verschuren 2003: 128-133). Despite the fact that this strategy 
is commonly used in qualitative research, here, it is applied to a mixed methods 
approach. Analytical pragmatism and opportunism represent two of the key 
elements of this research strategy (Stake 2005: 443). This strategy is the one that 
is better focused on answering research questions that are articulated around 
context as the key element. A case study research strategy encourages to 
pursue, with the assistance of multiple methods of analysis, an in-depth 
knowledge of a complex phenomenon through the incorporation of the context in 
which it unfolds (Flyvbjerg 2006: 221-223; Simons 2009: 21). 
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The justification for the use of a case study is fourfold. The first argument 
is that a case study grants the opportunity to understand a complex social 
phenomenon in a real-life environment, allowing for an in-depth and thick 
understanding of it (Verschuren 2003: 133-134). The second rationale is that 
context can incorporate as one of the key elements for the understanding of the 
phenomenon (Yin 2009: 23). The third justification deals with the idea that it 
permits the use of a combined set of methods of analysis to complement each 
other and avoid possible faults in a mono-analysis process (Stake 2005: 443-
444). The fourth reason observes this strategy as the one that favours the use of 
multiple sources of data and evidence, granting the possibility of a strong 
triangulation when combining methods of analysis and within method robustness 
(Noor 2008: 1602). 
When it comes to the type (Thomas 2011: 518-519) or category (Levy 
2008: 3) of case study, the literature identifies three main ones. In order to choose 
the proper one, issues such as the research question itself, control over the 
events, and the focus on contemporary or historical events have to be taken into 
consideration (Kohlbacher 2006: 4). The three types or categories of case studies 
are (Yin 2009: 17 and 47): exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. In this 
investigation, the type or category chosen is an exploratory case study, which at 
the same time, includes a certain degree of description in order to be able to fully 
clarify the phenomenon. Focusing on an exploratory case study also brings along 
the ability of describing.  
To finish this account, the specific case study design needs to be clear 
before the sampling scheme and final case selection are determined. The two 
main designs that are available are (Yin 2009:38-51): single-case study, focused 
on one single case to gain as much in-depth knowledge as possible to understand 
and explore a specific and complex phenomenon (Baxter and Jack 2008: 549), 
and multi-case study, focused on the ability for cross-case comparative, 
generalisations, and replications. These two main designs can be further divided 
into four more specific subdesigns (Yin 2009: 38-56): single-case (holistic) 
designs, single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and 
multiple-case (embedded) designs. Holistic designs refer to case studies that use 
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only one unit of analysis, and the embedded designs refer to the designs that use 
one unit of analysis but divided into further subunits of analysis. 
With the above in mind, in this investigation, a single-case embedded 
design has been selected. The rationale is fourfold: first, this design allows for an 
in-depth understanding of which factors shape party competition over the centre-
periphery cleavage in a specific context (Toshkov 2016: 285); second, this design 
allows for a richer understanding of the phenomenon by introducing a cross-case 
analysis and comparison of different subunits of analysis within the main unit of 
analysis; third, the main purpose of these subunits of analysis is to add more 
extensive and developed understanding of the unit of analysis as a whole (Scholz 
and Tietje 2002: 30-31); and fourth, using subunits of analysis grants the ability 
to analyse the data with more precision (Baxter and Jack 2008: 550), leading to 
an increase in the exploration of the phenomenon as a whole. 
2.2) Case selection: Spain 
 The task of this sub-section is to determine the total population, the 
targeted population or sampling frame, the sample, and finally the case selected 
and the rationale to justify it. In terms of the definitions of each concept, Toshkov 
(2016: 111-112) defines them as: total population refers to the entire set of cases 
to which and from which the case(s) belong, the targeted population or sampling 
frame refers to the population from which cases could have been drawn to form 
a sample, the sample refers to a subset of cases from the total population or if 
used, targeted population or sampling frame. A sampling scheme is understood 
as the strategy and process of selecting the case(s) (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 
2007: 283). The key step for any case selection is the ability of that case to be 
informative enough of the phenomenon (Mabry 2008: 217). 
 Starting with the total population, this refers to all countries in the world, as 
all can be considered to have a centre and a periphery. The targeted population 
or sampling frame refers to the countries with an outer-periphery that can be 
found worldwide, indistinctively of these being archipelagos or mainland 
peripheries. The key aspect is that this outer-periphery has to be detached and 
far away from the rest of the country. Here is where the sampling scheme is 
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introduced to determine the sample. The sampling scheme used is the 
homogeneous scheme, which is developed by selecting a set of cases that share 
the same or similar specific characteristics (Collins et al. 2007: 272). The 
characteristics used to define the sample according to this homogeneous 
sampling scheme are fourfold: 1) distance from the centre´s to the regions´ capital 
of at least 1,000 km; 2) a permanent and stable percentage of civil population of 
at least 0,3% of the total population; 3) the outer-periphery has to be detached 
from the rest of the country and share the same political status as the inner-
periphery and the core; and 4) have political parties acting in the region. A number 
of countries have been discarded because their outer-peripheries are not far 
away from the centre (Finland-Aland Islands), have a small percentage of/or no 
population (Chile-Region de Magallanes), only inhabited by scientific or military 
population (Chile-Hermite Islands), or are dependent territories according to the 
UN (British Bermuda Islands). With these characteristics, the sample has a size 
of five countries with outer-peripheries: Japan (Ryukyu Sholo), Russia 






(% of the local 
population in 
comparison 




























(Hawaii) +/- 3,000 
1,362,000 
 (0.43%) 
State of the Union Yes 
. 
Table 4.1.-Sample of Cases 
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From this sample of cases, Spain is the chosen case study. Although 
Spain is the case study selected, this investigation focuses on the Spanish 
regions as the main subunits of analysis to better understand the centre-periphery 
cleavage. The selection of the specific regions for each type of analysis is outlined 
in the sections below. The justification for Spain as the chosen case study is 
threefold: political saliency of the case, the importance of the Canary Islands, and 
availability of sources of evidence. The first consideration refers to Spain as a 
salient case study. Spain represents a salient case study in two key aspects. On 
one hand, the impact and importance that the centre-periphery cleavage has in 
Spain, and on the other hand, the multi-level and multi-dimensional party 
competition in a highly decentralised context. The complex relations between the 
centre and the peripheries in Spain picture a challenging phenomenon to 
understand because of its political implications, linked to the centre-periphery 
cleavage and regional claims (Hueglin 1986: 442; Moreno 1995: 15-16; Ruane 
2003: 29-32). The well-known cases of the Basque Country (García Venero 1945; 
Payne 1974; Linz 1986; Llera 1994; Lecours 2007; Muro 2008; Gray and Gillespie 
2015) and Catalonia (Trías Vejarano 1975; Llera 1984; Ross 1996; Guibernau 
2000, 2004; Greer 2007) are examples of how the centre-periphery cleavage 
unfolds and how the centre is being challenged by inner-peripheral regions. In 
comparison, the Canary Islands is an outer-peripheral region which may have 
other implications for the cleavage if compared to the former ones. All the regions 
in Spain can be classified using the centre-periphery continuum outlined in the 
previous chapter, and this investigation tries to obtain inferences taking into 
account these differences.  
Another reason for selecting Spain is the development of an explanation 
of how the centre-periphery cleavage unfolds in the so called “contemporary” 
regions (Hueglin 1986: 442-443). Much emphasis has been placed on the most 
problematic and “historic” regions (Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia), 
but little attention has been given to other peripheral regions when it comes to 
the study of this cleavage, known as contemporary due to their recent 
autonomous development. Finally,  Spain is a political salient case study in terms 
of multi-level and multi-dimensional party competition because, on one hand, 
there is a significant difference between the national and the regional-level 
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(Wilson 2012: 124-125), although some argue that they are linked and one relies 
on the other and vice versa (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 239-242), and on the 
other hand, there is a high variation of asymmetric behaviour of parties at the 
regional-level (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 72-75). 
The second consideration is the importance of the Canary Islands in 
comparison to the other outer-peripheries. The importance is calculated by taking 
into consideration the regional population in comparison to the rest of the state. 
As it can be observed, this outer-periphery is the most important region. This 
makes it the most suitable option when applying this criterion to the sample of 
cases presented here. The third consideration takes into account the availability 
of sources of evidence needed for the analysis. As it is explained below, the 
sources of evidence used are, amongst others: political manifestos, parliament 
discourses, and other political documents issued by parties. Regarding this, there 
is no data or sources of evidence, especially political manifestos, at a regional 
level in the cases referred to in Table 4.1. Using the RMP, access to these main 
sources of evidence is relatively easy. Not only the availability of the sources is 
important, but also the manageability of these sources is a key factor, affecting 
therefore the depth of the study. The sources of evidence are written in Spanish, 
which is the mother tongue of the researcher, making them suitable for this study.  
3. RESEARCH APPROACH: MIXED METHODS 
The starting point of this section is the consideration of mixed methods as 
the third major methodological approach. In this triumvirate of methodological 
approaches, the first is the quantitative approach, the second is the qualitative 
approach, and the third is the mixed methods approach (Teddlie and Tashakkori 
2009: 7). Mixed methods research is understood here as the combination of 
multiple methodological approaches, quantitative and qualitative, to analyse and 
understand in depth the phenomenon that is under research (Tashakkori and 
Creswell 2007: 4). Only using a quantitative analysis is not sufficient enough to 
unfold the necessary in-depth understanding of the centre-periphery cleavage 
that is required (Mahoney 2007: 124), but combining this with a qualitative 
analysis provides, at the same time, the necessary substratum to develop a more 
complete and in-depth answer to the main research question (Robson 1993).  
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The strengths that a quantitative analysis brings to this study are that, on 
one hand, a time- and context-free research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 
14; and Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 4-10) helps to achieve a high degree of 
objectivity, and on the other hand, increases the ability to generalise findings. The 
process of this research approach can be outlined in four main stages (Golafshani 
2003: 597-598): first, the emphasis is on empirical objective facts; second, the 
data and evidence is presented in numerical form; third, the mathematical 
process is the norm for analysing numerical data, which in this case is the 
regression analysis; and fourth, the final result is expressed in statistical 
terminology. In contrast, the strengths that a qualitative analysis brings to this 
study are that, on one hand, it addresses the main research question in a more 
detailed way (Mahoney 2007: 122) allowing researchers to identify and track over 
time the variation in the dependent variables as key to the explanation (Collier 
2011: 823-826) rather than applying generalisations, and on the other hand, it is 
done contextualising the phenomenon (Schwandt 2000: 205-210), and not treat 
it without the necessary values that bond the researcher to it (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004: 14). In this investigation, the idea is to bridge this dichotomy 
of quantitative versus qualitative with this third paradigm, where the research 
process is enriched, labelled as the fundamental principle of mixed methods 
research (Johnson and Turner 2003: 299). The purpose is to increase the 
possibilities to accumulate knowledge. 
The rationale for the use of a mixed methods approach is fourfold. First, 
increasing the validity and reliability of the findings using triangulation as a 
technique. Triangulation can be understood as within-, or between-method 
triangulation (Flick 2004: 179-180). This within-method triangulation is designed 
around, and involves, the crosschecking of the evidence to increase the internal 
validity, credibility, and consistency of the findings (Denzin 1978: 297-313). This 
allows for a more robust and solid understanding, and increases the in-depth 
knowledge of the phenomenon. Between-method triangulation refers to the 
procedure that combines the two research approaches to have strong inferences 
and be able to obtain at the same time statistical and analytic generalisations, 
which is the appropriate research strategy selected for this investigation in 
relation to the research question. Second, the ability to articulate a complete and 
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in-depth picture of the phenomenon that is studied here. Third, engaging with 
both classical approaches to assess the credibility of each other’s findings. 
Fourth, to compensate the weaknesses of one research approach by using the 
strength of the other. The combination of these strengths are the bases of the 
rationale to select this mixed methods research approach, putting emphasis on 
four of the different purposes for it (Bryman 2006: 105): triangulation, 
completeness, corroboration or confirmation, and compensation. Overall, this 
mixed method approach is intended to provide, at the same time, a compete and 
in-depth understanding of the research problem. 
It is necessary to clarify which specific mixed methods research design is 
used in this thesis. Due to the different typologies of mixed methods research that 
can be found in the literature (Patton 2002; Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2007; Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009), and in order to keep the 
description contained in this section as concise as possible, it is best to avoid too 
much complexity, but at the same time, be as clear as possible regarding this 
issue (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 680). Two main phases can be used to 
choose a proper mixed methods design: the first phase consists of the primary 
decisions that have to be taken to achieve a suitable design (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004: 20), and the second phase deals with the different designs 
that can be selected (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 267-272). Regarding the 
first phase, and according to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 20), three main 
decisions have to be taken before choosing from the different types of mixed 
methods designs contained in the second phase: firstly, the focus on one of the 
primary methods (quantitative or qualitative), or whether the weight of both 
methods is going to be equal; secondly, the timing of the execution of the analysis 
and whether the execution is going to be concurrent or sequential; thirdly, where 
the mixing of both methods is going to occur, either merged in the data, 
embedded in the data, or connected to the data. Regarding the second phase, 
and according to Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009: 267-272) and Johnson et al. 
(2007: 123-124), using the above first two decisions, here is where a specific 
mixed methods design has to be chosen. In total, there are nine mixed methods 
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Qualitative 
Dominated Quantitative 







followed by dominated 
Quantitative 
Dominated Quantitative 
followed by dominant 
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The design chosen is a mixed method design where both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods are mixed with an equal status and in a sequential 
way. This means that in the first instance, a quantitative method of analysis is 
used to obtain a complete picture, and second, a qualitative method of analysis 
is used in order to have an in-depth overview of the phenomenon.  Finally, the 
interpretation of the results from both methods is merged during the final 
discussion, after each individual analysis has been performed. 
 
Table 4.2.-Mixed Methods Typology 
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4. SAMPLING FRAME AND DESIGN IN A MIXED METHODS APPROACH 
4.1) Sampling frame  
 The process of sampling and case selection in a mixed methods approach 
is more complex and denser than for a monomethod approach. The aim of this 
sub-section is to fully develop a rationale to justify the sampling schemes used in 
both analyses in relation to a mixed methods approach. The sampling frame is 
required to base the explanation of how a single-case embedded case study 
design allows for a deep understanding of the phenomenon studied. In this case, 
the sampling frame is articulated around the two comparative approaches that 
the literature identifies (Ragin 1997). 
The use of a single-case embedded case study allows for the comparison 
of subunits of analysis within the same case to obtain solid inferences in terms of 
the exploration of the centre-periphery cleavage, which in this case study are the 
Spanish regions, resulting in a cross-case comparison of the former. It is 
designed to provide a solid base for an in-depth understanding of what factors 
shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, allowing for both a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis over time, one of the key features of this 
study (Bennett and Elman 2006: 252-256). This is granted by the cross-case 
analysis that a comparative approach allows for. Focusing on this cross-case 
analysis (Collier et al. 2004), this comparison best fit the requirements for a case 
study design which, in its quantitative and qualitative analysis, is designed to 
produce a complete and in-depth understanding of a complex phenomenon 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294-295). This is because the comparison between 
the different subunits of analysis helps to extract inferences according to the 
different features with which these regions contribute to make Spain a salient 
case (Mahoney 2007: 131). The justification to use this cross-case comparison 
is: first, the different cases represent rich examples of the phenomenon; second, 
the cases are comparable both in terms of their similarities or differences; third, 
the cases are available for the researcher to study; fourth, the connections 
between the cases can be stated by the researcher and explain both the 
similarities and differences; fifth, the researcher produces new knowledge of the 
cases using this type of analysis (Khan and van Wynsberghe 2008: 5).  
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Inside this cross-case analysis, two comparative approaches can be used 
(Ragin 1997: 28-30): the variable-, and the case-orientation approach. The 
variable-oriented approach focuses on the problem of assessing relations 
between variables, making possible statistical generalisations of a large sample 
of cases, and the case-oriented approach focuses on making possible analytic 
generalisations of a small sample of cases, which have been selected because 
they are significant for the understanding of the phenomenon (Della Porta 2008: 
202-208). In this investigation, both strategies are used. The variable-orientated 
approach is used for the quantitative analysis, and the case-orientated approach 
is employed in the qualitative analysis.  The reason for this is to be able to, as 
outlined above, obtain at the same time a complete and in-depth understanding 
of the phenomenon through the introduction of the context for the specific cases 
in both analyses. 
4.2) Sampling design  
 Now that the justification for a cross-case comparison with different 
subunits and the sampling frame has been developed, the next step is to clarify 
the sampling design. When a mixed method approach is used for any research, 
the sampling process needs to be designed considering both the quantitative 
(variable-orientated) and qualitative approach (case-orientated) (Onwuegbuzie 
and Collins 2007: 290), and therefore the exposition of the rationale needs to be 
more detailed. To do so, Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007: 290-296) have 
developed a process to end with a solid sampling frame and case selection in a 
mixed methods approach. In order to do so, the two authors identify the need to 
state clearly the: sampling design; the sampling scheme, which refers to the 
strategy used to select the cases specified depending on the type of analysis; the 
sample size; and finally, the selected cases themselves (Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins 2007: 283). 
 In terms of the sampling design, this focuses around the time-orientation 
and the relation between the quantitative and qualitative samples (Onwuegbuzie 
and Collins 2007: 292). Depending on the time-orientation and the relation 
between the samples that the study uses in the mixed methods approach, one 
selects the proper sampling design. There are eight possible designs 
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(Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 292-296): concurrent identical, concurrent 
parallel, concurrent nested, and concurrent multilevel on one side, and sequential 
identical, sequential parallel, sequential nested, and sequential multilevel on the 
other side. The sampling design selected in this investigation is a sequential 
nested design, which determines that it is sequential in terms of the time-
orientation, and nested in terms of the relation between the quantitative and 
qualitative samples. A sequential nested design implies that the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis happened one after the other and are dependent from each 
other (sequential), and that the cases from one of the samples (qualitative 
sample) is a subset of the other sample (quantitative sample) (Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins 2007: 292).  
5. MAIN SOURCES OF EVIDENCE AND DATA-SETS 
5.1) Main source of evidence 
Measuring party preferences is one of the most important empirical tasks 
that researchers have when analysing party behaviour. To do so, most of the 
literature identifies three main different sources of evidence on parties (Alonso et 
al. 2013: 192): expert surveys, mass surveys, and electoral manifestos (Laver 
and Garry 2000; Laver et al. 2003; Benoit and Laver 2006). All the evidence that 
can be extracted from these sources is used to determine not only the left-right 
positioning of parties, but also any other dimension that could be coded, including 
a possible centre-periphery dimension. This is due to the fact that the evidence 
is collected using different categories and policy domains, and not only focusing 
on one specific dimension. Combining these categories and policy domains, 
different dimensions can be captured with sufficient detail.  
From the above three methods of measuring party positions, expert 
surveys and voter surveys relate to each other in terms of the methodology used. 
The expert surveys provide, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys, multi-level 
policy dimensions of party preferences. The strong points of this method of 
measuring party positioning can be summarised in the following way (Bakker and 
Hobolt 2013: 35): first, the surveys provide explicit party positions and measures, 
second, the reliability of the measures provide a concrete degree of uncertainty 
that can be actually measured, and third, party positions are measured using a 
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variety of documents, increasing the validity of the measurements. Amongst the 
possible limitations of this method of measuring party positions, one can identity 
the subjectivity of the measurements, as they are based on the evaluation of 
experts. Policy domains are subjectively constructed, leaving little possibility of 
replicating the measurements and domains. The mass surveys, focused on 
voters, also have the same strengths as the previously described expert surveys 
as they follow the same design but the sample comes from the voters and not the 
party themselves. The strengths of this method are, on one hand, the availability 
of reliable party positions and measurements and the ability of calculating the 
degree of uncertainty, and on the other hand, it introduces the self-positioning of 
the voters in relation to the positioning of the parties, providing extra information 
on the image of the party amongst the voters. The main limitation is again the 
subjectivity of the measurements. This prevents replicability from other 
researchers, limiting the overall reliability of the data. 
Regarding the last method, electoral manifestos, this provided the 
necessary strength that was required for this research. Instead of relying on the 
subjectivity of the experts in both types of surveys, this method focuses on the 
objectivity of the position that parties take in relation to a policy domain. This is 
done by extracting the information from the official statements given by parties, 
so there a clear prove of where do they stand. The data obtained from party 
manifestos allows for longitudinal studies as they remain fixed in time, increasing 
the ability to track behavioural changes over time. Linked to this, the coding 
system is based on commonly designed schemes so that researchers can apply 
them over time and across different parties and countries. The limitations can be 
summarised, on one hand, in the lack of a possible measurement of uncertainty, 
and on the other hand, the different measurements provided by the different data-
sets that are based on this kind of data lack some degree of internal validity as 
they collapse categories into general scales like the left-right scale (Bakker and 
Hobolt 2013: 32). 
 From the mentioned three sources of evidence, the justification for the use 
of party manifestos is ninefold (Helbling and Tresch 2011: 176: Roooduijn and 
Pauwels 2011: 1274): the first reason is that they are documents that are driven 
and self-declared, the second reason is that the data can be collected 
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retrospectively, the third reason is that the data is available for long time-series, 
the fourth reason is that change over time can be traced, the fifth reason is that 
manifestos treat parties as unitary actors, the sixth reason is that manifestos can 
be flexibly coded according to issues or categories, the seventh reason is that 
data can be aggregated to generate indicators, the eighth reason is that causal 
analysis may be possible, and the ninth reason is that manifestos are appropriate 
to give a clear view of where the party stands on a certain issue at a specific point 
in time. Therefore, the main unit of analysis in this content analysis are party 
manifestos. In term of the unit of measurement, this changes.  Here, unit of 
measurement or meaning unit (also labelled as textual unit in the literature 
(Krippendorff 2004b: 788-789) is understood as the sentences, paragraphs, or 
group of words that refer to a specific theme, category, subcategory, code, or 
issue in which the unit of analysis is dissected into. 
To finish the account and justification for the use of party manifestos, the 
level addressed is due to be mentioned: the micro, the meso, and the macro level. 
The micro level refers to the usage of political discourses at a local level. An 
example of this could be the party manifestos for the local elections. The meso 
level refers to a level where the micro discourses are connected to each other or 
they are aimed to be harmonized. Finally, the macro level refers to the level where 
major social practices and behaviour are aimed to be changed or shaped. In this 
investigation, the level target is the meso level, or in other words, the regional 
level. This aims to fill the gap between the traditional macro-micro distinction (Hall 
1987: 10). Methodologically, the justification is that, on one hand, the evidence 
available on party manifestos in relation to the centre-periphery cleavage is richer 
and more detailed in the manifestos that are designed for the regional level, and 
on the other hand, in order to observe how some variables affect the centre-
periphery cleavage (regional identity or regional language), the regions are the 
most suitable units of observations to look at in this case study.  
5.2) Main data-set for the quantitative analysis 
 The quantitative analysis contained in this investigation uses the data 
collected and coded by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009; Alonso et al. 2011), which 
is based on the pre-existing CMP. This data-set codes party manifestos which 
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were designed for a regional-level competition (Klingemann et al. 2006). Two 
main reasons can be outlined to justify the use of the RMP (Alonso et al. 2013: 
194). The first reason is methodological. The RMP uses manual coding content 
analysis, and it has developed a trusted classification scheme that could fit with 
the measurement of some of the dependent variables selected for this 
investigation. Content analysis and not pure text analysis is used by the RMP 
because although pure text analysis could be less time consuming, it still does 
not capture with sufficient and necessary detail the meaning of the text. In this 
sense, pure text analysis is expressly quantitative, not only in numerically content, 
but also in the analysis (Benoit 2009), and for the purpose of measuring the 
dependent variables articulated here, also the understanding of the text is needed 
(Alonso et al. 2013: 194). Pure text analysis interprets manifestos not as 
discourses but as data in form of words (Laver et al. 2003), and content analysis 
contributes precisely contributes to achieve this, a more systematic measure of 
the dependent variables as a discourse. Following with this rationale, the focus 
of this investigation is the regional level, which is the one addressed by the RMP. 
Other existing data-sets are informed, to some extent, by a national bias, and this 
prevents robust inferences at this level.  
 The second reason is the accumulation of knowledge. The RMP has 
started to be used in comparative politics as one of the most successfully adapted 
data-set in the field for many studies. If party manifestos are the main source of 
evidence in this investigation, then the most reliable data-set for a comparative 
study based on a regional context that currently exists is the RMP. Also, not only 
a comparison is possible, which fits with a cross-sectional study, but this thesis 
evaluates the change of discourse of parties over time, a longitudinal study, and 
therefore, the RMP allows for this kind of research to be executed with a high 
degree of reliability. As Alonso et al. state (2013: 194), the main enterprise of the 
RMP has been the adaptation of the CMP´s methodology to a multi-level political 
scenario. This means that not only the RMP could be used for regional 
comparisons such as the one being carried out in this thesis, but also cross-




5.3) The RMP 
The RMP shares with the CMP the same quantitative methodology, so 
methodologically speaking, changing from the state-wide CMP to the regional-
based RMP is not so drastic as it may seem. The methodology of the CMP, and 
of the RMP subsequently, goes as follows. In each electoral program the units of 
measurement (text units of analysis), the so-called quasi-sentences, are 
identified and assigned a code with a classification scheme that captures 
exhaustively all public policy issues and preferences about the territorial 
distribution of competences of the political manifesto analysed. Once the electoral 
program has been coded using its text, the number of quasi-sentences devoted 
to each code, referring to each particular issue or topic, is recorded under 6 main 
policy domains. The indicator featured in the database is the percentage of quasi-
phrases that the electoral program dedicates to each of the codes (issues or 
topics) for total quasi-phrases contained in the program. This percentage allows 
direct measurement of the importance or saliency that a party gives to the various 
issues or topics in its electoral program. This direct measurement of the saliency 
of an issue or topic is the ratio of mentions that an issue or topic is given by parties 
in the manifestos. Therefore, a high score in this saliency measure indicates the 
importance that a party gives to that issue or topic, and with the tone (positive or 
negative) not only importance is measured but also the meaning and 
understanding of the discourse. 
The difference between the CMP and the RMP, although they share the 
same general methodology described above, is that there are some aspects that 
are specific to the RMP that the CMP does not have. The CMP subsumes all 
what is related to the centre-periphery cleavage under two positional issues: 
decentralization-positive (code 301) and centralization-positive (code 302). In 
other words, the CMP summarises all the aspects of the centre-periphery 
cleavage only under two main uses, whether it has to do with the political, cultural 
or economic aspects of the cleavage. What is effective and efficient for the CMP, 
which is state-based, is not even effective for the RMP, which is regional-based, 
for a possible measurement of the centre-periphery cleavage in the regions. To 
go into more detail about the components of the cleavage and how and to what 
extend parties make those components more salient, two new components are 
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added: 1) a newly designed territorial authority claim (Appendix A), and 2) new 
sub-categories are added to the original 56 categories of the CMP to try and 
capture the centre-periphery cleavage (Appendix B). In other words, the RMP 
adapts the existing CMP to multi-level politics or decentralised states using these 
two new characteristics. Real manifestos examples are contained in appendix C. 
- Contribution of the RMP 
The first contribution of the RMP to the existing CMP is that it includes a 
territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme to capture the level 
of administration that is addressed by the policy, and/or the relationship between 
the levels (Alonso et al 2011, 9). It is important to specify that these territorial 
authority competential preferences claims scheme does not necessary reflect the 
real existing distribution of competences between the levels, but more a goal than 
a reflection of reality (Alonso et al. 2013, 195). So, although it uses the word 
“competential”, this does not refer to the actual distribution of competences or the 
actual competential degree of the region in the constitutional design of the state. 
The main problem with decentralised states, such as Spain or Germany for 
example, is that the relations between the administrations are also addressed by 
the parties in order for them to reference the level at which the policy preference 
will be applied. This territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme 
allows the researcher to capture efficiently these multi-level references made by 
the parties. This necessary competential scheme is the first step to adapt the 
existing CMP to the multi-level political scenarios. This territorial authority 
competential preferences claims scheme is articulated using the following codes 
(Alonso et al. 2011, 9-10): the first digit refers to the level or government for which 
the policy preference is articulated, a second code that refers to the preferred 
degree of authority for that level (more or less). Alternatively, when more than 
one level of government is mentioned at the same time, 4 different codes are 
used to capture this multi-level relationship that is expressly addressed (Alonso 
et al. 2013, 196) (Appendix A). Finally, these two codes need come before the 
policy reference (Appendix B), in order to refer to the administrative level to which 
it is applied. 
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The second main contribution of the RMP to the existing CMP are the new 
sub-categories added in order to measure more precisely the centre-periphery 
cleavage. In total, the RMP adds 20 new sub-categories to the coding frame that 
the CMP has (Alonso et al 2011, 9) (Appendix B). These new sub-categories are 
intended to capture in detail the extent and ways in which the centre-periphery 
cleavage works in the different regions. Not all regions have the same 
development and political dynamics, so therefore the existing CMP needs to be 
adapted in order to measure these specific regional characteristics. The more 
solid way to capture these very different regional dynamics is to re-define the 
existing definitions of some categories, when not creating new categories, to fit 
the data-base to the different preferences of the parties acting in the regions. The 
CMP main category of decentralisation (e.g. positive or negative: 301 and 302) 
subsumes everything related to the centre-periphery cleavage into this broad 
definition, independently of the policy preference, financial or political for 
example. This could work for state-based elections, but regional-based elections 
deal with precisely these issues but in a more detailed manner. In this sense, 
regional elections effectively deal with decentralisation but the financial sphere is 
treated very differently from the political one for example. In order therefore to 
also capture these dynamics with precision, the definition of the CMP category 
must be re-defined, and if this does not work effectively, new sub-categories need 
to be articulated, as the RMP does so. 
The total amount of manifestos regarding Spain contained in this data-set 
is 289, which correspond to some of the main parties that act in the 17 
autonomous regions21. Two important issues have to be mentioned here in 
relation to the manifestos coded. The first one is that not all parties that act in the 
regions are included due to their lack of relevance. This is justified by considering 
the number of votes and seats obtained in the regional parliaments. The second 
one is that not all elections have been included. The main reason behind this is 
that the data-set is relatively new and it is projected to be expanded in the future. 
This allows for a quantitative analysis, opening the possibility to draw a complete 
picture of the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
21 The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are not included in this data-set. 
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- Limitations of the RMP 
 The main limitation of the RMP in relation to this investigation is the fitting 
of the different sub-categories and the dependent variables introduced here. As 
it is further explained in the section below that addresses the quantitative 
analysis, the description of the sub-categories not always correlate perfectly with 
the dependent variables or the indicator selected to measure them. Despite the 
fact that the RMP is currently the best data-set to carry out a quantitative analysis 
of the positioning of parties along a possible territorial axis at the regional level, 
one has also to acknowledge that the definition of the sub-categories that are 
used to code the manifestos not always comply with the dependent variables 
used to measure that same territorial axis. This is one of the main reasons why 
in this investigation the dependent variables selected for each type of analysis 
change. In order to adapt to this mismatch in some occasions, the RMP was left 
aside in favour of more precise qualitative data and analysis. Other data-sets are 
available to quantitatively analyse party manifestos, such as for example, the 
Manifesto Corpus (Lehmann et al. 2016; Merz et al. 2016), but they do not reach 
the required precision for the regional level analysis that is presented here. 
5.4) Main source of evidence for the qualitative analysis 
 The RMP also provides the actual manifestos through its data-base. These 
original manifestos provide the necessary documents to perform a qualitative 
analysis of the evidence, widening the research scope. Despite the fact that the 
data-base contains most of the necessary original manifestos, some are missing, 
and they have been obtained by direct contact with the parties when they offered 
to collaborate, which was not always the case. There was an added problem in 
terms of availability and the specific case of the PA/CA. This party is now extinct 
and it does not have digital archives.  This made it hard to obtain the manifestos 
that were missing from the RMP data-base, and contacting an extinct party is 
costly and difficult. The RMP, by providing the original documents, saves 
considerable efforts in terms of time and resources to be able to have access to 
the manifestos. This allows for a qualitative analysis that opens the possibility to 
draw an in-depth picture of the phenomenon under investigation. 
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5.5) Criteria used to select the parties  
 When it comes to the selection of the parties for both types of analysis, the 
criterion is twofold. First, the two main SWPs and their local branches. In all the 
regions of Spain, both the PSOE and the PP are relevant parties. If one wants to 
study which factors shape party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage, 
then these two parties need to be included due to their political importance, deep 
rooting amongst the population, and influence in the different regions across 
Spain. Added to this, due to their characteristics as state-wide parties, they are 
expected to behave in a specific way, allowing for a comparison with other types 
of parties. Second, in terms of the different regionalist parties, this is limited by 
the availability of data and evidence. For the quantitative analysis, the parties 
selected are those already coded by the RMP per region. For the qualitative 
analysis, the regionalist parties selected are the most important parties based on 
the votes cast during the regional elections selected. 
5.6) Criteria used to select the periods of analysis 
 The selection of the manifestos for the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
is designed to be carried out based on specific periods of time. In regards to this, 
for the quantitative analysis, it has to be stated that the periods of time are limited 
and reduced by the data coded by the RMP available for the region of Andalusia, 
which is restricted to the elections held during 2000, 2008, and 2012. In order to 
have homogenous time periods for both analyses, the qualitative analysis has to 
be also limited by the same parameters as the quantitative analysis. An added 
difficulty is that not all regions held their regional elections in the same years as 
Andalusia, so in order to breach this gap between the different regions, three 
electoral periods have been specified. The electoral periods chosen for both 
types of analyses are: 1998-2000, 2007-2010, and 2011-2012.  
5.6) Steps followed to select the manifestos 
This sub-section develops the steps used in the application of the above 
criteria to select the specific manifestos for the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. The practical application is summarised in three steps. The first step 
deals with the selection of the main sources of data and evidence. The second 
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step is used to select the parties that are going to be compared in both types of 
analyses. The result is that the parties that are compared are the local branches 
of the two main SWPs (PSOE and PP), and the most important regionalist parties. 
The third step is the selection of the regional elections to be compared, or in other 
words, the time-frame.  Again, this step is constrained by the data and evidence 
available for Andalusia, and the result time periods of 1998-2001, 2007-2010, 
and 2011-2012.  
STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 
Selection of the main source 
of data and evidence: 
1) Quantitative Analysis: 
RMP coded manifestos 
2) Qualitative Analysis:  
Original manifestos 
Selection of parties for both 
analyses: 
1) The local branches of the 
two main SWPs. 
2) The main regionalist 
parties. 
Selection of the electoral 






6. QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
6.1) Quantitative approach 
When it comes to the first of the two methodological approaches, the 
quantitative approach, it must be said that the aim of this research approach is 
generally linked to a positivist philosophy. In this sense, research is be done 
objectively. This means that the researcher needs to treat the data and 
observations as objective entities with no connection with the person who is 
researching it. This kind of research is time- and context-free (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14; and Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 4-10). Probably is the 
closes type of research approach that can be compared, in social science, to the 
natural sciences in terms of the reliability and validity. Quantitative analysis 
permits the researcher to highlight the measurable relation between concepts, in 
Table 4.3.-Application of the Criteria using Three Steps to Select the 
Manifestos for each Type of Analysis 
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this case the different components of the centre-periphery cleavage, and the final 
measurements. The main characteristics of quantitative research is the focus on 
a deductive approach, testing or confirmation of a theory and hypotheses, and 
finally, using a statistical analysis method to deal with the data. It is a numerically 
summary of the text that is being analysed (Neuendorf 2002, 21). In other words, 
it is the quantification of the message through categories and the relation between 
them in terms of frequency and occurrence (Riffe et al. 2014, 3). 
 In terms of the justification to use this research approach, there are four 
main reasons that can be very useful for the purpose of this thesis: the first reason 
is that this approach can help test and validate hypothesis that have been 
articulated before the analysis. The second reason is that the findings can be 
generalised to a broader population of cases. The third reason refers to the 
trustworthiness of the investigation, increasing the credibility and validity of the 
investigation. The fourth and last reason is that quantitative research allows for 
the understanding of a larger set of observations. Overall, the purpose of this 
quantitative approach is to obtain a complete picture of the research problem. 
6.2) Regions selected for the quantitative analysis 
The literature identifies around 24 different sampling schemes (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie 1998). One of the main characteristics of a mixed methods approach 
is that in order to answer the main research question, the sampling design, 
explained above, can employ any of the sampling schemes that the quantitative 
and qualitative approaches normally use (Teddlie and Yu 2007: 85). The rationale 
for the selection of the sampling scheme and sample size is focused on the 
different purposes of the study (Teddlie and Yu 2007: 86). Before establishing 
the sampling scheme and case selection for the quantitative analysis, and in 
order to adapt Spain to the centre-periphery continuum, the latter has to be 
divided into strata so that the different subunits of analysis are catalogued 

























Figure 4.1. Strata and regions in Spain. 
For the quantitative analysis, and in order to have a complete picture of 
the phenomenon in Spain, two steps need to justify the sampling scheme and 
case selection. The first step refers to the total population from where the cases 
are selected. Spain has 17 regions and 2 autonomous cities. Leaving out the 2 
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla because they are not actual “regions”, 
there is no coded data, and they are not represented in the main data-set used, 
the total population is made up of 17 possible cases. The second step refers to 
the sampling scheme used to select the cases. Because the main purpose of the 









Regions in the Centre: Castilla y Leon, Madrid, and Castilla-La Mancha. 
 
Regions in the Inner-Periphery: Extremadura, Catalonia, Andalusia, Balearic 
Islands, Murcia, Basque Country, Aragon, Navarre,  Cantabria, Asturias, 
Valencia, Galicia, and La Rioja. 
    







to have a defined sampling scheme or case selection. This means that all the 17 
regions have been selected. The sample size is appropriate, and at the same 
time, has a strong statistical power in order to answer the main research question 
with solid generalisations. In the quantitative analysis, all the regions that belong 
to the centre, the inner-, and the outer-periphery have been taken into 
consideration to have a complete picture of the phenomenon. 
6.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the quantitative analysis 
The selection of parties for this analysis needs to help to portray a 
complete picture of the phenomenon. The parties selected are: the main local 
branches of PSOE and PP in all regions (but not in all the electoral periods), and 
the most relevant regionalist parties contained in the data-set. It is important to 
say that some important regionalist parties are missing in the coding performed 
by the RMP. It would not have been advisable to code the missing manifestos 
because it would have broken the homogeneity of the coding and results done 
originally by the RMP team. The application of both criteria gives the result of 44 
manifestos in the electoral period of 1998-2001, 44 manifestos of the electoral 
period of 2007-2010, and 51 manifestos in the electoral period of 2011-2012. 
Tables 1 and 2 in appendix C show which parties have been selected and the 
statistical summary for the distribution of the manifestos by regions. 
6.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables 
To bridge the lack of a measurement scheme for a quantitative analysis of 
the centre-periphery cleavage (Alonso et al. 2013: 192-194), the purpose of this 
sub-section is to explain and justify the measurement used to quantify the three 
selected dependent variables or components of the centre-periphery cleavage 
for this analysis: saliency of the regional level, position of parties regarding the 
distribution of competences between territorial levels, and the attitudes towards 
multiculturalism. All three measurement schemes are designed to try and capture 
the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage in all the regions of Spain 
addressing the competential and identitarian dimensions that the RMP proposes, 
as outlined in the introduction of this thesis. In other words, to capture the 
complete picture of how parties articulate the centre-periphery cleavage nation-
wide. These dependent variables fit into the different sub-categories implement 
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by the RMP to maintain the homogeneity of the data-set via this quantitative 
approach. The saliency of the regional level and the position of parties regarding 
the distribution of competences are designed using the new territorial claims 
scheme introduced by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009), and the attitude towards 
multiculturalism is constructed using the definition of the categories of 
multiculturalism introduced by the CMP but applied regionally by the RMP. 
Although the first two measurement schemes use the same territorial claims 
scheme developed by the RMP, for the purpose of a clear explanation, they are 
dealt with separately. 
For each measuring scheme, the territorial levels are constructed by 
dividing Spain into three different layers, considering the basic administrative 
structure of the Spanish state: the central, the regional, and the local level. The 
main idea behind these two schemes is to use the territorial claims to observe the 
saliency and position of the parties in regards to each territorial level and the 
distribution of competences without considering any differences between policy 
preferences. This will enable the measurement of the saliency and the position 
of parties regarding the distribution of competences in reference to the region, 
which this scheme allows for. So far, this is the most specific development that 
the RMP has provided the field with in order to capture multi-level party 
competition. In this investigation, the main difference with previous works that use 
this territorial claim scheme is that here the territorial level that is going to be the 
focus is only the regional level, not considering the centre or the local levels. The 
reason is that the main territorial level researched is the region, and the other two 
administrative layers would not provide relevant evidence to answer the research 
question. 
According to authors such as Maddens and Libbrecht (2009), the position 
that a political party has with regards to any issue can include two main 
components: a salience and a positional component. The first component refers 
to the degree to which a party emphasises an issue, including a specific territorial 
level, through a manifesto or other means. The second component refers to the 
substantive content of the party’s issue profile, or in other words, the direction 
that a party takes with regard to an issue (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 205). 
Using this idea, the first measuring scheme focuses on the first component and 
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the idea of mapping specifically the saliency in regards to the regional level. This 
measures the number of times a party mentions the region in its manifestos. This 
same measuring scheme is introduced in the literature by authors such as Alonso 
et al. (2013: 201), but here, the regional level is measured not only using the 
territorial references to the region itself with no authority claim (Gómez et al. 2009: 
3), but also adding the mentions to the region with respect to taking away or giving 
more competences.  
In other words, the articulation of this dependent variable is as follows: all 
the references to the regional level. This is, those territorial references starting 
with the digit 2, that in the classification scheme of competential preferences 
explained above is accompanied at the end by the digit 0, 1, and 2 (Formula 
contained in appendix D). Finally, the higher the final score, the more emphasis 
of the regional level. The justification for this specific dependent variable is 
threefold. Firstly, if from manifestos that are produced for regional elections one 
could expect to see the regional level to be the most mentioned territorial level in 
comparison to the centre or the local levels, then it is reasonable to verify this 
expectation. Secondly, to observe if the region acquires more and more 
importance through a period of time in the manifestos as the Spanish state 
becomes gradually a more decentralised state, or if the mentions to the level 
remain the same independently from the decentralisation policies. Thirdly, based 
on the literature that refers to the changes that political parties may have over 
time (Janda et al. 1995), one can observe the general trends and fluctuations 
over time in relation to the mentions that the regional level receives.  
The second measuring scheme is based around describing the position 
that parties have in regards to the distribution of competences, or in other words, 
measuring the position that parties have when it comes to the call or not for more 
competences to be devolved to the regions. This is, the positional component, 
which refers to the substantive content of the party’s issue direction (Maddens 
and Libbrecht 2009: 205). According to Laver and Garry (2000: 627), a party´s 
position is defined as the direction that a party prefers regarding an issue. In this 
case, no specific policy is considered but all the policies that refer to the attribution 
of more or fewer competences to the region. As Maddens and Libbrecht put it 
(2009: 219), this variable measures the statements expressing a preference for 
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more or fewer competences for the region, independently of the policy. The 
specification of this dependent variable is as follows: subtract, using the 
classification scheme of competential preferences explained above, the territorial 
demands ordered under the first digits starting with 2 and ending with the digit 1, 
from the same territorial demands order under the first digits starting with 2 and 
ending with the digit 2 (Formula contained in appendix D). This final result is 
considered as a positional score. In this investigation, in order to obtain positional 
scores, the formula presented by Budge et al. (2001) is used in comparison to 
the one given by Laver and Garry (2000). This means that when one subtracts 
opposite categories, the final measurement can be considered not only as a 
saliency score but also as a declaration of the party´s attitude towards the issue 
(Alonso et al. 2013: 202). Finally, the higher the score, the more competences 
are called for to be devolved to the regions. 
It is important to specify that this territorial claim scheme does not 
necessary reflect the real existing distribution of competences between the 
territorial levels, but more a goal or a claim for more competences to be delegated 
or devolved to the regions from the central state than a reflection of the 
competences that a region already holds in reality (Alonso et al. 2013: 195). So, 
although it uses the word “competential”, this does not refer to the actual 
distribution of competences or the actual competential degree of the region in the 
constitutional design of the state. The justification for this measuring scheme is 
fourfold. The first reason is based on the identification of the general trends that 
can be described. The second reason is focused on identifying the possible 
reasons for the variation outlined in these trends. The third reason is to observe 
which parties call for more or less competences to be devolved. The fourth is 
based on the fact that with this positional scale, and according to Maddens and 
Libbrecht (2009: 219), one can suggest specific tendencies in regards to the 
attitude that these have with respect to the de/re-centralisation process. This 
means that if a party scores high, this may be due to a more autonomist or 
decentralising tendency in comparison to what may be occurring in other regions. 
 The third measuring scheme refers to the attitudes that parties may have 
when it comes to include and/or incorporate other identities or minority groups 
into a broader project. This broader project can be seen as exclusive or inclusive 
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depending on the greater or lesser degree of resistance that parties have when 
it comes to open the scope of it. As it has been explained in the theoretical 
framework, this exclusive/inclusive framework is linked to the extent to which a 
party is able to articulate a national/regional identity that is open or not to other 
identities. Multiculturalism has been used in the past decades to try and 
incorporate minority cultures into a broader political community which is not so 
much dependent on ethnic identities but more on a common citizenship 
(Habermas 1992), even to the extent of subordinating national/regional identities 
to a duty towards the common good (Mason 1999). A political community could 
have a common national civic identity (Calhoun 2002) with the coexistence of 
different national/regional identities in a pacific manner. This can include minority 
cultures to make every social group part of the community without losing what for 
those communities is important, such as their identities. The measuring scheme 
proposed in this sub-section is aimed at measuring this exclusive or inclusive 
vision of a broad national/regional identity that incorporates other identities to 
articulate a common one with which most of the community identifies without 
being alienated. Before detailing the components of this measuring scheme, one 
has to acknowledge the limitations that the data has. The theoretical definition of 
this exclusive/inclusive index may not match perfectly the definition of the 
variables of multiculturalism contained in the CMP and the RMP. Due to the lack 
of direct variables that distinguish between migrants from the outside or coming 
from other regions of the same state, this index is the best one available. 
The articulation of this measuring scheme is based on the categories of 
multiculturalism contained in the RMP. The definition of the category 
"multiculturalism" contained in both the CMP and RMP data-bases (Appendix B) 
can be suitable to articulate this measuring scheme: "favourable mentions of 
cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the 
preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country 
including special educational provisions" (multiculturalism positive: code 607), 
and "the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration and appeals for 
cultural homogeneity in society" (multiculturalism negative: code 608) (Volkens 
et al. 2016: 20 for the CMP and Alonso et al. 2012: 36 for the RMP), depending 
if the position in regards to multiculturalism is positive or negative. To construct 
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an index for this scheme, the final step is to subtract the saliency score for the 
category of multiculturalism negative from the category of multiculturalism 
positive, and the result should be treated as a positional score for the attitude 
towards multiculturalism. Therefore, the higher the score, the more able is a party 
to articulate a more inclusive vision of a national identity that is able to 
accommodate other regional identities (Formula contained in appendix D). 
 The justification behind this measuring scheme is based on the following 
reason. The rationale relates to the fact that the articulation of a political project 
is determined, to some extent, by the ability to incorporate minorities. This ability 
refers to the possibility for communities that could be considered as minorities, to 
recognise themselves as part of a broader political community without being 
alienated and therefore react negatively, triggering the intra-group solidarity and 
closing down as a social group. The less opposed a community is to the political 
project that is being brought to them from the centre, the more chances there are 
for a community to become part of the state-wide community without losing their 
own identity. The opposite could happen if there is a strong reaction against the 
political project that the community sees as less inclusive in regards of their own 
identity, triggering the desire to articulate its own national/regional political project 
in opposition to it. As it has been outlined in the theoretical framework, the more 
inclusive a party is, the more it is able to address and adapt the centre-periphery 
cleavage in a broader way, benefiting the communities in all the regions. 
 The main limitation of this measuring scheme is precisely the definition of 
the subcategories introduced by the RMP. The theoretical explanation given in 
the previous chapter for this dependent variable does not fit perfectly, or in the 
same manner as the former two dependent variables, the definition given by the 
RMP for attitudes towards multiculturalism. The original definition provided by the 
RMP refers to the attitudes towards immigrants coming from outside into a state 
and the definition given here refers to the attitudes towards immigrants coming 
from inside the same state. There is an evident mismatch, but despite this, these 
subcategories are able to capture, to some extent, the general attitude towards 
immigrants (being from outside or inside), and therefore, it is the currently the 




6.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables 
- Explanatory variables 
Three main explanatory variables have been used for this analysis: 
distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. For the variable distance, the 
operationalisation scheme is the measured distance in kilometres from the capital 
of the Spanish state, Madrid, to the capitals of the different regions22. 
Fragmentation is operationalised by giving a value of 1 to the regions which are 
considered spatially fragmented and 0 to those which are not. The next variable 
is polycentricity. This is operationalised as considering the total population of the 
urban areas in each region that the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) lists. 
In order to get a final measurement, a dichotomous scheme is used. This 
dichotomous scheme is applied by coding regions where the difference in 
population between the different urban areas is enough to consider that there is 
only one dominant urban area with a 0 (with the largest city having an urban 
population of at least 65% of the total urban population or the region), and regions 
where the difference in population is not enough to consider the existence of a 
single dominant urban area and therefore has multiple centres of power with a 1 
(with the largest city having an urban population of less than 65% of the total 
population of the region). 
- Control variables 
Five main control variables have been selected for this analysis: economic 
development, regional identity, regional language, party type, and ideology. The 
variable economic development is operationalised by taking into consideration 
the difference between the regional and the national average GDP per capita. 
The data is obtained from the INE. The variable regional identity feelings is 
divided into two main indicators. On one hand, the regional identity feelings that 
the political class and elites have, and on the other hand, the regional identity 
feelings that the masses have. By having these two different measurements, one 
 
22 Some regions have no official capitals but what are known as de facto capitals. There are 
two regions in Spain with de facto capitals: the Basque Country (Ley 1/1980, de 23 de mayo) 
and Castilla y Leon (Ley 13/1987, de 29 de diciembre). In this investigation, these de facto 
capitals are considered as the capitals of their regions in the same level as the official capitals 
of the other regions. 
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can have a more robust overall indicator of the regional identity feelings that can 
be found in the different regions.   
The political regional identity feelings indicator is operationalised by giving 
a value of 1 to the regions that have in their Statutes of Autonomy the recognition 
of the region as a historic nacionalidad, and a value of 0 to those regions that do 
not. For the popular regional identity feelings, the indicator is operationalised in 
the following way: the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) has had 
several surveys containing a question regarding the degree to which the regional 
populations identify with the regions (An example of this is contained in appendix 
E). These surveys are regionally based and over time. The surveys selected for 
this variable are the ones that coincide with the three electoral periods. The 
answer to this question is fivefold. The first two answers refer to the feelings that 
tend to be more Spain centric, the middle one considers the feelings towards the 
Spain and the region as being equal, and the last two refer to the feelings that 
are more region centric. For this variable, only the addition of the last two answers 
to the question are taken into consideration, the ones that refer to prioritising the 
regional identity in contrast to the Spanish or dual identities. The measurement 
has a scale of a maximum of 100. The higher the measure, the more the regional 
population identifies with the region.  
The variable regional language has been operationalised by taking into 
consideration the official status of another regional language apart from Spanish 
stated and listed in the Statutes of Autonomy of the region. The measurement is 
dichotomous again, having 1 for the regions with another co-official language and 
0 for the regions that do not have another co-official language. The 
operationalisation scheme of the variable party type uses again a dichotomous 
direction. On one hand, the SWPs, and on the other hand, the regionalist parties. 
The values are opposite, scoring a 1 for the SWPs and 0 for the regionalist 
parties. For the interaction effect of whether SWP are facing or not regionalist 
parties, this is operationalised by considering if SWP are facing or not regionalist 
parties during the different electoral periods. In order to do this, it is considered 
that a SWP is facing regionalist parties when both parties contested the same 
regional elections. The regionalist parties that are considered here are not only 
those parties that are region-wide, but also those sub-regionalist parties such as 
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the UPL in Castilla y Leon. The values are, again, dichotomous. Those regions 
where SWP face regionalist parties are coded 1 and those regions where SWP 
do not face regionalist parties are coded 0. 
Taking into consideration the last variable, party ideology, the 
operationalisation scheme used here is the same as the one used by the RMP to 
obtain a positional measurement on the left-right axis (Gómez et al. 2009; Alonso 
et al. 2011; Alonso et al. 2012), based on the widely used scheme developed by 
the literature when coding manifesto data (Laver and Budge 1992; Klingemann 
1995; Budge et al. 2001; van der Brug 2001). The scale in this case is not 
dichotomous but it goes from a maximum of -100 for a left party to a maximum of 
100 for a right party. In order to increase the reliability of the data, the 
measurements obtained for all the parties included here have been compared to 
other authors to see if the measurements coincided (Heller 2002; Massetti 2009; 
Alonso et al. 2015; Massetti and Schakel 2015). 
There is part of the literature that questions the validity of this measuring 
scheme (Laver and Garry 2000; Elias et al. 2015) used by some researchers 
when applying the original, or some derivative of the same, “rile” variable 
developed by the CMP (Laver and Budge 1992) to capture the social values of 
parties acting on the left-right axis, key point of the ideological position of parties, 
as explained in the previous chapter. The main criticism is focused on the ability 
of the “rile” variable, or derivates, to include the social dimension of the left-right 
axis (Elias et al. 2015: 842-843). This inclusion is problematic because it would 
be based on a very contextualised analysis of the country and party analysed 
(Benoit and Däubler 2014: 36), being highly problematic, for example, in Eastern 
Europe (Mölder 2016: 45). Therefore, according to this criticism, the most reliable 
measuring scheme for this dimension should be the economic dimension of the 
axis, which is consistent over time and space (Mark et al. 2006: 156-157).  
Despite this argument, in this investigation, the measuring scheme 
developed by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009: 4) is used. The justification for this is 
that the researchers that develop the RMP outline that a left-right axis, measured 
using the “rile” variable or derivates, should be able to capture, to some extent, 
the social values and collapse them with the economic dimension of the left-right 
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axis (Alonso 2012: 65-66; Alonso et al. 2017: 252) in a broad socio-economic 
dimension. Both the social values and the economic aspects of the meaning of 
“left” and “right” are intrinsically related (Knutsen 1995: 86-87), being at the same 
time dynamic in adapting to specific contexts (De Vries et al. 2013: 235). 
Klingemann et al. (2006: 83-84) approached the left-right axis developed by the 
CMP to empirically test it for reliability, being the results positive, and therefore 
considering in general that the CMP measuring scheme for the left-right axis is 
sufficiently reliable.  
To avoid the main criticism described above, this is, the problem of adding 
social values to the economic dimension of the axis, it has to be pointed out that 
the “rile” index was completed using a set of variables that where empirically and 
intuitively (Mölder 2016: 39), as well as theoretically (Laver and Budge, 1992: 26) 
driven, which points out that social values are also considered and not only 
economic aspects (Budge 1994: 457-458). This means that the “rile” variable is 
able to articulate a broad meaning of what is due to be “left” and “right” in a socio-
economic dimension. Therefore, because the RMP measuring scheme used here 
derive from the former, it should be also considered as a reliable way to obtain a 
socio-economic measurement of what is due to understood as “left” and “right”. 
Finally, these social values might change in their meaning if one compares two 
or more countries, preventing a robust measurement. To prevent this and 
increase the trustworthiness, this index has to be inserted in a specific context. 
In this case, because Spain is the case study, the meaning of these social values 
is expected to be the same in the different regions. 
6.6) Accounting for electoral period effects 
 Before going into outlining the description and quantitative analysis 
performed, the fixed effect for the different electoral periods has to be explained. 
The fixed effect designed here are the three different electoral periods (1998-
2001, 2007-2010 and 2011-2012). There are two main ways to control for the 
possibility of omitted variable bias: instrumental variables regressions and fixed 
effect regressions23. For this investigation, the main method used to avoid omitted 
 
23 Fixed effect regressions can solve, just like the random effect regressions, the correlated 
errors, but they go a step further and are able to control for the unobserved variables using 
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variable bias is the fixed effect regression. Fixed effect regressions measure the 
combined effects of all time-invariant predictors that differ across the different 
units of observations of a data base. Therefore, by controlling for all time-invariant 
differences in observables and unobservables, fixed effects regressions attempt 
to reduce as much as possible the possibility of omitted variable bias (Allison 
2009: 1-4). Two characteristics are necessary to use the fixed effect regressions 
(Allison 2005: 2). The first characteristic is that the same unit of observation in 
the data-set needs to have two or more measurements in the dependent variable. 
This is different from a cross-sectional panel, where the unit of observation has 
only one measurement. The second characteristic is that there needs to be a 
variation over time throughout the selected periods for the same unit of 
observation. As it has been explained above, the data-set fulfils both 
requirements.  
6.7) Accounting for interaction effects 
 Some interaction terms have been used to test the relation between two 
variables and the its effect on the outcome. The account contained in this chapter 
focuses on the last type of relation that can be found in a causal model, the 
moderated relationship, or also known in the literature as interaction effect 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003: 1). The aim of the different interaction terms designed 
here is to test whether a moderation variable intensifies the effect of an 
explanatory variable on the outcome (Coulton and Chow 1993: 181), which on its 
own would be only partial (Pollock 2005: 170). The different interaction terms 
employed in this investigation are: fragmentation and polycentricity, political 
regional feelings and distance, party type and ideological position, political 
regional feelings and ideological position, political regional feelings and language, 
political regional feelings and party type, political regional feelings and popular 
regional feelings, language and party type, and language and ideological 




each observation and its own control (Allison 2009). The method focuses on the within-person 
variation (Allison 2005: 4). 
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6.8) Description of the data 
 In order to put the reader into context, a previous description of the data is 
presented. This is achieved by contextualising the data with a cross-case 
comparison of how the dependent variables unfold in each electoral period. This 
description of the data only takes into consideration the representation of how the 
three dependent variables unfold in each region without taking into consideration 
any of the explanatory and control variables or interaction effects described 
above. This is performed in two different phases. The first phase considers the 
statistical description of the three dependent variables aggregated for all regions. 
The second phase considers the description of three dependent variables 
disaggregated by regions. The purpose of these two phases is, on one hand, to 
have a statistical description of the three dependent variables without taking into 
consideration the different regions of Spain, and on the other hand, to have a 
specific description of the three dependent variables in each individual region to 
be able to compare them. 
6.9) Quantitative analysis performed 
As it has been explained in this section, the broad concept of centre-
periphery cleavage has been operationalised into three main dependent 
variables: saliency of the regional level, distribution of competences, and attitudes 
towards multiculturalism. Despite the broad nature of the cleavage, these three 
dependent variables allow us to measure with greater precision the ways in which 
the relation of the centre with the different peripheries is articulated using party 
manifestos as the main source of data. These three dependent variables tap into 
the ways in which the centre-periphery cleavage is articulated in Spain using the 
different regions as the subunit of analysis. With this basic idea as a starting point, 
the aim of this sub-section is to explain the analysis performed on these three 
dependent variables. 
The statistical analysis that has been performed on the three dependent 
variables is a regression analysis. Four reasons can be stated here to justify this 
method of analysis. The first is to observe the relation between variables (Jaccard 
and Turrisi 2003: 1), the second is to estimate the importance of an explanatory 
or control variable in regards to the outcome (Johnson 2000: 1-2), the third is to 
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test the different hypotheses introduced in this study (Cohen et al. 2003: 3-4), 
and the fourth is to try and explain the outcome on the dependent variable when 
applying a number of different independent variables (Harrell 2015: 2). Amongst 
the different regression analysis methods available, the best choice is the multiple 
linear regression analysis. The aim of this method is twofold. On one hand, 
predict the value of the three dependent variables based on the effect that the 
three explanatory and five control variables have on the former, and on the other 
hand,  determine the overall fit and explain the variance of the models in relation 
to the relative contribution of each of the explanatory and control variables. This 
is one of the most solid methods capable of isolating the effect of a certain 
explanatory or control variable on the outcome whilst, at the same time, 
controlling for the other independent variables introduced in the different models 
(Pollock 2005: 168-170). 
7. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
7.1) Qualitative approach 
The other main methodological approach used in this investigation is the 
qualitative analysis to try and address the main research question in a more 
detailed way (Mahoney 2007, 122). This qualitative approach provides the means 
to procure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. For this approach, 
research is done contextualising the data, and not treat it without the necessary 
values that bond the researcher to it (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14). This 
necessary bond will provide the detailed and rich analysis needed at this stage 
of the analysis. As previously stated, this approach was introduced to examine 
the specific context in which a phenomenon unfolds (Schwandt 2000, 205-210), 
and using only using a quantitative analysis does not capture with enough depth 
the centre-periphery cleavage. Added to this limitation, a quantitative analysis is 
methodologically silent in terms of how to pursue this in-depth understanding 
(Mahoney 2007, 124). A qualitative analysis fills in this gap, and at the same time, 
provides the necessary inferences needed to develop a strong answer to the 
main research question with the discretion of the researcher to select the method 
(Robson 1993). The way it is designed lastly depends on the research question 
and the variables taken into consideration (Robson 1993, 79-94). 
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In terms of the justification to use this research approach, there are four 
main reasons that can be very useful for the purpose of this thesis: the first reason 
is that qualitative research is useful for studying very few cases but with in-depth 
understanding of them. The second reason is that this approach is very useful to 
understand very complex phenomena. The third reason is that the description 
and understanding of the phenomena is always placed in their own context. The 
fourth and final reason is that the researcher can study longitudinal processes of 
the phenomena. A qualitative analysis in this investigation provides two main 
inputs. The first input is that it allows the researcher to gain in-depth knowledge 
of the cases selected. The second input is that in order to gain the in-depth 
knowledge of the case selected, it also allows researchers to identify and track 
over time the variation in the dependent variables as key to the explanation 
(Collier 2011, 823-826).  
7.2) Regions selected for the qualitative analysis 
In order to have an in-depth picture of the phenomenon in Spain, the same 
two steps outlined for the sampling scheme in the previous section need to be 
clarified here, applied specifically to the qualitative approach. The first step is the 
total population from where the cases are going to be selected. As it has been 
mentioned, the sampling design selected in this investigation is a sequential 
nested design, and here is where the “nested” part of the design is introduced. 
To fulfil this characteristic of the design itself, the total population is the 17 regions 
from the previous quantitative analysis. The second step is which cases are 
selected from this total population. To do so, the sampling scheme used is the 
stratified scheme. This scheme implies that the 17 regions are divided into 
different strata of homogeneous subgroups. This has already been completed 
and explained in Figure 4.1. After stratifying Spain into three main subgroups 
(centre, inner-, and outer-periphery), a purposeful sample is used to select from 
each subgroup the necessary cases (Collins et al. 2007: 271-272).  
Once the different strata have been designed, the next phase deals with 
the sample size of the subgroups. According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007: 
246-248) and Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007: 288-289), the sample size needs 
to be at least of 3 cases per subgroup or stratum. In this case, and because a 
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nested sampling design that involves a qualitative analysis is aimed to redefine 
ideas and expand knowledge (Charmaz 2000: 519), only one case per stratum is 
chosen. With this in mind, one case per stratum, having three regions in total, 
provides the necessary strong analytic inferences and generalisations.  The 
regions chosen for the qualitative analysis are: Castilla-La Mancha (centre 
region), Andalusia (inner-peripheral region), and the Canary Islands (outer-
peripheral region). The justification to select these three regions is the following, 
and it approximates to the most similar system designs in comparative analysis. 
The regions in each stratum (centre, inner-, and outer-periphery) need to belong 
to the so called “contemporary” autonomies to avoid other important factors, such 
as the fueros24, which would affect the homogeneity of the cases and inferences. 
In this sense, the regions need to have similar historic, economic, cultural, and 
political development. In other words, the three regions are similar in most of their 
characteristics, except for the distance that separates them from the centre. 
7.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the qualitative analysis 
 In this qualitative analysis, because the sample is reduced to Castilla-La 
Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the selection of parties needs to be 
adapted. The parties selected, amongst those that act in these regions, are: the 
local branches of PSOE and PP, and the most relevant regionalist party in 
Andalusia (PA/CA) and the Canary Islands (CC) according to the votes cast 
during the elections. As it can be observed, the PA/CA, the most important 
regionalist party in Andalusia, has been included for this qualitative analysis. The 
reason is that in the previous quantitative analysis, coding this party would have 
threatened the internal coherence of the original coding. For this analysis, the 
inclusion of this party is not only possible but desirable in order to increase the 
internal validity of the findings. The application of the criteria to select the most 
relevant parties gives the result of 24 manifestos, which can be divided into 6 
manifestos that correspond to the main regionalist party in Andalusia (3) and the 
Canary Islands (3), and 18 manifestos that correspond to the local branches of 
the two main SWPs in the Canary Islands (6), Andalusia (6), and Castilla-La 
 
24 Fueros refers to the regional privileges of Navarre and the Basque Country in relation to 
issues such as tax transfers and civil law, recognised by the Spanish constitution and the 
Statutes of Autonomy of both regions (Sánchez-Prieto 2012). 
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Mancha (6). Tables 1 and 2 in appendix F show the parties selected and the 
statistical summary for the distribution of the manifestos by regions. 
7.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables 
 The purpose of this sub-section is to describe and justify the measurement 
schemes used to explore the four selected dependent variables or components 
of the centre-periphery cleavage presented in this qualitative analysis: saliency 
of the regional level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence 
distribution, and identity. As it has been said above, this qualitative method of 
analysis of political texts is used to incorporate context into the analysis 
(Krippendorff 2004a: 90-93). This aids to make interpretation of political 
discourses more reliable in order to address the main research question (Jahn 
2010: 750). The justification to add the dependent variables constitutional status 
of the region and identity, which substitute attitudes towards multiculturalism, in 
comparison to the quantitative analysis is that, on one hand, the RMP and the 
sub-categories introduced by this data-set are not precise enough to capture and 
match the theoretical explanation and expectations for these two dependent 
variables, and on the other hand, the analysis needs to be more fine grained than 
the quantitative analysis allows for in relation the way parties behave when 
addressing these issues, which normally are very contextualised, whilst still 
complying with the two dimensions in which the RMP disaggregates the territorial 
axis. This provides the grounds to get an in-depth understanding of party 
behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage. In other words, these four 
dependent variables adapt to the purpose of the qualitative approach developed 
in this section. 
To apply this qualitative method of analysis, a category system or a 
categorisation matrix needs to be developed (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006: 
84-90), which allows for a comparison of concepts and models (Marshall and 
Rossman 1995). When creating a categorisation matrix, generally two 
approaches can be used (Maxwell and Miller 2008: 465-467): the structured or 
unstructured matrix. The structured matrix refers to the practice of only selecting 
the aspects that fit the matrix itself from all the data. The unstructured matrix 
refers to the different aspects that the data contains and that can be used to 
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inductively infer conclusions. For this investigation, the structured matrix is used. 
The reason behind this is that the four dependent variables used as categories 
may not be addressed as such in the manifestos, making it necessary to create 
subcategories beforehand (Dey 1993: 102) that fit their boundaries to try and 
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7.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables 
 Before analysing the manifestos using the above structured categorisation 
matrix, an important issue has to be clarified. Despite the fact that qualitative 
analysis is introduced to incorporate context to the analysis (Bryman 2004: 542), 
there is still some lack of specific procedures to apply it. This is explained by the 
flexibility that this method of analysis provides. To bridge this gap, it is necessary 
to design a process where the evidence extracted from the manifestos using the 
above structured categorisation matrix is measured. Leaving behind frequency 
techniques and similar (Mayring 2014: 22-26), the focus in this analysis is placed 
on an analytic technique that allows to gain more in-depth knowledge and 
meaning of the statements contained in the manifestos. Due to the lack of 
standardised procedures in comparison to a quantitative analysis, establishing 
this before the analysis is a crucial part of any qualitative analysis, and this must 
fit the purpose of the study (Mayring 2014: 39). Three main aims form the bases 
that establishes this procedure beforehand: first, give answers to the possible 
criticisms that this kind of approach rise in positivist researchers, such as the 
lack of objectivity (Wesley 2014: 142-143); second, these answers should 
strengthen the trustworthiness of the qualitative analysis of these manifestos 
(Wesley 2014: 144); and third, having a detailed account of the procedure allows 
for other researchers to audit the methodological trails of the study (Altheide 
1996: 25-33). 
The procedure for the analysis of the manifestos designed in this chapter 
is divided into two phases (Gill 2007: 179-180). The first phase deals with the 
search for patterns in the text, and the second phase compares the main 
hypotheses to these patterns. More precisely, when it comes to applying these 
two phases, the first phase deals with the identification and articulation of the 
different categories and subcategories described in the above sub-section that 
deals with the operationalisation of the dependent variables, and the second 
phase considers the operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables 
to confirm or not the hypotheses and find possible answers to the main research 
question. The analysis of the data in qualitative analysis can be defined as the 
comparison of the data gathered using the structured categorisation matrix 
(Figure 4.2) with a set of questions that have been articulated in order to assess 
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and evaluate the outcome of the case study (George and Bennett 2005: 213). 
This can be seen as a fourth stage in the analysis of political documents in 
addition to the three stages described by Wesley (2014: 150-154). The first three 
stages deal with a broad overview of the texts selected for the study, the 
articulation of the categorisation matrix, and the fine grain ordering of the data 
under the different categories and subcategories articulated. The fourth stage 
can resemble the one described here, dealing with the inferences that are 
extracted in relation to the main hypotheses and research question.  
 This comparison requires a structured questions matrix to be applied to 
the data ordered by the above structured categorisation matrix. These structured 
questions are based on the main research question and hypotheses designed 
for this case study. The articulation and comparison of the structured 
categorisation matrix to the required structured questions matrix can be 
extracted from the analysis process proposed by the method of Discourse 
Tracing, applied to this qualitative analysis. This comparison has the aim of 
highlighting and trace over time political discourse (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 
1531-1534) around the centre-periphery cleavage contained in the manifestos 
and other documents issued by parties to deal with the regional level. This 
analysis gravitates around three main explanatory and three control variables: 
the explanatory variables are distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, and the 
control variables are party type, party ideology, and party structure. The 
structured questions that are introduced at this stage are designed using these 
variables to observe how the evidence obtained through the structured 
categorisation matrix changes over time and region, and how they are or can be 
connected (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1532). Once the comparison has been 
done, a second task needs to be completed (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1534-
1534), which involves the articulation of a narrative to answer the main research 
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 To increase trustworthiness, one can, apart from following the different 
procedures that the literature suggests, such as Morse et al. (2002: 14-16), focus 
on various ways to increase the level of the inferences of this study. Triangulation 
involves collecting, analysing, and cross-checking a variety of data that deals with 
the same case. Here, triangulation is addressed by introducing new sources of 
evidence. In general terms, triangulation derived from the labelled triangle 
analogy, implying that the observation of the same phenomenon through different 
and independent sources of evidence (Decrop 1999: 158). This should not be 
confused with the known between-method triangulation (Denzin 1978: 304). 
In this investigation, triangulation is understood as this way of triangulating 
different sources of data (Flick 2004: 178), or in other words, the use of other 
sources of evidence to increase the trustworthiness and confirm to some extent 
the findings (Patton 2002: 541-590). To perform the proposed triangulation based 
on different sources of evidence (Boyatzis 1998: xiii, and 144-159), this qualitative 
analysis complements the regional manifestos with other documents produced 
by the parties that may contain important evidence. These different documents 
deal with regional issues and are thought to answer and/or present the ideas that 
the different parties have regarding the articulation of the autonomous 
communities and their constitutional design. In terms of the different documents, 
the ones selected for performing this triangulation are: political resolutions for the 
congress that the parties had during the three electoral periods, the regional 
frameworks that SWPs issue for regional elections, and the inaugural speech. 
The specific documents can be found in Table 1, appendix G. 
7.7) Qualitative analysis performed 
Content Analysis is used as the main qualitative method of analysis in this 
investigation. This has the aim of incorporating context to the analysis (Titscher 
et al. 2000: 62). In order to do this, Content Analysis codes and categorises large 
amounts of textual evidence to highlight possible patterns and trends (Gbrich 
2007: 189-199), used to validate inferences from different sources of evidence in 
their own context (Krippendorff 2004a: 18). Focusing on the main source of 
evidence, the aim of this qualitative method of analysis is to disentangle political 
181 
 
discourse to gain in-depth knowledge of a case. Content Analysis grants the 
ability to, through the reading and coding of political texts, outline patterns over 
time of social processes inserted in a specific social context, providing the 
necessary in-depth understanding of the phenomenon that is being studied.  
The rationale for the use of Content Analysis is twofold. First, and focusing 
on the case study strategy outlined above (Eckstein 2000: 119-124), the following 
can be said. As this is a case study, Content Analysis fits the context-dependent 
knowledge required for an in-depth understanding of the case selected 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294-295). Analysing three subunits of analysis 
(Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands) has the aim of finding a 
balance between the internal and external validity of the design. This balance of 
validities consolidates the in-depth knowledge of the case (Gerring 2004: 347-
348), and provides the ground to open the door to some degree of generalisation 
of the findings (Ragin 1987: 70-71). The second rationale is the flexibility that 
Content Analysis allows in terms of designing the measurement schemes of the 
different dependent and independent variables in order to obtain the required in-
depth knowledge of the topic and context (Neuendorf 2017: 24-31). Content 
Analysis has no straight line in terms of the actual process to obtain an answer 
to the main research question. This is an advantage when it comes to gaining in-
depth knowledge, but at the same time, can be a disadvantage if the process 
used is not sufficiently justified along the study (Wesley 2014: 153-56). The 
flexibility needs to be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the method used 
and how the results were achieved (Holliday 2007: 7), rationale for this section. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline and describe in detail the 
methodology used in this investigation. This is one of the main procedures though 
which the characteristics of validity, reliability, replicability, and transparency can 
be achieved in social sciences. This methodological account needs to be used 
as the main pillar on which this investigation relays. The main research design 
used here is the sub-national comparative design, using a case study strategy as 
the most appropriate one to gain in-depth knowledge of Spain in a highly 
contextualised understanding. A mixed methods approach is used to combine the 
182 
 
strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches when analysing the 
different sources of evidence. This combination fits the aim of obtaining a 
complete and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. Using a sequential 
nested design to select the different subunits of the analysis in Spain opens the 
path to obtain the necessary inferences in order to address the main research 























































The purpose of this chapter is to quantitatively analyse the manifestos. The 
dependent variables in which the centre-periphery cleavage was divided into 
were: saliency of the regional level, position on competence distribution, and 
attitudes towards multiculturalism. These provided a complete overview of party 
behaviour when articulating the centre-periphery cleavage nation-wade. Added 
to the three main explanatory variables, the control variables selected were 
economic development, regional identity, regional language, party type, and 
ideology. This chapters tried to fill in the gap identified by Alonso et al. (2017: 
244), highlighting the fact that most studies concerning the research problem 
identified in the literature review chapter were based on state-level data. Here, 
regional-level quantitative data has been introduced to observe how the above-
mentioned factors were expected to shape party competition along this cleavage 
in the 17 regions of Spain. This chapter is divided into four main sections. The 
first section describes the data, the second presents the results of the quantitative 
analysis, the third contrasts the main findings with the hypotheses designed for 
all the regions of Spain, and the fourth discusses the most important inferences 
in relation to the research question. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
2.1) Introduction 
 The aim of this section is to present the data obtained regarding the three 
dependent variables for all the regions of Spain. The organisation of this section 
is the following: three main sub-sections, each one describing the data 
corresponding to each dependent variables. Each sub-section is divided into, on 
one hand, a cross-sectional description of each electoral period, and on the other 
hand, a longitudinal description of the three electoral periods. The raw data for 
the explanatory, control, and dependent variables is contained in appendix H 




2.2) Saliency of the regional level 
ELECTORAL 
PERIOD 
MEAN MEDIAN S.D. MAX. MIN. 
1998-2001 90.89 91.02 3.89 100 83.79 
2007-2010 91.86 93.02 5.08 100 68.12 
2011-2012 92.06 91.83 3.80 100 85.08 
* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data 
for this table can be found in appendix I. 
This cross-section statistical summary suggests four main points. The first 
point is that the expected weight of the region in the manifestos is strongly 
verified. All means show that overall and in all three periods, the regional level 
was addressed in over 90% of the total content of all manifestos. The second 
point is that not only was the regional level the most referenced one in comparison 
to other possible levels, but also that it gradually received more attention in the 
manifestos over time. The third point deals with the results for the maximum and 
minimum categories. The former reveals that, in some regions, there were some 
manifestos that were entirely dedicated to the regional level in some electoral 
periods. From the latter category, one can observe that there were some 
manifestos in some regions that dedicate considerable space to other 
administrative levels, with a considerable difference of more than 20 points 
between the mean and the minimum category for the electoral period 2007-2010, 
double the difference in comparison to the other two electoral periods. The fourth 
point deals with the scores for the standard deviation category. Both the first and 
last electoral periods score very similar results, with an insignificant difference 
between them. The most interesting result comes for the period 2007-2010, which 
shows a score of 5.08, representing a significant difference and a higher variation 
if compared to 1998-2001 and 2011-2012, which, added to the scores for the 
maximum and minimum categories for the same period, where the difference 
between them was the highest, represents the regional elections where the 
references to the regional level were less consistent.  




 Figure 5.1. Saliency of the regional level. 
The main observation from Figure 5.1 is that the general mean for all the 
regions had a positive tendency with a gentle incline. It can be said that most of 
the regions, with some exceptions such as Cantabria, Murcia, or Aragon, had the 
same positive trend. A good indicator of this general observation is that there 
were about half of the regions that started below the general mean line in the first 
electoral period and most of them ended above the same general mean line in 
the last electoral period 2011-2012. There were also exceptions to this, but 
nonetheless, they still followed the same positive pattern. Andalusia is a good 
example. In the first electoral period, the region had a mean considerably under 
the general mean, and in the last electoral period the mean of the region was still 
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can be considered as an opposite example of the latter region, but with the same 
positive trend. All its means were above the general mean and at the same time 
had a positive trend. There were regions that had negative trends in comparison 
to the above general observation. Murcia is a good example of a region with a 
negative trend. Its first mean scored above the general mean and its last mean 
scored below. This shows a clear negative trend. Aragon, the Balearic, and the 
Canary Islands followed the same negative trend. Castilla y Leon is an interesting 
region with different scores compared to the positive and negative trend 
described above. Although its second mean was under the general mean, the 
region had a general flat tendency overall. 
 The overall conclusion for both the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
description is that the general trend, represented by the three means in the cross-
sectional and the general mean in the longitudinal description, was positive. The 
regional level was the most referenced level compared to others, and this 
increased over time. Two reasons can explain this. The first reason for this may 
be that as the regions developed their Statutes of Autonomy with more 
competences delegated by the centre, this is the administrative level on which 
the bulk of the state´s functioning falls. Therefore, the region is the entity to which 
the citizens refer most of the time when they have to deal with the state, making 
the regions the direct receptor of their attention. In other words, the region is 
increasing its presence over time in the everyday life of the citizens. The second 
reason can be that the manifestos were compiled for regional elections, and 
therefore, the focus was on the region. The same happens with manifestos that 
address the national or local levels. In a multi-level democracy like Spain, each 
level is addressed specifically by the parties. If the elections correspond to the 
regional level, then, it is expected to observe the emphasis of the manifestos 







2.3) Position on competence distribution 
ELECTORAL 
PERIOD 
MEAN MEDIAN S.D. MAX. MIN. 
1998-2001 3.32 2.11 4.71 7.95 0 
2007-2010 1.56 0.88 1.82 9.03 0 
2011-2012 2.22 0.82 3.72 16.41 -0.65 
* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data 
for this table can be found in appendix I. 
Three main observations can be outlined using this cross-sectional 
description. The first obervation has to do with the means regarding each electoral 
period. All three periods had positive numbers, meaning that in each period, the 
parties in the regions demanded more competences for the regions in general 
terms. Despite this positive scores for all the means, it can be pointed out that the 
scores decreased from the first electoral period to the second, and increased from 
the second to the third. The positive mentions towards devolving more cometences 
to the regions were numerous during the period 1998-2001 and fewer during the 
period 2007-2010, but this increased during the period 2011-2012. The second 
observation refers to the maximun and minimun categories. Regading the 
maximun category, one can observe that the scores increased from one period to 
another, reaching a significantly higher number during 2011-2012. In the first two 
periods, the minimun scores were both 0, meaning that no party in any of the 17 
regions called for competences to be removed from the region to be asigned to 
other territorial levels. This changed during the period 2011-2012, where a 
negative score of -0.65 can be found, meaning that some competences were 
demanded to be taken away from the regional level. The difference that can be 
found between the maximun and minimun catgeory reaches its peak during the 
last electoral period, with a score of 17.06, more than double the minimun, reached 
during the period 1998-2001 with a score of 7.95. The last observation deals with 
the standard deviation category. The scores for the periods 1998-2001 and 2011-
Table 5.2.-Position on Competence Distribution* 
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2012 differ significatly from the one for the period of 2007-2010. The standard 
deviation for the period 2007-2010 is significantly lower, meaning that the variation 
in the positioning of parties calling for more competences to be devolved to the 
regions reached its minimun. In opposition, the period where one can find more 
variation in the same behaviour is the first electoral period.  
 
 Figure 5.2. Position on competence distribution. 
From this longitudinal description, two main observations can be made. 
The first observation, and possibly the most important one, is that there was a 
negative trend regarding the general mean for all the regions despite the increase 
in the last electoral period. Most of the regions, with some exceptions, had a 
negative trend. The negative trend had different declines, like for example, the 
decline of the Basque Country was more pronounced than the decline of the 
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Galicia for example. Aragon is another example of a region with a positive trend. 
The second observation deals with the position most regions have in comparison 
to the general mean had over time. Most of the regions started during the first 
period 1998-2001 below the general mean, and during the second and third 
electoral period, this remained the same. This means that most of the regions 
either followed the same negative trend, as for example Andalusia, or they had 
positive trends but they still scored below the general mean, as for example La 
Rioja.  
 The general conclusions regarding the cross-sectional and the longitudinal 
description of the data are the following. Despite the fact that negative results can 
be observed in very few cases, the call for more competences to de devolved to 
the regions was general in all regions. Nonetheless, these positive calls had a 
negative trend, decreasing over time. The high scores for the standard deviations 
support the variation around the general mean observed in Figure 5.2, where 
there were some regions that prominently deviated from it. An example of this is 
the Basque County in the first electoral period and Catalonia in the last one. 
During the middle electoral period, 2007-2010, one can observe how the regions 
tended to be more concentrated around the general mean, meaning that the calls 
for more competences were more homogenous in general. 
 A possible reason for the negative trend over time could be the 
development of the ongoing decentralisation process. The Spanish state has 
gone, according to the literature, through four waves of decentralisation (Gómez 
Corona 2009). In other words, the regions have developed their foundational laws 
and structure in four different waves, depending on the process they were 
assigned by the Constitution and the different reforms that their Statutes of 
Autonomy have undertaken. The four waves were (Castellà Andreu and Martín 
Núñez 2009: 49): the first during 1991, the second during 1994, the third during 
1996-2001, and the fourth during 2006-2007. As the regions developed their 
Statutes of Autonomy with more devolved competences, there were fewer that 
they could call for, and therefore, less emphasis on calling for more competences 
could be made as the list of transferable competences got shorter. In other words, 
the more competences the regions had, the fewer they called for as fewer 
competences were available to be devolved.  
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 According to the above observation and the four waves of decentralisation, 
by the electoral period 2011-2012 the mentions dealing with the distribution of 
competences towards the regions should be expected to be fewer than the 
mentions in the previous electoral periods. This is because there would be no 
other competences that could be devolved by the central government to the 
regions. This is not apparently the case. It seems that the mentions increased. 
The reason behind this increase could be found in the consequences of the 
Constitutional ruling of 2010 over the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006. The 
ruling discussed the competences that could be devolved to the regions (López 
Bofill 2011: 186-187). From this ruling, a new clarification and interpretation of the 
legal framework to devolve competences was introduced (Ortega Álvarez 2011: 
54). This could have triggered the issue of devolving new competences, or at 
least, introduced the discussion of this new interpretation of the existing legal 
framework in those regions that are were currently planning to reform their Statute 
of Autonomy in a possible fifth new wave of decentralisation (for example, the 
proposed reform of the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands 1996) 25. 
Parties, in order to position themselves in line with this new interpretation, could 
have increased their mentions to devolving more competences to the regions 
during the last electoral period 2011-2012. 
2.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism 
ELECTORAL 
PERIOD 
MEAN MEDIAN S.D. MAX. MIN. 
1998-2001 0.18 0.08 0.27 1.17 -0.25 
2007-2010 0.24 0.11 0.41 1.06 -0.68 
2011-2012 0.20 0.08 0.51 2.7 -0.65 
* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data 
for this table can be found in appendix I. 
 
25 http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-10-1.PDF. This is 
the proposal to reform the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands 1996. 
Table 5.3.-Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism* 
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This cross-sectional description of the data can be summarised as follows. 
The first consideration deals with the means. There was an initial increase, from 
199-2001 to 2007-2010, and a later decrease, from 2007-2010 to 2011-2012, but 
nonetheless, this last score was still higher than the one for the first period. Despite 
this fact, the lowest score were found during 1998-2001 and the highest during 
2007-2010. As regards to the maximum and minimun categories, the second 
consideration is the following. The maximum scores decreased from the first to the 
second electoral period, and increased from the second to the third period. The 
opposite behaviour can be found in the minimum category. The scores increased 
from the first to the second period, and decreased slightly from the second to the 
third electoral period. Regarding the differences between the two categories, one 
can observe a difference of 1.42 in the first period, a difference of 1.74 in the 
second period, and a difference of 3.35 in the last one, being this last difference 
the highest one. The last point regarding these two categories is that the minimum 
scores reflect that, in some regions, the attitudes of some parties towards other 
cultures were negative. The third consideration relates to the scores for the 
standard deviation. They increased from one period to the next. Despite this 
general increase, the difference in increase between the first and the second 
period was slightly higher, 0.14, than the increase between the second and the 
third period, 0.10. The last result, 0.51 during 2011-2012, points in the direction of 
observing a more hetegenoues behaviour by parties regarding the attitudes 




 Figure 5.3. Attitudes towards multiculturalism. 
From what can be observed in Figure 5.3, containing the longitudinal 
patterns, the general trend for all regions was either flat or very slightly positive 
over time. Despite this general trend, there were examples of negative 
tendencies. The region of Extremadura is an example of these negative trends. 
The last main observation deals with the negative results for regions such as the 
Balearic Islands, La Rioja, Valencia and Castilla-Leon. One can find negative 
results in these regions, meaning that, at some point in time, parties had negative 
attitudes towards multiculturalism, but this does not mean that they had an overall 
negative trend per se. In fact, there were examples of both positive trends with 
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such as Castilla-Leon. Following this observation, it must be said that most of the 
regions scored above 0 across the three electoral periods. This means that in 
most of the regions, parties had consistent positive attitudes towards 
multiculturalism. The general conclusion that can be stated here is that one can 
find either a flat or a slightly positive trend over time, and that the dispersion of 
the regions around the general mean increased at the same time. The first point 
can be reinforced comparing the means for all the three electoral periods and the 
line for the general mean for all regions. The second point con be supported using 
the scores for the standard deviation and the dispersion that can be observed in 
the Figure 5.3. 
2.5) Conclusions 
From the description of the data in relation to the three dependent variables 
in which the broad concept of centre-periphery cleavage has been divided into, 
the following can be said. Regarding the variable saliency of the regional level, 
the conclusion is that there was a positive trend overtime. This positive trend 
seems to had been steady over time, with a solid pace in its increase. With 
respect to the variable position on competence distribution, the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal description highlighted a negative trend overtime, but 
nonetheless, the calls for more competences to be devolved were positive 
overall, with very few negative examples. This means that parties, as time 
passed, called for fewer competences for the regions. Regarding the variable 
attitudes towards multiculturalism in all three electoral periods, the results showed 
a flat or a very slightly positive trend, with some consistently negative results.  
3. RESULTS 
3.1) Organisation of the multiple regression analyses 
 The multiple regression analyses are organised in the following way. 
Model 1 for every dependent variable contains only the three explanatory 
variables in a linear functional form and the account for the time effect. Model 2 
introduces to the above all the control variables, again in a linear functional form. 
Finally, models 3-8/9 (depending on the dependent variable) contain the linear 
functional form of the explanatory and control variables on one hand, and the 
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different interaction functional forms theorised to have an effect on the other 
hand26.  
3.2) Saliency of the regional level27 
 From all the explanatory and control variables, the one that has the 
strongest statistical significance is regional identity feelings via the indicator 
political regional feelings. This significance is robust and consistent in all the 
models presented, with a minimum statistical significance p-value of .05 and a 
maximum of .01. The association is also the strongest, with a maximum result of 
-4.91 and a minimum of -2.39.  
All the three explanatory variables have no statistical significance in any of 
the models. This applies for model 1, with the three explanatory variables on their 
own, model 2, with all the explanatory and the control variables, and models 3-8, 
with all the explanatory and control variables, and interaction effects. From the 
three, the one that has the strongest association with the dependent variable is 
fragmentation, being this consistently negative with a maximum score of -2.67. In 
regards to the regional-level control variables, none, except regional identity 
feelings via the indicator political regional feelings, has any statistical significance 
across the different models presented. When it comes to their impact, there is a 
mixture of positive and negative associations, being economic development and 
language representatives of the former, and regional identity feelings 
characterising the latter. Although with no statistical significance, regional 
language has the second strongest association, with a maximum of 1.72 in model 
3. Finally, economic development has no association. Reporting the results for 
the party-level control variables, the observations are less varied. The control 
variable that has the strongest statistical significance is party type, with a p-value 
of .1 in all models. Its effects on the dependent variable are also strong, with a 
maximum of -1.62 in model 6. The variables ideological position of parties and 
SWPs facing regional parties do not have any significance in any of the models. 
 
26 The results are contained in appendix J, K, and L. 




From these two last control variables, the latter scores strong associations, with 
a maximum sore of 2.57 in model 4.  
Focusing on the interaction effects and the electoral periods, the following 
can be said. Their impact on the dependent variable is marginal, except for the 
interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity, which has the strongest positive 
association of all, with a score of 6.56. The only electoral period that has a strong 
statistical significance is 2007-2010, with a maximum p-value of .05 in models 1 
and 2, but this is an exception as there is none in the remining ones. Its effects 
are considerable, with a positive association of 1.69 at its peak (Model 1). 
Regarding the different models presented, all have a strong significance in 
relation to the saliency of the regional level, with a maximum p-value of .05, being 
model 3 the strongest, with a F-statistic of 0.03. The highest R-square can be 
found in model 4, having the overall highest explanatory power (.16), although 
this leaves much variation unexplained. The most interesting result with respect 
to the different models is that one can highlight the fact that the three explanatory 
variables on their own have very insignificance impact on the outcome. This 
increases when they come in combination with the different control variables. 
3.3) Position on competence distribution28 
 In comparison to the results outlined for the previous dependent variable, 
this analysis presents more significant results. Overall, it can be seen at first hand 
the results for the statistical significance of the different explanatory and control 
variables contain more substantive results in most of the models. In regards to 
the results for the association with the position on competence distribution, the 
general overview is that they are consistently higher. Finally, the models present 
an overall considerably more significance than the ones for the saliency of the 
regional level. 
 From the three explanatory variables, two main results can be highlighted. 
On one hand, the results for the statistical significance and association with the 
dependent variable, and on the other hand, the sharp difference between the 
 




explanatory variables being on their own (model 1) or in combination with the 
control variables (model 2-9). Starting with the first set of important results, the 
explanatory variable with the most consistent statistical significance in all models 
is distance, with a consistent p-value of .05 except for model 1. This is followed 
by polycentricity, with strong statistical significance but less consistent, with 
variation of a maximum p-value of .05 and a minimum of .1. Fragmentation has 
no statistical significance in any of the models in which is it present. The strongest 
and consistent association can be found in relation to polycentricity, being this 
positive and with a maximum score of 1.76 in model 9. Distance displays an 
extremely negative weak association, with a maximum score of -0.008 in model 
4. Finishing with the second set of important results is that in model 1, where the 
explanatory variables are on their own, none score any statistical significance. 
This changes when these come in combination with the control variables in model 
2. Except fragmentation, distance and polycentricity have consistent statistical 
significance in all models. In addition, the associations turn direction for distance 
and fragmentation (positive to negative in the case of the former, and negative to 
positive for the latter), and in the case of polycentricity, its sharply increases. 
Considering the regional-level control variables, the ones with the 
strongest statistical significance are, in order of importance, regional language 
and regional identity feelings via both indicators. This relation varies, in most of 
the cases, from a minimum p-value of .1 to a maximum of .01, but it can be 
considered as robust and consistent across all models. Only economic 
development has no significance and association. When it comes to the 
association with the position on competence distribution, there is a clear cut 
between, on one hand, regional identity feelings via the indicator political regional 
feeling with very strong positive effects (a maximum of 3.75 in model 6), and on 
the other hand, regional language, with clearer consistent negative association 
(a maximum of -2.87 in model 6). Only economic development has no 
significance nor association. 
 Turning to the party-level control variables, party type has the most 
significant relation with the dependent variable, being this consistent across all 
the models, with a minimum p-value of .05 and a maximum of .01 (with the only 
exception of model 7). Ideology is also significant, but with less intensity than 
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party type, with a maximum p-value of .05, except for models 4, 5, and 7. 
Nonetheless, this last control variables can be considered as robustly related to 
the dependent variable. Party type has a solid and persistent negative association 
across the different models, with a maximum of -2.87 (model 6). Ideological 
position of parties also has a negative association on the dependent variable, but 
its effect is significantly inferior if compared to party type, with a maximum of -
0.24. The control variable SWPs facing regionalist parties has a variate statistical 
relation, having in some models none and in others a maximum p-value of .05. 
Its association is consistently negative, with the second highest scores. 
 From the different interaction effects, three out of seven have some 
statistical relation with the dependent variable, varying from a minimum p-value 
of .1 and a maximum if .05. These interaction effects are: party type and 
ideological position, regional language and ideological position, and political 
regional identity feelings and party type. The other four interaction effects have 
no statistical relation to the position on competence distribution. Considering their 
association, there is considerable positive effect for the interaction of 
fragmentation and polycentricity, with a score of 4.00, and a strong negative result 
of -2.88 for the indicator political regional identity feelings and party type. 
Regarding the different models presented here, all are statistically significant with 
a maximum p-value of .01 and a minimum of .05, with the exception of model 7. 
All the results for the R-squared are higher in comparison to the same category 
from the previous dependent variable. The models presented here can explain a 
minimum of 5.7% (model 1) and a maximum of 42% of the outcome (model 4). 
As with the analysis for the saliency of the regional level, in this case, the same 
behaviour regarding the difference between the explanatory power of the 
explanatory variables on their own or in combination with the control variables 
can be observed, but with a sharper gap. On their own, the three explanatory 





3.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism29 
 The analysis performed on the final dependent variable also shows 
interesting results. From the three main explanatory variables, only distance has 
some statistical significance with the dependent variable, with a consistent p-
value of .05, but at the same time with null association. In regards to 
fragmentation and polycentricity, both are statistically insignificant. When it 
comes to their association, these have opposite behaviours. Fragmentation being 
positive with a maximum score of 0.15 (model 7), and polycentricity being 
negative, with a maximum score of -0.15 (model 3). From the different regional-
level control variables, regional identity feelings, via the indicator political regional 
feeling, and regional language are the ones that have a clearer and stronger 
statistical significance. This relation varies from a minimum p-value of .1 and a 
maximum of .01, with only very few exceptions. When it comes to their 
association, regional identity feelings via political regional identity feelings and 
regional language have the strongest, opposite, effect (with a maximum effect of 
0.43 for the indicator political regional feelings in model 7 and -0.39 for regional 
language in the same model). Economic development has no statistical 
significance nor association. Turning now to the party-level control variables, it 
must be pointed out that only ideology had some statistical significance, with a p-
value of .1 in most of the models. The association of party type is the highest, 
with a maximum score of -0.12 in model 5. Ideology has less impact on the 
outcome in comparison. SWPs facing regionalist parties does not show any 
overall important significance or association. 
 From the different interaction effects, none have any significance. In terms 
of their possible associations, all have a negative impact, except for the 
interaction between fragmentation and polycentricity, with a positive score of 
0.64. Finishing with the electoral periods, both have an insignificance impact on 
the dependent variable. The different models present an overall explanatory 
power of 22% (model 6). As with the above two analyses, one can again see the 
important difference between the explanatory power of the three explanatory 
 




variables on their own and in combination with the different control variables. 
When distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity come on their own, they have 
a very insignificance explanatory power on the outcome of this dependent 
variable.  
3.5) Conclusions  
 The analysis that presents the most promising results in terms of statistical 
significance and association is the one performed on the dependent variable 
position on competence distribution. The results for the saliency of the regional 
level and attitudes towards multiculturalism are also, to some extent, overall 
significant. In terms of the significance of the different models and their 
explanatory power, the most positive results can also be found, again, for the 
dependent variable position on competence distribution, where both the statistical 
significance and the R-squared results are consistently higher. For the variable 
saliency of the regional level and attitudes towards multiculturalism, the results 
are also, to some extent, noteworthy. 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1) Saliency of the regional level 
 Overall, the results of the analysis performed on this dependent variable 
do not show, to the full extent, the expected behaviour of parties. From all the 
explanatory and control variables that can affect the saliency of the regional level 
as hypothesised, only party type and ideology fulfil the expected outcome. The 
remaining variables do not confirm the expectations and hypotheses outlined in 
the theoretical chapter. Focusing first on the three explanatory variables, all the 
hypotheses are rejected (H1.A, H2.A, and H3.A). None affect party behaviour 
along the centre-periphery cleavage as expected. One of the most unpredicted 
results can be observed for the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity. It 
was theorised to have a negative effect on the saliency of the regional level. This 
is not confirmed, but the results describe a very strong positive impact on the 
dependent variable.  
Regarding the party-level control variables party type and ideology, the 
expected effect on the outcome is the one hypothesised, confirming hypotheses 
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H7.A and H8.A. The relation between these control variables and the saliency of 
the regional level is as theorised. First, in regards to party type, the expectations 
are met and the predicted outcome fulfilled. The findings show that SWPs 
emphasised less than regionalist parties the regional level. A possible reason for 
this is that, in order to prevent the articulation of challenging peripheral regions 
towards the centre, SWPs, although defending the regional interests, inserted 
these in a state-wide project. Regions were not necessarily subordinated to the 
centre, but placed in a second place in importance, being the centre where their 
loyalties were placed. As explained, this does not mean that SWPs did not defend 
the regions or their interests, this means that these interests were not upgraded 
to achieve an equal treatment as the centre, where SWPs locate the decision-
making processes and loyalties. Second, the irrelevance of ideology on its own 
is also confirmed by the results. There is no statistical significance and the 
association was insignificant. If ideology is observed in isolation and in relation to 
this dependent variable, the effect is the one theorised. 
The regional-level control variable that shows the most interesting results 
is regional identity feelings. Despite the fact that it has very strong statistical 
significance via the indicator political regional feelings, the results reject 
hypothesis H5.A. The results show strong negative scores, especially for the 
latter indicator. A reason for this negative association might be that the pro-
periphery position of SWPs in regions with a recognised historic nacionalidad 
were very weak. This can be related to the fact that SWPs might have seen this 
recognition of nacionalidad as an element that could be used by regional elites to 
fuel the challenge to the centre via the understanding that the region has a distinct 
identity from the centre. In order to prevent this distinctive marker becoming a 
salient issue in the relations between the centre and the peripheries, SWPs might 
have weakened their pro-positions to undermine this possible effect. The results 
reject hypotheses H4.A, H6.A, H7.D, and H9.A, in the sense that economic 
development, language, SWPs facing or not regional parties, or the interaction of 
party type and ideology do not affect this dependent variable as theorised. 
Regarding the three electoral periods, the one that had some significance 
was 2007-2010. One possible reason for this positive effect could be found in the 
consequences of the new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia passed in 2006 by 
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the regional and national parliament. The extended new design of the region, 
including the label Catalan Nation when referring to the regional population of 
Catalonia, might have triggered the regional horizontal grievances of other 
regions. The parties in other regions might have used this opportunity to make 
their regions stronger by starting a new period of regional institutional 
development. One of the ways in which these grievances could be shown is in 
the increasing saliency of the regional level in the electoral period just after 2006, 
the one labelled here as 2007-2010. 
4.2) Position on competence distribution 
 In comparison to the saliency of the regional level, the analysis of this 
dependent variable provides the most overall interesting results, both in 
significance and association with the different explanatory and control variables. 
The most prominent results are obtained for the control variables party type and 
regional identity feelings. The rest of the explanatory and control variables show 
some strong statistical significance, but the associations go in the opposite 
direction to the one theorised, rejecting the main hypotheses. 
As with the above analysis in regards to the saliency of the regional level, 
the results for this dependent variable reject all the hypotheses articulated for the 
three main explanatory variables (H1.B, H2.B, and H3.B). Despite this general 
conclusion, promising results can be observed for both fragmentation and 
polycentricity. The positive results for the association with this dependent variable 
can point in an interesting direction. It was theorised that both variables would 
have a negative impact on the calls for more competences for the regions. The 
positive results that the analysis shows can be explained as follows. In Spain, 
competences can be devolved from the central government to the regions, and 
from the regions to the local bodies. This is, the competences that are devolved 
to the regions can be further devolved to the local level. With this in mind, the 
local island-based bodies and centres of power might saw the devolutions of 
competences to the region not as a threat but as an opportunity. The more 
competences the regions had, the more the local level could call for. By having 
more competences to exercise, the more chances to expand their influence and 
consolidate their position at a local level. This argument can be reinforced by the 
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very strong positive results of the interaction effect of fragmentation and 
polycentricity. Another possible reason, especially linked to spatial fragmentation, 
is that parties, by acknowledging its negative impact, called for more 
competences in order to prevent or minimise its impact. For example, having 
competences over marine transport could have given better, more contextualise, 
and specific solutions to this problem in comparison to the centre. In this case, 
both the regional and local-island bodies could benefit from these calls.  
Focusing on the results for the party-level control variable party type, the 
analysis confirms hypothesis H7.B. This is, SWPs undermined the calls for more 
competences to be devolved to the regions. The correlation between this control 
variable and the outcome is very strong, confirming the theorised relation. With 
this in mind, the focus turns now to the effect that party type has on the outcome. 
Party type strongly affects the position on competence distribution in a negative 
way. This can be explained using the following argument. SWPs, as explained in 
the theoretical framework, had their loyalties located at the centre. This made 
them the best instruments to defend the power relations of the former on the 
centre-periphery cleavage. If the regions wanted to challenge these relations and 
become a strong alternative to the centre, they would need to develop a strong 
institutional framework. Having more competences to exercise provided the 
means to expand their influence and power, directly challenging the centre. 
Therefore, SWPs, in order to undermine this possible scenario, weakened their 
calls for more competences to be devolved to the regions. Following with this, 
SWPs strongly call for less competences when facing regionalist parties, going 
against the expectations and rejecting hypothesis H7.E.  
Regional identity was hypothesised to affect the dependent variable 
positively. This is confirmed by the analysis. In most of the models, the relation 
between this regional-level control variable and the position on competence 
distribution is very strong for both indicators, confirming hypothesis (H5.B). This 
means that the feelings of a distinct regional identity affected positively the calls 
for more competences. This can be due to two possible reasons. The first one 
can be related to the protection and the promotion of regional identities. In order 
to protect and promote regional identities, more competences were needed. For 
example, protecting and promoting regional cultures, possible base of regional 
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identities, could be better done if regions actually had the competences to do so. 
The second reason can be linked to the feeling of being a distinct social group. 
Strongly feeling a distinct social group from both the masses and the elites could 
have been used to call for more competences in order to have the means to 
achieve the goals of this social group, which were different from the goals other 
social groups in other regions might had. The regional population and elites had 
these specific ambitions based on them being a distinct social group, and 
therefore, to fulfil these, they needed more competences. Following with the 
above argument, and outlining an interesting sideway of these results, SWPs 
actually called for fewer competences where there was a strong regional identity 
feeling, especially when this feeling was exercised by the elites, as the interaction 
between political regional identify feelings and party type suggested, with strong 
significance and negative results. It can be assumed that SWPs saw these strong 
regional identity feelings as a mechanism to tension the relations between the 
centre and the peripheries in favour of the latter to trigger strong regionalist 
movements. The more competences the regions had to strengthen regional 
identities, the stronger the challenge to the centre. 
Although the expectations with the regional-level control variable regional 
language are not met and hypothesis H.6.B is rejected, the results were no 
predicted. One could have expected that the existence of regional languages 
would affect positively the calls for more competences in order to protect and 
promote them. The results show that, despite the fact that the relation between 
the existence of a regional language and the position on the distribution of 
competences was strong, the effect is the opposite to the one expected. The 
existence of regional languages affected negatively the calls for more 
competences. This could be explained in the same way as the results for regional 
identity feelings and SWPs. In order to prevent regional languages from 
becoming a challenge to the Spanish national language, these parties tried to 
undermine the calls for more competences in order to protect and promote these 
regional languages. Regionalist parties were those ones expected to call for more 
competences to protect regional languages, but the results probably show that 
the emphasis was stronger by SWPs in order to prevent this. The latter could 
have observed in these regional languages a distinctive marker that, if with 
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enough strength, could have posed a real threat to the national language of the 
centre, and therefore, where their loyalties rested. The results for the interaction 
effect of regional language and ideology can be explained by taking into 
consideration the sample analysed. The number of regionalist parties coded in 
comparison to SWPs are skewed to the latter, as outlined in the methodology 
chapter, and this could have affected the results. A right/centre-right party was 
not expected to call for less competences per se, considering their conservative 
social values. The negative result could be explained because the observations 
coded for the PP, a SWP right/ centre-right party are higher than the observations 
for the PNV, a regional right/ centre-right party which strongly emphasised 
Basque. 
Considering party ideology, the results are, to some extent, curious. 
According to the analysis, hypothesis H8.B is rejected. It seems that right/ centre-
right parties called for fewer competences, going against the theorised 
expectations. To interpret these results, one could take into consideration the 
type of party that called for them. This behaviour, if only considering SWPs, could 
be the expected one, reinforced by the results for the interaction effect of party 
type and ideology, confirming hypothesised H9.B. If considering both SWPs and 
regionalist parties, then the results for the association of ideology on its own are 
not the expected ones. This could be explained in the same way as the results 
for regional language. The unbalanced number of observations for SWPs in 
comparison to regionalist parties might produce these unpredicted results. 
Finally, as with the previous analysis of saliency of the regional level, hypothesis 
H4.B is rejected, and the economic development does not affect the calls for 
more competences to be devolved to the regions, against the theorised 
expectations. 
4.3) Attitudes towards multiculturalism 
Considering attitudes towards multiculturalism, it can be said that the 
significance and associations of the different explanatory and control variables 
on the outcome are less clear and consistent in comparison to those of the 
dependent variable position on competence distribution, but nonetheless, display 
considerable results. The variables that fulfil the expectations are ideology and 
206 
 
regional identity. The results concerning the rest of the explanatory and control 
variables reject the main hypotheses. From the three explanatory variables, the 
analyses show that all the main hypotheses are rejected (H1.C, H2.C, and H3.C). 
The association of polycentricity with the dependent variable goes in the expected 
direction, but the lack of significance prevents the theorised effect to be 
confirmed. Although distance had consistent significance, the impact is null. As 
with the previous analyses, the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity 
shows promising results, applicable to the archipelagos of the Canary and 
Balearic Islands. Again, a positive result is shown, but there is no significance. 
Despite this, it can be said that, to some extent, the combination of island-based 
loyalties and centres of power were recognised as having a negative effect on 
the region as a whole, making parties move to prevent it. 
The results for party type reject hypothesis H7.C. Despite this, it has to be 
mentioned that the negative results confirm the association theorised. SWPs 
emphasised fewer positive attitudes towards multiculturalism. This can be 
explained by the idea of defending the centre from any challenge coming from 
the peripheries. If the peripheries were treated equally as the centre, they might 
articulate a threat towards the latter. In order to prevent this, the centre, though 
SWPs, undermined this possibility. This does not mean that regional cultures and 
populations were not recognised in any sense, but they were not equally 
recognised as the one from the centre. Recognising minority cultures and social 
groups could be part of the discourses articulated by SWPs, especially in regions 
where these were strongly felt, such as for example, in Catalonia, but the 
recognition was always inserted in the category of nacionalidades. As outlined in 
the conceptual framework, these nacionalidades are constitutionally recognised 
and accepted, confirming the will of the central government to incorporate these 
realities in to a broader state-wide political project, but this incorporation is limited 
by the Spanish nation. This subordination can explain, to some extent, the limits 
imposed to the SWPs when recognising minorities in the peripheries. Following 
with this, the positive results for the variable SWPs face regionalist parties could 
be used to say that the theorised expectations where to some extent consolidated 
but the lack of significance rejects hypothesis H7.F. 
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The ideological position of the parties fits the theoretical expectations. The 
expected behaviour of this variable was that left/centre-left parties would tend to 
have more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than right parties. The 
results show that there is significance in some of the models where this control 
variable is present. The negative results seem to help confirming, to some extent, 
hypothesis H8.C. These results can be useful to confirm that right/centre-right 
parties had fewer positive attitudes towards multiculturalism. As theorised, 
right/centre-right parties defend traditional values, including resistance in the 
recognition of other cultural and social groups. This exclusive vision of other 
cultural and social groups can be applied both ways, from the centre towards the 
periphery and from the periphery towards the centre. These finding can be 
applicable to both SWPs and regionalist parties. The results for the interaction 
between party type and ideology are insignificant, rejecting hypothesis H9.C. 
Considering the variable regional identity and focusing on the indicator 
political regional feelings, hypothesis H5.C can be confirmed. The significance 
and association of this indicators is consistent in all the different models in which 
it is included. The existence of a distinct regional identity provided the grounds 
for parties to have favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism. Parties, to 
prevent a situation where the minority groups located in the different peripheries 
felt they were being rejected and excluded, positioned themselves in a 
multiculturalist vision where the latter were incorporated. SWPs, trying to avoid a 
clash between social groups, provided the means, via their recognition, to prevent 
this situation. Regionalist parties could have used this distinctive marker to 
achieve more recognition and upgrade their overall status inside the state. 
The results for the regional-level control variable regional language reject 
hypothesis H6.C, but these go in line with the results obtained for the dependent 
variable position on competence distribution and the effect of SWPs. SWPs 
emphasised a stronger defence of the Spanish national language than regionalist 
parties their regional languages. For example, to protect the centre, the PP could 
have insisted in undermining the recognition, protection and promotion of regional 
languages. The interaction between regional language and party type, although 
there is no significance, can point in this direction with negative scores. The 
negative effects can support the idea of SWPs undermining positive attitudes 
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towards multiculturalism in regions where a strong regional language was present 
and recognised. Defending the Spanish national language could have made them 
less inclusive towards other languages and resistant to recognise and protect 
them if they posed a threat to the language they identify as their own. This 
argument regarding the importance of distinctive markers, such as regional 
languages and identities, posing a threat to the centre as a possible catalyst of 
regionalist movements and the reaction of SWPs against this could be further 
observed in the results for the interaction of political regional identity feelings and 
regional language.  The negative results can give some support to this reaction 
by SWPs. This might show that the combination of two important distinctive 
markers in the same region increased the reaction against the inclusion of 
strongly self-identified minority groups, especially in regions where one can 
observe both elements in interaction, such as in Galicia, the Basque Country, or 
Catalonia. Finally, and in line with the results for the previous dependent 
variables, hypothesis H4.C is rejected, meaning that economic development has 
no effect over the attitudes towards multiculturalism. 
4.4) Conclusions 
 The different analyses discussed here have helped to understand which 
explanatory and control variables affect the most party competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage in a quantitative manner and state-wide. On one hand, some 
results have been used to discuss and reject the hypotheses in relation to the 
main explanatory variables, and on the other hand, some results have been used 
to discuss and confirm, to some extent, the hypotheses in relation to the control 
variables selected. From the five control variables, the results that show a more 
solid relation, confirming the expectations, are party type, ideology, and regional 
identity.  
 To bring together the conclusions for the three main explanatory variables 
in relation to the saliency of the regional level, position on competence 
distribution, and attitudes towards multiculturalism, the following can be said. 
Starting with the main conclusion, the results presented here reject all the 
hypotheses. None show the expected effects. Despite this general statement, the 
most consistent relation can be found between distance and the three dependent 
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variables, although the association is not as significant as the one theorised. The 
most promising results can be found for the interaction of fragmentation and 
polycentricity, picturing a scenario where the presence of island-based loyalties 
and centres of power can favour the strengthening of the region as a whole. 
Spatial fragmentation on its own is a variable that has contrasting results. It was 
theorised to have a negative impact, but some results show the opposite. 
Polycentricity has also interesting contrasting results. It can be said that, overall, 
it actually affects positively the way parties compete along the cleavage. The 
theorised discussion between the centres of power can actually benefit the region 
in the sense that the more important the region is and the more competences the 
region has, the more this will benefit the different centres of power in the region.  
5. DISCUSSION 
 After considering the main results from the above analyses, the next step 
is to relate them to the main research question. Considering the main explanatory 
variables, the results do not show the expected effects on party behaviour along 
the centre-periphery cleavage. If all Autonomous Communities are considered, 
the theorised impact of these factors is faded or concealed. The main substantive 
political interpretation of this appreciation is that these three factors do not have 
a real impact on how parties position themselves when articulating the relation 
between the centre and its peripheries in a state-wide perspective. The 
systematic rejection of all hypotheses seems to confirm this. Further developing 
this conclusion, it is reinforced by comparing the results obtained for the R-square 
of model 1 and 2 in all three dependent variables. On their own (model 1), 
distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity have a very weak, at its best, influence 
on the behaviour of parties. When considered in combination with the control 
variables (model 2), the overall explanatory power increase sharply and this 
indicates that the latter variables are more determinant than the former. In 
summary and state-wide, in Spain one can observe that these three explanatory 
variables have very little impact on the way the centre-periphery cleavage is 
articulated by parties.  
 The results can be explained, to some extent, in relation to the sample 
used for the different analyses. For example, in the case of distance and 
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fragmentation, the peripheral regions that were theorised to be deeply affected 
by these factors were a maximum of two (the Canary and Balearic Islands in the 
case of fragmentation). The balance between the peripheral regions that were 
supposed to be profoundly affected by distance and fragmentation on one hand, 
and the ones affected by other important factors such as regional identities and 
regional languages on the other hand, was heavily skewed towards the latter, 
with a minimum ration of 8.5:1 in the case of fragmentation. Despite this, there 
are promising results for future research. For example, the positive results for the 
association of fragmentation and polycentricity in some of the dependent 
variables can point in the opposite direction to the one theorised. These factors 
seem to strongly affect party behaviour in a positive way, strengthening their pro-
periphery positions.  Added to this, and in the case of the Canary and Balearic 
Islands, the combination of these two factors pushed parties to have even 
stronger pro-periphery positions. A possible reason can be that parties, both 
SWPs and regional, tried to avoid the negative effects of both factors in 
combination on the regions as a whole. Although these strong pro-periphery 
positions could have been seen as a threat to local island-based loyalties and 
centres of power at the beginning, the regional solutions that parties might have 
had proposed could have benefited them more than undermined them.  
 From the regional-level control variables, the two most influential control 
variables than can also help explain, to some extent, how party competition is 
shaped along the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain are regional identity 
feelings and regional language. Despite the fact that the association was not 
always the expected one, nonetheless, they can further help to answer the main 
research question. The existence of strong regional identity feelings and regional 
languages reinforced the pro-periphery positions of regionalist parties, but at the 
same time, moderated them in the case of SWPs. The contrasting results, 
especially for the variable regional language, can be seen as an example of the 
latter. It was expected to observe regionalist parties, in regions where a regional 
language coexisted with Spanish, use this distinctive marker to reinforce the 
importance of the region. On the other hand, SWPs, although acknowledging the 
importance of these regional languages, could have seen them as a threat to the 
national language of the centre, and therefore, a threat to its social group, where 
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their loyalties rest. Again, the results do not show that SWPs turned to be hostile 
to regional languages, but it could be concluded that they were reluctant to make 
them even more important for the regional population, and prevented these from 
becoming a trigger of regional conflict between the centre and the peripheries.  
 Overall, it can be concluded that the acknowledgement by SWPs of the 
importance of distinctive markers for the regional population is consistent, and 
this can be observed in the results for the variable regional identity feelings. The 
positive association can support, to some extent, that SWPs accepted and 
adapted to deeply rooted distinct regional characteristics and not necessarily 
introduced a strong pro-centre discourse. Their ability to accommodate to these 
strong regional distinctive markers can be said to be determined by the threat 
that they posed to the centre, as the results for the regional languages propose. 
Finally, the factor economic development of the regions did not have the expected 
results. One possible reason can be the indicators used. In the case of this 
investigation, only one indicator has been used, and this might have faded or 
concealed the effect of this factor.  
 Out of all party-level control variables, the factor that influence the most 
how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage is party type. Being a 
SWP or regionalist party strongly determined the position they adopted. The 
behaviour of regionalist parties was the one expected, which the results 
contained here confirm. The regional population saw them as the best option to 
address the interests of the region. Therefore, their strong pro-periphery positions 
were consolidated. On the other hand, the behaviour of SWPs was more 
complex, determined by their loyalties to the centre. The protection of the 
interests of the centre undermined their ability to also have the same strong pro-
periphery positions. This does not mean that they emphasised pro-centre 
positions per se. It is important to highlight this fact, which will be further examined 
in the next chapter. What can be concluded from these findings is that regionalist 
parties had overall stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to SWPs. It is 
interesting to observe that competing with regionalist parties did not push SWPs 
to have more stronger pro-periphery positions to gain support as a trustworthy 
actor in defending the interests of the regions, as one might have expected. The 
results suggest that the possible shifts to stronger pro-periphery positions have 
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to be considered specifically to the dependent variable analysed, as the 
contradicting results for the three dependent variables show. 
 The ideological position of parties in isolation seems to have the theorised 
effect. This was confirmed by the results for the saliency of the regional level and 
the attitudes towards multiculturalism. The pro-centre/periphery positions were 
more or less inclusive according to the ideological orientation of parties. Despite 
this, the results for the dependent variable position on competence distribution 
can point to the fact that it is complicated to isolate its effect without the influence 
of the type of party. With this in mind, these results can be used to differentiate 
between the political projects of SWPs and regionalist parties. Left/centre-left 
SWPs were more able to have more strong and inclusive pro-periphery positions 
due to their ability to include the minority groups at the peripheries, whilst on the 
other hand, right/centre-right SWPs had more difficulties, resulting in milder and 
less inclusive pro-periphery positions. When it comes to right/centre-right 
regionalist parties, these already strong pro-periphery positions can be 
understood as less inclusive towards other social groups in comparison to 
left/centre-left regionalist parties, which were able to articulate broader political 
project.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of the general conclusions that can be extracted from this 
quantitative description and analysis of the data, the following can be said. From 
the description, two general conclusions can be outlined. On one hand, the 
variables that showed an overall positive trend were saliency of the regional level 
and attitudes towards multiculturalism. Parties referred to the region with more 
emphasis from one electoral period to the other, and the same happened when 
they had to be inclusive with other cultures or social. On the other hand, the 
variable position on competence distribution showed the opposite, a negative 
trend. In this case, parties seemed to have emphasised less the calls for more 
competences for the regions over time, although all mentions were positive. The 
regression analysis showed that the three main explanatory variables did not 
seem to have the expected effects on party competition along the centre-
periphery cleavage, but some results point in a promising direction for future 
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research. The interpretation of the overall results could be us to conclude that the 
factors that influenced the most how parties compete along the centre-periphery 
cleavage at a state-wide level were the control variables party type, ideology, 
regional identity feelings, and regional language. Table 5.4 contains all the 




Table 5.4.- Hypotheses Confirmed or Rejected for the Quantitative Analysis 
VARIABLES 














H1.A-the greater the 
distance from the centre, the 
more parties emphasise the 
regional level 
Rejected 
H1.B-the greater the distance 
from the centre, the more calls 
from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
Rejected 
H1.C-the greater the 
distance from the centre, the 
more emphasis of parties on 





undermines the emphasis of 
parties on the regional level 
Rejected 
H2.B-fragmentation reduces 
the calls from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
Rejected 
H2.C-fragmentation favours 






undermines the emphasis of 
parties of the regional level 
Rejected 
H3.B-polycentricity weakens 
the calls from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
Rejected 
H3.C-polycentricity 
diminishes the positive 







H4.A-the higher the 
difference between the 
economic development of the 
region and the country´s 
mean, the more emphasis of 
parties of the regional level  
Rejected 
H4.B-the higher the difference 
between the economic 
development of the region and 
the country´s mean, the more 
calls from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
Rejected 
H4.C-the higher the 
difference between the 
economic development of the 
region and the country´s 
mean, the more emphasis of 
parties on positive attitudes 
towards multiculturalism 
Rejected 
REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS 
H5.A-the stronger the 
regional identity feelings, the 
more emphasis of parties of 
the regional level 
Rejected 
H5.B-the stronger the regional 
identity feelings, the more calls 
from parties for more 
competences for the regions 
Confirmed 
H5.C-the stronger the 
regional identity feelings, the 
more emphasis of parties on 




H6.A-a regional language 
makes parties increase the 
emphasis of the regional 
level 
Rejected 
H6.B-a regional language 
makes parties increase the 
calls for more competences for 
the regions 
Rejected 
H6.C-a regional language 
makes parties increase the 







H7.A-SWPs emphasise less 
the regional level than 
regionalist parties 
Confirmed 
H7.B-SWPs call for less 
competences than regionalist 
parties 
Confirmed 
H7.C-SWPs call for less 
competences than regionalist 
parties 
Rejected 
SWP FACING REGIONALIST 
PARTIES 
H7.D-SWPs emphasise more 
the regional level when 
facing regionalist parties 
Rejected 
H7.E-SWPs call for more 
competences when facing 
regionalist parties 
Rejected 
H7.F-SWPs emphasise more 
positive attitudes towards 




H8.A-the ideological position 
of parties makes no 
difference on the emphasis 
of the regional level 
Confirmed 
H8.B-the ideological position of 
parties does not influence the 




are able to have more 




INTERACTION OF PARTY AND 
IDEOLOGY 
 
H9.A-the PSOE, in 
comparison to the PP, 
emphasises more the 
regional level 
Rejected 
H9.B-the PSOE, in comparison 
to the PP, calls for more 
competences for the regions 
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The aim of this chapter is to proceed with the qualitative analysis of the 
manifestos. The main difference with the earlier quantitative analysis focuses on, 
on one hand, the dependent variables selected, and on the other hand, the 
control variables chosen. The dependent variables were saliency of the regional 
level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence distribution, and 
identity. The purpose of re-introducing saliency of the regional level and position 
on competence distribution was to be able to capture in detail aspects that were 
not flagged in the previous chapter. Following with this, the prior quantitative 
analysis was not precise enough to pursue an accurate scrutiny of the variables 
constitutional status of the region and identity, main reason to introduce them 
here. Overall, with these four dependent variables one obtained the necessary 
particular understanding of the research problem that this qualitative approach 
allowed for, permitting for much richer and detailed findings (Taylor et al. 2015: 
7-8), securing and avoiding possible spurious relations (Mahoney 2007: 132). 
Apart from the three main explanatory variables, the control variables chosen for 
this qualitative analysis were party type, ideology, and party structure. The 
remaining control variables were controlled for via case selection, as outlined in 
the methodological chapter. In summary, this analysis provided an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon (Manson 2006: 10-13), resulting in a much 
more profound and thorough analysis of distance, fragmentation and 
polycentricity. This chapter has two main sections. The first section contains an 
analysis of the manifestos in relation to the main dependent variables and 
hypotheses for Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. The 
second section offers a discussion to illustrate how parties position themselves 
along the centre-periphery cleavage in relation to the main findings. 
2. ANALYSIS 
2.1) Saliency of the regional level 
 A general analysis of the manifestos shows that the regional level is, in 
comparison to the centre and the local levels, the most referenced level. For both 
SWPs, the PSOE and the PP, and both regionalist parties, the PA/CA in 
Andalusia and CC in the Canary Islands, the regional level is the most referenced 
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level across three electoral periods in all three regions. The main differences can 
be found in the relation to be established between the different levels. The factors 
that most affect the saliency of the regional level are fragmentation, polycentricity, 
party type, ideology, and party structure. Distance seems not to have a clear 
effect.  
 In terms of the explicit content of the manifestos for the PSOE across the 
three electoral periods and regions, the region is the main level addressed. The 
difference between the references to the regional level across the three electoral 
periods in the three regions is insignificant. In this sense, the region is the centre 
of the main policy proposals. These policies vary from specific issues, such as 
public health or immigration policies, to general statements on the development 
of the region as a whole. In terms of the references towards the centre and the 
local level, both are mentioned in more or less the same terms, except for two 
specific points in time. During the elections in Castilla-La Mancha in 2007 and 
2011, there are no references to the centre or the local level at all. In terms of the 
tone given, there is no significant difference between both and they are 
mentioned in a positive way, specifically when it comes to coordination and 
cooperation between the three levels. 
 Some examples of these references regarding cooperation and 
coordination are: ”Strengthen the instruments of cooperation and collaboration 
between the different administrative levels...” (PSOE C-LM 1999: section 199)30; 
“We will increase, in collaboration with the local governments, the coverage, 
intensity and specialisation of the Home Help Service…”31 (PSOE AND 2008: 
83); and “To favour the institutional cooperation between Municipalities, Cabildos, 
Autonomous Communities and Central Government, to ensure a balanced, 
sustainable and transparent territorial development that avoids illegal land use 
and speculation practices.”32 (PSOE CI 2007: 112). Despite this, it must be noted 
that the main difference between the centre and the local levels is that the latter 
 
30 “Reforzar los instrumentos de cooperación y colaboración entre las distintas 
administraciones...”. Own translation in the main text. 
31 “Aumentaremos, en colaboración con las Entidades Locales, la cobertura, intensidad y 
especialización del Servicio de Ayuda a Domicilio”. Own translation in the main text. 
32 “Favorecer la cooperación institucional entre Ayuntamientos, Cabildos, Comunidad 
Autónoma y Gobierno Central, para asegurar un desarrollo territorial equilibrado, sostenible y 
transparente que evite las prácticas abusivas y especuladoras del suelo.”. Own translation. 
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is also mentioned in terms of developing it alongside the region. Example of these 
references regarding the developing of the local bodies as a priority area of the 
regional government includes are: section 4 of the manifesto for Andalusia 2000 
dedicates an entire section solely on the development of the local bodies as one 
of the priorities of the region (PSOE AND 2000: 23); and section 3.5 of the 
manifesto for the Canary Islands 1999 dedicates one section to the 
implementation of a federal political system within the Autonomous Community 
through the development of the Cabildos and Municipalities (PSOE CI 1999: 47). 
Despite the above, there is an apparent increase in the importance of the 
local level as one approaches the outer-periphery, and one possible reason for 
this can be its importance for the region itself, more precisely, the importance of 
the local bodies that lay between the region and the municipalities. In the 
manifestos for Castilla-La Mancha, the local level is mentioned with very little 
frequence, being the region that has less development in this sense. Next and 
stepping into Andalusia, the local level is more addressed, not only in quantitative 
terms but in its importance. The Provincial Councils become an important part of 
the discourse. This importance is stated, for example, in the manifesto for the 
election of 2000, when it said that: “As for the Municipalities and Provincial 
Councils, the process of decentralisation and transfer of competences has 
allowed the regional Administration to become an active agent of such strategies 
and to act as a promoter of endogenous development processes.” (PSOE AND 
2000: 23). In comparison to Castilla-La Mancha, it seems that these entities have 
deeper roots amongst the regional population. Finally, when one reaches the 
Canary Islands, this idea of the increase in the importance of the local level is 
better observed. Before the introduction of the Autonomous Communities, the 
Cabildos were the political-administrative level that was most present in the lives 
of the citizens, which made them the key element in the relation between them 
and the state. This could have promoted the image of the Cabildos as one of the 
political-administrative traditions of the Canary Islands. This importance could 
have transcended the Autonomous Communities and the importance of these 
local bodies are still very present, not only in terms of the existence and utility of 
the Cabildos, but also in the references to them in terms of the organisation of 
the region itself. In comparison to Andalusia, these local bodies are an intrinsic 
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part of the everyday life of the regional population with more profound 
consequences than in the inner-periphery. 
 In terms of the latent content of the manifestos, for the PSOE, the region 
is also the centre of the manifesto in qualitative terms. It is the centre of the 
discourse, with the local bodies as a secondary level to be developed as the 
region develops over time, and finally having the centre as a tertiary auxiliary level 
that should allow the development of the former.  This is because the centre is 
the level that has the capacity and resources that can allow the development of 
the other two through, either decentralising more competences and resources, 
and/or increasing financial support. The PSOE conceptualises a triangle of 
relations representing different degrees of cooperation and coordination between 












Figure 6.1. Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PSOE.  
Further developing this, it can be asserted that the ideological position of 
the PSOE seems to affect the way the region is understood in relation to the latent 
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content of the manifestos. Being a left/centre-left oriented party makes the PSOE 
have a more open attitude towards incorporating social groups in the peripheries 
to a broader national project. In this sense, the regions are seen as a key part of 
this discourse, not subordinated to the centre but as an intrinsic component of the 
Spanish state. Articulating the regions as an essential part of the Spanish state 
in a relation of cooperation with the other levels is favoured by its ideological 
position in two ways. First, incorporating the needs and demands of the social 
groups that are not the ones at the centre, and second, these needs and 
demands are not in a relation of subordination but in a relation of mutual benefit 
from their cooperation. 
When it comes to the PP, the manifestos follow the same path as one 
described for the PSOE in relation to the explicit content. The region is the 
administrative level which is mostly referenced across all three electoral periods 
in all three regions. Again, there is no significant difference in terms of the 
mentions of the regional level in the three regions and across the three electoral 
periods. The region is mentioned both in specific public policy proposals and in 
general terms. The local level seems to be developed qualitatively in the same 
lines as the PSOE did. This is, the importance of local bodies increase as one 
reaches the outer-periphery. The main difference is that the overall references 
increase and there is a more developed emphasis. One reason for this can be to 
gain more power at this level, as it is stated in the manifesto for the Canary Islands 
in 2011: “Popular Party governments are needed in Municipalities, Cabildos and 
in the Autonomous Community.”33 (PP CI 2011: 4). Taking into consideration that 
the Autonomous Communities were a new political-administrative level of the 
Spanish state in the mid-1980s, the PP could have opted to preserve its power in 
the local bodies rather than attempting to obtain some power at the regional level. 
This can be observed in the results for the local elections between 1999-2011 
(1999, 2007, and 2011). The PP had more local power than the PSOE in two of 
the three electoral periods (1999 and 2011)34. Example of these references 
 
33 “Hacen falta gobiernos del Partido Popular en los Ayuntamientos, los Cabildos y en la 
Comunidad Autónoma.”. Own translation in the main text. 
34 The local power here is measured by the number of municipal councillors per party in all the 
municipalities in Spain. 1999-PSOE (21,917), PP (24,623) 2007-PSOE (24,029), PP (23,348) 
2011-PSOE (21,766), PP (26,507) (García-Guereta Rodríguez et al. 2014: 57). 
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regarding the developing of the local bodies as a priority area for the region can 
be seen in the following: the manifesto for Castilla-La Mancha 1999 dedicates a 
section to the explanation of the development of the local bodies as part of the 
decentralisation process in Spain, known as the Local Regional Pact (PP C-LM 
1999: 87); the manifesto for Andalusia 2008 dedicates a section to what the PP 
calls a “second decentralisation wave”, which is focused on the local bodies (PP 
AND 2008: 36); and the manifesto for the Canary Islands 2011 dedicates a 
section to the decentralisation of competences to the local bodies to develop 
them as a key level of the region (PP CI 2011: 22-23). 
Cooperation and coordination are emphasised by the PP with the same 
intensity and tone as in the case of the PSOE. Examples of these references 
regarding cooperation and coordination can be seen in the following: “Sufficient 
amounts of aid and support will be allocated to the Municipalities for the 
acquisition and transfer of development land ...”35 (PP C-LM 1999: 80); “We will 
promote the implementation of the University Permanent Training Workshops, in 
collaboration and coordination with Municipalities and universities.”36 (PP AND 
2012: 62); and “A reformist project, of wide scope and with high expectations. 
With the indispensable collaboration of all the Municipalities and Cabildos of the 
Archipelago.”37 (PP CI 2011: 5). 
Considering now the latent content, the analysis is the following. 
Regarding the centre, here is where one can find two main difference between 
the two SWPs. First, the references to the centre seem to point in the direction of 
the importance of this level in developing the regions and local bodies, and 
second, the way in which the centre is articulated. For the PP, although the 
regions are at the heart of the manifestos, the tone changes in comparison to the 
PSOE. The PP considers the centre level as the one with the leadership and not 
as an auxiliary level. The relation is not auxiliary any more but necessary. The 
 
35 “Se consignarán presupuestariamente cantidades suficientes de ayuda y colaboración con 
los ayuntamientos para a adquisición y cesión del suelo urbanizable...”. Own translation in the 
main text. 
36 “Impulsaremos la puesta en marcha de Aulas de Formación Permanente de la Universidad, 
en colaboración y coordinación con ayuntamientos y universidades.” Own translation in the 
main text. 
37 “Un proyecto reformista, de amplio calado, y con altura de miras. Con la imprescindible 




PP emphasises the fact that the regions are an extension of the central 
government. Two examples of this can be seen in the manifesto for the Canary 
Islands 2011: “The Autonomous Communities are an essential part of the 
constitutional Spain, of the social and democratic Rule of Law that we have all 
been building since 1978“38 (PP CI 2011: 7); and “Confidence in the regeneration 
of the institutions, in our renewed Statute of Autonomy and in the Constitutional 
Spain that gives meaning to our Autonomous Communities.”39 (PP AND 2008: 
11). This does not mean that the PSOE does not recognise the regions as part 
of the Constitutional system, which it does, as analysed previously, this means 
that the PP emphasises a subordinating relation between levels. The PP 
introduces these statements to make clear that the mother level is the central 
government, and the rest develops from it. The loyalties are to be put at the 
central level. This is reinforced by the integrated structure of this party, very 
determined by the centre in comparison to the degree of freedom granted to the 
regional branches of the PSOE. The local level remains the same, as a secondary 
level that should be developed as the region develops, but in this case, with more 









38 “La España autonómica es parte esencial de la España constitucional, del Estado social y 
democrático de Derecho que entre todos venimos construyendo desde 1978.”. Own translation 
in the main text.. 
39 “Confianza en la regeneración de las instituciones, en nuestro renovado Estatuto de 
Autonomía y en la España Constitucional que da origen y sentido a nuestro sistema 













Figure 6.2. Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PP. 
 The relations contained in Figure 6.2 highlights the second main difference 
between the PP and the PSOE. The PP articulates the centre as the mother level, 
with the other two as extensions of it. This centralist vision needs to be further 
developed in relation to its ideological position. This control variable affects the 
saliency of the regional level in opposition to the PSOE. This relation can be seen 
as coherent with the behaviour and orientation of a highly centralised right/centre-
right state-wide party like the PP. The PP is less open to include regions and 
other social groups to the power relations that it favours. This makes the PP 
articulate a discourse where the regions are, although the heart of the manifestos, 
seen as some kind of extension of the central government. Overall, the PP 
articulates the regions in the following way and in concordance with its ideological 
position: first, development of the regions as a branch of the central government, 
and second, the regions are subordinated to the interest of the centre, including 
the needs of the regional populations.  
The regionalist parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands also have 




















development. For both parties, the regional level is the administrative level that 
is most referenced across the three electoral periods in both regions, with no 
significant differences that stand out between them, like the PSOE and the PP. 
The main difference between these parties and both SWPs, especially the PP, is 
the tone with which the reginal level is addressed. The regional level is not only 
the main level addressed but also the mother level. As it can be observed, this 
changes the relation between levels that was highlighted above for both SWPs. 
The relation is not any more necessary or auxiliary, but it is now subsidiary. 
In this case, the centre should allow the development of the regions, complying 
with their needs. This reaches sometimes a character of bilateral relations, in the 
same way as relations between two independent states. Example of this bilateral 
references can be seen in the following references: “Relations with the State” 
(PA/CA AND 2008: 102-103); and “The Special Statute must be the framework 
that determines our relationship with the State.”40 (CC CI 2007: 8). Sometimes, 
the references also articulate an image of the region suffering deprivation of its 
resources by the action of the central government. This can convey the idea that 
the region is been undermined by the centre in pursuing its development. An 
example of this language can be seen in the manifesto of PA/CA for 2008 (PA/CA 
AND 2008: 41) 41, when the party claims a so-called historical debt of Andalusia 
vis-à-vis the central government. Another example can be found in the manifesto 
of CC for 2011 (CC CI 2011: 6) 42, when the party states that the restriction on 
regional competences concerning the coastal territory prevents the region from 
conserving it. It must be observed that the references to the historical debt that 
 
40 “El Estatuto Especial debe ser el marco que determine nuestra relación con el Estado.”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
41 “Es decir, no se habían paliado, con la financiación de las transferencias realizadas, los 
déficits de los servicios públicos existentes en Andalucía y por lo tanto no se garantizaba un 
nivel mínimo de prestación. Esta circunstancia ha perjudicado gravemente a Andalucía porque 
los distintos sistemas de financiación autonómica han partido de la cuantificación del gasto 
existente para determinar los recursos correspondientes en el año de referencia del sistema.”. 
Translation: “That is to say, the deficits of the public services existing in Andalusia had not been 
mitigated, with the financing of the transfers made, and therefore a minimum level of provision 
was not guaranteed. This circumstance has seriously damaged Andalusia because the 
different autonomous financing systems have started from the quantification of existing 
expenditure to determine the resources corresponding in the reference year of the system.”. 
42 “En los últimos años la política restrictiva del Estado en materia de costas ha perjudicado a 
Canarias. Debemos mejorar nuestros recursos costeros respetando su conservación y su 
desarrollo sostenible.”. Translation: ”In recent years, the restrictive State policy on coastal 
matters has harmed the Canary Islands. We must improve our coastal resources respecting 
their conservation and their sustainable development.”. 
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the central government has with Andalusia is also mentioned by the PSOE in 
Andalusia (PSOE AND 2000: 15) but not in the Canary Islands. These bilateral 
relations could resemble the relation between two independent states, but the 
analysis of the references suggests more a differentiated relation inserted in the 
Constitutional design of Spain according to a more decentralised/federal state. 
Not even CC, with the notion of a Special Statute, articulates the region as an 
independent political organisation outside the decentralised Spanish political 
architecture. What is clear is that both parties see the centre as subsidiary to the 
regions, allowing and promoting decentralisation with more emphasis: “... Article 
2 of the new Statute of Autonomy, which establishes the duty of the State to adapt 
its political, legislative, regulatory, financial and budgetary decisions to the 
defining characteristics of the Canary Islands ...”43 (CC CI 2011: 119).  
The local level is also mentioned as a level that needs to be developed 
alongside the region, as it happens with the PSOE and the PP, but the tone given 
is different. The local level, in this case, is not a distinct level any more, it is a sort 
of extension of the region. Both regionalist parties acknowledge the importance 
of the local bodies but prefer to emphasise more the regional level to the 
detriment of these. Following with this and in line with the above described idea 
of the increasing importance of these local bodies highlighted for both SWPs, the 
same behaviour can be outlined. The importance of the local bodies increases 
as one jumps from Andalusia o the Canary Islands. In relation to this, the position 
of the PA/CA is very peculiar in comparison to CC, as it calls for the 
disappearance of the Provincial Councils (PA/CA AND 2012: 14) and the 
replacement of these by Counties (PA/CA AND 2008: 28), buit this does not 
change the initial idea. Despite this peculiarity, the emphasis of these local bodies 
in less evident that in the case of the CC in relation to the importance of the 
Cabildos in the Canary Islands. CC emphasis more the importance for the 
regional population of the Cabildos as part of the Canarian identity. Overall, for 
the PA/CA and CC, the region is the main administrative level addressed in the 
manifesto, having the centre as a subsidiary level and the local bodies as a 
 
43 “...el artículo 2 del nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía, que establece el deber del Estado de 
adaptar sus decisiones políticas, legislativas, reglamentarias, financieras y presupuestarias a 
las características definitorias de Canarias...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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secondary level that derives from the region, to which the region delegates some 












Figure 6.3. Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PA/CA 
and CC. 
- Testing the hypotheses 
From the three main explanatory variables, the two factors that seem to 
play an important role in shaping this dependent variable are: fragmentation and 
polycentricity. Distance has no apparent effect on the salience given to the 
regional level. Comparing all three regions, the analysis shows that the effect of 
these two explanatory variables increases as one reaches the Canary Islands. 
Starting with fragmentation, and as stated in the theoretical chapter, there are two 
dimensions in which this factor affects the regions: the spatial and the political-
administrative dimensions. Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia are only affected, 
to some extent, by the second dimension. Spatial and political-administrative 
fragmentation come together only in the Canary Islands, deepening its overall 
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together is the statement: “Starting from the administrative model that we defend, 
based on the principles of efficiency, economy, maximum proximity to the citizen 
and attention to the insular condition44, we will continue in the line of devolving 
more competences to the Cabildos and Municipalities, thus bringing the decision 
making process and the providing of services closer to the citizens.”45 (Rodríguez 
Rodríguez CC, Official Diary 1999 núm. 3: 12). 
Starting with the first dimension, the emphasis is put on insularity. Starting 
with the PSOE, the party tries to put forward the perception of the negative effects 
that fragmentation has on the region. The discourse uses the negative effects of 
spatial fragmentation to criticise CC and PP, but nonetheless, the base is still the 
ways in which this dimension of this factor negatively affects the region: 
“Unfortunately CC and the PP have made the Canary Islands electoral subsystem 
adopt a formula that reverses the constitutional mandate exacerbating the insular 
territorial representation, undermining the representativeness of the regional 
governments in the Canary Islands during the past years .”46 (PSOE CI 2007: 
68); and “... so that their functions and competences cannot be diminished by 
insular criteria, which lack a supra-insular perspective.”47 (PSOE CI 2007: 110). 
The PP also emphasises the need to overcome the dangers of spatial 
fragmentation: “The government of the Canary Islands will ensure the balance 
between the different islands, deepening the effort to increase convergence 
among all, ... have in mind the costs implicit in the double and triple insularity.”48 
(PP CI 2011: 27). CC, like the PSOE and the PP, emphasises the negative effect 
of fragmentation and the need to overcome it: “... as well as an effective 
 
44 Insular condition refers in the discourses articulated in the region of the Canary Islands to 
the insular characteristic of the archipelago, fragmentated into different islands.   
45 “Partiendo del modelo administrativo que defendemos, basado en los principios de eficacia, 
economía, máxima proximidad al ciudadano y atención al hecho insular, continuaremos en la 
línea de transferencia a las Cabildos, así como delegación a los ayuntamientos, acercando de 
este modo las decisiones al administrado y la prestación de los servicios de manera más 
próxima.”. Own translation in the main text. 
46 “Desgraciadamente Coalición Canaria y el Partido Popular se han encargado que en el 
subsistema electoral canario se adopte una fórmula que invierta el mandato constitucional 
primando hasta el paroxismo la representación territorial insular y poniendo como 
consecuencia en peligro la representatividad de los Gobiernos en Canarias durante los últimos 
años.”. Own translation in the main text. 
47 “...por lo que sus funciones y competencias no pueden verse mermadas por criterios 
insulares, que carecen de perspectiva suprainsular.”. Own translation in the main text. 
48 “El gobierno de Canarias velará por el equilibrio entre las distintas islas, profundizando en 
el esfuerzo de aumentar la convergencia entre todas,...tener en cuenta los costes implicitos 
en la doble y triple insularidad.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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articulation of the compensatory measures of the costs derived from the 
ultraperipheral insular event.”49 (Rodríguez Rodríguez CC, Official Diary 1999 
núm. 3: 15); “At the dawn of the 21st century, the Canary Islands faces two new 
problems derived from its insular reality, absolutely unprecedented: the risks of 
overexploitation of the territory and overpopulation in a limited geographical 
space, fragmented and located in one of the richest natural areas of the world.”50 
(CC CI 2007: 7); and “In this sense, we will promote corrective measures of the 
cost of double insularity and distance for ...”51 (Rivero Baute CC, Official Diary 
2011 núm. 3: 8). 
Focusing on the second dimension of fragmentation, the following can be 
said. The references to the local bodies contained in the manifestos from all 
parties can affect the saliency of the regional level because, although the 
manifestos are articulated for the regional elections, the importance of these 
entities in terms of their political-administrative relation with citizens is 
acknowledged by all parties. For the purpose of this research, the key idea here 
is that the references to the local bodies that lay between the region and the 
municipalities (Provincial Councils and Cabildos) and their importance increase 
with distance. In this sense, as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, 
and finally to the Canary Islands, these local bodies become more and more 
important, and parties recognise this and they have acknowledged it in their 
manifestos (again, it must be outlined that the PA/CA calls to replace the 
Provincial Councils by Counties, but this does not change the argumentation for 
this factor). As distance from the centre increases, these local bodies tend to 
become more important, and therefore, the more they undermine the articulation 
of a strong regional level because they play a major role in the everyday life of 
the local populations. Weakening their influence and power might be considered 
as an attack to the political community that they represent. Although the 
importance of these local bodies increases as one reaches the outer-periphery, 
 
49 “...así como una articulación efectiva de las medidas compensatorias de los costes 
derivados del hecho insular ultraperiférico.”. Own translation in the main text. 
50 “En los albores del siglo XXI, Canarias se enfrenta a dos nuevos problemas derivados de 
su realidad insular pero absolutamente inéditos: los riesgos de la sobreexplotación del territorio 
y la superpoblación en un espacio geográfico limitado, fragmentado y situado en una de las 
zonas de mayor riqueza natural del mundo.”. Own translation in the main text. 
51 “En este sentido, propiciaremos medidas correctoras del coste de la doble insularidad y 
lejanía para...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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they have an even deeper impact in the articulation of the Canary Islands based 
on the combination of both dimensions of fragmentation (Ramírez Muñóz 1996: 
278-280), especially through the competences that are devolved to them by the 
region (Rodríguez Rodríguez 2001). The perfect match between the islands and 
the Cabildos multiples the negative effect of fragmentation. Overall, 
fragmentation affects more the saliency of the regional level as one moves from 
the centre to the outer-periphery, proportionally undermining the pro-periphery 
positions of parties as the abstraction level increases. 
Fragmentation was hypothesised to affect negatively the saliency of the 
regional level. The main findings point in the direction of confirming hypothesis 
H2.D. First, the analysis shows, to some extent, the increasing importance of the 
local bodies as one moves towards the Canary Islands (political-administrative 
fragmentation). Second, this increase in importance has the effect of increasing 
the undermining effect of fragmentation, weakening the ability of parties when 
articulate a strong regional level as one moves towards the outer-periphery. For 
example, the Cabildos in the Canary Islands, when articulating the archipelago 
itself, are to be taken into consideration without shrinking their influence and 
power, and the same happens in Andalusia but with less intensity, and even 
lesser in Castilla-La Mancha. Added to this and also in relation to the Canary 
Islands, these local bodies reflect the combination of the spatial and the political-
administrative dimension of fragmentation, not present in the mainland regions, 
deepening even more the negative effect of fragmentation as a whole. Overall, 
political-administrative fragmentation increases its negative effect as one reaches 
the outer-periphery as the importance of local bodies also increase, and this is 
deepened when combined with spatial fragmentation.  
Polycentricity affects the Canary Islands in two different ways. The first 
way is the so called pleito insular, where Tenerife and Gran Canaria compete 
with each other as the two main rival centres in the region. This is expressed in 
the following statements by the PSOE: “…the logic of shifts and distributions in 
the social needs, at the service of a strategy that has led to the insular 
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confrontation and to a worrying deficit of social cohesion.” 52 (PSOE CI 2007: 3); 
and “... without any credibility and with falsehood, a struggle, unprecedented in 
its execution, against the pleito insular, against the tension, ...”53 (López Aguilar 
PSOE, Official Diary of 2007 núm. 4: 4). CC also converges with the same idea, 
despite the fact that the PSOE blames the party for it: “... that foster territorial 
cohesion and the overcoming of the pleito insular...”54 (Rivero Baute CC, Official 
Diary of 2007a núm. 3: 5). The second way is the struggle of the smaller islands 
to free themselves from the dominance of Tenerife or Gran Canaria. This is 
outlined by this statement: “Where do we stand, are the islands of Gran Canaria 
and Tenerife the only ones that are not going to have limits to their growth? Is it 
a problem that only affects the peripheral islands?”55 (Saavedra Acevedo PSOE, 
Official Diary 1999 núm. 4: 15). Another example is: “We cannot treat equally 
what is unequal, hence the actions aimed towards the local population that lives 
in the islands of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro and 
La Graciosa, so that they do not see their quality of life diminished with respect 
to what they do and what they already enjoy in Gran Canaria or Tenerife”56 
(Barragán Cabrera CC, Official Diary of 2007 núm. 4: 15). 
As the data used for the quantitative chapters points out, multiple centres 
of power can also be found in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, but the above 
analysis of the manifestos for these regions show that the importance and impact 
of polycentricity is not mentioned or developed with the same intensity as in the 
Canary Islands. One reason for this can be directly linked to fragmentation in the 
following way. Having two very distinct major islands, represented at the same 
time by two major centres of power (Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de 
 
52 “…la lógica de turnos y repartos que, en las necesidades sociales, al servicio de una 
estrategia que ha abocado al enfrentamiento insular y a un preocupante déficit de cohesión 
social.”. Own translation in the main text. 
53 “...sin ninguna credibilidad y con fariseísmo, una lucha, inédita en su ejecutoria, contra el 
pleito insular, contra la crispación…”. Own translation in the main text. 
54 “...que fomenten la cohesión territorial y la superación del pleito insular...”. Own translation 
in the main text. 
55 “¿En qué quedarnos, o es que sólo las islas de Gran Canaria y Tenerife son las que no van 
a tener límites al crecimiento? ¿Es un problema que sólo afecta a las islas periféricas?”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
56 “No podemos tratar igual a lo que es desigual, de ahí que las acciones apuntadas para que 
los canarios y canarias que viven en las islas de Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, La 
Gomera, El Hierro y La Graciosa no vean disminuida su calidad de vida con respecto a lo que 
hacen, a lo que ya disfrutan en Gran Canaria o Tenerife.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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Gran Canaria), favours the undermining of a regional discourse due to the clash 
between their interests. In Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, having more than 
two strong centres of power can prevent this fierce competition, especially 
because there is not a so strong subordination of other provinces or centres of 
power to their interests, as there is in the Canary Islands with the minor islands 
and their capitals. Another possible explanation for this is linked to the proposed 
polycentricity scale. As one can observe from the data contained in Table 1 
(appendix M), the degree of polycentricity is lower in the Canary Islands than in 
Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, consequently having a deeper negative 
consequence, as the analysis shows. Table 1 (appendix M) contains the 
disaggregated data for the explanatory variable polycentricity and the different 
centres of power per region, showing an increase in the concentration of 
population, and therefore, of competence, in fewer urban centres as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands. This can 
be used to confirm, to some extent, that the concentration of competition in fewer 
centres of power can be more determinant in the shifting of party positions that 
the mere presence of centres of power. 
The above analysis and the two possible explanations for the findings can 
be used to confirm, to some extent, hypotheses H3.D. All parties in the Canary 
Islands recognise the negative effect of having two very defined centres of power 
competing between each other, undermining the region as a whole, pointing to 
the fact that the degree of polycentricity has an overall unfavourable 
consequence in comparison to the basic presence of multiple centres of power. 
In order to undermine the negative effect, all parties advocate to stop the power 
fight between Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 
reinforcing the regional level. There is no mention to the effect of polycentricity in 
the regions of Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia in the same degree as in the 
Canary Islands, which can point in the direction of also confirming the importance 
of concentrating competition around two or few centres of power in comparison 
to their mere presence. Despite this, it is also important to acknowledge the 
possibility of considering the impact of polycentricity in the Canary Islands as a 
secondary effect of spatial fragmentation. As it has been pointed out, in all three 
regions you have the presence of multiple centres of power, but spatial 
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fragmentation is only present in the Canary Islands, where the effect of 
polycentricity is deeper, so there might be an underlining relation that has to be 
further analysed. The main reason to consider the hypothesis confirmed is that 
although multiple centres of power are present in all three regions, the 
concentration of competence in a reduced number of the former increases as one 
moves towards the outer-periphery, but always considering important alternative 
interpretations. 
Focusing now on the control variables, the results are the following. With 
the above analysis, the hypothesis that can be tested at this point is H7.G. The 
analysis seems not to show this difference, and therefore, this hypothesis can be 
rejected. All parties seem to emphasise the regional level with the same intensity. 
One possible reason for this can be that the manifestos were framed for regional 
elections, and therefore, it was expected to observe the region to be the level with 
more emphasis. This applies for both SWPs and regionalist parties. The saliency 
of the regional level was also theorised to be unaffected by party ideology. 
Hypothesis H8.D can be confirmed. There is no difference in the emphasis of the 
regional level in relation to the ideological position of the partiers in any of the 
three regions and electoral periods. Hypothesis H9.D for the interaction between 
party type and ideology was focused on the two SWPs. The findings can confirm 
this hypothesis. Although both parties emphasise the region with the same 
intensity, as shown in this analysis, a key difference between the PSOE and the 
PP can be highlighted, centred on their ideological position. The PSOE, a 
left/centre-left SWP, addressed the regions as an intrinsic part of the Spanish 
state, having an auxiliary relation between them and the centre, and a mutual 
relation between the regional and local levels. The PP, a right/centre-right SWP, 
see the regions as an extension of the central government, subordinating their 
needs to the interests of the centre. It is not that the PSOE quantitatively 
emphasises more the regional level than the PP, but its ideological position helps 
framing them in a different qualitative manner. It could be said that by giving a 
more important role to the regions in comparison to the PP, the PSOE gives them, 
overall, a more equal treatment, not subordinating their demands to the centre.  
Finally, the effect of party structure also can be tested here. The analysis in 
relation to the above can point to confirming hypothesis H10.A. This increase in 
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the importance of the regions in the PSOE can be the result of contextualising its 
response to their demands. Giving more importance to the regions can be better 
done in relation to the high degree of freedom granted to its regional branches. 
By being able to contextualise their behaviour, the regional branches of the PSOE 
help to empower the regions. This cannot be observed in the PP with the same 
intensity. The variation between its regional branches is less evident. The centre 
is always seen as the mother level, allowing for less stretching of these limits. 
Despite these conclusions for structure and ideology, there is some degree of 
complexity in disentangling their individual effects. 
2.2) Constitutional status of the region 
 In terms of the constitutional status of the region, the general analysis of 
the manifestos show that both SWPs are normally found in the middle ground 
between a federal state and the current Autonomous Communities, and that both 
regionalist parties are located between a special status for the region and the 
development of Spain as a fully symmetric federal state. The factors that most 
affect the constitutional status of the region are distance, fragmentation, party 
type, ideology, and party structure. There is not enough evidence to conclude 
whether polycentricity has a clear effect or not. 
 The PSOE has an interesting approach to the constitutional status of the 
region for the different electoral periods and regions. The behaviour for the PSOE 
changes depending on the region where it acts. On one hand, there is the 
intention of developing the Autonomous Communities as they are, as in Castilla-
La Mancha, and on the other hand, there is a clear support for developing a 
symmetric federal state, as in Andalusia and the Canary Islands. Both 
approaches can correspond to the position that a state-wide party might have in 
relation to the architecture of the state. In Castilla-La Mancha, the party calls for 
the development of the region inside the current system of Autonomous 
Communities. An example of this defence of the current Autonomous Community 
is the following: “Regional elections are seeing an increase in their importance 
through more and more social repercussion. They are an essential part of the 
democratic functioning, and a key factor for the consolidation of the Autonomous 
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Communities as a constitutional structure.”57 (PSOE C-LM 1999: 1); and “Allow 
me, ladies and gentlemen, before I finish, to make a declaration of constitutional 
loyalty from my position as candidate for the Presidency of Castilla-La Mancha. I 
am very clear, ladies and gentlemen, that Castilla-La Mancha is nothing without 
Spain. If Castilla-La Mancha today has autonomy is because it has been 
recognized in a Constitution approved in the Spanish Parliament and endorsed 
by the Spanish people and because the Parliament and the Government of Spain 
are guarantors of the application of this Magna Carta. Castilla-La Mancha will be 
strong if Spain is strong, that is why our Statute and all our policies are planned 
and will be considered within the strict framework of the Constitution.”58 (Barreda 
Fontes PSOE Official Diary 2007 núm 2: 11). 
This is interesting because Castilla-La Mancha is a core region, and the 
discourse of the PSOE in this region seems to be extremely loyal to the current 
political architecture of Spain. One can observe that the position of the PSOE 
does not evolve across the three electoral periods, meaning that the degree of 
change was nil in terms of the constitutional status of the regions. This position 
changes in regions that are not part of the centre. Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands are examples of this. Not only can it be noted how these two regions differ 
from Castilla-La Mancha, but at the same time, it can be observed how the 
position of the party evolved. In the first electoral period, 1998-2001, the party 
called for the development of a federal state, where the regions are designed as 
federated states, in the same way as the German Länder. Examples of this can 
be the following statements for both regions: “The assumption of greater 
competences that define a trend of approximation towards the constitution of a 
State with federal characteristics, not exclusive of, or excluding, any Autonomous 
 
57 “Las elecciones autonómicas cobran cada vez más repercusión social. Son parte esencial 
del funcionamiento democrático y factor clave para la consolidación del Estado de las 
Autonomías como estructura constitucional.”. Own translation in the main text. 
58 “Permítanme, señorías, que antes de terminar, haga una declaración de lealtad 
constitucional desde mi condición de aspirante a la Presidencia de Castilla-La Mancha. Tengo 
bien claro, señorías, que Castilla-La Mancha no es nada sin España. Si Castilla-La Mancha 
tiene hoy autonomía es porque se ha reconocido en una Constitución aprobada en las Cortes 
españolas y refrendada por el pueblo español y porque las Cortes y el Gobierno de España 
son garante de la aplicación de esta Carta Magna. Castilla-La Mancha será fuerte si España 
es fuerte, por eso, nuestro Estatuto y todas nuestras políticas se plantean y se plantearán en 
el marco estricto de la Constitución.”. Own translation in the main text. 
237 
 
Community.”59 (PSOE AND 2000: 15); and “The regional administration will adapt 
its structure and operation to the achievement of a federalist model for the Canary 
Islands in a Federal Spain.”60 (PSOE CI 1999: 46). 
These two statements can be included in the category of a symmetric 
federal state for Spain. This clashes with the position put forward in Castilla-La 
Mancha during the same electoral period. This is the biggest difference that can 
be observed in the PSOE in regards to the constitutional status of the regions. It 
has to be highlighted that this symmetric federal claim calls for recognising the 
distinctive characteristics of the region without making these characteristics a 
source of privilege. Turning to other possible sources of information to observe 
this same change, the most solid political texts can be the regional frameworks 
that the party used to frame the different regional elections. Two of these 
documents can be useful here: the one for 1995 and 1999. Although this electoral 
period is 1998-2001, taking into consideration also the 1995 regional framework 
can be useful to recognise if Castilla-La Mancha was an exception, or on the 
contrary, if Andalusia and the Canary Islands constituted the exception. 
In both documents, 1995 and 1999, there is no mention of a symmetric 
federal state for Spain (PSOE FRAM 1995; PSOE FRAM 1999). It can be 
observed how the 1999 regional framework underlines the loyalty to the current 
constitutional design and the protection of it, with no major changes in regards to 
the regions except for the transfer of more competences: “We believe in this 
project of constitutional autonomies, as a framework and solution to build the 
future of Spain.”61 (PSOE FRAM 1999: 4); and “We are not in favour of deep 
reforms in the constitutional design, except in what refers to the configuration of 
the Senate.”62 (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6). It is the core that determines the position 
of the PSOE, with the inner- and outer-periphery trying to change this position. 
 
59 “La asunción de mayores competencias que definan una tendencia de aproximación hacia 
la constitución de un Estado de características federales, no exclusivo ni excluyente para 
ninguna Comunidad Autónoma.”. Own translation in the main text. 
60 “La administración autonómica adecuara su estructura y funcionamiento a la consecución 
de un modelo federalista para Canarias en una España Federal.”. Own translation in the main 
text. 
61 “Creemos en este proyecto de autonomismos constitucional, como marco y solución para 
construir el futuro de España.”. Own translation in the main text. 
62 “No somos partidarios de reformas profundas en el bloque constitucional, excepto en lo que 
se refiere a la configuración del Senado.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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Despite this initial position for a symmetric federal state in Andalusia and the 
Canary Islands, this changes in the manifestos for 2007-2010 and 2011-2012 in 
the direction of defending the current Autonomous Communities. This is, the 
PSOE changed its position to a more status quo position, the same as the one 
put forward at the centre. It seems as if there has been a clarification of the 
message in both regions to adapt to the position of the party at the centre. The 
change of position does not mean that the PSOE defends the status quo of the 
regions, but it defends a further development of the Autonomous Communities 
inside the current constitutional architecture. It can be said that the change of 
position was affected by its condition as a state-wide party, articulating a project 
that includes all regions but skewed towards the interests of the centre. 
Despite this change of position, the PSOE still supports the inclusion of the 
distinctive characteristics of some regions in their constitutional status, as in the 
manifestos for 1999, 2007, and 2011 in the Canary Islands (PSOE CI 1999: 48; 
PSOE CI 2007: 70; PSOE CI 2011: 24), but without creating privileges based on 
them. This claim is maintained from the previous suggestion of a symmetric 
federal state in the electoral period of 1998-2001. The support for this recognition 
is also stressed in all the regional frameworks. In Andalusia these distinctive 
characteristics are normally based on subjective elements such as regional 
identity, but in the Canary Islands, these are based on objective aspects, such as 
the distance from mainland Spain and insularity: “The existence and recognition 
of peculiarities should not be understood as justifying inequalities between the 
Communities.”63 (PSOE FRAM 1995: 4); “Ensure cohesion and equality by 
respecting peculiarities”64 (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6); and “It also includes economic-
financial or institutional character, adapted to the singularities or distinctive 
features of each region”65 (PSOE FRAM 2007: 10).  
Although there is a general acknowledgment by the PSOE to recognise 
these singularities, the references to them and their importance seem to increase 
 
63 “La existencia y el reconocimiento de los hechos diferenciales no deben entenderse como 
desigualdades entre las Comunidades”. Own translation in the main text. 
64 “Asegurar la cohesión y la igualdad respetando los hechos diferenciales”- Own translation 
in the main text. 
65 “También incluye el carácter económico-financiero e institucional, adaptado a las 
singularidades de los hechos diferenciales de cada región”. Own translation in the main text. 
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as move approaches the outer-periphery. With this in mind, the increasing 
emphasis of the references goes as follow. In Castilla-La Mancha, there are no 
references to any distinctive characteristics at all. The party in this core regions 
seems to defend the current constitutional status of the region. The emphasis in 
Andalusia increases in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha, but not to the extent 
of incorporating them to the constitutional status of the region. Some distinctive 
characteristics are referenced as intrinsic to Andalusia, such as the cultural 
heritage. Despite this, the PSOE does not seem to understand that these need 
to be recognised in the constitutional status of the region. Finally, in the Canary 
Islands, these references are mentioned with much more emphasis in 
comparison to the mainland regions, to the extent of calling for recognising them 
in the constitutional status of the region. The outer-periphery, according to this 
party, needs to be identified according to a certain set of distinctive 
characteristics. 
Two main distinctive characteristics are the focus in the outer-periphery: 
distance from the mainland and fragmentation. An example of these can be 
observed in the following statement: “Include the peculiarities derived from 
distance and insularity so that the State takes them into consideration when it 
comes to legislating.”66 (PSOE CI 2011: 103). Considering distance from the 
mainland, it must be said that this is probably the most emphasised distinct 
characteristic. Distance is linked to the concept of ultra-periphery, established by 
the EU to consider the far away territories as regions that need special legal 
provisions to deal with their specific characteristics. Fragmentation is considered 
here with the label “insularity”: “The Canary Islands will defend the maintenance 
and improvement of the protection of its remote insularity ...” (PSOE CI 1999: 
46)67.  The recognition of these distinctive characteristics implies their inclusion 
in the constitutional status of the region. The role of distance and fragmentation 
is important only in the Canary Islands in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha and 
Andalusia. 
 
66 “Incluir las peculiaridades derivadas de la lejanía e insularidad de modo que el Estado las 
pondere a la hora de legislar.”. Own translation in the main text. 
67 “Canarias defenderá el mantenimiento y mejora de la protección de su insularidad alejada...”. 
Own translation in the main text. 
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The regional variation found in the analysis of the PSOE can be explained 
not only by the type of party, but also by its ideological position and structure. 
Regarding its ideological position, it can be argued that the left social values of 
the PSOE allows for a more inclusive vision of the social groups in the 
peripheries, especially when these peripheries can be defined according to 
distinctive characteristics. If incorporating these social groups in the peripheries 
means that the status of the regions in the constitutional framework needs to 
change so that they feel recognised, then left parties like the PSOE are more 
open to accept this situation. This variation is also affected by its structure.  The 
degree of freedom that its regional branches have can explain the different 
articulation of the regions depending on the context in which they act, despite the 
pressure that they receive from the state-wide party.  
Exercising a high degree of freedom by its regional branches does not 
mean that the main centre of loyalties changes, but a balance between the 
interest of the core and the peripheries is, at least, aimed for. An example of this 
degree of freedom and the contextualised position of the regional branches can 
be recognised in the fact that in core region of Castilla-La Mancha the party 
always had the same position, whilst in the inner- and outer-periphery of 
Andalusia and the Canary Islands, its position changed. Developing the example 
of a differentiated constitutional status of the region according to the context in 
which the regional branches act can be observed in the Canary Islands. As 
regards to the constitutional status of the region, the Canarian branch of the party 
called for the recognition of the ultraperipheral characteristic of the region, both 
in the EU and the Spanish constitutional architecture, which was not matched by 
a similar call in Andalusia. The type of party, ideological position, and structure of 
the PSOE can account for this change in position. Its regional branches, in order 
to adapt to the local peculiarities by having a more positive and inclusive vision, 
adopted certain policy proposals to fulfil them. The degree of freedom that 
regional branches have in a federal party is much higher than in a centralised 
party, and this might put some pressure on the relation between them and the 
state-wide party, shown by the change in the initial position of the PSOE in 
Andalusia and the Canary Islands, where the position of the centre was imposed. 
Despite this, the loyalties of the PSOE still remain in the centre because of its 
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nature as a SWP, resulting in these position strains between the interests of the 













Figure 6.4. Timelines of the different PSOE´s regional branches regarding the constitutional 
status of the regions. 
The PP had a consistent position across the three electoral periods in all 
three regions, always standing on the position of developing the regions inside 
the current constitutional status. As a state-wide party, the PP has a clear idea of 
how to develop the Spanish state. There is no difference between what the 
regional branches of the PP argue in Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, or the 
Canary Islands. The current constitutional design is for the PP the best system 
that the Constitution can have: “Ladies and gentlemen, I firmly believe in our 
































created ...”68 ; (Dolores de Cospedal PP Official Diary Castilla-La Mancha 2007, 
núm. 2: 5); “We understand constitutional loyalty and cooperation as an essential 
element for the functioning of the Autonomous Communities.”69 (PP AND 2012: 
130); and “... the reform of the Statute of Autonomy, we have done it with the 
purpose of expanding the levels of self-government of this Community, under an 
interregional solidarity approach and in the development of a constitutional State 
model in which the territorial organization must necessarily be decentralized; ...”70 
(Sánchez-Simón PP Official Diary the Canary Islands 1999 núm 4: 9). 
The position that the PP has can be attributed to, as the with the PSOE, 
not only to the type of party, but also to its ideological position and structure. The 
PP, as a right/centre-right orientated and centralised party, also acts in the 
regions through its regional branches. This, although expected to create the same 
tension as in the PSOE, are less evident due to its highly integrated structure, 
clearly influenced by its social values. The local branches have some degree of 
freedom to deal with the local demands, but the position in terms of the 
constitutional status of the regions remains consistent, reinforced by the social 
values of a right party, meaning that the ability and willingness to incorporate 
other social groups in the peripheries is weak. The Autonomous Communities do 
not need a new constitutional status is this pose a threat to the centre. Upgrading 
the regions with new constitutional status might make them an equal actor in their 
challenge to the centre, and the PP is clearly against this scenario. The local 
branches have freedom to act but inside very clear red lines, and the 
constitutional status of the regions is, according to the analysis, one of them. 
These red lines are drawn by the centre and can be observed in the regional 
frameworks: “Spain is a Nation of free and equal citizens before the law. The 
Autonomous Communities are the constitutional expression of a diversity based 
on cohesion and solidarity, which contributes to the progress and well-being of 
all. We understand constitutional loyalty as an essential element for the 
 
68 “Señorías, yo creo firmemente en nuestro Estado Autonómico, en el Estado Autonómico que 
la Constitución creó...”. Own translation in the main text. 
69 “Entendemos la lealtad constitucional y la cooperación como elemento esencial para el 
funcionamiento del estado de las autonomías.”. Own translation in the main text. 
70 “...la reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía, lo hemos hecho con la finalidad de ampliar los 
niveles de autogobierno de esta Comunidad, bajo un planteamiento de solidaridad 
interregional y en desarrollo de un modelo de Estado constitucional en el que la organización 
territorial ha de ser necesariamente descentralizada...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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functioning of the Autonomous Communities.”71 (PP FRAM 2007: 12); and “The 
Autonomous Communities are an essential part of the constitutional Spain, of the 
social and democratic Rule of Law that we have all been building since 1978.”72 
(PP FRAM 2011: 13). 
Focusing on the PA/CA and CC, the manifestos analysed show how these 
parties have different positions regarding this dependent variable. The PA/CA 
has a consistent position in line with a clear regionalist agenda on the 
constitutional status of the region. In all three electoral periods, the party stands 
for a federal state, which is going a step further than a SWP because it would 
contradict the current Constitutional architecture of the state, limit imposed by the 
latter. It recognises the positive effects of the Autonomous Communities, as for 
example: “The Spanish Constitution has been a valid experience to advance in 
the freedoms and in the decentralized political culture of the Spanish State.” 73 
(PA/CA AND 2000: 1-2), but calls for a more decentralised constitutional status 
of the region, suggesting a federal state: “The Autonomous Communities are, 
today, just one step, an instrument that should serve as a springboard to walk 
from the current compounded state or quasi-federal State to a fully-fledged 
federal state ...”74 (PA/CA AND 2000: 1-2). At the same time, this federal state 
needs to be symmetric and inclusive, without privileges granted to the so-called 
traditional nacionalidades. The system proposed by the PA/CA is more state-
wide than only considering Andalusia on its own. The party calls for an equal 
bilateral relation between all the federated regions in this new Spanish federation: 
“... the full self-government of Andalusia in convergence with the other regions of 
the State in freedom and equality ... We do not accept, on the contrary, ... that it 
would be an unbalanced State where the highest degrees of self-government 
 
71 “España es una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales antes la ley. El Estado de las 
autonomías es la expresión constitucional de una diversidad basada en la cohesión y la 
solidaridad, que contribuye al progreso y al bienestar de todos. Entendemos la lealtad 
constitucional como elemento esencial para el funcionamiento del estado de las autonomías.”. 
Own translation in the main text. 
72 “La España autonómica es parte esencial de la España constitucional, del Estado social y 
democrático de Derecho que entre todos venimos construyendo desde 1978.”. Own translation 
in the main text. 
73 “La Constitución Española ha sido una experiencia válida para avanzar en las libertades y 
en la cultura política descentralizada del Estado español.”. Own translation in the main text. 
74 “El Estado de la Autonomías es, hoy por hoy, sólo un paso, un instrumento que debe servir 
de trampolín para caminar desde el actual Estado compuesto o cuasifederal a un modelo 
federal acabado...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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would only correspond to the so-called historical nationalities.”75 (PA/CA AND 
2000: 1). This symmetric federal system is mentioned in all three electoral 
periods: ”That is why we are Andalusianists, but also pro-European and 
supporters of a federal Spain.”76 (PA/CA AND 2012: 11); and “... relations of 
equality between the territories, so we propose to move towards federal formulas 
both in the Spanish State and in the European Union from equality, solidarity and 
the redistribution of wealth.”77 (PA/CA AND 2008: 22). Although it is a regionalist 
party, the PA/CA is able to admit the inclusion of Andalusia in a broader political 
project.  
When it comes to the CC, the evolution goes from an asymmetric federal 
state to a Special Status for the region. In line with a regionalist agenda, it calls 
for a restructuring of the state where regions would benefit in detriment of the 
centre. During the 1999 elections, CC positioned itself like the PSOE, with the 
support for a federal system, but introducing an asymmetric characteristic based 
on its conservative social values: “We advocate for an asymmetric federal model 
of the State ...”78 (CC IC 1999: 7). This position evolves, using this asymmetry, to 
the defence of a Special Status for the Canary Islands, but not focused on 
independence and inside the current constitutional framework (CC IC 1999: 7), 
understood in the following way: “Our objective - essential in this second 
modernisation wave- is a Special Statute that reinforces and enhances our 
identity and our self-government by recognising the singularities derived from the 
double insularity and remoteness, for which we reject any claim to impose a 
Statute alien to our interests as a people.” (CC IC 2007: 8)79. As in the case of 
the PSOE and the PP when they move from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, 
 
75 “...el autogobierno pleno de Andalucía en convergencia con los demas pueblos del Estado 
en libertad e igualdad...No aceptamos, por el contrario, que pretendía un Estado 
desequilibrado en donde las mayores cuotas de autogobierno sólo correspondían a las 
llamadas nacionalidades históricas.”. Own translation in the main text. 
76 “Por eso somos andalucistas, pero también europeístas y defensores de una España 
federal.”. Own translation in the main text. 
77 “...unas relaciones de igualdad entre los territorios, por lo que proponemos avanzar hacia 
formulas federales tanto en el Estado como en la Unión Europea desde la igualdad, la 
solidaridad y la redistribución de la riqueza.”. Own translation in the main text. 
78 “Propugnamos un modelo federal asimétrico del Estado...”. Own translation in the main text. 
79 “Nuestro objetivo –imprescindible en esa segunda modernización- es un Estatuto Especial 
que refuerce y potencie nuestra identidad y nuestro autogobierno mediante el reconocimiento 
de las singularidades derivadas de la doble insularidad y de la lejanía, por lo que rechazaremos 
toda pretensión de imponernos un Estatuto ajeno a nuestros intereses como pueblo.”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
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and finally to the Canary Islands, the change in the position of the PA/CA and CC 
in relation to the constitutional status of the region can be linked to the distance 
that separates the regions from the centre. Taking into consideration these two 
peripheral regions, it can be observed that as move moves away from the centre, 
the constitutional status of the regions becomes more distinct and exclusive. The 
state-wide symmetrical federal system of the PA/CA contrasts to the Special 
Status of the Canary Islands of CC. 
As it can be observed, the ideological orientation of CC supports the 
asymmetrical status of the region in order to protect the social groups in the outer-
periphery. Being a right/centre-right party allows CC to support a more favourable 
treatment to the Canary Islands on detriment of other regions and social groups. 
Both parties criticised the privileges of the so-called nacionalidades (CC CAN 
2007: 8; PA/CA AND 2012: 24), but CC, based on its ideological position, goes a 
step further and calls for the same privileges for the Canary Islands through this 
Special Status instead of calling for a symmetric federal state like the PA/CA: “... 
self-government through its own status. Status that, as already happens in the 
Basque Country or Navarre, would allow asymmetry amongst the different 
regions.”80 (CC CI 2011: 118). Finally, to be precise, the Special Status that CC 
tries to obtain through an asymmetric federal design is more a degree of 
asymmetry rather than a new step to a possible federal state. 
If the ideological position and structure of the PSOE differentiates it from 
the PP, the difference in the constitutional status of the region between the PA/CA 
and the CC can be also explained along the same lines, especially focused on 
the ideological orientation. The PA/CA, a left/centre-left orientated party, bases 
its framing of a Spanish symmetrical federal state on an equal treatment to all the 
different regions, with no privileges to any. This can explain the criticism to the 
status of the Basque Country and Navarre. Therefore, the PA/CA, although 
calling for a deepening of the decentralisation process until Spain reaches the 
status of a federal state, this is based around the principle of equality between 
regions. The opposite can be observed for CC. As a right/centre-right orientated 
 
80 “...el autogobierno mediante un estatus propio. Estatus que, como ya sucede en el País 




party, it defends the privileges of the social group that it represents. This is 
translated into a federal system, in the same way as the PA/CA, but with 
privileges, which in this case, applies to the Canary Islands via a Special Status. 
This asymmetric system would protect the privileges of the elites in the region, in 
line with the social values of right/centre-right parties. 
The factors used by parties to differentiate the constitutional status of the 
region as one reaches the outer-periphery are distance and fragmentation. When 
the recognition of the geographical characteristics of the Canary Islands in a new 
Statute of Autonomy, the Constitution, and the EU legal framework were brought 
up in the above analysis, distance and fragmentation were introduced as factors 
that helped deepening a possible differentiated status. These two characteristics 
only affect to a greater extent the Canary Islands, as there is also a degree of 
distance and fragmentation in Andalusia in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha. All 
three parties that act in the region, the PSOE, the PP, and CC, agree on the need 
to acknowledge distance and fragmentation in the constitutional status of the 
region. The recognition of distinctive characteristics seems to affect the Canary 
Islands the most, but in Andalusia, there are also some references to these, 
linked to other markers or characteristics, but to a lesser degree. In this case, the 
distinctive characteristics of Andalusia are based on elements such as its cultural 
heritage. Finally, in Castilla-La Mancha, there are no references to distinctive 
characteristics. 
The PSOE shows strong support for the inclusion of the distinctive 
characteristics. This does not mean that the PSOE calls for an asymmetric 
autonomous or federal system, but the recognition of distinctive characteristics 
without privileges. This claim is maintained from the previous support for a 
symmetric federal state in the electoral period of 1998-2001. This is also stressed 
in all the regional frameworks included here. As stated above, there is a 
difference between Andalusia and the Canary Islands in terms of the distinctive 
characteristics that the party emphasises. In both regions, the PSOE calls for the 
recognition of these characteristics in the Statutes of Autonomy, but in Andalusia 
this normally is based on subjective elements such as regional identity, and in the 
Canary Islands, this is based on objective aspects, which in this case are distance 
from mainland Spain and insularity: “The existence and recognition of 
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peculiarities should not be understood as justifying inequalities between the 
Communities.”81 (PSOE FRAM 1995: 4); “Ensure cohesion and equality by 
respecting peculiarities”82 (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6); and “It also includes economic-
financial or institutional character, adapted to the singularities or distinct 
characteristics of each region”83 (PSOE FRAM 2007: 10).  
An example of the inclusion of distance and insularity as distinctive 
markers is the following statement: “Include the peculiarities derived from 
distance and insularity so that the State takes them into consideration when it 
comes to legislating.”84 (PSOE CI 2011: 103). Considering distance from the 
mainland, it must be said that this is probably the most emphasised distinctive 
characteristic that the PSOE mentions in the manifestos. Distance is linked to the 
concept of ultra-periphery that the EU framework established to consider the far 
away territories as regions that need special legal channels to deal with their 
specific characteristics. Fragmentation is considered here with the label 
“insularity”: “The Canary Islands will defend the maintenance and improvement 
of the protection of its remote insularity ...” (PSOE CI 1999: 46)85.   
The PP seems to have the same behaviour in relation to recognise certain 
set of distinctive characteristics. The references to these singularities also 
increase as one moves towards the outer-periphery. In Castilla-La Mancha, there 
are no refences. The PP does not observe the need to mention any distinctive 
characteristics. The party, in Andalusia, moves to reference some certain 
characteristics that are used to define the region. As in the case of the PSOE, 
they are not explicitly mentioned in a possible new constitutional status of the 
region. They are used more to contextualise the appeals to the voters rather than 
in relation to an updated status of the region. When the PP adapts to the context 
of the Canary Islands, the references not only increase, but they are observed as 
 
81 “La existencia y el reconocimiento de los hechos diferenciales no deben entenderse como 
desigualdades entre las Comunidades”. Own translation in the main text. 
82 “Asegurar la cohesión y la igualdad respetando los hechos diferenciales”- Own translation 
in the main text. 
83 “También incluye el carácter económico-financiero e institucional, adaptado a las 
singularidades de los hechos diferenciales de cada región”. Own translation in the main text. 
84 “Incluir las peculiaridades derivadas de la lejanía e insularidad de modo que el Estado las 
pondere a la hora de legislar.”. Own translation in the main text. 
85 “Canarias defenderá el mantenimiento y mejora de la protección de su insularidad alejada...”. 
Own translation in the main text. 
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essential in the understanding of the region, and this is better done if they are 
referenced in the constitutional status of the outer-periphery. 
The most referenced distinctive characteristics that the PP references in 
the Canary Islands are distance and fragmentation. In this sense, and despite the 
consistent initial position in terms of the defence of the current Autonomous 
Communities, the party calls for the recognition of the same distinctive 
characteristics in the Canary Islands as the PSOE does. The position of the PP 
is the same as the PSOE, where the constitutional status of the region is the 
current design but with the recognition of the characteristics, especially the one 
labelled as ultra-peripheral, as announced in the UE legal framework, and 
insularity86. The PP, when it calls for the recognition of these distinctive 
characteristics, does not call for an asymmetric Autonomous Community, but a 
recognition without privileges: “... the reflection of the necessary resources 
without discrimination, under the express recognition of the insularity and 
remoteness made in the Spanish Constitution, the Treaty of the European Union 
or the Law on Economic and Fiscal Regime of the Islands.”87 (PP CI 2011: 27).  
The Special Status that CC calls for is also affected by distance and 
fragmentation. Using the asymmetry introduced for the regions that developed 
their Statute of Autonomy following article 151 of the Constitution, CC calls for a 
Special Status that recognises the Canary Islands as the region with the most 
distinctive characteristics in the Spanish state: “Needless to remember that the 
Canary Islands is the territory of the Spanish State with the most singularities 
and, in addition, recognised by the European Union.”88 (CC CI 2011: 118). The 
support for an asymmetric system that CC puts forward is based on the distinctive 
characteristics of each region, which would lead to the final Special Status that 
the party requires for the Canary Islands: “That is, an asymmetric State based on 
the singularities of each community, in which the remoteness and insularity of the 
 
86 “Tenemos que consolidar todo un conjunto de incentivos, de singularidades, peculiaridades 
dentro de la Unión Europea”. Translation: “We have to consolidate a whole set of incentives, 
singularities, and peculiarities within the European Union” (Soria PP Official Diary Canary 
Islands 2007 núm 4, 69). 
87 “...el reflejo de los recursos necesarios sin discriminación, bajo el reconocimiento expreso 
de la insularidad y lejanía que hace la Constitución Española, el Tratado de la Unión Europea 
o la propia Ley de Régimen Económico y Fiscal de las Islas.”. Own translation in the main text. 
88 “Huelga recordar que Canarias es el territorio del Estado español con más singularidades y, 
además, reconocidas por la Unión Europea.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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Canary Islands appear as the obvious singularities given their special influence 
on the self-government of the Archipelago.”89 (CC CI 2007: 26). The distinctive 
characteristics in the case of the Canary Islands, according to CC, are distance 
from Madrid, the ultra-peripherality of the archipelago and fragmentation. This 
can be observed using the following statement: “... has not understood things that 
were practically impossible to understand with respect to a territory that is more 
than 2,000 kilometres away from Madrid, a fragmented territory, which has other 
difficulties and that has nothing to do with the mainland?”90 (Rivero Baute CC 
Official Diary 2007b núm 4: 24). These characteristics need to be recognised by 
a special status of the region. 
The above references are based on both the spatial and political-
administrative dimensions of fragmentation in combination. In this case, CC is the 
party that most clearly reference this element: “The new Statute of Autonomy 
should emphasise the relevance of the Cabildos as the insular government, 
representation and administration of each Island.”91 (CC CI 2011: 120). One 
would expect that strong local island-based bodies like the Cabildos would 
undermine a differentiated constitutional status of the region which would 
reinforce the latter. This would ultimately undermine their power. The analysis 
shows the opposite. The Cabildos are actually referred to in order to underpin the 
call for a special status of the region in a positive way. One reason for this can be 
that these local island-based bodies, if also referenced in this differentiated 
constitutional status of the region, can reinforce their influence and power. The 
PSOE and the PP, although not directly calling for the Cabildos to be recognised 
in this differentiated constitutional status of the region as CC does, also reference 
the importance of recognising them somehow in the self-government of the 
region: “The Canarian socialists affirm categorically that not only the region, but 
 
89 “Esto es, un Estado asimétrico en función de los hechos diferenciales de cada comunidad, 
en el que la lejanía e insularidad de Canarias aparezcan como el hecho diferencial evidente 
dada su especial incidencia en el autogobierno del Archipiélago”. Own translation in the main 
text. 
90 “...no ha entendido cosas que eran prácticamente imposibles que entendiera con respecto 
a un territorio que está a más de 2.000 kilómetros de distancia de Madrid, un territorio 
fragmentado, que tiene otras dificultades y que no tiene que ver nada con el territorio 
continental?”. Own translation in the main text. 
91 “El nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía debe subrayar la relevancia de los Cabildos Insulares 
como órganos de gobierno, representación y administración de cada Isla.”. Own translation in 
the main text. 
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also the islands-based governments and the Municipality are defining and 
decisive elements of our self-government…”92(PSOE CI 1999: 47) 
- Testing the hypothesis 
From this analysis, the explanatory variables that most affect this 
dependent variable are distance and fragmentation. Starting with distance, it was 
theorised to affect the constitutional status of the region in a positive way. The 
above analysis seems to confirm hypothesis H1.E. Distance deepens the calls 
for a more differentiated constitutional status of the region. Although this is more 
apparent when comparing both regionalist parties, it can also be outlined for both 
SWPS when one takes into consideration the bases for this differentiated status. 
As it has been observed, distance is also one of the two distinctive characteristics 
that base the differentiated status that parties outline for in the Canary Islands. 
The parties in this outer-periphery use distance to reinforce the support for the 
recognising of a differentiated constitutional status for the region around this 
factor. This behaviour can be observed for the PSOE, the PP, and CC. There is 
a need to acknowledge the fact that the region is far away from the centre, or in 
other words, the Canary Islands being an ultra-periphery. Overall, the pro-
periphery positions of parties are deepened by distance when they articulate the 
constitutional status of the region.  
The same behaviour can be observed for fragmentation. From the analysis, 
one can conclude that hypothesis H2.E can be rejected. Not only distance, but 
also fragmentation is a factor that deepens and reinforces support for a distinct 
constitutional status, strengthening the pro-periphery position of parties. The 
analysis of the manifestos for the parties in the mainland regions outline the 
importance of the Provincial Councils and Counties, and this is higher in 
Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha (for example, PSOE AND 2000: 23; PA/CA 
AND 2012: 2), but not to the extent of recognising them as part of a differentiated 
constitutional status of the region as in the Canary Islands. In this sense, it can 
be said that the same behaviour observed for the saliency of the regional level in 
 
92 “Los socialistas canarios afirmamos rotundamente que no sólo la region, sino tambien la 
islas y el municipio son elementos definitorias y decisivos de nuestro autogobierno…”. Own 
translation in the text. 
251 
 
relation to fragmentation can also be highlighted here, but having the opposite 
effect, strengthening the articulation of a more differentiated constitutional status 
of the region. In other words, the deeper the effect of the political-administrative 
dimension of fragmentation, the more parties call for a more differentiated status 
of the region. In addition to this, the coincidence of the spatial and the political-
administrative dimensions of fragmentation in the outer-periphery region of the 
Canary Islands also contradicted the expected negative effect, providing 
unpredicted observations. The coincidence of both dimensions of fragmentation 
had the opposite effect to the ones theorised, reinforcing a more differentiated 
constitutional recognition of the region. Overall, it can be said that the deeper the 
effects of fragmentation, the more it favoured a more differentiated constitutional 
status of the region. 
Turning to the control variables, the conclusions are the following. The 
hypotheses that can be approached refer to party type, ideology and structure. 
Regarding party type, it was hypothesised that the PA/CA and CC would 
emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status for the region than the 
PSOE and the PP. The analysis shows that hypothesis H7.H can be confirmed. 
The constitutional status that the regionalist parties support is more differentiated 
that the one proposed by the PSOE and the PP. This differentiated constitutional 
status vary between a symmetric federal system in Andalusia (PA/CA) and the 
recognition of a Special Status for the region in the Canary Islands (CC). The 
PSOE and the PP, on the other hand, defend the current Autonomous system, 
although the PSOE has two major exceptions in Andalusia (2000) and the Canary 
Islands (1999), closer to the position of the regionalist parties.  
When it comes to the hypothesis regarding ideology (H8.E), this can be 
confirmed. In this sense, the PSOE and the PA/CA, both left/centre-left parties, 
emphasise a more inclusive symmetrical constitutional status of the regions, 
empowering the regions with the same rights and status. The PP, a right/centre-
right party, articulate a symmetrical constitutional status of the region, as the 
previous parties, but with less degree of inclusiveness of the regions. For the PP 
and in relation to the above analysis of the saliency of the regional level, the 
regions, although with no privileges, are still subordinated to the centre. They are 
an extension of the centre. Empowering the regions with an upgraded 
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constitutional status might undermine the influence and power of the centre, 
stablishing an asymmetrical relation between the latter and the former. CC, also 
a right/centre-right party, emphasises a more asymmetrical constitutional status 
of the region to protect the interest of the social groups in the outer-periphery 
influenced by its social values, undermining the possibility of applying the same 
to other Autonomous Communities. The hypothesis (H9.E) for the interaction 
between party type and ideology can be also confirmed. CC emphasises a more 
differentiated constitutional status of the region, inserted in an asymmetrical 
federal system with the same privileges as the Basque Country for example, 
based on its ideology. As a right/centre-right party, the less ability to incorporate 
other social groups outside the region, as the PA/CA does, makes this party focus 
on defending the privileges of their own social group, promoting a special 
protection so that the economic relations that empowers the social group where 
it bases its loyalties are preserved.  This can be used to conclude that the 
ideological orientation of CC makes this party have a slightly stronger pro-
periphery position than the PA/CA. 
The structure of the PSOE and the PP was hypothesised to affect the 
constitutional status of the region as follows: the greater autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to articulate a more differentiated 
constitutional status of the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more 
horizontal variation. The analysis shows that hypothesis H10.B can be confirmed. 
The change in the position of the PSOE in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, in 
comparison to the consistent position of the PP in all three regions across all 
three electoral periods, points in this direction. The higher degree of freedom that 
the regional branches of the PSOE have can explain, to some degree, this 
variation, although the state-wide party, locating its loyalties at the centre, seems 
to impose its point of view. This existing initial version can be used to reinforce 
the confirmation of the stated hypothesis, but if one takes into consideration more 
regional elections, especially further back in time, the picture could be clearer. It 
has to be acknowledged that the change in position, forced by the state-wide 
party, undermines these conclusions, but at the same time, it points in the 
direction of the importance of the freedom that the regional branches of the PSOE 
had, and still have. It can be said that the mere presence of the initial proposition 
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in Andalusia and the Canary Islands confirms this hypothesis. This variation is 
not observed for the PP, a more integrated party. Figure 6.5 summarises the 
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2.3) Position on competence distribution 
 The general analysis for all parties across the three electoral periods is 
that the calls for the devolution of more competences for the regions is common 
to all. There were two occasions where the PP called for recentralising 
competences, but these were an exception rather than a general call. Normally, 
all parties link this devolution to specific public policies, but some manifestos 
called also for more competences in general terms, normally connected to the 
development of a new Statute of Autonomy. In comparison, advocacy of more 
competences for the local level is emphasised much less. In terms of developing 
the region, all parties identify the devolution of competences as a key step 
towards this aim. The factors that most affect party positioning on competence 
distribution are, distance, fragmentation, party type, ideology, and party structure. 
There is not enough evidence to conclude whether polycentricity has a clear 
effect or not. 
Before analysing the manifestos, an important point needs to be clarified 
in terms of the different types of competences developed the Spanish 
constitution. In the allocation of competences to the regions and the central 
government, three main types of competences can be identified: exclusive, 
shared, and concurrent. The first one refers to the exclusive exercise of the 
competences by one of the levels, the central government or the regional 
administration, depending to which one they are assigned. The second one refers 
to the case where competences over a certain issue are distributed by levels, 
depending on what powers each level has over it. Examples of these 
competences are: the attribution of the basic legislation to the central 
government, and the execution of this basic legislation by the Autonomous 
Communities. The third one refers to the case where both levels have the 
possibility of concurring with the same powers to regulate a matter. The 
competences that are exclusive to the central government refer to those that are 
used to define an independent state with the ability to control its own territory and 
population. In other words, those that are necessary to exercise jurisdiction, 
which are, for example: justice, defence, international relations, customs and tariff 
regime, foreign trade, or general treasury and state debt. 
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Regarding attitudes to competence distribution in the PSOE, the overall 
behaviour in all three regions and electoral periods is that the party calls for the 
devolution of more competences to the regions: “Education: the assumption of 
competences in non-university education will mark the next term.”93 (PSOE C-LM 
1999: 6); “Promote the process of devolving the competences that deal with the 
issue of communications that are contemplated in the Constitution.”94 (PSOE 
AND 2000: 37); and “The Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands must 
assume full regulatory powers in terms of financing derived from the Canary 
Islands Economic and Tax Regime.”95 (PSOE CI 2007: 76). There is an exception 
in the manifesto for 2011 for Castilla-La Mancha, where there is no reference to 
more devolution of competences to the region, but this is not a call for 
recentralisation in favour of the central government.  
These references are linked to specific policy proposals, and at the same 
time, some manifestos dedicate a specific section to the devolution of 
competences to the region as a whole. The first part of the manifesto for 2008 in 
Andalusia and the last part of the manifesto for 2011in the Canary Islands contain 
a full section dedicated to the development of a new Statute of Autonomy, and 
this development is focused on the devolution of more competences to the 
regions. Examples of these calls are: “We consider necessary and urgent a 
reform of the Statute of Autonomy to fulfil the following objectives: ... claim new 
competences.”96 (PSOE CI 2011: 24); and “Access to greater competencies that 
define a trend of approximation towards the constitution of a state with federal 
characteristics, not exclusive of, or excluding, any Autonomous Community.”97 
(PSOE AND 2000: section 2). There is less emphasis on more competences to 
be devolved to the local level in comparison to the regional level, but nonetheless, 
 
93 “Educación: la asunción de las competencias en materia de educación no universitaria 
marcará la próxima legislatura.”. Own translation in the main text. 
94 “Impulsar el proceso de transferencia de las competencias que en materia de comunicación 
se contemplan en la Constitución.”. Own translation in the main text. 
95 “La Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias debe asumir competencias normativas plenas en 
materia de financiación derivada del Régimen Económico y Fiscal de Canarias.”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
96 “Consideramos necesaria y urgente una reforma estatutaria para cumplir los siguientes 
objetivos:...asumir nuevas competencias.”. Own translation in the main text. 
97 “La asunción de mayores competencias que definan una tendencia de aproximación hacia 
la constitución de un Estado de características federales, no exclusivo ni excluyente para 
ninguna Comunidad Autónoma.”. Own translation in the main text. 
256 
 
they are present: “As for the Municipalities and Provincial Councils, the process 
of decentralisation and devolution of competences has allowed the regional 
Administration to become an active agent of such strategies and to act as a 
promoter of their own development processes.”98 (PSOE AND 2000: 23). There 
is general support for a reorganisation of competences between the three levels 
and not only devolution per se: “Recognition of the existence of other levels of 
government and administration, typical of a democratic and decentralised state, 
while integrated into the European Union, with its own and / or shared tasks and 
competences ...”99 (PSOE CI 2007: 73). 
There are no calls for a recentralisation of policies. The PSOE supports 
the principle of reorganising, in general terms, the competences that the three 
levels currently have, aiming for a more efficient administration: “We will approve 
the general legal framework for the local bodies in Andalusia, which will regulate 
the devolution of competences to the Municipalities, cooperation between 
Municipalities, and coordination with the Provincial Councils.”100 (PSOE AND 
2008: 19). Reorganising the way the three levels interact is focused more on 
devolving competences to the region and the local bodies as opposed to making 
the centre more involved. Competences are better managed at the regions and 
local bodies. 
In terms of the type of competences that the PSOE calls for in all three 
regions, the party tries to push forward some demands for competences that can 
be considered exclusive of the central government. Examples of these are: “We 
will demand the approval of the National Hydrological Plan, the devolution of 
competences regarding water in the intra-community basins and the 
 
98 “Al igual que para los Ayuntamientos y Diputaciones Provinciales, el proceso de 
descentralización y transferencia de competencias ha permitido a la Administración regional 
convertirse en un agente activo de tales estrategias y actuar como un promotor de procesos 
de desarrollo endógeno.”. Own translation in the main text. 
99 “Reconocimiento de la existencia de otros niveles de gobierno y administración, propios de 
un estado democrático y descentralizado, a la vez que integrado en la Unión Europea, con 
funciones y competencias propias y/o compartidas...”. Own translation in the main text. 
100 “Aprobaremos la ley de régimen local de Andalucía, que regulará las transferencias y 
delegación de competencias en los Ayuntamientos, la cooperación entre los Municipios y la 
coordinación con las Provincial Councils.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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management of the Guadalquivir basin.”101 (PSOE AND 2000: 104); and “We will 
propose the devolution of competences over work permits for foreign people, as 
well as an increase in the role of the Autonomous Community in the determination 
of the quotas of foreigners who enter the labour market in Andalusia.”102 (PSOE 
AND 2008: 18). The importance of the hydraulic resources is a key factor in both 
Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia. For Castilla-La Mancha, this can be also 
observed in the following statement: “…the autonomy, to be the main guardians 
in defending now the Statute of Autonomy, that thanks to the initiative of the 
President of Castilla-La Mancha is going to amended, and that it is going to mean 
to us not only the already devolved competences in matter of water but more 
financial aid, more competences and, therefore, more possibility of solving these 
issues that are in the interest of the regional population…”103 (Moreno González 
PSOE Official Diary Castilla-La Mancha 2007 núm. 2: 28). The same strong calls 
for more competences can be observed for the region of the Canary Islands: “The 
Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands must have full regulatory powers 
in terms of financing derived from the Canary Islands Economic and Tax Regime. 
In this context, the IGIC and the AIEM, should be configured as taxes of our 
Autonomous Community, with full powers over its regulation, application, review, 
and liable to the principles set out in the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary 
Islands”104 (PSOE CI 2007: 76). 
The aim of the PSOE is to increase the capacity of the region by exercising 
more competences, some belonging to those that are considered as crucial for 
 
101 “Exigiremos la aprobación del Plan Hidrológico Nacional, la transferencia de las 
competencias en materia de aguas en las cuencas intracomunitarias y la gestión de la cuenca 
del Guadalquivir.”. Own translation in the main text. 
102 “Plantearemos el traspaso de las competencias de las autorizaciones de trabajo de las 
personas extranjeras, así como incrementar el papel de la Comunidad Autónoma en la 
determinación de los contingentes de extranjeros que accedan al mercado de trabajo 
andaluz.”. Own translation in the main text. 
103 “...la autonomía, a ser los máximos exigentes en defender ahora el Estatuto, que gracias a 
la iniciativa del Presidente de Castilla-La Mancha se va a reformar y que nos va a suponer no 
sólo lo ya consignado en materia de agua sino más financiación, más competencias y, por 
tanto, más posibilidad de resolver desde la cercanía los asuntos que interesan a los castellano-
manchegos...”. Own translation in the main text. 
104 “La Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias debe asumir competencias normativas plenas en 
materia de financiación derivada del Régimen Económico y Fiscal de Canarias. En este 
contexto, el IGIC, y el AIEM, deben ser configurados como tributos propios de nuestra 
comunidad Autónoma, con plenas competencias sobre su regulación, aplicación y revisión y 
con sujeción a los principios recogidos en el Estatuto de Autonomía de Canarias.”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
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an independent state. Despite this, these calls refer to specific issues, not a 
general call for more competences that are exclusive from the central 
government. This is a crucial difference. This can be expected in a state-wide 
party that supports the decentralisation of the state but within the current 
constitutional architecture. In a decentralised state like Spain, the expected 
behaviour is for state-wide parties in regional elections to call for more 
competences to be devolved to the Autonomous Communities, and this is what 
can be observed for the PSOE. In some cases, as it has been shown, the party 
pushes the calls for more specific competences that are considered as exclusive 
of the central government, but this does not mean necessarily the support for 
creating a full developed independent state. In relation to the process of 
decentralisation, the PSOE pushes for more competences to be devolved to the 
regions as distance from the centre also increases. There seems to be an 
increase both in the calls for more and more important competences for the 
regions as one reaches the Canary Islands. In order to contextualise its appeals 
to the local populations, the party observes that calling for more competences is 
a possible solution to do so. As the appeals increase with distance, the calls for 
more and more important competences also increase. 
 In the manifestos of the PP, one can observe the same general position 
as the PSOE in all three regions and electoral periods, including the increasing 
emphasis on more competences to be devolved to the regions as distance 
increases. The PP focuses on the devolution of competences towards the region 
as a key step for the latter´s development.  An example of these calls is: “We will 
define, in a framework of agreement with the central government, the 
competences of the Regional Government in the Transversal Railway Axis of 
Andalusia”105 (PP AND 2012: 98). Three exceptions can be found, two in Castilla-
La Mancha (2007 and 2011) and one in the Canary Islands (2007), as if the status 
quo was satisfactory. Despite this, there is a key difference between the PP and 
the PSOE this respect. The PSOE, as outlined above, organises these calls in 
two ways, demanding specific competences or calling for more competences 
 
105 “Definiremos, en un marco de acuerdo con la Administración Central, las competencias de 




through a new Statute of Autonomy. The PP only calls for more competences 
using the first way, with no mentions of a new Statute of Autonomy in any of the 
regions or electoral periods. There are no direct calls for the recentralisation of 
competences, but sometimes the language used points in this direction and 
greats confusion regarding its position in relation to this dependent variable, 
especially in the Canary Islands: “It does not make sense for a Municipality, a 
Cabildo or an Autonomous Community to receive competences that they cannot 
carry out.”106 (PP CI 2011: 14). For the local level, the proposals contained in the 
manifestos support devolving more competences towards the Provincial 
Councils, Cabildos and Municipalities, sometimes directly, and sometimes with 
references to a specific policy proposal. In comparison to the PSOE, the PP 
displays a more consistent position in all the manifestos across regions and 
electoral periods, for example: “The PP of Andalusia considers that, following the 
principle of subsidiarity, the time has come to devolve regional competences, 
endowed with sufficient economic resources, to the Municipalities, as established 
in the Statute of Autonomy.”107 (PP AND 2008: 13). It seems that, in general, the 
PP focuses more on the local level than the PSOE.  
It can be observed that, overall, the PSOE and the PP try to position 
themselves in further developing the decentralised Spanish state through 
devolving more competences to the regions and general calls for reorganising 
competences between the regional, centre, and local levels to make the 
administration more efficient. On some occasions, these calls include soft calls 
for exclusive competences of the central government, but these are few. Their 
behaviour is, therefore, in line with the expected. On top of this general 
conclusions, one can observe that these calls increase as they reach the outer-
periphery. The null call for more competences in Castilla-La Mancha by both 
parties and the strong decentralisation proposals in the Canary Islands can be an 
example of this. Both parties understand that the distance that separates a region 
from the centre needs to be approached by regional solutions, and this is done 
 
106 “No tiene sentido que un Ayuntamiento, un Cabildo o una Comunidad Autónoma tengan 
asignadas competencias que no pueden llevar a cabo.”. Own translation in the main text. 
107 “El Partido Popular de Andalucía considera que, en cumplimiento del principio de 
subsidiariedad, ha llegado el momento de transferir competencias autonómicas, dotadas con 
recursos económicos suficientes, a los Ayuntamientos, tal y como establece el Estatuto de 
Autonomía.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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via exercising more competences to give better and more contextualised 
responses. However, there are still some sharp differences between the two. As 
observed from the above analysis, the PSOE calls, in general terms, for more 
competences to be devolved to the regions than the PP, and the nature of these 
competences go a step further, focusing more on some competences that 
normally are understood to belong to the central government. These differences 
in the attitude regarding the position on the distribution of competences appears 
to be determined, to some extent, by their ideological position and structure.  
Being a left/centre-left orientated party grants the ability to the PSOE to 
increase the calls for more competences for the regions in comparison to the PP. 
This can be explained by the capacity that this party has to fulfil the interests of 
the regions. In comparison, the PP is less open to achieving the same level of 
interaction with the elites at the periphery. The PSOE not only emphasises more 
the devolution of more competences to the regions than the PP, but also the 
nature of these competences’ changes, and this is also linked to their ideological 
position. The degree of inclusiveness of the PSOE allows this party to go further 
and demand, not only more competences for the regions but also competences 
that further develop their institutional frame and increase their political 
importance. This includes competences that are assumed to belong to a 
hypothetical independent state. The PP, although also promoting the devolution 
of competences to the regions as the PSOE, does not go as far as the latter. Its 
less openness to include other social groups that might threaten the privileges of 
the elites that they defend prevents this party to demand as many competences 
as the PSOE does and the types of competences do not trespass the lines of the 
exclusive competences of the central government with the same intensity. 
The regional branches of the PSOE are able to contextualise more the 
demands for more competences than the PP. The former, although limited by the 
state-wide party through documents such as the regional frameworks, is more 
capable of stretching these limits to respond to the demands of the regions. The 
regional branches of the PP are more limited due to its highly integrated structure, 
but they still exercise some degree of freedom to contextualise their policies. 
These regional branches, limited by the interest of the elites at the centre, do not 
addressed to the same extent the interests of the regions as the reginal branches 
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of the PSOE do, which undermines the call for more competences as a whole. 
The above analysis suggests that this difference in the structure determines, to 
some extent, the attitudes that these two parties have towards the distribution of 
competences.  
 In comparison, the PA/CA and CC make overall stronger statements for 
the devolution of competences to the region. Both regionalist parties have a 
similar behaviour to the PSOE. In this sense, both call for more competences to 
be devolved in two ways: specific calls in different policy areas and calls for more 
competences in general terms through the development of a new Statutes of 
Autonomy.  Examples of calls for specific policies are: “Call for the competences 
on commuter trains to design a commuter network according to the geographical 
and social needs of Andalusia.”108 (PA/CA AND 2012: 59); and “Request the 
competencies in matters of coasts”109 (CC CI 2011: 6). Examples of the 
developing a new Statute of Autonomy with new competences are: “Our strategic 
priority is the defence of our autonomy and for that same reason, without 
renouncing the reform of the Statute of Autonomy, we want to promote its 
maximum development, both from the perspective of competence transfer and 
the development of rights and financing commitments, to respond to the problems 
and aspirations of the Andalusian people.”110 (PA/CA AND 2008: 38-39); and 
“…the Statute of Autonomy must determine a competence system that makes 
possible the future project for the Canary Islands that we propose.”111 (CC CI 
2007: 8). These two regionalist parties see the centre as the level that should aid 
the Autonomous Communities to develop: “It is essential to establish in the 
Constitution, not only the existence of compensation funds or guarantees of 
solidarity, equality and cohesion, but the obligation of the central government to 
 
108 “Reclamar las competencias sobre los trenes de Cercanía para diseñar una red de 
cercanías acorde a las necesidades geográficas y sociales de Andalucía.”. Own translation in 
the main text. 
109 “Solicitar las competencias en materia de Costas”. Own translation in the main text. 
110 “Nuestra prioridad estratégica es la defensa de nuestra autonomía y por ese mismo motivo, 
sin renunciar a la reforma del Estatuto, queremos impulsar su máximo desarrollo, tanto desde 
la perspectiva del traspaso competencial como del desarrollo de los derechos y los 
compromisos de financiación, para que dé respuesta a los problemas y a las aspiraciones del 
pueblo andaluz.”. Own translation in the main text. 
111 “…el Estatuto debe determinar un sistema competencial que haga posible el proyecto de 
futuro para Canarias que proponemos.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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distribute its budgets according to criteria of internal convergence…”112 (PA/CA 
AND 2008: 23) 
Despite these strong calls for more competences to be devolved to the 
regions by both regionalist parties, there is a difference between them. The 
analysis shows that CC, in comparison to the PA/CA, calls for more and more 
important competences to be devolved to the Canary Islands. This observed 
behaviour goes in line with the one highlighted for the PSOE and the PP. As one 
moves away from the centre, the regionalist parties call for more and more 
important competences for the regions. The competences that both parties call 
for belong to the exclusive list of competences that the Constitution assigns the 
centre. 
When it comes to the type of competences that the regionalist parties 
demand from the centre, it must be said that there is more emphasis on 
competences that belong exclusively to the central government than in the case 
of both SWPs. The PA/CA has a very good example of this. In its manifesto for 
the election of 2000, the party has a very detailed list of competences that they 
demand for Andalusia, most of them belonging exclusively to the state, such as 
a tax agency, foreign health113, penitentiary institutions, or official statistics. There 
is an interesting fact to highlight, and it is the desire by both the PA/CA and CC 
to achieve the same development as the “historic” regions through the same 
competences. This objective focuses on four aspects: international relations, 
borders, autonomous tax agency, and autonomous police. Some of these 
competences belong to the state exclusively, such as borders, and international 
relations. Others, such as an autonomous tax agency and autonomous police are 
not exclusive to the state to the full extent, but are characteristics of a very 
developed region. 
 
112 “Es irrenunciable establecer en la Constitución, no sólo la existencia de fondos de 
compensación o garantías de solidaridad, igualdad y cohesión, sino la obligatoriedad para el 
Gobierno Central de distribuir sus presupuestos según criterios de convergencia interna…”. 
Own translation in the main text. 
113 Foreign health refers to the competences and activities that the central government has in 
terms of control of the possible health hazards and risks derived from the import, export or 
transit of goods, and international passenger traffic (Ley 14/86, General de Sanidad). 
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Dealing with the competences that belong exclusively to the state, both 
parties seem to emphasise the competences on international relations and 
borders. In terms of international relations, because the Constitutional Court has 
limited this to the central government, the regions can have their own international 
activity but this “…should be understood as limited to those that do not imply the 
exercise of a ius contrahendi, do not give rise to immediate and current 
obligations to the powers that be foreign publics, do not affect the foreign policy 
of the state and do not generate responsibility of this vis-à-vis foreign states or 
international supranational organisations.”114. Both the PA/CA and CC 
emphasise the fact that Andalusia and the Canary Islands should have their own 
international activity focused on the defence of their interests. Examples of this 
international activity can be found in the manifestos of the PA/CA (PA/CA AND 
2000: 3) and CC (CC CI 2011: 124). It must be stated that this international 
activity is also mentioned by the PSOE in both regions (PSOE AND 2012: 48; 
PSOE CI 2007: 71). This does not happen with the PP. In terms of the borders, 
this normally comes through the demand to control ports and airports, the main 
entry gates to the region: “Second, we want to be able to decide on our own 
model, assuming full powers in the management of ports and airports and ...”115 
(PA/CA AND 2008: 244); and “In the next four years, we aspire to have a Statute 
of Autonomy endowed with the competencies that the Canary Islands calls for, 
especially those relating to the management of our airports, coasts, inter-island 
air transport and the management of our marine resources ...”116 (CC CI 2011: 
4). 
When it comes to an autonomous tax agency, both parties call for the 
creation of agencies like the ones that the “historic” regions of the Basque 
Country and Navarre have: “We claim our own Tax Agency with the same 
 
114 STC 85/2016 28th April 2016 (FJ 3), STC 31/2010 28th June 2010, and STC 80/1993,8th 
March 1993. 
115 “En segundo lugar queremos poder decidir sobre nuestro propio modelo, asumiendo las 
competencias plenas en la gestión de puertos y aeropuertos y...”. Own translation in the main 
text. 
116 “En los próximos cuatro años aspiramos a contar con un Estatuto de Autonomía dotado de 
las competencias que reclama Canarias, especialmente la relativa a la gestión de nuestros 
aeropuertos, costas, transporte aéreo interinsular y la gestión de nuestros recursos marinos...”. 
Own translation in the main text. 
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competences as Catalonia...”117 (PA/CA AND 2008: 43); and “The creation, within 
the Canarian Public Treasury, of a Tax Agency to collect, in addition to the REF 
and the agreed and assigned taxes, the direct taxes (IRPF and Sociedades), 
regardless of the destination that is given to its collection.”118 (CC CI 2011: 11). 
In terms of the autonomous police, which currently can be found in the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, and Navarre, both parties seem to have the same 
understanding of developing a true autonomous police and not only a 
complementary force: “Demand from the central government the competences 
and funding for the definitive implementation of the Autonomous Police.”119 
(PA/CA AND 2012: 59); and “The creation of the Canarian Police is reaffirmed to 
raise the levels of security in the Islands and reinforce the administration of 
Justice from the regional Government of the Canary Islands for a better service, 
with guarantees of efficiency, to our entire society.”120 (CC CI 2007: 28). 
The local level is mentioned in the same way as the PSOE and the PP do. 
The Counties, Cabildos and Municipalities need to have more competences to 
be devolved to them in order for them to develop as part of the region rather than 
a separate level. Examples of the delegation of more competences to the local 
bodies are: “Devolving competences from the regional government to the 
Municipalities in relation to matters linked to the provision of services to the 
citizens, accompanied by unconditional financing that allows their financial 
autonomy.”121 (PA/CA AND 2008: 98); and “Complete the competence devolution 
process to the Cabildos and Municipalities.” (CC CI 2007: 150).  Examples of the 
local bodies as part of the region are: “The PA/CA is committed, in coherence 
with its municipalist tradition, to a revitalisation of the role of Municipalities in 
 
117 “Reivindicamos una Agencia Tributaria propia con las mismas competencias que 
Cataluña…”. Own translation in the main text. 
118 “La creación, dentro de la Hacienda Pública Canaria, de una Agencia Tributaria que 
recaude, además de los impuestos del REF y los cedidos, los impuestos directos (IRPF y 
Sociedades), independientemente del destino que se le dé a su recaudación.” Own translation 
in the main text. 
119 “Demandar al Estado las competencias y financiación para el impulso definitivo a la Policía 
Autonómica.”. Own translation in the main text. 
120 “Se reafirma la creación de la Policía canaria para elevar los niveles de seguridad en las 
Islas y refuerza la administración de Justicia desde el Gobierno de Canarias para una mejor 
atención, con garantías de eficiencia, a toda nuestra sociedad.”. Own translation in the main 
text. 
121 “Traspaso de competencias desde la junta a los municipios de materias relacionadas con 
la prestación de servicios a los ciudadanos, acompañada de una financiación incondicionada 
que les permita autonomía financiera.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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Andalusian public life, an issue that has to materialise in the integration between 
the municipal administrations and the regional administration.”122 (PA/CA AND 
2000: 16); and “In this sense, CC  will lead a series of measures aimed at actively 
promoting the policies carried out by the public administration as a whole 
(Regional Government, Municipalities and Cabildos) with total respect ...”123 (CC 
CI 2007: 14). Again, and like both SWPs, the statement of reorganising the 
competences between the three levels is mentioned across the three electoral 
periods in both regions to make the administration more efficient. In comparison 
to SWPs, regionalist parties demand more competences to be devolved to the 
regions, including more competences that belong exclusively to the state. These 
competences are aimed to fully develop the autonomy of the region, for example, 
by having tax agency, police, borders, and international activity that is purely 
regional. The ideological position of the PA/CA and CC does not affect, 
apparently, the calls for more competence and their nature. 
- Testing the hypotheses 
As regards to distance, it can be observed that this factor has a degree of 
effect on competence distribution. If the hypothesis was that the further away a 
region is from the centre, the more likely a party is to call for more competences 
to be devolved, the manifestos seem to point in this direction. The further away a 
region is, the higher the calls for more competences to be devolved to the region. 
As one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to the Canary Islands, the more 
competences are called for by parties. Despite this general effect of distance, 
there is a decrease in the emphasis of these calls over time. This negative 
tendency can be due to the culmination of the competences that can be devolved 
to the regions according to the constitutional architecture and the Statutes of 
Autonomy, but this does not fade away the effect of this explanatory variable. 
 
122 “El Partido Andalucista se compromete, en coherencia con su tradición municipalista, a una 
revitalización del papel de los municipios en la vida pública Andaluza, cuestión que ha de 
concretarse en la integración de las administraciones municipales en la administración 
autonómica.”. Own translation in the main text. 
123 “En este sentido, Coalición Canaria liderará una serie de medidas encaminadas a fomentar 
de manera activa las políticas llevadas a cabo en el conjunto de la administración pública 




Distance was theorised to affect the position of parties on competence distribution 
in a positive way. With this analysis, hypothesis H1.F can be confirmed. 
The regions, over the past decades, have expanded the number of 
competences that they are exercising, reducing the competences that they can 
still demand. If the number of competences that can still be demanded is reduced 
over time, consequently, the fewer competences can be requested, and 
therefore, the less emphasis for more competences to be devolved. This can be 
summarised by the following statement: “We have lived in the last almost thirty 
years an intense political decentralisation in which the PSOE has played a 
decisive historical role. In the Canary Islands the change and the decentralising 
force of the autonomic principle has been spectacular and, why not say it, with 
an extremely positive balance. Political autonomy has taken root in the Canarian 
society.”124 (PSOE CI 2007: 68). Despite this, there is still more decentralisation 
to be done, and this is emphasised more in the outer-peripheral region of the 
Canary Islands: “Self-government has two complementary aspects: improving 
the management of competencies already delegated and increase the material 
scope on which to exercise it; that is, more and better self-government.”125 (CC 
CI 2011: 117).  
 Developing more the above argument, the Canary Islands is affected by 
distance in another way. This region adds to the general call for more 
competences the fact that this request is based on the negative impact that 
distance has on the region. In order to overcome the latter, this factor is used as 
the base for more competences to be devolved to the archipelago: “...the Canary 
Islands were able to manage a part of their calls to be able to adequately exercise 
part of its competences in terms of the public services that the Autonomous 
Community has, however we are still a long way from solving the problems 
 
124 “Hemos vivido en los últimos casi treinta años una intensa descentralización política en la 
que el Partido Socialista Obrero Español ha jugado un papel histórico decisivo. En Canarias 
el cambio y la fuerza descentralizadora del principio autonómico ha sido espectacular y, por 
qué no decirlo, con un balance extremadamente positivo. La autonomía política se ha 
enraizado en la sociedad canaria.”. Own translation in the main text. 
125 “El autogobierno tiene dos vertientes que se complementan: mejorar la gestión de las 
competencias ya asumidas y aumentar el ámbito material sobre el que ejercerlo; es decir, más 
y mejor autogobierno.”. Own translation in the main text. 
267 
 
derived from our multiple insularity and remoteness ...”126 (CC CI 2011: 10). Not 
only distance has a direct effect on the competences that the archipelago already 
has, but also in the way the centre exercises its own: “... or what ultraperificity 
imposes on the State, within the scope of its competences, the need to modulate 
its policies when those circumstances of insularity and remoteness demand it 
...”127 (CC CI 2011: 188). The references that parties use to request the 
recognition of the distinctive characteristics that affect the archipelago, which are 
basically distance and fragmentation, are the pillars on which new competences 
are called for to precisely correct their negative effects. 
 Focusing on fragmentation, the analysis shows two very different results 
that go in opposite ways. On one hand, spatial fragmentation seems to favour the 
call for more competences in order to avoid its negative impact. From the 
analysis, distance and spatial fragmentation come together. Both are the main 
distinctive characteristics that need to be recognised in order to avoid their 
negative impact on the region, and this comes through the devolution of more 
competences. On the other hand, political-administrative fragmentation seems to 
undermine the call for competences due to the importance that the Provincial 
Councils, Counties, and Cabildos have in the regional reality, as expected. This 
undermining effect seems to increase as one reaches the Canary Islands. This 
can provide evidence to confirm that the undermining effect of political-
administrative fragmentation increases as one moves away from the centre in 
relation to the increasing importance of these ruling bodies for the local 
populations. This can be illustrated in the following statements: “…in such a way 
that the strengthening of regional power must not imply, in any way, the 
undervaluation of the other two institutional elements." “128 (PSOE CI 1999: 47); 
“The commitment to greater prominence of the Cabildos is irreversible. The 
 
126 “...Canarias logró una parte de sus reclamaciones para poder ejercer adecuadamente parte 
las competencias y servicios públicos que la Comunidad Autónoma ostenta, todavía estamos 
muy lejos de conseguir que se atiendan totalmente las especiales dificultades de nuestra 
múltiple insularidad y lejanía...”. Own translation in the main text. 
127 “...o en que la ultraperificidad imponga al Estado, en el ámbito de sus competencias, la 
necesidad de modular sus políticas cuando esas circunstancias de insularidad y lejanía así lo 
demanden...”. Own translation in the main text. 
128 "...de tal forma que el fortalecimiento del poder regional no ha de implicar, en modo 




Cabildos will be the main administration par excellence.”129 (PP CI 2011: 23); and 
“The Cabildos, as the authentic island governments and institutions of the 
Autonomous Community, will be endowed with a more stable framework ...”130 
(Rodríguez Rodríguez CC Official Diary 1999 núm 3: 12). Reinforcing the region 
with more competences in detriment of the Cabildos can have a negative impact 
on the life of the local populations in each island, and therefore, the call for more 
competences to the region is undermined by the importance of these local island-
based bodies. Without this deep effect of fragmentation, the calls for more 
competences would be higher, as there would be no opposing ruling body that 
would be undermined by this. 
 With this analysis, hypothesis H2.F can be partially confirmed via the 
political-administrative dimension of fragmentation. The calls for more 
competences for the regions are undermined by the importance that the 
Provincial Councils and Counties have in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, and 
the Cabildos in the Canary Islands, and this increases as one reaches the outer-
periphery. Although parties in Castilla-La Mancha (e.g. PSOE C-LM 1999: 98-
100) and Andalusia emphasise the importance of the local bodies (e.g. PA/CA 
AND 2008: 28; PP AND 2012: 122), this increases when one turns to the Canary 
Islands. In this last region, they seem to act as the “true” ruling body and not the 
region itself, and this situation further undermines the ability of any other 
administrative level to increase its importance via, for example, calling for more 
competences to expand its influence. The positive results for spatial 
fragmentation can be taken into consideration when observing the effects of the 
combination of both dimensions of fragmentation in the Canary Islands. 
According to the above, the combination of the two dimensions of fragmentation 
in the Canary Islands can turn parties to stronger pro-periphery positions on some 
occasion. The negative effect of political-administrative fragmentation is still 
present, but there is a genuine concern of all parties to avoid the overall negative 
impact of both dimensions of fragmentation. The more competences the region 
has, the more this negative effect can be overcome. These two contradicting 
 
129 “La apuesta por un mayor protagonismo de los Cabildos es irreversible. Los Cabildos serán 
la administración gestora por excelencia.”. Own translation in the main text. 
130 “Los Cabildos, como auténticos gobiernos insulares e instituciones de La Comunidad 
Autónoma, serán dotados de un marco más estables...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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results are challenging, and they should be further analysed to outline the causal 
mechanism that can explain them, but for the current research, the results can 
be used only to partially confirm the stated hypothesis. 
Turning to the hypotheses that deal with the control variables party type, 
ideology, and structure, the conclusions are as follows. Party type was 
hypothesised to observe regionalist parties calling for more competences for the 
regions in comparison to both SWPs. The analysis shows that hypothesis H7.I 
can be confirmed. The regionalist parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands 
seem to call for more competences that the SWPs. Ideology appears to have the 
same effect as for the saliency of the regional level, and the analysis confirms 
hypothesis H8.F. The ideological position of parties does not influence the 
emphasis for more or less competences for the regions. The PP and the CC are 
both right/centre-right parties, but the former seems to call for less competences 
for the regions than the latter. It has to be acknowledged that the ideological 
position of parties affects the way the PSOE and the PP articulate their attitudes 
toward competence distribution, but the comparison with the results for the 
PA/CA and CC point in the direction of considering the importance of ideology in 
relation to party type when it comes to both SWPs. Putting emphasis on the 
PSOE and the PP, the hypothesis (H9.F) for the interaction between party type 
and the ideological position of parties can be confirmed. The PSOE, as shown, 
calls for more and more important competences in comparison to the PP. This 
can be reasoned in the fact that this left/centre-left party is more willing to 
incorporate other social groups into a broader political project, and one way can 
be by fulfilling the need via more and more important competences, even those 
that belong exclusively to the central government, in order to achieve the aim. 
The PSOE calls for competences that belong exclusively to the state in both 
regions, but these are contextualised to the needs of the region, as its structure 
suggests.  
The final hypothesis deals with the structure of the parties, with the focus 
on both SWPs. This analysis confirms hypothesis H10.C. Not only does the 
PSOE call for more competences than the PP to be devolved to the regions, but 
also the nature of these competences changes. The competences that in some 
occasions are called for by the PSOE, are those that could be considered as 
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belonging to an independent state, and they are called for to address the interest 
of the regions. The call and nature of the competences are in relation to the needs 
of the regions and not to those of the centre exclusively. Therefore, the call for 
competences are highly contextualised, having more horizontal variation than the 
PP, which is limited by the centre. One of these limits can be precisely the 
competences that belong to the central government. Figure 6.6 summarises the 
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 The manifestos for all parties in all regions and for the three electoral 
periods in terms of the articulation of a regional identity can be generalised using 
the following statement. Identity is referred to by parties in two main blocks: on 
one hand, the sources of identity, and on the other hand, the articulation of the 
identity itself. SWPs tend to refer to the first block with more emphasis, the 
sources of identity, and less to the second. In comparison, when it comes to the 
PA/CA and CC, both mention the sources and the articulation of identity itself with 
the same intensity. They position themselves on the defence of a strong regional 
identity, which is articulated in a national way in both cases and in all the electoral 
periods. The factors that affect the most this dependent variable are distance, 
fragmentation, party type, ideology, and party structure. There is not enough 
evidence to conclude whether polycentricity has a clear effect or not 
 As it has been outlined, identity is approached in two different bocks, and 
in Castilla-La Mancha, both SWPs do not seem to develop any of the two. There 
are only highly indirect references to some kind of identity that comes from the 
identification of the hydraulic resources as part of the Castilian identity, which 
seems to be a salient issue in the new regionalism is Spain (Lopez-Gunn 2009: 
3070-371). Therefore, it can be stated that, in Castilla-La Macha, both the PSOE 
and the PP do not refer to the articulation of a regional identity itself. The reason 
for this can be twofold. The first reason is the lack of deep rooted historical 
characteristics that are used to articulate a regional identity as it has been done 
in the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia with a regional language, or a 
regional culture like in Andalusia or the Canary Islands: “Regions that do not know 
or cannot forge their identity will harm their people and their territories. Some put 
the accent on their history or on their nationalist ideologies; Castilla-La Mancha 
has put it, from its configuration as an Autonomous Community, in its majority will 
expressed for the last 16 years: HAVING VOICE...”131 (PSOE C-LM 1999: 3). In 
Castilla-La Mancha, the most common issue that the local population share are 
 
131 “Las regiones que no sepan o no puedan forjar su identidad perjudicarán a sus gentes y a 
sus territorios. Algunos ponen el acento en su historia o en sus ideologías nacionalistas; 
Castilla-La Mancha lo ha puesto, desde su configuración como comunidad autónoma, en su 
voluntad mayoritariamente expresada desde hace 16 años: TENER VOZ..”. Own translation in 
the main text. 
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the hydraulic resources such as the rivers Segura, Jucar, Guadiana, and Tajo: 
“We do not want to shield any river. This region is a very solidary region, it does 
not intend to make exclusive use of water if others need it and we have more, but 
we have to enrich ourselves with our water and we must fight for the defence of 
the interests of the men and women of Castilla-La Mancha”132 (Dolores de 
Cospedal PP Official Diary Castilla-La Mancha 2007 núm. 2: 17). The second 
reason is that the regional identity in Castilla-La Mancha is, at its best, weak. This 
is because it identifies with the centre. The possible regional identity that can be 
found in Castilla-La Mancha coincides with the Spanish national identity. When 
parties in Castilla-La Mancha refer to the Spanish national identity, they are also 
referring to the Castilian regional identity. How this Spanish national identity is to 
be understood is not outlined. 
 SWPs in Andalusia display a different dynamic in relation to the two blocks. 
The references are a mixture of possible sources and the articulation of the 
regional identity in Andalusia. The references to the sources of a regional identity 
can be observed for both parties in the many references to the need for promotion 
and protection of the regional culture and heritage through various methods, such 
as cultural programmes and the use of public media: “... as a unique element of 
the Andalusian cultural heritage.”133 (PSOE AND 2008: 92); and “... for the 
enhancement of the heritage and identity of our peoples and cities ...”134 (PP AND 
2008: 127). These references can also come through recognising the need to 
develop the distinctive characteristics of Andalusia in a new Statute of Autonomy 
as in 2000: “The guarantee of distinctive features...”135 (PSOE AND 2000: 15).  
The important references in Andalusia come in the second block, the 
articulation of the regional identity. An example of these references to the 
articulation of a regional identity can be found in the PP for the elections of 2008 
and 2012, making use of the term andalucismo constitucional: “The PP 
 
132 “No queremos blindar ningún río. Esta Región es una Región muy solidaria, no pretende 
hacer un uso exclusivo del agua si los demás la necesitan y a nosotros nos sobra, pero 
tenemos que enriquecernos con nuestra agua y hay que luchar por la defensa de los intereses 
de los hombres y mujeres de Castilla-La Mancha.” Own translation in the main text. 
133 “...como elemento singular del patrimonio cultural andaluz.”. Own translation in the main 
text. 
134 “...para la puesta en valor del Patrimonio y señas de identidad de nuestros pueblos y 
ciudades...”. Own translation in the main text. 
135 “La garantía de los hechos diferenciales...”. Own translation in the main text. 
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inAndalusia establishes its ideological base on Constitutional Andalusism”136 (PP 
AND 2008: 15). The PSOE also refers to the issue of the regional identity, but 
without introducing an specific term for it: “... cohesive in social and territorial 
matters, proud of its cultural identity and its history ...”137 (PSOE AND 2000: 5); 
and “... to contribute to the knowledge of the history and common signs of identity 
of all Andalusian citizens.”138 (PSOE AND 2008: 22). 
Both the PSOE and the PP articulate an Andalusian regional identity that 
is not only compatible with the Spanish identity, but also part of it: “Mr. Chávez, 
we have always believed that Andalusia, our culture, our identity and our interests 
can be developed without confrontation, suspicion, or confusion with the whole 
of Spain in a common future project.”139 (Siaz PP Official Diary 2000 núm. 3: 58). 
Andalusia´s identity is part of the Spanish national identity for both SWPs. The 
main difference is that there is more emphasis on a distinct regional identity in 
Andalusia than in Castilla-La Macha. The reason for this is that they compete in 
the periphery, where the centre has to compete with the reaction of the local 
population using identity as a distinctive marker. The centre, through the SWPs, 
interacts with regional identities through a Spanish national identity which is 
capable of incorporating the former. The common ground that the PSOE and the 
PP share is that none refer to the Andalusian identity as national or as a 
nacionalidad. The difference in the case of Andalusia when comparing the two 
SWPs is that the PSOE tries to make the Spanish national identity compatible 
with the Andalusian regional identity, whilst the PP tries to assimilate the latter to 
the former. 
When it comes to the Canary Islands, the same behaviour can be 
observed. In this region, the references are also divided into the references to the 
sources and the articulation of the regional identity itself. The SWPs feel 
comfortable discussing the articulation of a regional identity, but again, without 
 
136 “El Partido Popular de Andalucía sienta su base ideológica en el Andalucismo 
Constitucional.”. Own translation in the main text. 
137 “...cohesionada en lo social y en lo territorial, orgullosa de su identidad cultural y de su 
historia...”. Own translation in the main text. 
138 “...para contribuir al conocimiento de la historia y las señas de identidad comunes de toda 
la ciudadanía andaluza.”. Own translation in the main text. 
139 “Señor Chaves, siempre hemos creído que Andalucía, nuestra cultura, nuestra identidad y 
nuestros intereses pueden ser desarrollados sin confrontación ni recelos ni guirigáis con el 
conjunto de España en un proyecto de futuro común.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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considering it a national, nacionalidad, or incompatible identity with the Spanish 
one. The analysis shows that the PSOE and the PP, in all three elections, refer 
with more or less degree of emphasis, to a Canarian regional identity, but their 
references are not directed to consider it in-depth nor giving it a status that could 
make it stand in equal consideration as the Spanish national identity. Rather than 
referring to the Canarian regional identity as a distinct identity, they refer to it 
using other labels, such as distinctiveness features: “... and taking into account 
the unique characteristics of the Canarian culture.”140 (PSOE CI 2007: 14). Using 
the two blocks in which the references to a regional identity can be divided into, 
both SWPs are comfortable dealing with the fist block, the possible sources of 
the Canarian regional identity, but their references to the second block, its 
articulation, are determined by which party develops it. Again, the PSOE tries to 
make the Spanish national identity compatible with the Canarian identity and the 
PP tries to make assimilate it to the Spanish national identity. 
Although a general behaviour can be observed in approaching regional 
identities, there are verifiable differences between the PSOE and the PP, and 
these appears to be determined by their ideological position and structure. 
Left/centre-left parties, more willing to incorporate other cultural groups, are open 
to develop a peaceful coexistence between regional and national identities. This 
is the case of the PSOE, which stands on this position. Although an SWP, it is 
able to stretch the boundaries of the Spanish national identity to make it 
compatible with the identities found in the regions. This is reinforced by the 
degree of freedom that its regional branches have. These two elements, in 
combination, grants the PSOE the capacity of incorporating regional identities to 
a more inclusive Spanish national identity without them being in a dichotomous 
relation. The opposite happens with the PP. Being a right/centre-right and highly 
integrated party limits its action when dealing with regional identities. This does 
not mean that the party does not acknowledge them, but the relation with the 
Spanish national identity is very determined by the centre. In other words, the 
Castilian-centred Spanish national identity that the PP defends is not as capable 
of incorporating regional identities as the broader Spanish national identity of the 
 
140 “...y teniendo en cuenta las singularidades propias de la cultura canaria.”. Own translation 
in the main text. 
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PSOE. These limitations are reinforced by the action of its regional branches, 
which highlight the articulation of a regional identity which is subordinated to the 
Castilian-centred Spanish national identity, as shown in the case of Andalusia. 
Overall, both SWPs deal with regional identities with the attitude of recognising 
them, but the extension of this recognition is determined by their ideological 
position and structure. 
In comparison to the PSOE and the PP, both regionalist parties have the 
same emphasis on developing the Andalusian and Canarian identities as national 
identities or nacionalidades, but they differ in terms of the compatibility of these 
identities with the Spanish national identity. In the Spanish context, as outlined in 
chapter 3, this national identity is referred to as a nacionalidad, which is 
compatible with the Spanish national identity but in a hierarchical relation. These 
nacionalidades are below in rank to the Spanish national identity. They have 
constitutional recognition, but initially thought for the so-called historical regions, 
such as Catalonia or the Basque Country. Both the PA/CA and CC stand on the 
position of recognising their regions as nacionalidades. References to the 
Andalusian and Canarian identities are made by using most of the time the term 
identidad, but both parties refer to this identity as a national reality, national 
identity or nacionalidad, being this the key point. The references to this identity 
are done, as in the case of both SWPs, using the same two blocks. The difference 
with the SWPs is the relation with the Spanish national identity, dictated by the 
constitutional recognition described above. 
When it comes to the inner-periphery of Andalusia, the references to the 
sources of the regional identity come through the same methods as for the PSOE 
and the PP. These are, for examples, references to the historical heritage or 
regional culture: “The Andalusian culture is our main resource of distinctiveness 
for progress and our main patrimony for a coexistence based on the values of 
tolerance, autonomy and equity.”141 (PA/CA AND 2008: 180) or “The environment 
is, together with our culture, the greatest heritage of the Andalusians and a basic 
 
141 “La cultura andaluza es nuestro principal recurso de singularidad para el progreso y nuestro 
principal patrimonio para una convivencia asentada en los valores de tolerancia, autonomía y 
equidad.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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collective right ...”142 (PA/CA AND 2012: 21). Adding to this explicit content of the 
manifestos, the political texts incorporate other non-textual elements that can 
help reinforce this argument. The PA/CA, in the case of the manifesto of 1999, 
introduces a quote at the beginning which refers to the Manifiesto de la 
Nacionalidad de 1919143, where Andalusia is defined as a national reality. 
In terms of the articulation of  the Andalusian identity, the PA/CA refers to 
it as a national reality or nacionalidad: “We understand the national reality of 
Andalusia as a living process ...”144 (PA/CA AND 2008: 27) and “... rational 
articulation of the different institutional areas and in the national self-government 
of Andalusia.”145 (PA/CA AND 2012: 26). There is a doubtless reference to the 
identity in Andalusia as being national. The next step is identifying when this 
national identity is part of a broader Spanish national identity. In other words, 
what kind of relation can be established with the Spanish national identity. The 
party defines this national identity as: “We understand the national reality of 
Andalusia as a living process and subject to continuous transformation and 
progress. Our identity has been shaped throughout centuries, thanks to the 
influence and contribution of multiple cultures and will continue being built and 
enriched in this way, thanks to the incorporation and integration of the new 
Andalusians who today come to live and work in our land.”146 (PA/CA AND 2012: 
33). These references to the national identity in Andalusia, the sources and the 
articulation of it, and the way it is put forward can be summarised concluding that 
for this regionalist party, the national identity of Andalusia, although it is 
 
142 “El medio ambiente es, junto con nuestra cultura, el mayor patrimonio de los andaluces y 
un derecho colectivo básico...”. Own translation in the main text. 
143 The Manifiesto de la Nacionalidad de 1919 was articulated by the Asamblea de Cordoba 
de 1919, where Andalusia was declared a national reality. The current Statute of Autonomy of 
2007 refers to this manifesto of 1919 to define Andalusia as a historic nationality, as stated in 
art. 2 of the Constitution of 1978. 
144 “Entendemos la realidad nacional de Andalucía como un proceso vivo...”. Own translation 
in the main text. 
145 “...articulación racional de los distintos ámbitos institucionales y en el autogobierno nacional 
de Andalucía.”. Own translation in the main text. 
146 “Entendemos la realidad nacional de Andalucía como un proceso vivo y sometido a continua 
transformación y avance. Nuestra identidad se ha conformado a lo largo de los siglos, gracias 
a la influencia y a la aportación de múltiples culturas y va a seguir siendo construida y 
enriquecida de este modo, gracias a la incorporación e integración de los nuevos andaluces 
que hoy vienen a vivir y trabajar a nuestra tierra.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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articulated with its own distinct components, is compatible with other identities 
with an equal status, being them national or not. 
The nationalism shown by the PA/CA seems to be able to cohabit with 
other identities, including the Spanish national identity: “Today the citizen shares 
multiple identities. Especially the Andalusian feels identified, to a greater extent 
than another Spanish citizen, with the different institutionalised territorial areas 
(Europe, Spain, Andalusia, his city). This is because our Andalusian identity is 
not exclusive but a melting pot, and where others see incompatibilities, we 
appreciate complementarity and synergy.”147 (PA/CA AND 2008: 30). The identity 
that is developed by the PA/CA can be classified as a national identity that is able 
to complement itself with other identities, including a Spanish national identity, on 
an equal footing. 
When it comes to the outer-peripheral region of the Canary Islands, the 
analysis shows that in comparison to Andalusia, the regional identity articulated 
by CC goes a step further in its articulation. The references to the regional identity 
are as national or as a nacionalidad: “Recognition of the Canary Islands as a 
national entity.”148 (CC CI 2007: 29); and “The definition of the Canary Islands as 
an Atlantic Archipelago, in which its unique identity gives it the character of 
Nationality ...”149 (CC CI 2011: 119). This national identity seems to be different 
from the Spanish identity, and its origins are stated to be different: “... historical 
character of the Canarian identity that alludes to the aboriginal populations until 
our days, happening through the Rome of the III century dc., the Europe of the s. 
XIV, the Spanish conquest, belonging to the Spanish State or integration into the 
European Union, without forgetting relations with America and Africa.”150 (CC CI 
 
147 “Hoy el ciudadano comparte múltiples identidades. Especialmente el andaluz se siente 
identificado, en mayor medida que otro ciudadano español, con los distintos ámbitos 
territoriales institucionalizados (Europa, España, Andalucía, su ciudad). Esto es así porque 
nuestra identidad andaluza no es excluyente sino mestiza y donde otros ven 
incompatibilidades nosotros apreciamos complementariedad y sinergia.”. Own translation in 
the main text. 
148 “Reconocimiento de Canarias como entidad nacional.”. Own translation in the main text. 
149 “La definición de Canarias como Archipiélago Atlántico, en el que su identidad singular le 
confiere el carácter de Nacionalidad...”. Own translation in the main text. 
150 “...carácter histórico de la identidad canaria que aluda a las poblaciones aborígenes hasta 
nuestros días, pasando por la Roma del siglo III dc., la Europa del s. XIV, la conquista 
castellana, la pertenencia al Estado español o la integración en la Unión Europea, sin olvidar 
las relaciones con América y África.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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2011: 199); and “Our geographical situation is determining in the conformation of 
a distinct identity forged through five centuries…”151 (CC CI 2007: 7). 
The references to the sources of the identity of the region are the same as 
for the other parties (PSOE, PP, and the PA/CA) and regions: “Study, rescue and 
promotion of cultural values linked to the landscape and identity of the Canary 
Islands ...”152 (CC CI 2007: 40); and “We will promote the Canarian cultural 
heritage as a social and cultural structuring tool of the Canary Islands, as well as 
a means for the assumption of our identity as a people.”153 (CC CI 2011: 61). 
Regarding the visual references, observed also for the PA/CA in Andalusia, it 
must be stated that CC does not use quotations like the PA/CA, but instead, 
introduces the so-called independence flag154 in the manifestos of 2007 and 
2011, in the same way as the estelada155 flag is used in Catalonia. 
Regarding the articulation of a Canarian identity, the same question as 
with the PA/CA in Andalusia has to be asked: is this national identity compatible 
with other identities, especially with the Spanish identity? The answer seems to 
be positive in general terms: “We are in the Spanish State for history and tradition, 
and we defend our nationality status, with the maximum of competences ... in it 
we will be”156 (CC CI 1999: 7); and especially “The trace of our origins can never 
be destroyed. Neither conquest, nor colonization, nor centralism, have managed 
to erase the certainty of this living culture. We do not deny the ties that bind us to 
the peoples of Spain, but we claim our own personality. In the historical process, 
we have assimilated those elements that have served to conform our peculiarity 
and rejected what did not suit it. Our universality is based on our 
 
151 “Nuestra situación geográfica es determinante en la conformación de una identidad distinta 
forjada en cinco siglos...”. Own translation in the main text. 
152 “Estudio, rescate y promoción de los valores culturales ligados al paisaje y a la identidad 
de Canarias...”. Own translation in the main text. 
153 “Promoveremos el patrimonio cultural canario como un instrumento de vertebración social 
y cultural de Canarias, así como un medio para la asunción de nuestra identidad como 
pueblo.”. Own translation in the main text. 
154 The independence flag of the Canary Islands has the same design as the current flag but 
substituting the constitutional coat of arms with 7 green stars organised in a circle. This flag 
was designed in 1964 by the Movimiento por la Autodeterminacion e Independencia del 
Archipielago Canario (MPAIAC) to be the future flag of an independent Canary Islands. 
155 The estelada is the independence flag in Catalonia, which substitutes the traditional Senyera 
by introducing a blue triangle with a white star in the left side of the flag. 
156 “Estamos en el Estado español por historia y tradición, y defendemos nuestro estatus de 




primordialism.”157 (CC CI 2007: 30). The national identity in the Canary Islands, 
according to CC, is distinct with its own characteristics but compatible with the 
Spanish national identity. This coincides with the definition of the Andalusian 
national identity articulated by the PA/CA. 
There is a key difference between CC and the PA/CA when it comes to 
the compatibility of the regional identity with the Spanish national identity, and the 
ideological position of these two parties seems to reinforce this difference. 
Although both regionalist parties defend the identity of Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands as national or as a nacionalidad, compatible, to some extent, with an 
inclusive Spanish national identity, these nacionalidades become compatible or 
not depending on the social values that the parties support. The statements 
where the PA/CA defines the Andalusian nacionalidad as universal and result of 
a melting pot (PA/CA AND 2008: 30) are expected from a left/centre-left party 
that embraces universalism and openness to other cultures. In the case of CC, 
although some manifestos contain references to this (CC CI 1999: 7), the right 
social values that this party support makes this degree of compatibility less 
evident. The references that CC makes to the past of the Canary Islands as a 
territory conquered by Castilla (CC CI 2011: 199), and being the Canarian identity 
distinct from the Castilian-centred national identity (CC CI 2007: 7), seem to point 
in the direction of articulating a nacionalidad which is compatible but to a lesser 
extent in comparison to the Andalusian nacionalidad that the PA/CA articulates. 
Introducing elements that differentiate the Canarian nacionalidad in opposition to 
the Castilian-centred national identity can contribute to conclude that CC, in 
contrast to the PA/CA, frames the Canarian nacionalidad as less compatible with 
the Spanish national identity. 
This degree of compatibility locates CC in a grey zone where the 
compatibility of the regional identity is put forward, like the PA/CA does, but the 
language used to construct the identity can point in the direction of having them 
 
157 “Nunca podrá ser destruida la huella de nuestros orígenes. Ni la conquista, ni la 
colonización, ni el centralismo, han logrado borrar la certidumbre de esta cultura viva. No 
negamos los lazos que nos unen a los pueblos de España, pero reivindicamos nuestra propia 
personalidad. En el proceso histórico, hemos asimilado aquellos elementos que han servido 
para conformar nuestra peculiaridad, y rechazado lo que no se acomodaron a ella. Nuestra 
universalidad se fundamenta en nuestro primitivismo.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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separate and not together in a broader Spanish national identity. It seems as if 
CC wants to keep both identities separate and only admitting their interaction but 
not their mixture. On the other hand, the PA/CA seems to accept that both the 
Andalusian and Spanish national identity can, through their cohabitation and 
interaction, articulate a broader identity with the incorporation of characteristics 
of both. Feeling Andalusian can mean feeling Spanish and vice versa. CC keeps 
this difference solid. Feeling Canarian does not necessarily mean feeling Spanish 
and vice versa, but at the same, it is not incompatible per se. This is the reason 
for considering the attitude of CC to be somehow in a grey zone. The ideological 
position of CC can help reinforce this idea, as right/centre-righted orientated 
parties are less open to include other social groups and identities.  
When it comes to the effect of distance and fragmentation (spatial 
dimension), the development of the reasoning can be the following. The more 
differentiated nacionalidad that CC defends in comparison to the PA/CA can point 
in the direction of distance and fragmentation making a major difference in this 
degree of distinctiveness. In the analysis of the dependent variable constitutional 
status of the region, CC suggested that the outer-periphery of the Canary Islands 
needs to have some kind of recognition in the Constitutional architecture of the 
state by the means of enumerating the distinctive characteristics that this region 
has in comparison to the rest. These characteristics were distance and 
fragmentation. Taking this as a starting point, the same can be said for identity, 
but in this case, CC argues that the national identity of the Canary Islands is 
based, to some extent, on distance and insularity: “... that reinforces and 
enhances our identity and our self-government through the recognition of the 
peculiarities derived from the double insularity and the distance, ...”158 (CC CI 
2007: 8). Through these kinds of statements, CC introduces distance and 
fragmentation as part of as distinct national identity in the Canary Islands.  
The incorporation of distinctive characteristics of the region to the regional 
identities is not an exception of the Canary Islands: “For Andalusians, 
commitment to the environment is not only a matter of rationality but also of 
 
158 “...que refuerce y potencie nuestra identidad y nuestro autogobierno mediante el 
reconocimiento de las singularidades derivadas de la doble insularidad y de la lejanía,...”. Own 
translation in the main text. 
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affectivity and symbolism because our territory, the conservation of Andalusian 
landscapes, the protection of our environment and our aesthetics, constitute our 
own identity.”159 (PA/CA AND 2008: 198). As it has been shown, both regionalist 
parties make use of the distinct characteristics of the region to reinforce its 
identity, but distance and fragmentation draws a difference between Andalusia 
and the Canary Islands. In the case of the Canary Islands, distance and 
fragmentation are pillars on which to articulate the Canarian nacionalidad, which 
does not happen for the case of Andalusia. Distance and fragmentation make the 
Canarian identity more distinct from the Spanish national identity than the 
Andalusian identity. Therefore, it can be observed that distance and 
fragmentation make the regions of Andalusia and the Canary Islands differ from 
each other when it comes to their identity. The emphasis on distance and 
fragmentation in the Canary Islands as part of its identity seem to be made mainly 
by CC in opposition to the PSOE and the PP. The latter use these characteristics 
to support a differentiated constitutional status of the region rather than for a 
distinct Canarian identity. 
- Testing the hypotheses 
Distance was theorised to affect positively the articulation of the regional 
identity in a positive way. The analysis, especially for CC, shows that being far 
away from the centre has fostered the strengthening of a Canarian identity. The 
isolation from the centre fuelled the articulation of a very distinct identity, which is 
based on this distance that separates the archipelago from any other sources of 
identity. As one can observe, distance has also contributed to the articulation of 
an Andalusian identity, not as a distinctive characteristic like in the Canary Islands 
but as a factor that has favoured its differentiation from the Castilian-centred 
Spanish national identity found in Castilla-La Mancha. Therefore, hypothesis 
H1.G can be confirmed. The lack of development of the Canarian identity by both 
SWPs undermines this possible conclusion but nonetheless, the behaviour of CC 
points in the direction of confirming the stated hypothesis.  One possible reason 
 
159 “Para los andalucistas el compromiso con el medio ambiente no es sólo una cuestión de 
racionalidad sino también de afectividad y simbolismo porque nuestro territorio, la 
conservación de los paisajes andaluces, la protección de nuestro medio ambiente y de nuestra 
estética, constituyen nuestras propias señas de identidad.”. Own translation in the main text. 
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for this might be the fear of the PSOE and the PP to articulate a Canarian identity 
so different from the Spanish national identity that is might serve as a bases for 
some independentist groups to support secession, going against the interest of 
the centre.  
Added to distance as a source of identity, the same can be said for 
fragmentation. With this in mind, hypothesis H2.G can be rejected. One could 
expect fragmentation to affect negatively the articulation of a strong regional 
identity due to the identification of the local population with the local ruling bodes 
and their islands, in the Canary Islands, as the main source of identity. The 
opposite seems to be occurring. Fragmentation is used to strengthen the regional 
identity via the incorporation of this distinctive characteristics as part of the 
Canarian identity. The references to these distinct characteristics linked with 
identity are made primarily by CC, whereas the PSOE and the PP mentioning 
distance and fragmentation as characteristics of the region in general and not 
specifically in relation with the Canarian identity. Looking at the elections for the 
local bodies in this region might help reinforce this conclusion of open the door to 
a new understanding of this phenomenon, so this should be taken with caution. 
As a general conclusion for parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, 
the following can be said. The PA/CA and CC call for the regional identities to be 
recognised as national realities, nacionalidades, or national identities. Both 
national identities are defined as distinct from a Castilian-centred national identity 
(PA/CA AND 2012: 4; CC FRAM 2008: 3-5), but at the same time and to some 
extent, compatible with a more inclusive Spanish national identity (PA/CA AND 
2008: 30; CC CI 1999: 7). However, the degree of this compatibility is graduated 
by their ideological position. This analysis can be used to confirm hypothesis 
H7.J. These two regionalist parties support the recognition of the regional 
identities found in Andalusia and the Canary Islands as nacionalidades in contrast 
to the PSOE and the PP. The ideological position of parties makes a deeper 
difference in comparison to the above dependent variables. This was 
hypothesised that left/centre-left parties are able to articulate a more inclusive 
national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties. The analysis also 
suggests that hypothesis H8.G can be confirmed. Both the PSOE and the PA/CA 
seem to have a more inclusive vision of the identity that they articulate, being this 
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national or regional. It can be said that the degree of compatibility is higher in 
left/centre-left parties. 
This degree of compatibility of the regional identities and the Spanish 
national identity can be further observed in the interaction between party type and 
ideology. With these results, hypothesis H9.G can also be confirmed. The PP and 
CC articulate a Spanish/Canarian national identity which is less inclusive of 
others, especially of each other. This can be translated in the former having 
milder pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PSOE, and the latter stronger 
pro-periphery positions than the PA/CA. When it comes to the party structure of 
the PSOE and the PP, hypothesis H10.D can be also confirmed. The highly 
integrated structure of the PP allows less contextualisation from its regional 
branches to stretch the limits of a strong Castilian-dominated Spanish national 




























Figure 6.7. Description of the articulation of regional and national identities. 
3. DISCUSSION 
After qualitatively analysing the manifestos to address the different 
hypotheses designed for the comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, 
Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the purpose of this section is to contrast the 
main findings with the structured questions contained in the methodological 
chapter to conclude how distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, party type, 
ideology, and party structure shape party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage. Overall, the main finding points in the direction of identifying all these 
factors to have some degree of impact. 
In this qualitative analysis, contrary to the findings in the previous chapter, 
distance seems to have a pro-periphery effect on how parties’ position on the 
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centre-periphery cleavage. This can be one of the main contributions of this 
chapter, showing that distance has a much deeper effect than the one observed 
in the previous analysis. The effects of distance on the behaviour of parties can 
be linked to the increasing effect of the abstraction level as one moves away from 
the centre, strengthening their pro-periphery positions. This is, the effect of 
distance increases exponentially when reaching the Canary Islands. The process 
of territorialisation makes the region increase its importance amongst the 
peripheral population, making parties shift to adapt to this new circumstance, 
adopting stronger pro-periphery positions as the region becomes the location of 
the loyalties of the regional population. Both SWPs and regionalist parties turn to 
the characteristics of the region to find a link to fulfil the place attachment feeling 
that the local population requires to form part of an identifiable political 
community. Not only distance seems to have a pro-periphery overall effect on 
party behaviour, but this factor is explicitly referenced to justify their positions. 
This can be better observed in the analysis for the dependent variables 
constitutional status of the region and position on competence distribution. 
Parties acting in the Canary Islands not only call for a more differentiated 
constitutional status of the region, but also, this differentiated this needs to 
gravitate around the fact that the distance from mainland negatively affects its 
development. In order to deal with this situation, parties increasingly call for more 
competences to be devolved to the region to address the negative impact of the 
ultra-peripherality of the region. 
The above analysis shows that fragmentation provided unpredicted effects 
from the ones theorised. The expected undermining effect on the pro-periphery 
positions of parties is only observed in the results for the dependent variable 
saliency of the regional level. The unexpected results come in relation to the 
dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, clearly going 
in opposite direction to the theorised expectations. According to this, one can say 
that fragmentation has a mixture of effects on the positions of parties that reveals 
its complexity. First, the expected negative effect of political-administrative 
fragmentation was confirmed when analysing the saliency of the regional level, 
preventing a strong regional discourse and undermining the pro-periphery 
positions of parties, finding its strongest impact in the Canary Islands. In this last 
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region, the coincidence of the spatial and political-administrative dimensions of 
fragmentation deepens even more the negative effect of fragmentation as a 
whole, based on the perfect match between the island-based loyalties (spatial 
dimension) and the island-based ruling bodies (political-administrative 
dimension). The positive effects of fragmentation on the pro-periphery positions 
of parties can be observed when articulating a differentiated constitutional status 
of the region and a strong regional identity in the Canary Islands. In the case of 
these two dependent variables, when both dimensions of fragmentation coincide, 
parties turned to stronger pro-periphery positions in order to reinforce the region. 
Parties in this outer-periphery strengthen their pro-periphery positions based on 
acknowledging this explanatory variable as an intrinsic characteristic of the region 
without which it cannot be understood. It can be observed how fragmentation is 
taken as one of the pillars on which the strong image of the archipelago region is 
built on. 
The analysis of the dependent variable position on competence 
distribution shows contrasting results themselves, but they provide a clear picture 
of its complexity. Initially, and as expected, parties, although calling for more 
competences to be devolved to the regions, draw the line in not undermining the 
competences that the Provincial Councils, Counties, and Cabildos already have. 
This refers to the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, 
undermining the ability of parties to have strong pro-periphery positions when 
calling for more competences to be devolved to the regions. This increases with 
distance from the centre, as the importance of these local bodies also increases. 
Opposite to this and the theoretical expectations, spatial fragmentation pushed 
parties to adopt strong pro-periphery positions to deal with its negative effects at 
the regional level in the Canary Islands. As it can be observed, depending on the 
dimension analysed, the results are different. This complexity is even greater 
when considering both dimensions in combination. When both dimensions of 
fragmentation coincide like in the Canary Islands, picturing the same theorised 
deep negative effect as in the analysis of the saliency of the regional level outlined 
above, parties, instead of adopting the same behaviour, turned to stronger pro-
periphery positions. With this in mind, the overall conclusion in relation to the 
position on competence distribution can be that the importance of Provincial 
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Councils, Counties, and Cabildos prevents parties from calling for more 
competences to be devolved to the regions, but the combination of the two 
dimensions of fragmentation can make them, on some occasions, turn to strong 
pro-periphery positions based on their determination to avoid its negative impact.  
As a whole, the complexity of these findings regrading this factor points in 
the direction of further researching for a possible casual mechanism that might 
help understand its real impact on the centre-periphery. Having two very different 
and opposing scenarios highlights the importance of scrutinising fragmentation 
more in detail to observe if, on one hand, the two dimensions proposed here are 
related to each other in a different way, and on the other hand, one is a catalyst 
of the other. Providing an example of the latter, if the importance of the political-
administrative dimension of fragmentation is exacerbated by the spatial 
dimension of fragmentation, then this would change the understanding of 
fragmentation as a whole. In this sense, the important dimension of fragmentation 
would be the political-administrative one, and spatial fragmentation would then 
be considered, for example, as a causal mechanism to explain the deep impact 
that local ruling bodies have, as the Cabildos do in the Canary Islands, in insular 
regions. 
The anticipated negative effect of the degree of polycentricity was only 
observed, to some extent, in the saliency of the regional level. This leads to 
preliminary conclude that the existence of two very dichotomous centres of power 
(low degree of polycentricity) undermines, to some extent and as theorised, the 
pro-periphery positions of parties, acknowledged by all in the Canary Islands in 
contrast to the high degree of polycentricity found in Castilla-La Mancha and 
Andalusia. As suggested by both the analysis and the data used to set the 
number of competing centres of power in the three regions, the degree of 
polycentricity is the factor that might further shape party positions and not the 
mere existence of different centres of power per se. Despite this observation, this 
needs to be further analysed as the inferences for the rest of the dependent 
variables are not enough to confirm or reject the remaining hypotheses, Added 
to this, the analysis also highlighted the fact that the strong effect of the degree 
of polycentricity in the Canary Islands can be linked to fragmentation, making this 
factor one of its main effects or consequences. 
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As with the quantitative analysis, party type seems to deeply shape how 
parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage. Party positions turn more 
or less pro-periphery according to which type of party articulates the discourse. 
With this in mind, regionalist parties seem to have the strongest pro-periphery 
positions than SWPs. This behaviour can be observed in Andalusia and the 
Canary Islands, where these parties push for more benefits for their regions. This 
is the expected outcome. Their centre of loyalties, located in the peripheries, 
determines their positions. SWPs have a more complex behaviour to be 
examined. The importance of the Autonomous Communities pushes the PSOE 
and the PP to contextualise their discourse, especially at the regional level. The 
results obtained for the quantitative analysis already suggested this complexity. 
The PSOE and the PP do not have pro-centre positions per se because of their 
nature, but their defence of the regions is shaped by it. The need to adapt to a 
decentralised political arena in combination with their nature as state-wide 
political actors make them adapt to the regional context with pro-periphery 
positions but with less emphasis than regionalist parties. This can be observed in 
the three regions. The pro-periphery positions are clear, but moderated by their 
defence of the centre, limit not present in the case of the regionalist parties. 
Ideology has interesting results that need to be further explained. This 
qualitative analysis clarifies the results obtained in the previous quantitative 
analysis and the overall expectations. According to the main findings, ideology 
does not have a significant effect on the saliency of the regional level and the 
distribution of competences, where the social values in isolation do not have a 
deep influence. The opposite happens with the variables constitutional status of 
the regions and identity, where the social values were expected to play a major 
role. The social values that characterise left/centre-left parties, in contrast to 
right/centre-right parties, allows the former to articulate a discourse that is more 
open to include minorities and other social groups. The articulation of a more 
inclusive constitutional status of the region and national identity can be observed 
in the case of the PSOE and the PA/CA. In general terms, these results can be 
used to conclude that the ideological position of parties can be considered on its 
own and not necessarily always in interaction with party type to understand its 
real impact on how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. 
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Turning to the interaction of party type and ideology, the results suggest 
the following conclusions. Putting the focus on the PSOE and the PP, the analysis 
shows that their ideological orientation moderates their competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage. This can be better seen for the analysis of the variable 
saliency of the regional level. The social values that the PSOE defends makes 
this party incorporate the regions with a much more important role than the PP. 
In this sense, the PSOE empowers the regions to make them stand as an intrinsic 
part of the state and not as an appendix or branch of the central government as 
the PP does, strengthening its pro-periphery positions. In the case of these two 
SWPs, the interaction of ideology and party type makes the PSOE shift, overall, 
to stronger pro-periphery positions than the PP. The position of regionalist parties 
can also be considered to be moderated by their ideological positions. The 
constitutional status of the region and identity are examples of this. The PA/CA, 
a left/centre-left party, calls for a symmetrical constitutional recognition of the 
regions in contrast to CC, a right/centre-right party, which calls for the defence of 
the elites in the Canary Islands via a Special Status of the region, shifting this 
party to stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison. The Andalusian identity 
that the PA/CA articulates is more inclusive and opened to be included in a 
broader national identity, like the Spanish national identity, in opposition to CC, 
which sees the Canarian identity as less integrated, again, reinforcing the pro-
periphery positions of this party.  
The structure of SWPs, in light of the analysis, also make parties along the 
centre-periphery cleavage shift to milder or stronger pro-periphery positions. As 
outlined in the methodological chapter, this variable applies only to the PSOE and 
the PP due to the difficulties of dealing with regionalist parties with the same 
accuracy. The main conclusion is that the importance of the horizontal variation 
found for the PSOE in comparison to the PP allows the former to address the 
regional demands and interests with more precision. This produces a shift of the 
PSOE to stronger pro-periphery positions. The other side of the coin is that this 
high degree of horizontal variation also produces tensions with the state-wide 
party. The location of the loyalties at the centre acts as a limit to the action of the 
regional branches. This cannot be observed in the PP with the same intensity. Its 
highly integrated structure prevents its regional branches to stretch the limits, 
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resulting in a very consistent position. In the PSOE, where the degree of freedom 
is higher, the contextualisation of the discourse is greater. This can be an 
example of how the pressure of the regional branches affect the overall position 
of parties, but this can also be top-bottom. The shift of positions in Andalusia and 
the Canary Islands when putting forward a federal symmetric system is an 
example of how the state-wide party imposes its views. This horizontal variation 
can also be affected by their ideological position. The social values of the PSOE 
can contribute to contextualise more the responses to the demands of the 
regions. The calls for more and more important competences by this party in 
comparison to the PP can be an example of this interaction of party type, 
ideology, and structure, resulting in overall stronger pro-periphery positions. 
Considering all the factors analysed in this chapter, Figure 6.8 locates the PSOE, 
the PP, the PA/CA and CC in the pro-centre/periphery continuum according to 
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As this qualitative analysis has shown, two main conclusions can be 
outlined. First, the explanatory variables distance, fragmentation, and 
polycentricity shape party competition, to some extent, as expected. From the 
three, distance has the most profound effect. Fragmentation provided some 
interesting contradicting results which were not theorised, expanding the 
understanding of its complex impact on the positions of parties. Polycentricity has 
to be further analysed as the inferences where not enough to study its real impact 
with the necessary depth, although the results point in the direction of confirming 
the expected influence. The above results can confirm that, in the case of Spain, 
these factors need to be qualitatively analysed to grasp their real impact in 
shaping party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. Second, the control 
variables confirmed the theorised behaviour. The results obtained in the previous 
quantitative for these variables have been further validated with this qualitative 
analysis of the manifestos, reinforcing the expectations. Table 6.1 contains all the 
hypotheses tested in this analysis. 
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Table 6.1- Hypotheses Confirmed or Rejected for the Qualitative Analysis 
VARIABLES 



















H1.D-as distance from the 
centre increases, parties 
will emphasise more the 
regional level as one 
moves from Castilla-La 
Mancha to Andalusia, and 
finally to the Canary 
Islands 
Rejected 
H1.E-as distance from 
the centre increases, 
parties will emphasise a 
more differentiated 
constitutional status of 
the region as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha 
to Andalusia, and finally 
to the Canary Islands 
Confirmed 
H1.F-as distance from the 
centre increases, parties 
will increase the demands 
for more competences as 
one moves from Castilla-
La Mancha to Andalusia, 
and finally to the Canary 
Islands 
Confirmed 
H1.G-as distance from 
the centre increases, 
parties will increase the 
emphasis on a 
differentiated identity as 
one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 




undermines the articulation 
of a strong regional level 
by parties due to the 
acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local 
level, increasing its effects 
as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 
the Canary Islands 
Confirmed 
H2.E-fragmentation 
weakens the ability of 
parties to articulate a 
differentiated 
constitutional status of 
the region due to the 
acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local 
level, increasing its 
effects as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha 
to Andalusia, and finally 
to the Canary Islands 
Rejected 
H2.F-fragmentation 
reduces the ability of 
parties to call for more 
competences for the 
region due to the 
acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local 
level, increasing its effects 
as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 





erodes the ability of 
parties to articulate a 
strong regional identity 
due to the 
acknowledgement of the 
importance of the local 
level, increasing its 
effects as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha 
to Andalusia, and finally 






weakens the ability of 
parties to articulate a 
strong regional, increasing 
its effects as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 
the Canary Islands 
Confirmed 
H3.E-polycentricity 
undermines the ability of 
parties to articulate a 
differentiated 
constitutional status of 
the region, increasing its 
effects as one moves 
from Castilla-La Mancha 
to Andalusia, and finally 




the ability of parties to call 
for more competences for 
the region, increasing its 
effects as one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 




reduces the ability of 
parties to articulate a 
strong regional identity, 
increasing its effects as 
one moves from 
Castilla-La Mancha to 
Andalusia, and finally to 





H7.G-the PA/CA and CC 
emphasise more the 
regional level than the 
PSOE and the PP 
Rejected 
H7.H-the PA/CA and CC 
emphasise more a 
differentiated 
constitutional status of 
the region than the 
PSOE and the PP 
Confirmed 
H7.I-the PA/CA and CC 
emphasise more the 
devolution of competences 
to the region in comparison 
to the PSOE and the PP 
Confirmed 
H7.J-the PA/CA and CC 
emphasise a stronger 
regional identity in 
comparison to the 





position of parties makes 
no difference in the 
emphasis of the regional 
level  
Confirmed 
H8.E- the PSOE and the 
PA/CA are able to 
articulate a more 
inclusive constitutional 
status of the region  
Confirmed 
H8.F-the ideological 
position of parties does not 
influence the calls for more 
competences for the 
regions  
Confirmed 
H8.G- the PSOE and 
the PA/CA are able to 







PARTY AND IDEOLOGY 
 
H9.D-the PSOE, in 
comparison to the PP, is 
more capable of 
incorporating the regions 
Confirmed 
H9.E-the PA/CA, in 
comparison to the CC, 
emphasises a more 
symmetrical 
Confirmed 
H9.F-the PSOE calls for 
more and more important 
competences to be 
devolved to the regions in 
comparison to the PP in 
Confirmed 
 H9.G-the PP and CC 






with a more important role 
in relation to the centre 
constitutional status of 
the region 
order to fulfil the needs of 
the social groups in the 
peripheries 
in comparison to the 
PSOE and the PA/CA 
PARTY STRUCTURE 
H10.A-the greater 
autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE 
makes them emphasise 
more the importance of the 
regional level in 
comparison to the PP, 




autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE 
increases the possibility 
to articulate a more 
differentiated 
constitutional status of 
the regions in 
comparison to the PP, 




autonomy of the regional 
branches of the PSOE 
increases the possibility to 
call for more and more 
important competences for 
the regions in comparison 




autonomy of the 
regional branches of the 
PSOE increases the 
possibility to reinforce 
the coexistence of 
multiple identities in 
comparison to the PP, 


































The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the findings from the two types of 
analysis (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 2003: 375-378), helping to maximise the 
inferences, and by doing so, obtain a full and detailed picture of the case study 
(Yin 2006: 42). Along this investigation, the aim of the research process was to 
obtain an answer to the main research question: what factors shape party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage? In modern political systems, and 
through the processes of state-/nation-building, relations between centres and 
peripheries are a salient issue that have a major effect not only on the sub-national 
(Keating 2008: 60-64), but also on the national (Caramani 2004: 32) and 
supranational levels (Bartolini 2004: 19-21). This chapter presents a full narrative 
that, by approaching the different hypotheses underlined in the theoretical 
framework, engages with the main research question and contributes to enlarge 
knowledge on the topic. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first 
section merges and discusses the findings from the two previous analyses for both 
the explanatory and control variables in relation to the main hypotheses and 
research question. The second section outlines the intended contributions to the 
literature on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage. 
2. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
- Explanatory variables 
 Considering distance, the conclusions are the following. With the centre-
periphery continuum outlined in the conceptual framework in mind, the distance 
that separated a peripheral region from the centre made a difference on how a 
party behaved. The effect of distance was the theorised and expected one. As one 
moved towards the outer-periphery, the pro-periphery positions of parties 
consolidated and strengthened. Both SWPs and regionalist parties were equally 
affected, so it can be considered a deeply rooted transversal factor. This was better 
shown by the qualitative analysis in relation to the dependent variables 
constitutional status of the region, competences distribution, and identity, 
confirming hypotheses H1.E, F, and G. The results for the dependent variable 
saliency of the regional level, rejecting hypothesis H1.D, could be explained in 
relation to the fact that the manifestos were articulated for regional elections, and 
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independently from the distance that separated a peripheral region from the centre, 
these documents addressed this level with the same degree of intensity in all 
regions. 
 SWPs, to avoid the negative effects of the abstraction level, adapted to the 
characteristics of the region in order to find a link between their state-wide 
discourses and the psychological attachment feeling towards the territory that the 
regional population had. By doing so, they were able to articulate a discourse 
where the peripheral regions were part of a broader state-wide political project. 
The analysis showed that this adaptation increased as one approached the Canary 
Islands, revealing a strengthening of the pro-periphery positions of the PSOE and 
the PP. The results for the regionalist parties also confirmed this expectation. The 
further away from the centre, the more these parties emphasised the 
characteristics of the region to increase the territorialisation process and articulate 
a discourse where the periphery was naturalised as distinct because it was far 
away and placed in opposition to the centre. This resulted in CC having stronger 
pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PA/CA, putting more emphasis on the 
territorial attachment feeling of the regional population towards the region, 
identifying it as distinct. Both SWPS and CC strengthened their pro-positions as 
one reached the Canary Islands by emphasising a more differentiated 
constitutional status of the region, called for more competences to be devolved to 
the region, and articulated a more differentiated regional identity. 
 Remoteness on its own, without considering other distinctive markers, was 
salient enough to shift party positions, and as one moved towards the outer-
periphery, these became strongly pro-periphery. The analysis also showed that 
distance was explicitly mentioned and referenced by parties as the raison d´etre 
for these positions, and this was done where this factor was theorised to have its 
deepest impact, in the outer-periphery. All parties based their positions on the fact 
that the Canary Islands were far away from the centre. This was not observed in 
Andalusia, and therefore, it can be assumed that the impact of this factor increased 
exponentially as one moved away from the centre. The results for the qualitative 
analysis can be used to confirm, to some extent, that without disentangling the 
centre-periphery cleavage into the more specific labels of inner- and outer-
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periphery, the variation observed between Andalusia and the Canary Islands could 
not have been explained with the necessary detail. Both regions belonged to the 
general category of “peripheral” regions, but this was not enough to understand 
how, in this case, distance strengthened the pro-periphery positions of parties as 
one moved from Andalusia to the Canary Islands. 
 Notwithstanding the above conclusions, which provide a detailed picture of 
the effect of distance for the specific comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, 
Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the quantitative analysis did not show the 
expected results for the rest of Spain, rejecting all hypotheses (H1.A, B, C). Two 
possible reasons could explain this. First, the limitation of the data. According to 
the strata in which Spain was divided into (Figure 4.1), the only outer-periphery 
region was the Canary Islands with a ratio of 13:1 in favour of the inner-peripheral 
regions. This might have faded or concealed the effect of distance as it was not 
expected to have the same deep impact in the inner- as in the outer-periphery. To 
avoid this, and in the case of Spain, this explanatory factor needs to be considered 
in a qualitative manner to fully understand its effect on party competition. Second, 
the importance of other factors apart from distance. Not only there was a 
considerable difference between the number of inner- and outer-peripheries, but 
the presence of important regional distinctive markers in some of the former 
regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Galicia) could also have faded or 
concealed the effect of distance. The strong pro-periphery positions of parties in 
these regions gravitated around other dominant factors such as identity or 
language, which were not present in Andalusia or the Canary Islands. In 
comparison, the effect of these distinctive regional characteristics might have been 
more salient than distance. When these were not present, as the qualitative 
analysis showed, distance had the deep theorised effect. 
 Focusing on fragmentation, the analyses showed an overall mix of expected 
and unpredicted effects on party behaviour. Comparing this factor with distance, it 
can be concluded that the results provided a less consistent scenario to the one 
theorised. It was hypothesised that the two dimensions of this explanatory variable 
(spatial and political-administrative dimensions) would have an overall negative 
effect on the pro-periphery positions of parties, counterbalancing the effect of 
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distance. As with the previous factor, the qualitative analysis provided the most 
interesting inferences. Although the analysis of the dependent variable saliency of 
the regional level confirmed, to some extent, the theorised expectations and 
hypothesis H2.D, the unexpected results were linked to the dependent variables 
constitutional status of the region and identity, rejecting hypotheses H2.E and G. 
The analysis of the variable position on competence distribution had contradictory 
results themselves that can enrich this discussion (the results were used to partially 
confirm hypotheses H2.F). 
 Starting with the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, the 
expectations were fulfilled by the results. The main findings showed that the impact 
of fragmentation was overall negative, and even deeper when both the spatial and 
political-administrative dimensions were present, as expected. First, the impact of 
the spatial dimension, only present in the Canary Islands, had the expected 
negative effect when articulating a regional discourse. Second, the impact of the 
political-administrative dimension was expected to affect more negatively the 
Canary Islands in comparison to the other two regions due to the deep roots of the 
island-based political ruling bodies, and the analysis confirmed this. The results 
also signalled a different degree of impact of this dimension in the three regions. 
The importance of the local ruling bodies for the regional populations increased as 
one approached the outer-periphery. Although there was a clear difference 
between the importance of the Cabildos and the Provincial Councils and Counties, 
even between the mainland regions, there was a difference between the centre 
and the inner-periphery. The Provincial Councils and Counties had different 
degrees of importance, and they seem to have been more relevant for the regional 
population in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha. Overall and comparing these 
three regions, the conclusion is that the negative effect of fragmentation, via the 
political-administrative dimension, increased as one reaches the outer-periphery. 
At the same time, when both dimensions of fragmentation coincided in the same 
region, like in the Canary Islands, the pro-periphery positions of parties were 
further undermined. 
 The centre-periphery continuum was again key to understand the regional 
variation in relation to this factor. Without specifying the label “peripheral” regions, 
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the negative effect of fragmentation in Spain could not have been flagged. Not only 
did the negative effect of fragmentation deepened exponentially as one moved 
away from the centre, as the above results showed, but the combination of the 
spatial and political-administrative dimensions in the Canary Islands can be used 
to reinforce the need to approach regional variation with more precision, as the 
centre-periphery continuum did. With the above observations, it can be concluded 
that fragmentation proportionally counterbalanced the positive effect of distance, 
undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties and accentuating its negative 
effect as one reached the outer-periphery. 
 Despite the above findings, they have to be taken with caution. Although the 
effects of fragmentation seem to have been confirmed, to some extent, by the 
qualitative analysis in relation to the dependent variable saliency of the regional 
level, two main limitations have to be acknowledged at this point. First, the 
difficulties to disentangle the effects of fragmentation from those of distance. An 
indicator of this difficulty might be the exponential counterbalance of the effect of 
distance by the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation. As the 
qualitative analysis showed, the further away the region was from the centre, the 
more fragmentation, via the political-administrative dimension, undermined the 
pro-periphery positions of parties. The abstraction level that grounded the effect of 
distance affected the attachment feelings that the regional populations had 
towards the institutions of the centre, and this was also captured, precisely, by this 
dimension of fragmentation. With this limitation in mind, it is hard to differentiate 
the effects of fragmentation from those of distance because both factors affected 
the same attachment feelings that the regional populations had towards the 
institutions of the centre. Second, and in relation to the first limitation, it is difficult 
to measure the real magnitude and impact of the political-administrative dimension 
of fragmentation in comparison to the spatial dimension. The latter dimension was 
relatively easier to measure as the focus is the geographical objective 
fragmentation of the region, and the former was more subjective, and therefore, 
harder to measure. 
 As outlined above, the unexpected results can be observed for the 
dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, rejecting 
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hypotheses H2.E and G. The contradicting results themselves for hypothesis H2.F 
are used here to further expand the argument. Opposite to the theorised 
expectations and the above discussion of the dependent variable saliency of the 
regional level, the results showed that when the two dimensions of fragmentation 
were present, the behaviour of parties turned, sometimes, to strong pro-periphery 
positions. Although this has to be highly contextualised, in this case for Spain and 
the Canary Islands, it can be concluded that not always did this factor lead to an 
undermining of the pro-periphery positions of parties. One possible reason can be 
used to explain this behaviour. The acknowledgement of the impact of 
fragmentation, as outlined in the results for the dependent variable saliency of the 
regional level, was used by parties in the Canary Islands to reinforce the region by 
addressing and overcoming its negative impact. For example, calling for more 
competences for the region was used to counterbalance the negative effect of 
spatial fragmentation. The positive results in the association between 
fragmentation and the distribution of competences in the quantitative analysis can 
also point in this direction, although there was not statistical significance. The same 
was observed in the calls for a differentiated constitutional status of the region. The 
profound impact of political-administrative fragmentation in the Canary Islands was 
used to strengthen the need of recognising this distinctive characteristic as intrinsic 
to the region, without which the archipelago itself could not be understood. Parties, 
in this outer-periphery, aimed to build the region on the bases of considering 
fragmentation as the grounds on which to articulate it. It was not any more a 
dichotomy island versus archipelago, but more a single unit with different 
fundamental characteristics.  
 The rejection of all the hypotheses in the quantitative analysis (H2.A, B, C) 
can be explained, like in the case of distance, in relation to the limitation of the data 
and the importance of other regional distinctive markers. First, spatial 
fragmentation, tested on its own, did not have the expected effect. These results 
can be explained in relation to the low number of archipelagos in Spain. Comparing 
only the Balearic and the Canary Islands to the rest of the mainland regions, with 
a ratio of 8.5:1 in favour of the latter, could have faded or concealed the possible 
impact of this dimension. Second, the importance of other distinctive regional 
characteristics could have been more salient than this factor, fading away the 
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impact of spatial fragmentation. Despite the above, the qualitative analysis showed 
that this dimension still had the expected negative effect in some occasions. As 
with distance, this factor needs to be considered in a qualitative manner. The best 
example of this was the deep effect of the combination of the spatial and political-
administrative dimensions in the Canary Islands. In this region, the deep 
undermining effects of insularity on the pro-periphery positions of parties could be 
considered as the result of the combination of these two dimensions of 
fragmentation, favoured by the “perfect” match between the island and the island-
based ruling body. 
 Turning to the last explanatory variable, polycentricity, the results showed 
that, to some extent, the importance of the theorised degree of polycentricity was 
more decisive than the mere presence of multiple centre of power in terms of 
undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties. The qualitative analysis helped 
to signal a differentiated impact of polycentricity depending on its degree via the 
dependent variable saliency of the regional level, confirming hypothesis H3.D. The 
further analysis of the pleito insular in the Canary Islands showed that the lower 
the degree of polycentricity, the deeper its negative effect and the more the pro-
periphery positions of parties were undermined. Multiple centres of power were 
present in all three regions, but the concentration of competence in two very 
distinct centres of power strengthened its negative impact, as shown in the struggle 
between Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This can be 
used to confirm that, at least in the Canary Islands, it was the concentration of 
competition in two confronting centres of power that accentuated the undermining 
of the pro-periphery positions of parties and not the presence of multiple centres 
of power per se. This can be further confirmed by the quantitative analysis. On the 
contrary to observing the rejection of all the hypotheses (H3.A, B, C) as negative, 
the results could show that the presence of multiple centres of power was not as 
important as the degree of polycentricity, outlined by the qualitative analysis. The 
data used to confirm the number of regions with multiple centres of power in 
comparison to those with only one was not affected by the same limitation as 
distance and fragmentation were, helping to reinforce the utility of these findings. 
Despite this, one limitation can be pointed out here. This investigation, although 
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proposing a possible scale of polycentricity, did not develop a quantitative 
measuring scheme for it to further expand the results for the qualitative analysis. 
 The centre-periphery continuum also helped to explain the variation 
between the three regions. As it can be observed from the data used to establish 
the presence of multiple centres of power (Table 1 in appendix M), the 
concentration of power in small number of centres of power increased (therefore 
decreasing the degree of polycentricity) as one reached the outer-periphery, 
parallel to the intensification of its negative impact, as the qualitative analysis 
showed. With this in mind, it can be concluded that the exponential negative effect 
of this factors deepened when moving away from the centre, in the same way as 
fragmentation, reaching its peak in the Canary Islands. Again, without precising 
the “periphery” into more accurate labels, this would not have been signalled. 
Despite this overall conclusion, this factor needs to be further analysed. For 
example, only the hypothesis for the dependent variable saliency of the regional 
level was approached in the qualitative analysis. In this analysis, there were not 
enough evidence to confirm or reject the hypotheses designed for the dependent 
variables constitutional status of the region, competences distribution, and identity 
(H.3.E, F, G). Another example can be found in the results for the quantitative 
analysis. Although all the hypotheses were rejected, the strong positive association 
between polycentricity and the dependent variable position on competence 
distribution can point in the direction of an unexpected behaviour of parties. The 
more competences the regions have, the more they can be further devolved to the 
local level, where these centres of power could benefit from them. This can push 
parties to call for more competences at a regional level. 
 Two main limitation that affected the findings for all three explanatory 
variables can be highlighted. The first main limitation is linked to the type of 
analysis that has provided the most interesting inferences. Comparing both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, the main limitation is that only the latter 
provided important results. This might produce a scenario where these three 
explanatory variables seem to only deeply affect the specific outer-peripheral 
region of the Canary Islands, undermining the possibility of generalising the 
findings, or in methodological terms, weakening the external validity of this 
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investigation. It is important to outline that the intention was not to present the 
Canary Islands as unique, but to show how these three factors were expected to 
shape party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage in the context of 
exploring how the cleavage itself could be specified to the more concrete labels of 
“centre”, inner-periphery”, and “outer-periphery”. Despite this limitation regarding 
distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity, the results for the party-level control 
variables, as shown below, seem to point in the same direction as the ones 
obtained for the quantitative analysis, not undermining to the same extent the 
possibility of generalising the findings in relation to these variables.  
 The second main limitation is related to the mechanism of triangulation. In 
this research, triangulation has been used to incorporate other sources of evidence 
apart from party manifestos. This has proven very useful for the qualitative 
analysis, but it can be further extended. Added to party manifestos, party 
frameworks, and parliament speeches, one can also acknowledge the importance 
of incorporating other methods of collecting data such as for example in-depth 
interviews with political leaders. In-depth interviews can provide this research with 
a deeper understanding of how parties adapt to the explanatory variables 
introduced here. Although party manifestos are a very good measure of party 
positions, they are also limited by the public to which they are addressed. Normally 
the are very concise and summarised, articulated in a format that is able to 
effectively and efficiently pass on the message to the voter. This limits to some 
extent the understanding of how parties adapt to complex dynamics, specially in 
multi-level state. In-depth interviews would provide a wider picture of the research 
problem, not only for a descriptive, but also for an explanatory approach. 
- Control variables  
 Out of the six control variables, and according to both analyses, the three 
party-level variables impacted the most party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage. In this respect, party type had the most consistent impact on party 
behaviour. It was expected SWPs to have milder pro-periphery positions than 
regionalist parties. The results for both analyses showed that depending on which 
type of party emphasised or adopted a certain position regarding a salient issue, 
this behaviour was more or less pro-periphery, confirming all hypotheses except 
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one (H7.A, B, C, H, I, J). In terms of SWPs, the results confirmed that the positions 
of these parties were overall pro-periphery. Although they located their loyalties at 
the centre, there was no occasion where they adopted specific pro-centre 
positions. Both the PSOE and the PP adapted to a multi-level party competition 
arena by contextualising their preferences to the needs of the different peripheries, 
incorporating them to their state-wide political projects. In comparison, regionalist 
parties had stronger pro-periphery positions. This went in line with their core 
ideology, as they were perceived as the best mechanism to defend the interest of 
the region. With this in mind, the results showed that their consistent pro-periphery 
positions complied with what their main aim was, protect and empower the regions 
to improve their position in relation to the centre.  
 This investigation also turned to one of the main consequences of 
competition between SWPs and regionalist parties. This was, the possible 
strengthening of the pro-periphery positions of SWPs when facing regionalist 
parties. The quantitative analysis rejected all hypotheses (H7.D, E, F). In this 
sense, SWPs did not turn to stronger pro-periphery positions when they faced 
regionalist parties. Despite this, the analysis showed a mixture of interesting 
results, although there was no statistical significance in any of the three dependent 
variables. On one hand, the considerable positive association with the dependent 
variable saliency of the regional level can point in the direction of confirming that 
SWPs tried to engage with regionalist parties in their own agenda, shifting to 
stronger pro-periphery positions. On the other hand, the important negative 
association with the dependent variable distribution of competences can suggest 
that SWPs, when facing regionalist parties, called for fewer competences for the 
regions to prevent these from becoming too strong and pose a real threat to the 
centre, empowered by the action of regionalist parties. A possible conclusion with 
these results in hand can be that the behaviour of SWPs when facing regionalist 
parties has to be more specified and not taken as a whole. SWPs do not turn to 
stronger or milder pro-periphery positions in general terms when they face 
regionalist parties, but their behaviour needs to be contextualised to the issues that 
they are dealing with. 
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 The ideological position of parties was theorised to have, when considered 
on its own, a deep impact when articulating the inclusiveness or not of the position 
that parties adopted along the centre-periphery positions. This is, the pro-
centre/periphery positions were more or less inclusive in relation to the ideological 
position of parties. The qualitative analysis better provided the necessary 
inferences to observe the PSOE and PA/CA were more able to incorporate other 
social groups to their political projects than the PP and CC, being these state-wide 
or regional, confirming hypotheses H8.D, E, F, and G.  This was further supported 
by the quantitative analysis in relation to the dependent variables saliency of the 
regional level and attitudes towards multiculturalism, confirming hypotheses H8.A 
and C. Overall, left/centre-left parties were more able than right/centre-right parties 
to incorporate other social groups to their political projects. The ideological 
orientation of parties did not skew parties to stronger pro-centre/periphery 
positions, but made them more or less inclusive.  
 Considering the interaction of party type and ideology was fundamental to 
understand party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage. The results for 
both analyses showed that the interaction of these two factors could push parties 
to stronger or milder pro-periphery positions based on their degree of 
inclusiveness, confirming most of the hypotheses (H9.B, D, E, F, G). This 
interaction explained, to some extent, the variation observed between parties that 
belonged to the same type. SWPs, according to the above discussion of the control 
variable party type, had overall pro-periphery positions, but the analysis also 
showed a substantial difference between the PSOE and the PP, and this was 
better understood via this proposed interaction. The same happened with CC and 
the PA/CA. Both had stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs, but there was a 
sharp difference between one and the other. Turning the focus to the PSOE and 
the PP, the former was more capable of articulating an inclusive state-wide political 
project which was able to include regional social groups. Both parties had their 
core level at the centre, but the interaction of party type and ideology turned the 
PSOE to stronger pro-periphery positions in order to approach regional needs with 
the willingness to incorporate them to its state-wide political project. The lower 
degree of openness of the PP prevented this party from following the same path. 
This resulted in, although still having pro-periphery positions, these were not as 
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strong as in the case of the PSOE. Applying the same argument to CC and the 
PA/CA, the results were similar but at a regional scale. The less degree of 
openness that CC had in comparison to the PA/CA made the former have stronger 
pro-periphery positions. In the same way as the PP had a strong Castilian-centred 
state-wide project with other social groups in subordination, CC had a strong 
Canarian-centred regional project which was less able to incorporate social groups 
which came from outside the region, skewing its position to the absolute pro-
periphery end of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. In contrast, the PA/CA, 
although still having its core level at the region, was more capable of articulating a 
broader inclusive Andalusian-centred regional project.  
 The variation observed between the PSOE and the PP was also explained 
in relation to their structure. The qualitative analysis showed that the higher degree 
of freedom granted to the regional branches of the PSOE allowed this party to 
contextualise more its response to the regional demands than the PP, confirming 
all hypotheses (H10.A, B, C, D). This resulted in the PSOE having, or being able 
to sustain, stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PP. Not only the 
regional branches of the PSOE had more freedom to adapt their discourses, but 
they were also freer to have different positions depending on the region in which 
they acted. This was better observed when analysing the dependent variable 
constitutional status of the region. The variation found in the regional branches of 
the PSOE in Andalusia and the Canary Islands in comparison to Castilla-La 
Mancha can be taken as the result of the ability to contextualise their discourses 
to the needs of the regions in which they acted. Another important conclusion is 
that this degree of freedom granted to the regional branches in the PSOE also 
fuelled conflict with the state-wide party. Again, focusing on the same dependent 
variable as before, the state-wide party seemed to have pressurised the regional 
branches in Andalusia and the Canary Islands to change their positions to make 
them coincide with the one coming from the centre. This resulted in a change from 
calling for a federal system to the defence of the current State of Autonomies. This 
internal conflict was not observed with the same intensity in the PP, mainly 
because the control of its regional branches by the state-wide party, via a lower 
degree of freedom, was stricter.  
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 From the three regional-level control variables, regional identity had the 
deepest impact on party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. The results 
showed that strong regional identities made parties shift to consistent pro-
periphery positions, confirming hypotheses H5.B and C. From the two indicators, 
the political regional identity feelings, which measured the identitarian feelings of 
the elites, had the strongest effect. In comparison, the results showed that the 
indicator popular regional identity feelings, although with the same statistical 
significance, did not affect party behaviour with the same intensity. In this sense, 
what influenced the pro-periphery positions of parties in relation to this factor was 
what the elites felt and not so much the sentiment that the regional population had. 
In contrast to these findings, the presence of strong regional languages, which 
were expected to have the same effect as the previous factor, did not skew parties 
to pro-periphery positions. The results rejected all hypotheses (H6.A, B, C). The 
findings for these two factors, which represented strong distinctive markers, can 
be used to conclude that the mere existence of these characteristics did not push 
parties to pro-centre/periphery positions as such. They have to be observed in 
context and not taken as a whole, being part of the dynamic process that the 
centre-periphery cleavage represents. Finally, the results for the economic 
development of the regions rejected all the hypotheses (H4.A, B, C). A possible 
reason for this might be a limitation in the indictor chosen. Although the economic 
development of the regions was thought to be important, especially if party 
competition was multi-dimensional, the difference between the regional and 
national average GDP per capita did not shift party positions along the centre-
periphery cleavage. The economic development of regions is a broad term which 
includes many indicators, such as for example unemployment rate. This variety of 
indicators and the results for the quantitative analysis suggest that this factor may 
be better measured with an index rather than with single indicators.  
 With the results provided by both analyses, a possible answer to the main 
research question can be the following. All three explanatory variables seem to 
have shaped party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, but their 
degree of impact was different. The factor with the strongest influence was 
distance. As one moved away from the centre, parties clearly strengthened their 
pro-periphery positions. This affected both SWPs and regionalist parties. Following 
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this came fragmentation, which had a lesser, but still important, degree of impact. 
This thesis has outlined how this factor shifted party positions both to milder and 
stronger pro-periphery positions, depending on the dependent variable analysed. 
Although this has to be highly contextualised, it can be concluded that in the case 
of the Canary Islands, the theorised undermining effect of the pro-periphery 
position of parties was not always present. Overall, the analysis of this factor 
provided a scenario which was less consistent in comparison to distance. In this 
sense, the pro-periphery positions of parties were undermined in some cases, but 
in other occasions, they were reinforced. Polycentricity was the factor that lest 
affected party competition, but nonetheless, the results showed that the weakening 
of the pro-periphery positions of parties came via its degree of impact and not the 
presence of multiples centres of power per se.  
 From the control variables, the party-level control variables were the factors 
that most strongly skewed party positions along the centre-periphery cleavage. 
From these, party type had the deepest impact. Regionalist parties had stronger 
pro-periphery positions than SWPs. When it came to their ideological orientation, 
this factor did determine the inclusiveness or not of the positions they adopted. 
The interaction of these two factors was the key element that can made these 
positions further shift to one end or the other of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. 
Left/centre-left SWPs, influenced by their ideological orientation, had stronger pro-
periphery positions than right/centre-right SWPs due to the resistance of the latter 
to incorporate other social groups to the power relations of the centre. The inverse 
happened with regionalist parties. Right/centre-right regionalist parties had 
stronger pro-periphery positions than left/centre-left regionalist parties due to their 
opposition to incorporate social groups outside the periphery to the power relations 
in the peripheries. Finally, the structure of SWPs also influenced their positions 
along the cleavage. The PSOE, a less integrated party, was able to have stronger 
pro-periphery positions than the PP because of the degree of freedom granted to 
its regional branches so that they could contextualise the response of the party to 
the interest of the regions. 
 Turning to the regional-level control variables, the factor that fulfilled the 
theorised expectations was regional identity. The presence of strong regional 
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identities made parties adopt stronger pro-periphery positions. The same was 
theorised to be the case for regional languages, but the results showed, to some 
extent, unexpected results. SWPs might have seen these as a threat to the national 
language of the centre, and therefore, turned to milder pro-periphery positions in 
order to defend it.  In the case of regionalist parties, the results matched the 
expectations, and this factor strengthened their pro-periphery positions. The 
economic development of the regions did not strengthen or undermined the pro-
periphery positions of parties overall, with very insignificant results. 
3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE ON PARTY COMPETITION 
ALONG THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE 
- Explanatory variables 
As it can be observed, distance was the explanatory variable which most 
affected party behaviour. There is no discussion in the literature in relation to the 
possible effect of this factor on how parties compete along the centre-periphery 
cleavage in Spain. The results provided in this investigation can be used to 
approach this gap. The qualitative analysis provided enough inferences to confirm 
that, in Spain, the further away a peripheral region is from the centre, the more 
abstract the latter becomes to the regional populations and the more parties have 
to adapt to it by shifting to stronger pro-periphery positions. In more general terms, 
and to some extent, this confirms that the Construal Level Theory can be 
successfully applied in comparative politics (Idson and Mischel 2001; Fujita et al. 
2006; Trope and Liberman 2010). The main consequence is that the regional 
populations, in order to replace their place attachment feelings towards the centre 
as this becomes vaguer with distance, turn to the region to fulfil this need (Hosany 
et. al. 2015: 484). Distance affects both types of parties with the same intensity, 
and it is used as a distinctive marker to articulate either a state-wide or regional 
identity linked to a specific political project (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). In regions with 
no other distinctive markers such as regional identities or languages, distance can 
fuel strong regionalism (Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 124). For future research 
agendas, these findings can be exported to observe if the effect of distance 
outlined in this investigation can be also found in other insular and archipelago 
regions as the general hypothesis proposes (H1), which represent the typical 
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outer-periphery (Baldacchino and Milne 2000; Baldacchino 2010; Fazi 2012; 
Hepburn and Baldacchino 2013). 
 In the same way as the literature on party competition along the centre-
periphery cleavage in Spain has overlooked the effect of distance, fragmentation 
has received no attention. To fill in this gap, the results in the case of Spain suggest 
that this factor could be analysed with more precision via the two proposed 
dimensions. The contribution to the literature in relation to this factor is twofold: on 
one hand, based on the confirmed expectations, and on the other hand, centred 
on the unexpected outcomes. Regarding the confirmed negative effects of this 
explanatory variable, theoretically, it can be proposed that the Construal Level 
Theory goes beyond the region as a whole. As the centre becomes more abstract 
with distance, the regional population not always turns to the region in order to 
locate its loyalty. This can be placed on a specific territory (island) and/or local 
body (Provincial Councils and Cabildos) which correspond to the sub-regional 
level. This effect is even deeper when the two dimensions of fragmentation 
coincide. In this sense, the centre and the periphery are both abstract, and the 
islands are the logical territory to which the local population turns to fulfil its 
attachment feelings. When it comes to the unexpected outcomes, this thesis has 
also provided encouraging results. The main contribution to the literature in this 
respect, to further expand on the above, is that not always the undermining effect 
of fragmentation is present. The incentives that overcoming the negative effects of 
fragmentation as a whole pose to the parties can be strong enough to make them 
focus on the region instead of approaching them at the sub-regional level. 
Articulating a strong regional level might by the best way to deal with this factor in 
archipelago regions. 
 Generalising these findings to a broader set of cases, the focus can be 
located on the effects of insularity as the result of combining the spatial and 
political-administrative dimensions and how it might affect party behaviour. This 
can add a new perspective of analysis to the literature concerning island 
jurisdiction via the general hypothesis (H2) (Watts 2000; Warrington and Milne 
2007; Hepburn 2012). For example, in terms of party competition in archipelagos, 
this can propose a new dimension. This is, an island-based axis in addition to the 
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typical centre-periphery axis of competition (Ferri et al. 2019: 130-136) to observe 
how fragmentation can articulate island-based versus other identities that 
strengthen sub-regional loyalties (Hache 1998; Hay 2003; Baldacchino 2006). 
Further developing this, insularity can be approached not only as a factor that 
empowers sub-regional units of identification, but also as a way of articulating a 
strong archipelago region via the overcoming of the negative effects of its main 
distinctive characteristic, as explained above. The archipelago peripheral regions 
can be framed by parties around the dimensions of spatial and political-
administrative fragmentation as the essential pillars on which these regions 
themselves relay. This investigation has provided grounds to consider insularity as 
an entangled factor, being at the same time positive and negative for the 
articulation of a strong reginal discourse, and future research agendas can further 
approach this complexity. 
 The main contribution to the literature of the analysis of polycentricity is the 
support to the idea of developing a possible scale of its impact. The presence of 
multiple centres of power does not affect party competition along the centre-
periphery cleavage with the necessary depth, but it is the concentration of power 
struggle in a small number of urban centres what can shift party positions with 
more strength. This has not yet been approached by the literature in the case of 
Spain. The results can be used to confirm that, at least in the Canary Islands, the 
struggle between two very dichotomous centres of power undermined the pro-
periphery position of parties.  In addition, and in line with the general hypothesis 
(H3), the analysis also showed that this undermining effect can be linked to the 
interaction of polycentricity with fragmentation, as part of the literature that deals 
with urban centres and archipelagos suggests (Picornell 2014; Grydehøj et al. 
2015). The impact of this factor has received little attention in relation to party 
competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, and the results contained here 
can be used for future research agendas by providing in-depth understanding of 
polycentricity in the case of Spain. Although these results have to be understood 
inside a specific context, they can be used to propose a comparison between 




- Control variables 
 When it comes to the economic development of the regions, the results 
seem to confirm the existing literature for the case of Spain (Alonso et al. 2015: 
861). The influence of the degree of economic development of the regions seems 
not to have the theorised impact when only one indicator is selected. There are 
different indicators used by the literature to measure the economic development of 
the regions, like for example, the unemployment rate, regional GDP, or economic 
activity (van Houten 2007: 556; Deiwiks et al. 2012:  296; Kyriacou and Morral-
Palacín 2015: 8-9), but the results contained here suggest that considering them 
in isolation is not enough to capture the effect of this factor. An index of economic 
development made of different indicators might be precise enough to measure its 
impact. When it comes to the general literature, for example, on party competition 
in a multi-dimensional political space with the left-right and the territorial axes 
interacting (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 870), or on regionalism (Sorens 2008: 
345-346; Fitjar 2010b: 61), the results show a strong link, but this is not the case 
for Spain (Alonso et al. 2015: 2015: 861), at least, when it comes to the indicator 
selected for this investigation. With the idea of articulating an index of economic 
development of the regions in mind, not only this factor could be further analysed 
in the case of Spain, but also in broader terms, as the general hypothesis suggests 
(H4), to test if the measurements are more precise and its effects are properly 
captured. 
 The results for the control variable regional identity support the existing 
literature on the topic. This factor can be framed as the consequence of multiple 
ethnoterritorial party competition in a country where the centre and the peripheries 
have related to each other on other issues rather than only class struggle (Moreno 
1995: 11). Decentralisation in Spain has contributed to regionalise identities and 
locate loyalties in the regions rather than exclusively in the central state, opening 
the political sphere to increasing number of dual identities and the decline of 
monolithic ones (Beramendi and Máiz 2004: 138). The effect and importance of 
regional identities in contemporary Spain has been thoroughly analysed by the 
literature (Moreno et al. 1998: 65-66; Lecours 2001: 211; Muro and Quiroga 2004; 
28-33), and the results provided here confirm the main findings. Strong regional 
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identities make parties shift to stronger pro-periphery positions. The main 
contribution of this thesis is that regional identities are better approached via two 
main indicators in combination to measure their real impact, as these feelings can 
have multiple dimensions. This has been done focusing, on one hand, on the 
feelings of the regional population through the well know “Moreno question” 
(Pallarés et al. 1997: 151-155; Martínez-Herrera 2002: 433-434; Chernyha and 
Burg 2012: 777-780), and on the other hand, through a historical institutionalism 
perspective (Lecours 2001: 214-215) and the recognition of some regions as 
nacionalidades due to their historic development as distinct political units 
(Martínez-Herrera and Jeffrey 2010: 7-11). These two indicators, as used in this 
investigation, are factors that, overall, favour sub-national mobilisation around 
identity, in harmony with the main literature on the topic (Lecours 2011).  
 In line with the main literature, the findings confirm that this applies for both 
SWPs and regionalist parties. In terms of the latter, the importance of regional 
identities for these parties has been analysed by part of the literature as an intrinsic 
dimension of regional conflict and as part of their core ideology (Urwin 1982: 427-
429; Núñez 1999: 127-133; Alonso et al. 2017: 253-256; Keating 2017: 13-14). 
This pushes regionalist parties to stronger pro-periphery positions, as shown here. 
When it comes to the PSOE and the PP, these, although more complex due to 
their condition as state-wide parties, consider the importance of this distinctive 
marker for the regional population (Keating 1993: 204-210), and position 
themselves in an overall positive attitude when articulating their territorial axis 
(Alonso et al. 2013: 203-206). These results contribute to confirm the already 
existing studies in relation to the importance of strong regional identities and party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. In general terms, these findings can 
be used to explore and compare other salient cases where this factor has a major 
impact, such as the case of Scotland and the UK, testing with new inferences if 
regional identities shift or not party positions to stronger pro-periphery, as the 
general hypothesis suggests (H5). 
 The results for regional languages, linked to strong regionalisms (Wright 
1994: 3; Fitjar 2010a: 53; 2010b: 523-525; Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 122; 
Massetti and Schakel 2016: 61), point in a different direction in the case of Spain. 
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The negative association in the quantitative analysis can highlight a reaction from 
SWPs that was not theorised or expected. Like with regional identities, SWPs were 
expected to adopt stronger pro-periphery positions when regional languages 
where present, but this was not the case, with important negative scores for the 
dependent variables distribution of competences and attitudes towards 
multiculturalism. Part of the literature has observed the same behaviour. A possible 
explanation for this can be the reaction of SWPs to the strengthening of regional 
grievances that come from the Spanish regional autonomy system (Hombrado 
2011: 482-282). As a result of the asymmetric political design of the Autonomous 
Communities in relation to the cultural distinctiveness, this can make the non-
historic regions see themselves as losing influence and importance (Moreno 
1997a: 97-100).  
These grievances can fuel strong regionalist movements in these regions to 
achieve the same influence and importance as the historic Autonomous 
Communities (Giordano and Roller 2004: 2173). One way to avoid these 
grievances to expand amongst the non-historical regions is to prevent the historical 
Autonomous Communities from becoming more empowered by articulating more 
and more elements that differentiate them from the rest. In the case of Spain, the 
negative results observed in the quantitative analysis go in line with this identified 
negative reaction from SWPs. In more abstract terms, this can suggest an 
undermining of the devolution Spanish autonomous process as a whole (Máiz et 
al. 2010; Máiz and Losada 2011), especially coming from the PP (Gómez and 
Cabeza 2013). Generalising these findings, this reaction observed in Spain can be 
also tested using the general hypothesis (H6) in other countries where strong 
regional languages can also cause regional grievances, like for example, in 
Belgium. 
 From the party-level control variables, the factor that most influenced party 
competition on the centre-periphery cleavage was party type. This was, to some 
extent, the expected outcome in line with the existing literature. Most of the seminal 
works that focus on Spain (Libbrecht et al. 2009, 2011; Alonso and Gómez 2011; 
Alonso 2012; Amat 2012; Alonso et al. 2015, 2017; Field and Hamann 2015; 
Cabeza 2017) distinguish between the types of parties to explain how these 
behave along the centre-periphery cleavage. When addressing this, the starting 
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line is the distinction between SWPs and regionalist parties. Both the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis confirmed this. In the case of Spain, this factor has deep 
implications. The accommodation of strong peripheral movements in the post-
fascist Spain can be explained, to some extent, due to the agreement that SWPs 
and regionalist parties had towards recognising this reality in the constitution of 
1978 (Moreno 2002: 400). Although both types of parties have this same 
commitment and starting line, their behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage 
change according to which family they belong to. The general hypothesis (H7) has 
been strongly confirmed in the case of Spain, but these findings could be used in 
broader terms to compare and expand the existing literature with cases where the 
decentralisation process is not as developed, like for example, in France. 
 The decentralisation process of Spain owes much to regionalist parties, and 
this has to be taken into consideration (Liebert 1990: 147-151), resulting in the 
significant variation in party competition in the different regions (Detterbeck and 
Hepburn 2010: 114). The importance of regionalist parties in the Spanish regional 
elections has been confirmed by the literature (Revenga and Sánchez 2002; 
Pallarés and Keating 2003), making them an important actor that can shape the 
centre-periphery cleavage in a strong way.  As the main promoter of the region´s 
interests, the positions they have on the centre-periphery cleavage are strongly 
skewed towards the peripheries. These pro-periphery positions have some 
determinants to be considered, like for example, adapting their regional political 
demands to ongoing decentralisation processes (Sorens 2008: 329-331; Massetti 
and Schakel 2016: 59-62), or their involvement in regional and national 
governments (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 507-513), but all seem to reinforce the 
predominance of the region´s interests. The results discussed above confirm these 
findings. 
The expected behaviour of the PSOE and PP in regional elections, on the 
other hand, seems more complex in this multi-level party competition arena 
(Jeffery and Hough 2003: 199-201; Wilson 2012: 124-125), as the literature 
suggests. In comparison to regionalist parties, which have their loyalties clearly 
located in the regions, regional elections in a decentralised state like Spain make 
SWPs shift their strategies and structures (Verge 2013: 322-330; León 2014: 393-
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394) to accommodate to a reality in which they seek to obtain their maximum 
electoral performance (Hopkins 2003: 228-230) and maintain at the same time a 
coherent discourse of an integrated state (Convery and Lundberg 2017: 389-290). 
As the results have shown, this complexity can affect their positions on the centre-
periphery cleavage in a much wider and deeper aspect in comparison to regionalist 
parties, addressing regional assertiveness, which varies from region to region (van 
Houten 2001: 2). Despite this complicated behaviour, it must be observed that they 
position themselves in overall pro-periphery positions, as the main literature also 
has outlined (Alonso 2012: 72-75), favouring in general terms decentralisation 
(León 2014: 395). Contradicting results can be found when analysing the 
behaviour of SWPs when facing regionalist parties. In this investigation, the results 
show that their pro-periphery positions seem not to turn stronger, as the main 
literature suggests (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 189-190; Alonso et al. 2015: 856-
857). A possible reason for this, as discussed above, can be that the behaviour of 
SWPs when facing regionalist parties has to be taken into consideration with more 
precision and not as a whole. 
Ideology is one of the factors that showed potential results to be further 
developed in future research agendas by considering it in isolation. It was theorised 
that considering ideology on its own was expected to have effects on the pro-
centre/periphery positions of parties by making these more or less inclusive. This 
was confirmed by the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Ideology, if considered 
on its own, affects how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage by 
making them more or less open to include other social groups. The literature 
normally treats this factor in combination with party type, in the sense that the 
behaviour of the different types of parties along this cleavage is affected in 
combination with their ideological positions. The results presented here go a step 
further, and confirms that, if the factor party type is taken away, ideology on its own 
can explain the nature of the positions that parties adopt via the social values of 
the labels “left” and “right”. The results contained here can be used to address the 
general hypothesis (H8) in the case of Spain, but in order to observe if the 
theorised expectations have broader implications, it could be useful to expand the 
existing literature on the topic by exploring other case studies where ideology on 
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its own might have a stronger effect than the one identified, faded away by its 
interaction with other factors, such as party type. 
 Considering the interaction party type and ideology, the results are 
consistent with the literature on Spain and the general hypothesis (H9) addressed 
in multiple cases. Although both the PSOE and the PP are SWPs, and therefore, 
their core-level remains in the centre (Deschouwer 2003: 216–17), their positions 
on the centre-periphery are different, affected by their ideological orientation 
(Verge 2013: 318). The PSOE locates itself in a more pro-peripheral position due 
to its ideological orientation in comparison to the PP, which has less openness 
towards other social groups. Both favour decentralisation towards the regions 
(León 2014: 395), but their attitudes are different. The ideological orientation of the 
PSOE (Méndez Lago 2006, 431-432) allows it to be more inclusive towards the 
needs of the regions. In some occasions, even pushing for a clearer federal system 
in comparison to the PP (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006, 410-414), who 
defends the current constitutional design of the state and the political status quo, 
in line with a coherent conservative party (Layton-Henry 1982: 1-3). The latter, 
influenced by its conservative ideological position (Balfour 2005: 146-151), tries to 
undermine the aspirations for a more decentralised system if this changes the 
current political situation. At the same time, the pressure to adopt stronger pro-
periphery positions by the regional branches of the SWPs are somehow contained 
by their characteristic as national-wide symbols and instruments of the current 
political scenario (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 63). 
The above argument can also be applied to regionalist parties in Spain, as 
the literature suggests. The ideological orientation of regionalist parties can make 
their pro-periphery positions shift more to the absolute pro-periphery end of the 
pro-centre/-periphery continuum outlined in the conceptual framework. Taking the 
comparison of CC and the PA/CA as an example, the former can be considered a 
right/centre-right party and the latter a left/centre-left, but at the same time both are 
non-secessionist regionalist/nationalist parties (Massetti 2009: 507). As expected, 
both locate themselves clearly in strong pro-periphery positions (Massetti and 
Schakel 2015: 875), but their ideological orientation can make these positions shift 
even more towards absolute pro-periphery positions. CC and the PA/CA call for a 
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more decentralised state, further developing their regions with more powers, but 
the inclusiveness of the PA/CA allows this party to have an open view towards an 
inclusive state-wide political project. In comparison, CC is less inclusive, resulting 
in a call for the region to be differentiated from the rest.  
CC can be considered a non-secessionist regionalist party, but it has 
experienced, along the three electoral periods, an evolution that makes it stand 
between being an autonomist and an open secessionist party. This evolution was 
suggested by Massetti and Schakel (2013: 801-802), although at this point in time, 
the evolution is not clear enough to confirm this change yet. The more its 
ideological orientation makes it move away from moderately autonomist to more 
assertive autonomist positions (Massetti 2009: 505), the more its political project 
will become less inclusive. This seems not to be the case of the PA/CA. This non-
secessionist regionalist/nationalist party has a consistent position and remains 
strongly autonomist (Massetti 2009: 505) along all the electoral periods. Its political 
project remains with the same degree of inclusiveness along all the three electoral 
periods. These varieties of positions in regionalist parties go in line with the 
research agenda that identifies the deep influence of ideology on these parties 
(Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 254). 
As shown when analysing the behaviour of SWPs, the results confirm the 
existing literature that explores the adaptation of these parties to a multi-level 
setting in decentralised states like Spain (Montero 2005: 63-66; Fabre and 
Swenden 2013: 345) via the general hypothesis outlined (H10). One of the factors 
that can explain this complex behaviour, apart from ideology, is their internal 
structure (Deschouwer 2006; Laffin et al. 2007). These parties organise 
themselves according to the reality in which they act, adapting, in this case, to the 
regional context. This adaptation needs to acknowledge that SWPs are the main 
link between the different levels of party competition (Fabre and Sweden 2013: 
343), and at the same time, integrated parties (Thorlakson 2013: 716-718). They 
have the responsibility to maintain a state-wide project that can be recognised in 
most of the state, adapting it to the needs of the regions through a pragmatic 
approach (Fabre 2011: 345) and maintaining internal consistency (Klingelhöfer 
2014: 4) and cohesion (León 2017: 1-4). This process of pragmatic adaptation to 
the regional needs results in the autonomy of their regional branches (Filippov et 
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al. 2004: 192–194). When regional elections are held, the regional branches make 
the centre of power inside the party shift from the centre to the peripheries (Hopkins 
2003: 230).  
This internal adaptation can be behind the diverse and varied set of results 
observed when comparing the PSOE and the PP in the three regions. According 
to these, and in line with the main literature, the PSOE has maintained, to some 
extent, a formal federal structure with strong regional power (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 
68). The PSOE grants its regional branches with a high degree of autonomy to 
adapt to the needs of the region (Hopkins 2009: 188-195). Despite this degree of 
freedom and the regional variation amongst the different regional branches, this 
did not reach the same level as the one granted to the PSC in Catalonia (Keating 
2001; Roller and van Houten 2003). The PP can be placed on the opposite side, 
with a more integrated structure, with the location of decisions-making processes 
clearly at the centre (García-Guereta 2001: 401-402). Its regional branches have 
less degree of autonomy, and therefore, they have fewer possibilities to adapt to 
the regional context, following with more precision the instructions coming from the 
centre (van Biezen 2003: 93-101). This can explain the stronger pro-periphery 
positions of the PSOE in comparison to the PP, acting nearly as a fully federal 
party (Hopkins 2009: 192-195). In light of the existing literature, the results, to some 
extent, confirmed this behaviour. Overall, they adopt pro-periphery positions to 
comply with the decentralisation Spanish process (Keating and Wilson 2009: 538), 
but their internal structure determines, to some extent, their strength. Future 
research agendas can focus on the interaction of this factor with the ideological 
orientation explained above to understand more in detail how this degree of 
freedom is articulated. 
In relation to the above, two other main findings have emerged from the 
analysis that further confirm the literature. First, the internal tensions. Adapting to 
different regional scenarios entails conflict that puts under pressure their internal 
coherence (Fabre 2008: 310-312) and their image as integrated part of the current 
political system (Hopkins and Bradbury 2006: 136). These emerged when 
observing the behaviour of the PSOE in the regions of Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands. In these two regions, it seems that the regional branches had stretched 
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too much the limits imposed by the centre and the ability to articulate a 
recognisable state-wide discourse, undermining its possibilities in other regions 
(Chandler 1987: 152). This threat was addressed by imposing to the regional 
branches the view of the centre, displayed by the regional frameworks 
(Klingelhöfer 2014: 2). This can contribute to measure the importance of the so-
called baronias160 in the Spanish context and their impact in the internal power 
structure of the PSOE and the PP (Astudillo y García-Guereta, 2005: 3; Betanzo 
2006: 247-249; Astudillo 2010: 343-349). Second, the competition against strong 
regionalist parties. The variation observed in both parties can also be explained by 
the competition with strong regionalist parties, not present in Castilla-La Mancha. 
Regionalist parties pressure the regional branches of the SWPs to stretch their 
degree of freedom and point out their contradictions between what they say at the 
national-level and what they say at the regional-level (Meguid 2005: 357-358). The 
results showed that both the PSOE and the PP regionalise more their discourse in 
Andalusia and the Canary Islands. This change can be explained, to some extent, 
because two strong regionalist parties act in these regions. The stronger the 
regionalist parties, the more autonomy is granted to the regional branches (Jeffery 
2010: 9). 
- Further contributions 
Considering the results contained here in a broader sense, a crucial factor 
has to be outlined. This is, the importance of the context in which the phenomenon 
unfolds (Alonso et al. 2015: 853; Rovny 2015: 916). This was highlighted in the 
analysis of both the explanatory and control variables. According to the 
interpretation of the Rokkian model, the relations between the centre and the 
peripheries are constrained and determined by the context in which they unfold. 
As the analyses have shown, the Spanish context is key to understand the results. 
Fragmentation can be an example of this. What happens in the Canary Islands can 
be confounded to the Canarian reality, with difficulties to extrapolate it. Despite 
this, the results for this archipelago can be tested against other outer-peripheries 
to see if there is a common narrative to be able to articulate a general theory of 
 
160 Baronias is a label used in the Spanish political arena to refer to the power that the regional 
branches of the PSOE and the PP have inside the stet-wide party. 
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fragmentation. The same can be said for distance. Can the same results be found 
in the island of Réunion (France)? This can only be answered considering the 
island of Réunion in depth. The qualitative analysis contained in this investigation 
was intended to bring in context as a key factor. Understanding the conditions in 
which parties act can anticipate the possible answers to the main research 
question. 
This investigation has addressed the specific Spanish regional context via 
three main explanatory and six control variables. The combination of these two 
types of variables has provided a wider picture of the phenomenon in the case of 
Spain. Focusing only on the explanatory variables might have weakened the final 
answer to the main research question. The main findings in relation to the control 
variables show that the literature on parties can be, to some extent, confirmed. The 
main contribution of this investigation goes along the main explanatory variables. 
As it has been shown, distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity procure 
promising results for further research agendas, approaching important factors that 
have been overlooked by the existing literature, both in general terms and in 
relation to Spain as a specific case study. Applying a mix method approach has 
granted this investigation with the proper means to observe how these variables 
need to be considered in both a quantitatively and qualitatively manner to grasp 
their real impact on party positioning on the centre-periphery cleavage. Using only 
one method of analysis might have discard important inferences that need to be 
considered to fully understand how parties behave and articulate the relations 
between the centre and the peripheries. These results build on the general 
literature that addresses party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage 
and the specific research based on Spain. In the case of the first body of literature, 
the conclusions contained in this chapter can be used to expand on the existing 
knowledge of how parties articulate the relation between regions. Regarding the 
second type of studies, the inferences discussed in the present thesis can be used 
to, on one hand, better understand how parties address the tensions that 
dichotomous regions cause in Spain and how they are dealt with, and on the other 
hand, this novel mixed methods approach contributes to also widen the different 
routes that one can take when dealing with this same research problem.  
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 In this thesis, a centre-periphery continuum has been proposed. The 
purpose was to disentangle the broad concept of “centre-periphery”. By introducing 
distance, this has to be further broken down to seek precision in the analysis. The 
distance from the centre makes a difference, and the impact of this factor in the 
inner-periphery is not the same as in the outer-periphery, as shown by the 
analyses. Being further away from the network of power relations and decision-
making processes of the centre is key to understand the level of development of 
the regions, and more broadly, of the state itself. Managing these differences, 
especially by SWPs, has to be put in context in decentralised states like Spain, 
deeply affected by multi-level party competition and strong regionalist tensions. 
Adapting to never-ending demands by regionalist parties and demands from the 
regional populations is better understood if the concept “centre-periphery” concept 
is precise. This investigation has tried to contribute with a centre-periphery 
continuum that the results seem to support. The differences between regions can 
be explained, to some extent, by classifying them into centres, inner-, and outer-
peripheries.  
Finally, the last main contribution is linked to the analysed context. The 
findings over time have shown that the relations between the centre and the 
different peripheries change, and this reinforces the idea that this cleavage is an 
ongoing dynamic process. Building on the literature that considers the process of 
state/nation-building a dynamic process (Bartolini 2005: 122-131), social 
cleavages, like the one presented here, also need to be inserted in these major 
dynamics. The centre-periphery cleavage can be understood as an example of 
how social cleavages change and adapt over time under the pressure of major 
processes that are multi-level and socio-structural in nature. With this in mind, this 
investigation is circumscribed to a specific case study and time period, Spain 1998-
2012. The results answer the main research question for this period of time in 
Spain. They have to be further contrasted to the current political reality. The 
behaviour of the PP can be an example of change over time. The current 
recentralisation dynamics of this party reinforces, on one hand, the idea of an 
ongoing process, and on the other hand, highlights the fact that the results need 
to be updated to provide the literature with an explanation over time and of the 




This chapter has provided the necessary discussion of the main findings 
provided by both analyses in relation to the main research question and 
contribution to the existing literature. The results showed that all factors shaped, 
with different degrees of impact, party competition on the centre-periphery 
cleavage. From the three explanatory variable, distance was the factor that had 
the deepest effect. In the case of fragmentation, the results showed interesting and 
unexpected behaviours by parties in the specific circumstances of the Canary 
Islands. Polycentricity also affected party competition as theorised, but this factor 
needs to be further analysed. These three main factors were better explained using 
the proposed centre-periphery continuum, without which the variation between the 
regions could not have been explained with the necessary depth and detail. From 
the six control variables. the expectations were fulfilled with more strength by the 
three party-level control variables, in line with the main body of the literature. The 
findings for the three regional-level control variables showed that these factors also 
had some degree of impact, providing the literature with a wider and more precise 
understanding of the phenomenon, like for example, via the relation of strong 














































This investigation has been based on the idea of better understanding party 
competition over the centre-periphery cleavage as the main research problem. 
Approaching this phenomenon is crucial to comprehend the deep roots that social 
cleavages have for the articulation of political struggle. Being central actors in 
configuring political agendas make parties responsible for structuring modern 
democracies and linking the citizens with the institutions that are in charge of 
providing the necessary means to fulfil their needs and interests. Not only are 
parties responsible for articulating political agendas around the most salient social 
cleavages, but this is done at the level in which they unfold. Political research, 
when dealing with this same research problem, has been informed by a strong 
national bias, which has provided deep understanding of the phenomenon, but 
social cleavages go beyond the nation-state as the perfect unit of analysis. 
Examining social cleavages at the level in which they unfold opens the door to 
have a more detailed picture of party competition and provides stronger answers 
to important research questions. In decentralised states, this is fundamental. The 
increasing importance of supra-national, regional, and local bodies in the current 
political scenario of globalisation needs to be addressed at the proper level, without 
which, the impact of social cleavages would be faded or concealed by other factors 
that do not reflect their actual influence on the everyday life of citizens.  
This multi-level context makes party competition more complex. Party 
structures, organisations, and behaviours respond to these new settings by 
adapting to social processes that are informed by many different interests that not 
only radiate from the central level. This makes these social processes dynamic, 
stressing the ability of parties to adjust to never-ending demands from many 
different actors and that respond to many different circumstances. Amongst these 
different dynamic social processes, the centre-periphery cleavage maybe 
represents one of the most influential cleavages that shape party competition in a 
multi-level political arena. Political mobilisation at the regional level poses a real 
threat to the interest of the elites at the centre. Other social cleavages could be 
considered more or less state-wide, but the centre-periphery cleavage reveal the 
uneasy assimilation of sub-national social groups which identify with other loyalties 
that do not necessary match those that come from the centre. In order to address 
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this strongly territorialised social cleavage, this thesis has focused on the regions 
as the main unit of observation.  
Many European states have experienced, in the past decades, impressive 
decentralisation and devolution processes. This has led regions, especially 
peripheral regions, to be the locus of significant political processes that are not 
limited by national borders, increasing their importance both outside and inside the 
states in which they are located. This has generated tensions in the relations with 
the centres via deeply perceived territorial grievances, triggering alternative sub-
national mobilisation movements. On one hand, peripheries claim a more 
important role in state-wide issues, and on the other hand, centres try to maintain 
their privileged position. The elites in both types of regions politicise these territorial 
grievances to rearrange the institutional context to their own benefit. It could be 
said that regions and territorial politics have emerged as political spaces in their 
own right. To adapt to the saliency and prominence of the centre-periphery 
cleavage and respond to its challenges, parties now frame political debate with an 
intense territorial sub-national base, upgrading the importance of the regional level 
and not considering it any more of second order. The main consequence is that 
party competition has become both inter- and intra-regional. Observing this 
regional variation using a national lens might prevent the efforts to properly 
understand how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage as the main 
research problem, and how this configurates the way in which centres and 
peripheries frame their relations. 
In order to approach the above research problem, this thesis has focused 
on examining what shapes party behaviour when engaging in political competition 
over the centre-periphery cleavage. The literature that deals with this phenomenon 
has centred its attention on disentangling how parties position themselves in 
relation to the different issues that articulate this cleavage. This is, party behaviour 
along the centre-periphery cleavage is defined, in general terms, in relation to 
which issues they emphasise, what position they assume regarding these, and 
what strategies they can adopt to conform their political agendas and maximise 
their electoral performance. To better grasp the ways in which parties behave, the 
different authors have also taken into consideration which factors shape this 
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conduct. Regarding this, the literature has drawn attention to elements such as 
party type, ideology, identity, or language. Numerous studies have confirmed that 
these have a deep impact on the way this cleavage is articulated and how the 
relations between centres and peripheries are framed by parties. Despite this 
considerable body of literature, there is a gap in relation to other factors that might 
also have profound effects. This thesis has had the purpose of addressing this 
vacuum. With this in mind, the main research question has been: what factors 
shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage? The focus was centred 
on three regional-level factors that have received little or no scrutiny in the literature 
in the field of comparative politics and party competition over the centre-periphery 
cleavage: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. In order to acknowledge the 
importance of the different factors that the literature has identified, six control 
variables were also selected: economic development, regional identity feelings, 
regional languages, party type, ideology, and party structure. The purpose was to 
observe if the findings presented here went in line with the existing studies. 
The effects that these three factors were expected to have on party 
competition on can be summarised in two dichotomous outcomes. On one hand, 
distance was expected to strengthen the pro-periphery position of parties. This was 
based on the effect of the abstraction level addressed by the Construal Level 
Theory. As the centre becomes more abstract with distance, parties would turn to 
the region to fulfil the attachment feelings of the regional populations. This 
territorialisation would increase exponentially as distance from the centre also 
increases. On the other hand, fragmentation and polycentricity were expected to 
have the opposite effect, this is, the weakening of the pro-periphery position of 
parties. The reason for this was that the Construal Level Theory was expected to 
go beyond the region. In other words, the abstraction level was also thought to 
affect the region. The sub-regional entities or urban centres of power would be the 
locus of the loyalties of the regional populations as the abstraction level increases 
with distance. The importance that the local ruling bodies and centres of power 
have for the regional populations would undermine the ability of parties to 
strengthen the regional level if this went to the detriment of these local bodies. 
Added to the gap in the literature described above, one can find that the different 
studies that explore the centre-periphery cleavage take the labels “centre” and 
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“periphery” as absolute. This does not match the regional variation that the same 
studies find. To approach this, this investigation has proposed a centre-periphery 
continuum that disentangles this cleavage into more precise labels to capture with 
more detail the evident regional variation that one can find when analysing regions 
that are articulated and framed by parties according to factors that do not apply 
homogeneously to all. These labels are “centres”, “inner-peripheries”, and “outer-
peripheries”. 
The research method selected has been the sub-national comparative 
method of analysis. This method has the advantage of dealing with the regional 
variation identified above when examining party competition along a strongly 
territorialised social cleavage like the centre-periphery cleavage with more 
precision, and this has been key in this investigation, as the centre-periphery 
continuum suggested. The case selected has been Spain. The reason for this was 
the salience of the centre-periphery cleavage in this case study. The different 
processes of decentralisation and devolution have made Spain an example of a 
consolidated de facto federal state. This has encouraged peripheral regions to 
demand more political weight inside the state, tensioning the relations with the 
centre. Not only have the different peripheral regions become increasingly 
important, but also their different degrees of development procure a high regional 
variation that provides the necessary scenario to engage with the ways in which 
parties adapt to the context in which they act.  
To apply this sub-national comparative method, a mix method approach 
was chosen. The reason for this was to obtain at the same time a complete and 
in-depth picture of the phenomenon. The complete picture took all the 17 regions 
of Spain to observe the impact of the three factors state-wide. This was done using 
a quantitative method of analysis via a multiple regression analysis. The RMP 
provided the most developed data-set and sources of information for this analysis. 
The in-depth picture specifically compared Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the 
Canary Islands to test the impact of distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity in 
regions that shared more or less the same economic, cultural, and social context. 
This was performed using a qualitative content analysis method. Political 
manifestos were selected as the principal source of information as these 
documents faithfully represent the position that parties had over time with more 
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accuracy. The analysis of the different regions of Spain was done for the period 
1998-2012, divided into three electoral periods: 1998-2001, 2007-2010, and 2011-
2012.  
 According to the main findings, distance was the factor that most affected 
party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage. As distance from the centre 
increased, the pro-periphery positions of parties also strengthened. This could be 
used to confirm that the Construal Level Theory could be applied to the centre-
periphery cleavage with some degree of success. As one moved towards the 
outer-periphery, the abstraction level also increased and parties adapted to it by 
territorialising their appeals to the regional populations. This affected both SWPs 
and regionalist parties, so this factor could be considered as transversal and with 
profound roots in the way they frame the relations between regions. The 
expectations that were theorised were, to some extent, confirmed. The different 
analyses confirmed that from the three main explanatory variables, this factor had 
the most consistent impact on party behaviour. 
Following with fragmentation, this factor also had deep effects, which at the 
same time weakened and strengthened the pro-periphery positions of parties. This 
explanatory variable has been analysed through two main dimensions. On one 
hand, the spatial dimension, which referred to the spatial fragmentation of the 
region, like in archipelago regions. On the other hand, the political-administrative 
dimension, which linked to the importance that the local ruling bodies had for the 
local population. Considering first the weakening effects, the analyses confirmed 
that the pro-periphery positions of parties were, to some extent, undermined. The 
abstraction level that increased with distance also turned against the region when 
the local populations had consolidated sub-regional units of identification to turn to 
when seeking to fulfil their needs and demands. When the two dimensions of 
fragmentation coincided, like in the case of the Canary Islands, the undermining 
effect multiplied its strength. Turning now to the strengthening effects, the analysis 
also showed that, in the same case and in some occasions, the combination of the 
two dimensions of fragmentation not always had the undermining effect outlined 
above. This is, the results showed that in some specific occasions, the pro-
periphery position of parties strengthened on the bases of trying to avoid its 
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negative effects and to build the region around this specific and intrinsic 
characteristic. 
In the case of polycentricity, the results showed that this factor needs to be 
further analysed as the inferences where not enough to obtain the same answers 
and explanations as for the previous two factors. Nonetheless, the results showed 
that the degree of polycentricity was more important in shifting party positions than 
the presence of multiple centres of power per se. This factor affected the position 
of parties over the centre-periphery cleavage via the concentration of competition 
in a reduced number of centres of power. Considering the main finding for all three 
explanatory variables, this thesis has shown that in the case of Spain, these factors 
are better understood in a qualitative manner. When it comes to the control 
variables, the findings pointed in the direction of confirming what the literature has 
outlined regarding party type, ideology, party structure, and regional identity. 
Economic development and regional languages, although going in another 
direction than the mainstream literature, provided interesting insights which could 
be used to better understand the phenomenon.  
In relation to the limitations mentioned in the previous chapter, these could 
be dealt with in large comparative studies. The specific limitations regarding the 
data used, the significant difference between the results obtained in the 
quantitative in comparison to the qualitative analysis, and the impression of 
presenting the Canary Islands as a unique case could be solved by exporting this 
investigation to other case studies and outer-peripheries. One possible way to 
overcome the above limitations could be to apply this research process to case 
studies which have a more balanced distribution of inner- and outer-peripheries. 
Examples of this could be Portugal, Denmark, or Japan. These three countries 
have, on one hand, more outer-peripheries than Spain, and on the other hand, 
more archipelago or insular regions than the case study analysed in this thesis. 
These types of cases could provide enough quantitative and qualitative inferences 
to further understand, and with a higher degree of detail, the real impact of 
distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. 
With these conclusions in mind, a possible answer to the main research 
problem, and key message of this investigation, could be the following. All three 
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main factors affected party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, but with 
different degrees of impact. In this sense, the factor that most affected the 
behaviour of parties was distance, strongly skewing their positions to the absolute 
pro-periphery end of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. In the second place 
came fragmentation, which although confirming the expectations to some extent, 
also revealed stimulating unpredicted outcomes. This factor, considered in a 
specific context, had the theorised undermining effects, but sometimes and in the 
case of the outer-peripheral region of the Canary Islands, turned parties to adopt 
strong pro-periphery positions. Polycentricity came in last place. Its negative 
effects were confirmed in relation to its degree of impact, but the lack of further 
inferences prevented a fully detailed picture of its influence on the behaviour of 
parties when articulating the relations between the centre and the different 
peripheries. Without the proposed centre-periphery continuum, the regional 
variation that the analyses have flagged would not have been identified and 
explained as this investigation has tried to. The effects of these factors were 
different depending on which region was examined. Their impact was not the same 
in the centre than in the peripheries, and at the same time, the peripheral regions 
were affected differently depending on which one was scrutinised. 
This investigation has provided encouraging findings for future research 
agendas. In terms of distance and the Construal Level Theory, this factor could be 
applied to other outer-peripheries that are further away than the Canary Islands to 
observe, for example, if the abstraction level reaches a maximum point or if this 
could go as far as to sustain secessionist positions when parties are unable to 
procure a solid link between the centre and the periphery. Applying this theory to 
the field of comparative politics has yet to be developed in its full extension and in 
different contexts. Fragmentation has more complex implications, but future 
research agendas could focus on, on one hand, how the Construal level Theory 
could also be applied to sub-regional realities, and on the other hand, understand 
in depth how the combination of the two dimensions of this factor proposed here 
really affect the articulation of the regional level in archipelago peripheries. In 
relation to the latter, and to make the overall analysis of this factor more accurate 
and detailed, one possible research line could be specifically focused on 
articulating a possible measuring scheme for the political-administrative dimension 
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of fragmentation for it to be quantitatively analysed. With this, one could examine 
state-wide the impact of both dimensions of fragmentation in both types of 
analyses in the same way as distance.  
The results for polycentricity imply that future examination of this factor 
could be associated to its degree of impact rather than to the presence of multiple 
centres of power per se. To achieve this, and following with the example of the 
measuring scheme for the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, a 
future research line could be centred on developing a measuring scheme for its 
degree of impact to test it quantitatively. This would allow polycentricity to be 
analysed in depth via two ways. Firstly, measure the impact that the presence of 
multiple centres of power have, as this investigation has tried to achieve. Secondly, 
observe if the degree of polycentricity really has the deep effects that the qualitative 
analysis contained here has suggested. Another research line in relation to the 
concentration of competition in small number of centres of power, as this thesis 
has outlined, could be focused on the study of the interaction of polycentricity and 
fragmentation. In this sense, the relation between these two factors may be deeper 
than the one theorised. The perfect match between the island, the local population, 
and the island-based ruling bodies could be expressed through strong island-
based centres of power, especially if the archipelago has two or more mayor 
islands, and this needs to be further analysed to fully understand the insular 
dynamics of this type of regions.  
In order to address the significance of the results contained here in relation 
to the factors economic development and regional languages, which go against 
the mainstream literature on the topic, future research agendas could  be directed 
to obtain, on one hand, a more reliable measuring scheme for the economic 
development of the regions, and on the other hand, a more detailed understanding 
of the processes of centralisation and SWPs. Regarding the first, the indicator 
employed in this investigation did not show the expected results, and this could be 
linked to the measuring scheme selected. Using only one economic indicator to 
measure the economic development of regions seems not to be enough to capture 
what this factor was theorised to measure. The economic development of regions 
is a broad concept which is articulated around many different economic indicators, 
and therefore, focusing only on one might fade or conceal the real degree or state 
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of the economic development of the regions. Articulating an economic index 
composed of these different economic indicators might be one possible research 
lines to study how the economic development of the regions affects the way parties 
frame the relations between centres and peripheries in a quantitative manner. In 
relation to the second, the centralisation processes that consolidated decentralised 
states such as Spain are experiencing could be one of the ways to understand and 
further explain the impact that strong regional distinctive markers have on the 
behaviours of parties, especially those of SWPs. The results presented here can 
open a new line of research which links these processes of centralisation and their 
impact on strong regional distinctive markers and party behaviour. The tensions 
created between region by these processes could be expressed or signalled via 
























The Territorial Authority Competential Preferences Claims Scheme: 
Level of government (first digit): 
1 the local level; 
2 the regional level; 
3 the state level; 
8 the European level; 
9 the international level. 
 
Preferred degree of authority (second digit): 
1 the quasi-sentence claims less authority for the respective level; 
2 the quasi-sentence claims more authority for the respective level; 
0 the quasi-sentence contains no authority claim. It states only the level of 
government addressed by the policy preference, without claiming more or fewer 
competencies for that particular level of government in that policy area. 
 
Classification scheme of the territorial authority competential preferences claims. 
 
Code Explanation 
11 Less authority for the local level 
12 More authority for the local level 
21 Less authority for the regional level 
22 More authority for the regional level 
31 Less authority for the national level 
32 More authority for the national level 
81 Less authority for the European level 
82 More authority for the European level 
91 Less authority for the international level 
92 More authority for the international level 
10/20/30/80/90 No explicit claim for more or less authority to the level of 
government addressed. 
00 No competential preference is expressed (no level addressed, no direction). 
 
01 In favour of subsidiary principle. 
02 In favour of clear (jurisdictional) distinction between levels (accountability). 
03 In favour of shared authority between levels, i.e. explicit calls for cooperation 
or co-ordination between higher and lower levels (vertical cooperation). 









The Standard Comparative Manifesto Project Coding Frame: 56 Categories in 7 
Policy Domains. 
  
Domain 1: External Relations  
101 Foreign Special Relationships: positive  
102 Foreign Special Relationships: negative  
103 Anti-Imperialism  
104 Military: positive  
105 Military: negative  
106 Peace  
107 Internationalism: positive  
108 European Community: positive  
109 Internationalism: negative  
110 European Community: negative  
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy  
201 Freedom and Human Rights  
202 Democracy  
203 Constitutionalism: positive  
204 Constitutionalism: negative  
Domain 3: Political System  
301 Decentralisation  
302 Centralisation  
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency  
304 Political Corruption  
305 Political Authority  
Domain 4: Economy  
401 Free Enterprise  
402 Incentives  
403 Market Regulation  
404 Economic Planning  
405 Corporatism  
406 Protectionism: positive  
407 Protectionism: negative  
408 Economic Goals  
409 Keynesian Demand Management  
410 Productivity  
411 Technology and Infrastructure  
412 Controlled Economy  
413 Nationalisation  
414 Economic Orthodoxy  
415 Marxist Analysis  
416 Anti-Growth Economy  
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life  
501 Environmental Protection  
502 Culture  
503 Social Justice  
504 Welfare State Expansion  
505 Welfare State Limitation  
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506 Education Expansion  
507 Education Limitation  
Domain 6: Fabric of Society  
601 National Way of Life: positive  
602 National Way of Life: negative  
603 Traditional Morality: positive  
604 Traditional Morality: negative  
605 Law and Order  
606 Social Harmony  
607 Multiculturalism: positive  
608 Multiculturalism: negative  
Domain 7: Social Groups  
701 Labour Groups: positive  
702 Labour Groups: negative  
703 Agriculture  
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups  
705 Minority Groups  
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups 
 
The Standard Coding Frame for Regional Manifestos: 20 new Sub-categories in 
the 7 Policy Domains of CMP (notice that RMP codes each policy preference 
with 4 codes instead of the 3 that CMP uses). 
 
Domain 1: External Relations 
1017 Interregional Relationships: Positive 
1027 Interregional Relationships: Negative 
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy 
2024 Representative Democracy: Positive 
2025 Participatory Democracy: Positive 
Domain 3: Political System 
3012 Sub-state Finance 
3013 Differential Treatment among Regions: Negative 
3014 Differential Treatment among Regions: Positive 
3031 Administration of Justice 
Domain 4: Economy 
4111 Management of Natural Resources 
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
5032 Equal treatment of immigrants 
5042 Welfare for immigrants 
5051 Welfare limitations for immigrants 
5062 Education expansion for immigrants 
5071 Education limitation for immigrants 
Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
6015 Promotion and Protection of Vernacular Language(s) 
6016 Cultural links with Diaspora 
6017 Bilingualism: positive 
6051 Immigrants’ negative impact on law and order 
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Domain 7: Social Groups 
7053 Immigrants: positive 



















































ELECTION YEARS AND  
PARTIES 
(coded by the RMP) 
1998-2001 2007-2010 2011-2012 
Andalusia 2000: PSOE and 
PP 
2008: PSOE and PP 2012: PSO and PP 
Aragon 1999: PSOE, PP, 
CHA, and PAR 
2007: PSOE, PP, 
CHA, and PAR 
2011: PSOE, PP, CHA, 
and PAR 
Asturias 1999: PSOE and 
PP 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
Balearic Islands 1999: PSOE, PP, 
UM, and PSM 
2007: PSOE, PP, and 
UM 
2011: PSOE, PP, and 
PSM 
Basque Country 1998: PSOE, PP, 
PNV, EA, and EH 
2009: PSOE, PP, 
PNV, and EA 
2012: PSOE, PP, PNV, 
and Bildu 
Canary Islands 1999: PSOE, PP, 
and CC 
2007: PSOE, PP, and 
CC 
2011: PSOE, PP, and CC 
Cantabria 1999: PSOE, PP, 
and PRC 
2007: PSOE, PP, and 
PRC 
2011: PSOE, PP, and 
PRC 
Castilla-La Mancha 1999: PSOE and 
PP 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
Castilla y León 1999: PSOE, PP, 
and UPL 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE, PP, and 
UPL 
Catalonia 1999: PSOE, PP, 
and CIU 
2010: PSOE, PP, and 
CIU 
2012: PSOE, PP, CIU, 
ERC, ICV, and CUP 
Extremadura 1999: PSOE 2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
Galicia 2001: PSOE, PP, 
and BNG 
2009: PSOE, PP, and 
BNG 
2012: PSOE, PP, BNG, 
and AEG 
La Rioja No coded data 
available 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE, PP, and PR 
Madrid 1999: PSOE and 
PP 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
Murcia 1999: PSOE and 
PP 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
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Navarre 1999: PSOE, UPN, 
and EH 
2007: PSOE, UPN, 
and NaBai 
2011: PSOE, PP, UPN, 
and NaBai 
Valencia 1999: PSOE and 
PP 
2007: PSOE and PP 2011: PSOE and PP 
TOTAL 44 44 51 
 
 













Aragon 12 6 6 1:1 
Asturias 





Balearic Islands 10 6 4 1,5:1 
Basque Country 13 6 7 0.9:1 
Canary Islands 9 6 3 2:1 
Cantabria 9 6 3 2:1 
Castilla-La Mancha 




Castilla y León 8 6 2 3:1 
Catalonia 12 6 6 1:1 
Extremadura 6 6 Electoral Cartel - 
Galicia 9 6 4 1.5:1 
La Rioja 5 4 1 4:1 
Madrid 









Navarre 10 4 6 0.67:1 
Valencia 






















Formulas for the attitude towards multiculturalism: 
Multiculturalism positive saliency score: c607 
Multiculturalism negative saliency score: c608 
















CIS Survey 2286/5-0 (05/05/1998) 
PREGUNTA 48 
¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases se identifica Ud. en mayor medida? 
 
  % . (N) 
Me siento únicamente español 3.4 (18) 
Me siento más español que canario 1.7 (9) 
Me siento tan español como canario 49.3 (258) 
Me siento más canario que español 30.2 (158) 
Me siento únicamente canario 14.7 (77) 
N.C. 0.6 (3) 
TOTAL 100.0 (523) 
Translation:  
Question 48 
With which of the following statement do you identify more: 
a) I feel only Spanish 
b) I feel more Spanish than Canarian 
c) I feel both Spanish and Canarian 
d) I feel more Canarian than Spanish 




Measuring Scheme: the final results for the independent variable Regional 
Identity is obtained by adding up the last 2 answers to the question asked in the 
survey (d+e), this is, more Canarian than Spanish and only Canarian. The result 
in this case is 44.9%. 
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Table 1.-The Selected and Available Manifestos for the Regions of Castilla-La 





% OF VALID VOTES CAST-Nº 




1999 PSOE, PP PSOE: 53.42%-26, PP: 40.40%-21 
2007 PSOE, PP PSOE: 51.95%-26, PP: 42.38%-21 




2000 PSOE, PP, 
PA/CA 
PSOE: 44.32%-52, PP: 38.02%-
46, PA/CA: 7.43%-5 
2008 PSOE, PP, 
PA/CA 
PSOE: 48.41%-56, PP: 38.45%-
47, PA/CA: 2.76-No Seats 
2012 PSOE, PP, 
PA/CA 
PSOE: 39.56%-47, PP: 40.67%-
50, PA/CA: 2.51%-No Seats 
The Canary Islands 
(outer-peripheral 
region) 
1999 PSOE, PP, CC PSOE: 24.03%-19, PP: 27.13%-
15, CC: 36.93%-24 
2007 PSOE, PP, CC PSOE: 34.51%-26, PP: 24.04%-
15, CC: 24.24%-19 
2011 PSOE, PP, CC PSOE: 20.98%-15, PP: 31.94%-
21, CC: 24.94%-21 
 
Table 2.-Statistical Summary of the Manifestos Selected for the Regions of 
Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands 












9 6 3 2:1 
The Canary Islands 
(outer-peripheral region) 
9 6 3 2:1 
TOTAL 24 18 6 3:1 
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Table 1.-Aggregated Data for the Dependent, Explanatory, and Control Variables 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
SALIENCY OF THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Indicator: RMP c.20+c.21+c.22 
139 91.628 4.272 68.12 100 
POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION 
Indicator: RMP c.22-c.21 
139 2.359 3.673 -0.65 26.28 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM 
Indicator: RMPc-607-c.608 
139 0.204 0.411 -0.80 2.70 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
DISTANCE 
Indicator: distance in Km from Madrid to the capital of the region 
Continuous variable 
139 419.1007 376.045 0 1748 
FRAGMENTATION 
Indicator: archipelago regions 
Categorical variable (No=0/Yes=1) 
139 .117647 .3321056 0 1 
POLYCENTRICITY 
Indicator: existence of multiple centres of power 
Categorical variable (No=0/Yes=1) 
139 .496403 .5017953 0 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Indicator: Difference between regional and national average GDP per capita  
Continuous variable 
139 3332.05 1935.513 400 8146 
REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS 
Popular Regional Identity Feelings 
Indicator: CIS identity question 
Continuous variable 
139 23.29597 16.32874 2.3 50.12 
REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS 
Political Regional Identity Feelings 
Indicator: recognition of the region as a historic nacionalidad in the Status of Autonomy 
Categorical variable (No=0/Yes=1) 




Indicator: recognition of a regional language in the Status of Autonomy 
Categorical variable (No=0/Yes=1) 
139 .438849 .4980412 0 1 
PARTY TYPE 
Indicator: SWP or regional party 
Categorical variable (Regional Party=0/SWP=1) 
139 .697842 .4608542 0 1 
IDEOLOGICAL POSITION 
Indicator: RMP left-right scale  
Continuous variable 
139 -1.459065 7.513842 -26.58 14.07 
SWP FACING REGIONALIST PARTIES 
Indicator: if SWPs face or not regionalist parties in the elections 
Categorical variable (No=0/Yes=1) 





Table1.-Disaggregated Data for the Three Dependent Variables  
 
REGIONS 
SALIENCY OF THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Indicator: RMP c.20+c.21+c.22 
POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION 
Indicator: RMP c.22-c.21 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM 
Indicator: RMP c.607-c.608 













PP: 3.02  
2008: 
PSOE: 1.88 
PP: 0.62  
2012: 
PSOE: 0.58 

































































































































































































































































PSOE:  86.22 















































































































































































































































































































































Madrid to the 








centres of power 
Andalusia 390 NO YES 
Aragon 274 NO NO 
Asturias 383 NO YES 
Balearic Islands 550 YES NO 
Basque Country 283 NO YES 
Canary Islands 1747 YES YES 
Cantabria 339 NO NO 
Castilla-La Mancha 68 NO YES 
Castilla y León 162 NO YES 
Catalonia 505 NO NO 
Extremadura 281 NO YES 
Galicia 487 NO YES 
La Rioja 251 NO NO 
Madrid 0 NO NO 
Murcia 349 NO NO 
Navarre 317 NO NO 















Indicator: difference between the 
regional and national average GDP 
per capita 
REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS 
Popular regional identity feelings 
Indicator: CIS Question 
REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS 
Political regional identity feelings 
Indicator: historic nacionalidad in the 




recognition of a 
official regional 
language in the 
Statutes of 
Autonomy 
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YES YES YES YES 
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Indicator: type of party 
IDEOLOGICAL POSITION 
Indicator: RMP left-right scale 
SWP FACING REGIONALIST PARTIES 
Indicator: electoral competition between SWP and 
regionalist parties 
























































































































































FA, URAs, PAs 
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RI, ICV-
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Saliency of the Regional Level         
Explanatory and Control Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Distance 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fragmentation (Yes) -2.264 -1.971 -2.130 - 2.669 -1.981 -1.997 -1.986 -1.928 
 (2.729) (2.527) (2.581) (2.643) (2.536) (2.520) (2.541) (2.456) 
Polycentricity (Yes) 0.483 0.662 0.297 0.368 0.632 0.718 0.643 0.642 
 (0.739) (0.879) (0.939) (0.879) (0.887) (0.892) (0.908) (0.891) 
Economic Development  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regional Identity Feelings         
Popular Regional Feelings  -0.043 -0.056 -0.043  -0.045 -0.044 -0.043 -0.043 
  (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Political Regional Feelings (Yes)  -2.585*** -2.387** -4.912** -2.649*** -2.554*** -2.641** -2.618*** 
  (0.905) (0.937) (2.062) (0.933) (0.916) (1.121) (0.910) 
Regional Language (Yes)  0.986 1.717 1.224 1.022 1.032 0.877 0.958 
  (1.082) (1.251) (1.081) (1.117) (1.099) (1.851) (1.125) 
Party Type (SWP)  -1.548* -1.447* -1.457* -1.475* -1.624* -1.553* -1.524* 
  (0.812) (0.804) (0.795) (0.874) (0.829) (0.832) (0.801) 
Ideological Position  -0.046 -0.049 -0.046 -0.067 -0.070 -0.045 -0.033 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.068) (0.096) (0.054) (0.067) 
SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)  1.609 2.259 2.567 1.679 1.549 1.633 1.628 
  (1.546) (1.702) (1.757) (1.582) (1.578) (1.611) (1.564) 
Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)         
Electoral Period 2007-2010 1.689** 1.349 1.320 1.380 1.341 1.369 1.343 1.346 
 (0. 796) (0.932) (0.939) (0.937) (0.817) (0.952) (0.938) (0.939) 
Electoral Period 2011-2012 1.222 0.579 0.543 0.565 0.541 0.616 0.574 0.538 
 (0.969) (1.161) (1.169) (01.161) (1.159) (1.183) (1.170) (1.237) 
Fragmentation (Yes)#Polycentricity (Yes)   6.560      
   (5.990)      
Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Distance    0.008     
    (0.006)     
Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position     0.036    
     (0.099)    
Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Ideological Position      0.038   
      (0.115)   
Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Language (Yes)       0.145  
       (1.930)  
Language (Yes)#Ideological Position        -0.025 
        (0.106) 
         
Constant 90.607*** 90.782*** 91.401*** 91.891*** 90.690*** 90.827*** 90.773*** 90.784*** 
 (0.751) (1.669) (1.733) (1.893) (1.709) (1.702) (1.685) (1.676) 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Degree of Freedom 1.61 1.95 1.92 1.87 1.83 1.83 1.78 1.78 























Position on Competence Distribution          
Explanatory and Control Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Distance 0.000 -0.005** -0.008** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fragmentation (Yes) -1.434 1.106 1.009 1.167 1.471 1.189 0.747 0.895 0.986 
 (0.904) (1.208) (1.159) (1.227) (1.292) (1.285) (1.294) (1.221) (1.219) 
Polycentricity (Yes) 0.764 1.494** 1.272* 1.688** 1.329* 1.532** 1.362* 1.248* 1.763** 
 (0.815) (0.754) (0.720) (0.756) (0.737) (0.758) (0.766) (0.694) (0.726) 
Economic Development  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.0002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regional Identity Feelings          
Popular Regional Identity Feelings  0.158** 0.150** 0.171*** 0.158*** 0.161** 0.149** 0.110 0.156** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) (0.061) (0.069) (0.061) 
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)  1.907** 2.028*** 2.323*** 1.630** 1.825** 3.752*** 0.668 2.052*** 
  (0.756) (0.756) (0.707) (0.694) (0.754) (1.115) (1.165) (0.712) 
Regional Language (Yes)  -2.256** -1.810* -2.488** -2.492** -2.939 -1.788* -1.863* -2.036** 
  (0.989) (0.920) (0.998) (1.002) (1.914) (1.023) (0.961) (1.004) 
Party Type (SWP)  -2.344*** -2.282** -2.814*** -2.147** -2.867*** -0.409 -2.369*** -2.704*** 
  (0.885) (0.910) (0.751) (0.858) (0.742) (0.819) (0.904) (0.861) 
Ideological Position  -0.124** -0.127** 0.014 -0.018 -0.127** -0.101 -0.119* -0.243** 
  (0.061) (0.062) (0.074) (0.039) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) (0.101) 
SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)  -1.729* -1.333 -2.177** -1.569* -1.818** -1.188 -1.087 -2.018** 
  (0.943) (1.074) (0.964) (0.923) (0.896) (0.893) (0.824) (0.936) 
Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)          
Electoral Period 2007-2010 -1.362* -0.110 -0.127 -0.686 -0.135 -0.107 -0.239 -0.248 -0.013 
 (0.693) (0.447) (0.451) (0.547) (0.478) (0.455) (0.448) (0.450) (0.455) 
Electoral Period 2011-2012 0.704 1.278 1.256 0.872 0.929 1.272 1.225 1.153 1.453** 
 (0.996) (0.787) (0.785) (0.862) (0.781) (0.785) (0.794) (0.767) (0.078) 
Fragmentation (Yes)#Polycentricity (Yes)   4.001       
   (3.931)       
Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position    -0.231**      
    (0.110)      
Language (Yes)# Ideological Position     -0.212*     
     (0.108)     
Language (Yes)#Party Type (SWP)      0.931    
      (1.832)    
Political Regional Identity Feelings#Party Type (SWP)       -2.878**   
       (1.399)   
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Popular Regional Identity Feelings        0.054  
        (0.061)  
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Ideological Position         0.179 
         (0.124) 
          
Constant 2.330*** 3.849** 4.226*** 4.445*** 3.865** 4.295*** 1.877 3.894** 4.060** 
 (0.631) (1.640) (1.578) (1.507) (1.547) (1.275) (1.361) (1.646) (1.625) 
Observations 





















































Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism         
Explanatory and Control Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Distance 0.000 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fragmentation (Yes) -0.102 0.120 0.104 0.140 0.120 0.149 0.154 0.110 
 (0.140) (0.142) (0.142) (0.146) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.147) 
Polycentricity (Yes) -0.102 -0.109 -0.145** -0.118 -0.107 -0.070 -0.069 -0.114 
 (0.081) (0.070) (0.067) (0.074) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) 
Economic Development  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regional Identity Feelings         
Popular Regional Identity Feelings  0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009* 0.008 0.017*** 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)  0.222** 0.242*** 0.207** 0.228*** 0.340*** 0.426** 0.232** 
  (0.092) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086) (0.115) (0.160) (0.095) 
Regional Language (Yes)  -0.314** -0.242* -0.327** -0.317*** -0.085 -0.378*** -0.234 
  (0.125) (0.144) (0.133) (0.109) (0.211) (0.128) (0.149) 
Party Type (SWP)  -0.111 -0.101 -0.100 -0.117 -0.100 -0.107 -0.050 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.078) (0.071) (0.070) (0.100) 
Ideological Position  -0.0141* -0.014* -0.008 -0.012 -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)  0.034 0.097 0.043 0.028 -0.016 -0.072 0.044 
  (0.090) (0.120) (0.084) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.086) 
Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)         
Electoral Period 2007-2010 0.056 0.087 0.084 0.085 0.087 0.098 0.109 0.086 
 (0.071) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.078) 
Electoral Period 2011-2012 0.051 0.025 0.021 0.005 0.028 0.035 0.045 0.025 
 (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.074) (0.080) (0.078) (0.084) 
Fragmentation#Polycentricity   0.642      
   (0.500)      
Language (Yes)#Ideological Position    -0.012     
    (0.015)     
Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position     -0.003    
     (0.019)    
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Language (Yes)      -0.303   
      (0.204)   
Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Popular Regional Identity Feelings       -0.009  
       (0.006)  
Language (Yes)#Party Type (SWP)        -0.108 
        (0.160) 
         
Constant 0.222*** 0.145 0.205** 0.146 0.152 0.164 0.137 0.093 
 (0.056) (0.113) (0.114) (0.111) (0.110) (0.115) (0.116) (0.122) 
Observations 
















































Table 1.-Disaggregated Data for the Explanatory Variable Polycentricity 
ANDALUSIA 
(Total Population) 
2001: 7399974 2007: 8059461 2011: 8424102 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION 
% OF THE 
TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Sevilla 1174751 15.88 26.09 1242958 15.42 25.04 1294867 15.37 24.80 
Málaga 766742 10.36 17.03 889649 11.04 17.92 953251 11.32 18.26 
Bahía de Cádiz 585248 7.91 13.00 624619 7.75 12.58 642504 7.63 12.31 
Granada 436848 5.9 9.70 484115 6.01 9.75 517580 6.14 9.91 
Córdoba 314034 4.24 6.97 323600 4.02 6.52 328659 3.9 6.30 
Bahía de 
Algeciras 
206484 2.79 4.59 226668 2.81 4.57 235572 2.8 4.51 
Almería 187920 2.54 4.17 210940 2.62 4.25 219650 2.61 4.21 
Costa del Sol 156490 2.11 3.48 190003 2.36 3.83 209815 2.49 4.02 
Huelva 158921 2.15 3.53 170061 2.11 3.43 176229 2.09 3.38 
Jaén 131533 1.78 2.92 139841 1.74 2.82 141742 1.68 2.72 
Roquetas de Mar 47571 0.64 1.06 71279 0.88 1.44 89851 1.07 1.72 
Vélez-Málaga 63894 0.86 1.42 78518 0.97 1.58 86627 1.03 1.66 
El Ejido 55710 0.75 1.24 78105 0.97 1.57 83774 0.99 1.60 
Sanlúcar de 
Barrameda 
61737 0.83 1.37 63968 0.79 1.29 66944 0.79 1.28 
Motril 50812 0.69 1.13 58501 0.73 1.18 60887 0.72 1.17 
Linares 57796 0.78 1.28 61262 0.76 1.23 61110 0.73 1.17 
Utrera 45862 0.62 1.02 49135 0.61 0.99 51630 0.61 0.99 








ARAGON 2001: 1198017 2007: 1296655 2011: 1346293 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Zaragoza 649920 54.25 89.45 712513 54.95 89.45 746152 55.42 89.48 
Huesca 45874 3.83 6.31 49819 3.84 6.25 52443 3.9 6.29 
Teruel 30789 2.57 4.24 34236 2.64 4.30 35288 2.62 4.23 
TOTAL 726583 60.65 100.00 796568 61.43 100.00 833883 61.94 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.95 0.80  0.95 0.80  0.94 0.80 
 
ASTURIAS 2001: 1075329 2007: 1074862 2011: 1081487 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Gijón 269270 25.04 48.62 274037 25.5 47.74 277559 25.66 47.32 
Oviedo 201005 18.69 36.29 216607 20.15 37.74 225391 20.84 38.43 
Avilés 83553 7.77 15.09 83320 7.75 14.52 83617 7.73 14.26 
TOTAL 553828 51.50 100.00 573964 53.40 100.00 586567 54.23 100.00 




2001: 878627 2007: 1030650 2011: 1113114 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Palma 447780 50.96 85.86 512801 49.76 84.70 548211 49.25 83.69 
Eivissa 73724 8.39 14.14 92611 8.99 15.30 106810 9.6 16.31 
TOTAL 521504 59.35 100.00 605412 58.75 100.00 655021 58.85 100.00 




2001: 2101477 2007: 2141860 2011: 2184606 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 




Bilbao 905360 43.08 59.87 904439 42.23 59.08 910578 41.68 58.60 
Donosti 387847 18.46 25.65 396959 18.53 25.93 403807 18.48 25.99 
Vitoria 218902 10.42 14.48 229484 10.71 14.99 239562 10.97 15.42 
TOTAL 1512109 71.96 100.00 1530882 71.47 100.00 1553947 71.13 100.00 




2001: 1781366 2007: 2025951 2011: 2126769 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Las Palmas 505126 28.36 38.77 529801 26.15 35.89 540563 25.42 34.95 
S/C Tenerife 405138 22.74 31.09 437851 21.61 29.66 453371 21.32 29.31 
Gran Canaria Sur 149056 8.37 11.44 181925 8.98 12.33 203857 9.59 13.18 
La Orotava 103555 5.81 7.95 108999 5.38 7.38 112538 5.29 7.28 
Tenerife Sur 94554 5.31 7.26 160611 7.93 10.88 179158 8.42 11.58 
Arrecife 45549 2.56 3.50 56834 2.81 3.85 57357 2.7 3.71 
TOTAL 1302978 73.15 100.00 1476021 72.86 100.00 1546844 72.74 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.35 0.27  0.33 0.25  0.32 0.24 
 
CANTABRIA 2001: 537605 2007: 572824 2011: 593121 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Santander 306335 56.98 100 320779 56 100 328635 55.41 100 
TOTAL 306335 56.98 100.00 320779 56 100.00 328635 55.41 100.00 




2001: 1754395 2007: 1977304 2011: 2115334 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Albacete 149507 8.52 25.19 164771 8.33 23.84 171390 8.1 23.10 
Guadalajara 102558 5.85 17.28 136147 6.89 19.70 155245 7.34 20.93 
363 
 
Toledo 90609 5.16 15.27 107933 5.46 15.62 118174 5.59 15.93 
Talavera de la 
Reina 
83100 4.74 14.00 94432 4.78 13.67 98796 4.67 13.32 
Ciudad Real 71560 4.08 12.06 83917 4.24 12.14 89315 4.22 12.04 
Cuenca 46490 2.65 7.83 52980 2.68 7.67 56703 2.68 7.64 
Puertollano 49613 2.83 8.36 50838 2.57 7.36 52200 2.47 7.04 
TOTAL 593437 33.83 100.00 691018 34.95 100.00 741823 35.07 100.00 




2001: 2478884 2007: 2528417 2011: 2558463 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Valladolid 372672 15.03 28.87 395545 15.64 28.93 408647 15.97 29.12 
León 182563 7.36 14.14 194210 7.68 14.21 199597 7.8 14.22 
Salamanca 180274 7.27 13.97 188821 7.47 13.81 191034 7.47 13.61 
Burgos 167043 6.74 12.94 175718 6.95 12.85 181187 7.08 12.91 
Palencia 94736 3.82 7.34 97319 3.85 7.12 97156 3.8 6.92 
Ponferrada 77650 3.13 6.02 82650 3.27 6.05 85070 3.33 6.06 
Zamora 68958 2.78 5.34 70276 2.78 5.14 70194 2.74 5.00 
Segovia 64350 2.6 4.99 70641 2.79 5.17 71664 2.8 5.11 
Ávila 47967 1.94 3.72 53794 2.13 3.93 59008 2.31 4.20 
Soria 34640 1.4 2.68 38205 1.51 2.79 39987 1.56 2.85 
TOTAL 1290853 52.07 100.00 1367179 54.07 100.00 1403544 54.86 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.39 0.16  0.37 0.16  0.36 0.16 
 
CATALONIA 2001: 6360392 2007: 7210508 2011: 7539618 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Barcelona 4391120 69.04 85.79 4858016 67.37 84.56 5030679 66.72 84.10 
Tarragona-Reus 291328 4.58 5.69 359645 4.99 6.26 382304 5.07 6.39 
364 
 
Lleida 130191 2.05 2.54 150801 2.09 2.62 166874 2.21 2.79 
Girona 115437 1.81 2.26 141792 1.97 2.47 152477 2.02 2.55 
Manresa 84470 1.33 1.65 97619 1.35 1.70 102739 1.36 1.72 
Blanes-lloret de 
Mar 
57438 0.90 1.12 79027 1.10 1.38 86033 1.14 1.44 
Sant Feliú de 
Guixols 
48182 0.76 0.94 58330 0.81 1.02 60913 0.81 1.02 
TOTAL 5118166 80.47 100.00 5745230 79.68 100.00 5982019 79.34 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.79 0.75  0.77 0.73  0.76 0.71 
 
EXTREMADURA 2001: 1070007 2007: 1089990 2011: 1109367 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Badajoz 141614 13.23 47.47 150403 13.80 46.96 157122 14.16 46.98 
Cáceres 92742 8.67 31.09 102116 9.37 31.88 106345 9.59 31.80 
Mérida 63992 5.98 21.45 67779 6.22 21.16 70975 6.40 21.22 
TOTAL 298348 27.88 100.00 320298 29.39 100.00 334442 30.15 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.88 0.36  0.87 0.37  0.86 0.37 
 
GALICIA 2001: 2732925 2007: 2772533 2011: 2795422 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Vigo-Pontevedra 553751 20.26 39.45 576705 20.80 39.22 587843 21.03 39.01 
A Coruña 370725 13.57 26.41 397944 14.35 27.06 410401 14.68 27.23 
Ferrol 136579 5.00 9.73 136933 4.94 9.31 136698 4.89 9.07 
Santiago de 
Compostela 
126012 4.61 8.98 135706 4.89 9.23 142325 5.09 9.44 
Ourense 127717 4.67 9.10 129213 4.66 8.79 131695 4.71 8.74 
Lugo 88901 3.25 6.33 93853 3.39 6.38 98007 3.51 6.50 
TOTAL 1403685 51.36 100.00 1470354 53.03 100.00 1506969 53.91 100.00 




LA RIOJA 2001: 267571 2007: 308968 2011: 322955 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Logroño 142745 53.35 100.00 165709 53.63 100.00 175230 54.26 100.00 
TOTAL 142745 53.35 100.00 165709 53.63 100.00 175230 54.26 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.50 1.00  0.50 1.00  0.50 1.00 
 
MADRID 2001: 5371855 2007: 6081689 2011: 6489680 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Madrid 5096704 94.88 99.22 5694969 93.64 99.14 6052247 93.26 99.09 
Aranjuez 40113 0.75 0.78 49420 0.81 0.86 55755 0.86 0.91 
TOTAL 5136817 95.62 100.00 5744389 94.45 100.00 6108002 94.12 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.98 0.98  0.98 0.98  0.98 0.98 
 
MURCIA 2001: 1190378 2007: 1392117 2011: 1470069 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Murcia 519659 43.65 65.34 608195 43.69 66.00 643854 43.80 66.34 
Cartagena 198592 16.68 24.97 223757 16.07 24.28 233743 15.90 24.09 
Lorca 77075 6.47 9.69 89606 6.44 9.72 92869 6.32 9.57 
TOTAL 795326 66.81 100.00 921558 66.20 100.00 970466 66.01 100.00 
HH-INDEX  0.59 0.49  0.61 0.49  0.61 0.49 
 
NAVARRE 2001: 555877 2007: 605876 2011: 642051 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Pamplona 283856 51.06 100.00 317168 52.35 100.00 340691 53.06 100.00 
TOTAL 283856 51.06 100.00 317168 52.35 100.00 340691 53.06 100.00 




VALENCIA 2001: 4201398 2007: 4885029 2011: 5117190 
URBAN AREAS POPULATON % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
POPULATION % OF THE TOTAL 
% OF THE 
URBAN TOTAL 
Valencia 1367584 32.55 47.23 1507108 30.85 44.71 1551585 30.32 44.06 
Alicante-Elche 572498 13.63 19.77 665018 13.61 19.73 698662 13.65 19.84 
Castellón de la 
Plana 
249408 5.94 8.61 297946 6.10 8.84 315617 6.17 8.96 
Costa Blanca 163963 3.90 5.66 219325 4.49 6.51 237458 4.64 6.74 
Gandía 99077 2.36 3.42 126603 2.59 3.76 131289 2.57 3.73 
Torrevieja 68772 1.64 2.38 109138 2.23 3.24 118999 2.33 3.38 
Denia-Jávae 81953 1.95 2.83 106449 2.18 3.16 114415 2.24 3.25 
Orihuela 72803 1.73 2.51 101497 2.08 3.01 111213 2.17 3.16 
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Alcoy/Alcoi 78150 1.86 2.70 80520 1.65 2.39 81699 1.60 2.32 
Sagunto/Sagunt 59690 1.42 2.06 68419 1.40 2.03 71448 1.40 2.03 
TOTAL 2895281 68.91 100.00 3370798 69.00 100.00 3521721 68.82 100.00 
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